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Preface by ESReDA President 
Foresight in safety is a critical capability for high-risk industries. It is needed to 
achieve sustainable, reliable and safe performance: failures of foresight have been 
observed in most accidents. Foresight in safety requires a mindset within operating 
companies and regulators to think ahead and to remain critical about current risks 
that are not fully controlled or acceptable, and to develop vigilance to new threats. 
We should humbly acknowledge that risk anticipation is a difficult challenge and 
has no perfect, simple or definitive solution in complex systems. Indeed, systems 
are dynamic, continuously evolving with important changes, such as the current 
massive digitalisation, and external challenges - some with potential major crisis 
consequences such as the COVID19 pandemic that surprised many stakeholders.   
The European Safety, Reliability and Data Association (ESReDA) was created almost 
thirty years ago to help stakeholders to cope with these kinds of challenges. Its 
principle is cooperative: across boarders in Europe; as well as between industries, 
institutions, and authorities. ESReDA is a non-profit making association of 
European industrial and academic organisations that promotes advances in the 
fields of safety and reliability. ESReDA is a forum for experts to exchange potential 
strategies and solutions to cope with these kinds of challenges. The association 
always welcomes comments and contributions concerning their publications and 
invites all to submit ideas for further developments in the field of new safety 
measures and reliability data as well. 
The analyses and proposals presented here were written by an ESReDA project 
group. This report would not have been possible without substantial individual 
efforts by the ESReDA project group members who come from different 
companies, research institutes, universities and authorities. They have produced 
its contents without any financial support and have devoted considerable free time 
to the task. This publication is based on extensive experience from several 
industrial sectors (transportation, energy, chemical…) and countries in Europe. 
ESReDA is proud to present the results of their work and hopes it will benefit the 
many organisations and individuals worldwide concerned with foresight in safety 
challenges.  
ESReDA would like to thank the authors for their contribution and also the member 
organisations for funding travel expenses for its members. In particular special 
thanks are due to those organisations that have allowed working group members 
to participate in this work including giving free access to their extensive in-house 
expertise and experience. We record our appreciation and grateful thanks to: 
• Agenția de Investigare Feroviară Română (AGIFER), Romania
• Collectif Heuristique pour l’Analyse Organisationnelle de Sécurité (CHAOS),
France
• Électricité de France, EDF R&D, France;
• Energias de Portugal (EDP) – Gestão da Produção de Energia, S.A., Portugal;
• European Commission, DG-Joint Research Centre, Energy, Transport &
Climate, (JRC), the Netherlands; and DG-Joint Research Centre, Space,
Security & Migration, (JRC), Italy
• Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue, Belgium
• Fondation pour une Culture de Sécurité Industrielle (FonCSI), France
• Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), France;
• Kindunos Safety Consultancy Ltd, the Netherlands;
• Noordwijk Risk Initiative Foundation (NRI Foundation), The Netherlands,
• Societatea Nationala Nuclearelectrica SA, Romania,
• SRL Health, Safety, and Environment Consulting, Norway
• Starline, USA
• Tukes - Safety Technology Authority, Finland;
• University of Pardubicze, Czech Republic
In addition, we specifically thank the Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission for their support on the publication and dissemination of this ESReDA 
deliverable. We hope this report meets the expectations of members of the public 
and organisations who have shown interest in the work of the group in this 
important field. 
Porto, November 2020  Saclay, November 2020 
Luis Andrade Ferreira  Mohamed Eid 
Universidade do Porto  CEA 
Former President of ESReDA Current President of ESReDA 
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Preface by the ESReDA Project Group Foresight in Safety 
This report is the result of a joint effort by experts, working in the fields of risk 
management, accident analysis, learning from experience and safety 
management. They come from 10 countries, mainly from Europe but also from the 
USA and Australia. Their expertise covers several industrial sectors.  
The report aims to provide useful information, from both theoretical and practical 
viewpoints, about “Foresight in Safety”, based on current practices and the state 
of scientific knowledge.  
Safety is an area concerned by ongoing debate (e.g. is goal of safety to ensure that 
'as few things as possible go wrong' or to ensure that ‘as many things as possible 
go right’?), but we can assume that safety implies continued correct operation of 
the process such that errors and failures do not lead to major accidents. 
The contents of this publication are summarised below. 
 
Chapter 1 presents the case for a new approach to “foresight in safety”, based in 
particular on the literature in future studies, and presents its theories, traditions, 
and challenges; 
Chapter 2 shows how foresight is conceptually located between system resilience 
and listening to whistleblowers; 
Chapter 3 aims to characterise some of the failures to foresee major accidents in 
order to foster the ongoing debate about the best strategies to enhance “foresight 
in safety”; 
Chapter 4 claims that organisational loss of memory is a topic to be taken into 
account, in particular the loss of knowledge regarding Early Warning Signs; 
Chapter 5 demonstrates that scenarios describing potential event sequences are a 
practical tool for thinking about risk; 
                                                                
1 The ESReDA Cube is a conceptual model focused on the “learning from accident” process. It was 
developed by a previous Project Group dealing with “Dynamic Learning as the Follow-up from Accident 
Chapter 6 points out that visualisation of early warning signs is critical to a clear 
understanding of the causes of existing weaknesses and to defining proper actions 
to prevent their escalation; 
Chapter 7 shows how the ESReDA Cube1 can be used to identify foresight potential 
for detection of Early Warning Signs; 
Chapter 8 focuses on the investigation and diagnosis of dysfunctional 
organisational factors, in particular those than may lead to a safety level decrease 
with potential negative consequences; 
Chapter 9 identifies areas of the asset management process that can be used to 
generate safety foresight, enabling the detection of process and 
systems/equipment deterioration and other anomalies before a serious accident 
can occur; 
Chapter 10 explains how analysis of “big data” can help to detect Early Warning 
Signs of system failure, and can predict occurrence of very infrequent events 
affecting safety; 
Chapter 11 focuses on the role of whistleblowers and argues that taking advantage 
of information provided by these persons could help avoid the occurrence of 
events; 
Chapter 12 presents technologies, domains and applications that can be used to 
improve safety directly and by enabling use of foresight; 
Chapter 13 describes some daily activities of regulators and discusses the ways in 
which regulators can generate and disseminate foresight during these activities. 
 
This report can be read either as a whole (by downloading the full report) or you 
can read only single chapters (a hyperlink is available for every chapter on the 
ESReDA dedicated webpage – www.esreda.org).  
Also ESReDA is grateful of the support of Joint Research Center to jointly edit the 
report which is available for download on op.europa.eu/en/web/general-
publications/publications and publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/.  
Investigation”. (https://esreda.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ESReDA-dynamic-learning-case-
studies-180315-1.pdf). 
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All members of the Project Group have been actively involved in preparing this 
report from 2015 to 2020.  
An overview of the group‘s participating members with their name and affiliation 
is given below.  
• Ludwig Benner (Starline, USA) 
• Bastien Brocard (EDF, FRANCE) 
• Nicolas Dechy (IRSN, FRANCE) 
• Yves Dien (CHAOS, FRANCE) 
• Antonio Felicio (ESReDA, PORTUGAL) 
• Milos Ferjencik (University of Pardubicze, CZECH REPUBLIC) 
• John Kingston (NRI Foundation, The NETHERLANDS) 
• Paulo Maia (EDP, PORTUGAL) 
• Eric Marsden (FonCSI, FRANCE) 
• Sever Paul (AGIFER, ROMANIA) 
• Sverre Røed-Larsen (SRL Health, Safety, and Environment Consulting, 
NORWAY) 
• Dan Serbanescu (Nuclearelectrica SA, ROMANIA) 
• Zdenko Šimić (EC JRC, The NETHERLANDS) 
• John Stoop (Kindunos, The NETHERLANDS) 
• Miodrag Stručić (EC JRC, The NETHERLANDS) 
• Tuuli Tulonen (Tukes, FINLAND) 
• Frank Verschueren (Ministry of Labour, BELGIUM) 
• Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano (EC JRC, ITALY) 
This PG was co-chaired by N. Dechy, Y. Dien and F. Verschueren. The treasurer 
responsibility was ensured by A. Felicio.  
This report is edited by the ESReDA Project Group ‘Foresight in Safety’ as a whole.  
The authors of each chapter are listed in each chapter.  
The introduction and conclusion have been prepared by J. Kingston, A.-L. Vetere 
Arellano and Y. Dien on behalf of the project group. 
 
                                                                
2 As coined by Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano 
A continuing odyssey2 
Some members will continue in the new project group starting in November 2020 
on “Risks, Knowledge and Management”. New participants and volunteers are 
welcome!  
The new project group and JRC will organise the 58th ESReDA seminar on this topic 
in the Netherlands in 2021 (postponed from 2020 due to Covid19 crisis). 
Some members have been cooperating in the ESReDA framework since the 
beginning of 2000. Indeed, the Project Group “Foresight in Safety” follows on from 
other ESReDA Working / Project Groups.  
The Working Group “Accident Analysis” (1993-2000) published two deliverables:  
• “Directory of Accident Databases” (1997), 
• “Guidance Document for Design, Operation, and Use of Safety, Health, and 
Environment (SHE) Databases” (2001).  
Then the Working Group “Accident Investigation” (2001-2008) issued in 2003: 
• a survey report entitled “Accident Investigation Practices – Results from a 
European Inquiry”  
• a book in 2005 “Shaping Public Safety Investigations of Accidents in Europe”.  
• a report “Guidelines for Safety Investigations of Accidents” in 2009.  
The Project Group “Dynamic Learning as the Follow-up from Accident 
Investigations” (2009-2015) issued three reports in 2015  
• (“Case study Analysis on Dynamic Learning from Accidents — The ESReDA 
Cube, A Method and Metaphor for Exploring A Learning Space for Safety”,  
• “Barriers to Learning from Incidents and Accidents”,  
• “Training Toolkit: Learning from Incidents and Accidents”).  
• An essay was also issued by Pr. J. Stoop “Challenges to the investigation of 
occurrences”. 
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Since 2000, these Groups also organised a number of ESReDA Seminars: 
• the 24th seminar in 2003 on ‘Safety Investigation of Accidents’ in Petten (the 
Netherlands), organised jointly with the JRC-Institute for Energy; 
• the 33rd seminar in 2007 on ‘Future challenges of Accident investigation’ in 
Ispra (Italy), organised jointly with the JRC-Institute for the Protection and 
Security of the Citizen; 
• the 36th in 2009 on ‘Lessons learned from accident investigations’ in Coimbra 
(Portugal), organised jointly with Energias de Portugal; 
• the 45th in 2013 on ‘Dynamic Learning from Incidents and Accidents’ in Porto 
(Portugal), organised jointly with Energias de Portugal; 
• the 53rd in 2017 on ‘Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight’ in Ispra, 
(Italy), organised jointly with the JRC-Institute for the Protection and Security 
of the Citizen; 
• the 55th in 2018 on ‘Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety 
Management in Complex Systems’ in Bucharest (Romania), organised jointly 
with AGIFER (Romanian Railway Investigating Agency). 
 
The 53rd Seminar was hosted in 2017 at JRC, in Ispra, by A. L. Vetere Arellano and 
Z. Simic, with the support of M. Ioakeimidou. The proceedings were edited by A.-
L. Vetere Arellano, Z. Simic and N. Dechy.  
 
The 55th Seminar was hosted in 2018 at AGIFER, in Bucharest, by S. Paul with the 
support of V. Patrascu. The proceedings were edited by S. Paul, E. Marsden, F. 
Verschueren, T. Tulonen, M. Ferjencik, Y. Dien, K. Simola, V. Kopustinskas. 
 
The reports as well as the seminar proceedings are available on the ESReDA 
website3 either to order or as free downloads. On that aspect, the project group is 
also grateful to I. Šarūnienė (ESReDA Secretary) and K. Simola and V. Kopustinskas 
(JRC) for the proper publication of seminar proceedings on ESReDA website. 
 
                                                                
3 https://www.esreda.org/ 
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Introduction 
ESReDA Project Group on Foresight in Safety4 
This introduction gives an overview of topics in foresight contained in thirteen 
chapters written by members of ESReDA’s project group on Foresight in Safety. 
The group did not attempt a comprehensive treatment of foresight. Instead, 
experts in safety have shared ideas about the role and challenges of foresight in 
their field—mainly industrial safety, and focussed on accident investigation and 
prevention. But the chapters span a broader scope; and address foresight in 
process safety, nuclear safety, transportation safety, occupational safety, 
consumer safety, and medical safety. 
If you are a reader that is interested in foresight in socio-technical systems and 
safety, this is a book for you. In the main, the authors have concentrated on a 
pragmatic approach with a relatively short-term time horizon. Their aim is to 
enhance the level of safety in important, societal fields. However, there are also 
some observations that would apply equally well to ‘futures research’ and related 
fields. The reader is directed to the conclusions chapter in particular.  
As you read, you will find links to the individual chapters. It is suggested that you 
read all the way through this introduction before reading the chapters. Please note 
that a related volume of seminar proceedings is also available for download.  
The first part of this introduction presents signposts to ways of conceptualising 
foresight. These include how foresight is seen within different paradigms such as 
resilience engineering, social science, and accident investigation. 
The second part of this introduction considers foresight alongside various aspects 
of socio-technical systems. There are three main headings: foresight as a property 
of organisations; foresight in the prediction and control of operations, and lastly; 
foresight as a subject for regulatory action. 
                                                                
4 The introduction has been prepared by John Kingston, Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano and Yves Dien on behalf 
of the project group. 
Conceptual views of “Foresight in Safety” 
Foresight is based on knowledge of what has happened before and what has yet 
to happen. Chapter 5, Use of Scenarios, refers to this as retrospection and 
prospection, respectively. 
Chapter 1, Foresight in safety. Theories, traditions, and challenges – a new 
approach, shows how the issue of foresight has been considered in the field of 
safety. It describes how some methodologies for foresight are already 
implemented in some sectors. The time concept in foresight and foresight 
traditions and futures research is described and analysed. The chapter also 
considers the relationships between safety, investigations and the modern system 
approach. The strategic triangle and resilience are also discussed.  
Chapter 1 reviews several theoretical perspectives on foresight. The authors 
consider apply insights from futures research and resilience engineering to 
foresight in safety. Resilience engineering is further considered in Chapter 2: 
Future of safety, resilience. In a similar vein, Chapter 9, Asset Management, 
Monitoring and KPIs, discusses the role of foresight in asset management and 
makes comparisons to foresight in safety. 
Different theoretical perspectives offer alternative approaches to improving 
foresight. However, it may not be easy to combine them. As Chapter 2 points out, 
engineering paradigms and socio-psychological paradigms construe foresight in 
different ways. Notwithstanding their distinctiveness, different perspectives can 
be complementary, and arguably this is essential in an inclusive approach to 
foresight. 
Although views differ about what foresight is and how it works, there seems to be 
general agreement that foresight should be a trigger for learning and risk 
reduction. The connection between foreseeing and acting is sometimes implicit, 
such as identifying early warning signs through analysis of scenarios. This is 
explored in Chapter 5, Use of Scenarios. Scenarios are used as a practical tool for 
thinking about risk; they are relatively straightforward to create and have many 
uses.  In contrast, the authors of Chapter 7, Utilizing the ESReDA Cube to detect 
EWS, look at the explicit steps that lead from analysis to action. These steps include 
identifying which actors are best placed to interpret findings, finding solutions, and 
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initiating change in the system. Similarly, Chapter 6, Visibility of Early Warning 
Signs, describes how meaningful signals need to be escalated for review and 
action. However, there are many situations when an actor—a foreseer as it were—
cannot get the right kind of change to happen, or happen with sufficient urgency. 
Chapter 11, Whistleblowers, explores these situations.  
Foresight and levels of system 
There are many different perspectives on foresight. It can be seen as a technical 
question concerned with how people work with technology to better understand 
and control operational systems. Foresight can also be seen as an aspect of 
governance of the organisation that owns or has a role in the operation. 
The organisation 
Foresight as a function of organisations 
As explained in Chapter 3, Failures of Foresight in Safety: Fantasy Risk Analysis and 
Blindness, investigations of major accidents often reveal problems of foresight. As 
well as questioning the technical adequacy of hazard identification and risk 
quantification, investigators are increasingly willing to consider structural 
problems—dysfunctions—in the organisation itself. 
Chapter 8, Organizational dysfunctionalities, describes how these conditions are 
important features for safety which, when degraded, predispose operations to 
accidents. The chapter also describes how a competent authority assessed the 
organisational functions of major hazard sites, including those associated with 
foresight, before accidents. The authors report instances of important functions 
working badly in organisations, apparently without any awareness by top 
management. According to the competent authority’s inspectors, the factors of 
special relevance to foresight are often located at a senior level, and include 
strategy, policy, structure, resources, roles, and responsibilities.  
Blindness, deafness and whistle-blowers 
The assessment scheme described in Chapter 8 can be seen as a normatively 
defined contrast between a functional and a dysfunctional organisation.  Chapter 
3 makes a comparable distinction; using the metaphor of physical ability and 
pathology, it notes that foresight problems can be considered as blindness and 
deafness. As noted in Chapter 11, in whistleblowing cases, management appear 
insensible to the foresight voiced to them, with only subsequent accidents 
restoring their sight and hearing. Even if blind to the risks that whistle-blowers 
express, organisations tend to excessively fixate on the whistle-blower as an 
enemy in their midst, rather than acting constructively on their message. Chapter 
11 gives examples of this and discusses ways that allow whistle-blowers to voice 
their concerns without the denials, suppression and punishment that invariably 
follow. 
The operational system 
Foresight, considered earlier as an organisational duty, can also be considered as 
a capability. As in most fields, tasks once seen as uniquely human are increasingly 
assisted by technology. And whilst technology can undoubtedly assist, foresight is 
largely an exercise in human cognition, professional knowledge, and human 
relationships within socio-technical systems. 
Technology to support foresight 
Chapter 12, Role of Technology, points out that people use foresight in a variety of 
situations, such as development, training, operation, monitoring, diagnoses, 
prediction, emergency response, and accident management. Technology needs to 
be designed to accommodate the distinctive requirements of these situations.  
Chapter 12 reviews the state of these developments. The authors consider the 
assistance provided by sensors, computing power, communication bandwidth, 
computer-aided hybrid development, real-time modelling analysis and artificial 
intelligence. Chapter 10, Big Data Analytics and Early Warning Signs, looks at how 
foresight by humans can be assisted by patterns detected using big data 
technology. It describes how big data approaches can help to detect new safety 
threats, improve the monitoring of safety barriers, facilitate structural health 
monitoring, and provide inputs to safety investigations. The promise of big data 
approaches is tempered by a number of issues, not least the inscrutability of the 
algorithms used and data adequacy.  
Knowledge, visualisation and Early Warning Signs (EWS) 
Visualisation and early warning signs (EWS) are a recurrent theme in safety 
foresight. Chapter 6, Visibility of Early Warning Signs, argues that foresight 
depends on clarity about the meaning of early warning signs. Chapter 5, Use of 
Scenarios, explains that knowledge of EWS is critical to foresight, and describes 
how scenarios can be used to identify them. Chapter 3, Failures of Foresight in 
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Safety: Fantasy Risk Analysis and Blindness, and Chapter 2, Future of Safety, 
Resilience, note that when EWS are weak signals; they present a special challenge 
to foresight. Chapter 3 also underlines that, whatever their strengths, EWS seldom 
trigger actions that are effective in terms of safety. 
Knowledge of early warning signs, and their meaning, depend on memory. As 
Chapter 4, Loss of Memory, explains, memory can be personal, externalised in a 
database/repository or a combination of these. And in Chapter 5, Use of Scenarios, 
it is explained that foresight depends on some aspects of memory more than 
others. However, Chapter 4 points out that because memory is not intrinsic to 
organisations, risk management depends on deliberate efforts to create this 
capacity. Organisations suffer memory loss in a variety of ways, and retention of 
memory is a goal that needs to be managed. Chapter 4 describes the challenges of 
organisational forgetting and presents approaches that may be helpful in retaining 
memory. These approaches include using scenarios and the early warning signs 
associated with them. 
Chapter 7, Utilizing the ESReDA Cube to detect EWS, discusses visualisation, not of 
EWS per se, but of systemic relationships. It presents the ESReDA Cube as a tool to 
assist stakeholders to make sense of situations, find solutions and improve 
foresight. 
Role of regulators 
Chapter 13, The Role of Safety Authorities in Providing Foresight, and Chapter 8, 
Organizational dysfunctionalities, remind of the unique role that regulators play in 
the governance of safety. As asserted in Chapter 3, Failures of Foresight in Safety: 
Fantasy Risk Analysis and Blindness, organisations may be foresight-blind and, as 
noted in Chapter 8, regulators are well-placed to discover this and challenge the 
organisation’s management and culture. 
Chapter 13 describes the unique opportunities that regulators have for foresight 
in safety, by virtue of their privileged acquisition of data from all levels, and their 
overview. It describes the role of regulators to generate and disseminate foresight 
of risks, and how this is discharged by competent authorities. 
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1 Theories, traditions, and challenges – A new 
approach 
Sverre Røed-Larsen, SRL Health Safety Environment Consulting, Norway, 
John Stoop, Kindunos Safety Consultancy Ltd, the Netherlands, 
Jan Erik Karlsen, University of Stavanger, Norway. 
Executive summary 
In this chapter we explore historical relations between safety, foresight, 
innovation, and policymaking. We also look at how these relations got lost over 
the last two decades and how they can be restored. Socio-economic drivers, 
political philosophies, and social values shape foresight in safety. We have taken a 
top-down perspective to gain insights into these higher order forces.  
The chapter outlines the historical background of foresight, reviews the evolution 
of foresight-theories, and lists the methods used. The time concept in foresight, 
foresight traditions, and futures research is described and analysed, as are the 
relationships between safety, investigations, and the modern system approach. 
The strategic triangle and resilience are also discussed.  
Among the recurrent themes discussed is the role of safety in legacy and 
innovative systems, the full information paradigm in combining feedback and feed-
forward control of safety, and the role of resilience engineering.  
A discussion on the ‘Foresight in a world at risk’, illustrated by the 2020 coronavirus 
pandemic, stresses the need to be organised in order to safeguard resilience. In 
summary: sense and learn from the past, make-sense and act in the present, and 
prepare for the unexpected future.  
The approach towards a safety foresight methodology and challenges is outlined, 
and examples given of foresight implementation in areas such as management, 
education, and learning.  
Finally, we suggest integrating several notions as building blocks for a 
multidisciplinary activity in the domain of safety and foresight. Recommendations 
are made for a new holistic safety management based on feed-forward as well as 
on feedback information and insights. 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Combining foresight and safety 
During the work of various ESReDA project groups on safety, the topic has been 
shifting. Starting in 1993 with exploring the early phases of the investigation 
process – as data collection and guidelines for investigation of accidents - to later 
phases like dynamic learning as the follow-up from accident investigations. The 
focus on foresight represents a shift from reactive to proactive approaches. What 
are the origins of foresight as a pro-active notion, and how are they related to 
safety? 
In this chapter we explore historical relations between safety, foresight, 
innovation, and policymaking. We also look at how these relations got lost over 
the last two decades and how they can be restored. Socio-economic drivers, 
political philosophies, and social values shape foresight in safety. We have taken a 
top-down perspective to gain insights into these higher order forces.  
The chapter outlines the historical background of foresight, reviews the evolution 
of foresight-theories, and lists the methods used. The time concept in foresight, 
foresight traditions, and futures research is described and analysed, as are the 
relationships between safety, investigations, and the modern system approach. 
The strategic triangle and resilience are also discussed. 
1.1.2 Foresight, how it began 
In addressing the concept of foresight from a historical perspective, Martin (2010) 
clarifies various early interpretations and perspectives, originating from the 
Science, Technology and Society (STS) debates in the 1970’s. These STS debates 
aimed to foreseeable effects of innovations to societal developments and their 
problem-solving potential for practical problems. Such innovations affected a 
large-scale introduction of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP), Electronic Highway and 
DNA technology. Disasters in these areas were deemed to have unacceptable 
consequences and should be addressed proactively in order to make them socially 
acceptable. 
According to Martin (2010) foresight is defined as: 
”a process by which one comes to a fuller understanding of the forces shaping the 
long-term future which should be taken into account in policy formation, planning 
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and decision making. By clarifying input assumptions, one can come to a prediction 
of outputs which can be justified scientifically.”  
In this definition, the goal of foresight is to systematically survey all paths that 
could be developed and identify what options or alternatives are open. This 
process explicitly does not restrict itself to preferential options from a single actor 
perspective but covers all options from an evidence-based perspective.  From this 
point of view, decisions of today create the future by taking actions (Martin 2010). 
Such foresight is based on an understanding of interrelations between science, 
technology, and society. It should help to stimulate public discussion of desirable 
futures and of the role of government in such futures (Steed and Tiffin 1986). 
During its development, foresight has covered three domains of interest: 
• technological innovations and their transition processes by industrial 
initiatives; 
• policy making, assessing the impact of decisions and actions of governance 
control; 
• foreseeable safety consequences of new technologies revealed by case-
based learning. 
1.1.3 A sensitivity to overarching philosophies 
Projects on foresight were initiated in several highly industrialised countries: the 
UK, US, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Australia. Martin 
observes that the development of foresight was dominated by different countries’ 
political and socio-economic philosophy (Martin 2010). 
In the USA and UK, the Reagan and Thatcherite ‘New Economy’ intended to ‘roll 
back the state’. The aim was to reduce governmental responsibilities in selecting 
preferential priorities for policy making decisions on innovative developments. The 
selection of winners and prioritising was left to ‘the market’. Foresight had no part 
of their privatisation and deregulation policy. In this political philosophy, there was 
no need to identify and select scientific and technological priorities. In the UK—
and to a lesser extent the US—a convenient framework of scientific notions was 
developed by social and organisational scientists as Reason, Rasmussen, Perrow 
and Turner. Safety became ‘emergent’ and unforeseeable due to ‘complexity’, 
while accidents became ‘normal’ after a period of ‘incubation’ (Stoop, 2020). This 
framework disculpated those with governance responsibilities, and masked 
governmental failure of foresight in safety. It left foresight to those corporate 
levels and gave them exclusive managerial responsibility for safety and risk control. 
Within the framework, safety was no longer a societal concern, but became an 
operational performance indicator at a corporate level, submitted to 
efficiency/thoroughness trade-off considerations, balanced against other process 
indicators such as costs and lead-times. To this purpose a toolkit with ALARP (As 
Low As Reasonably Practicable) criteria for accepting risks and safety cases was 
developed, in conjunction with Safety Management Systems with quantifiable 
safety performance indicators.   
This neoliberal framework assumed confidence in a proper functioning of such 
delegated responsibility for safe operations and a fair-trade behaviour of each of 
the actors with respect to risk avoidance, liability, and expert knowledge (Pupulidy, 
2019). The shift in responsibility, from governmental oversight and control to self-
regulation in industry, was based on the assumptions that substantive safety 
knowledge was in the market and that governmental oversight of corporate safety 
management processes would suffice. 
However, unforeseen vulnerabilities in these assumptions emerged over time, 
culminating in serious concerns about deregulation, privatisation, and a proper 
functioning of Safety Management Systems (Farrier, 2017; Pupulidy, 2019): 
• in disconnecting content from process, a shift occurred from a factual and 
actual performance control to compliance with standard operating 
procedures. Regulatory on-site inspections were replaced by functional 
demands on managerial processes. 
• This shift also hampered feedback from anomalies, empirical disclosure of 
deviations, incidents, and accidents. Lessons learned from safety 
investigation and recommendations at a sectoral level became detached 
from corporate Safety Management System input (Farrier 2017). At this 
corporate level, a new set of performance indicators had to be developed, 
such as Safety II as the expression of Best Practices and learning from 
successes. 
• Recognition of that a degree of operator variability is normal also indicated 
differences between Work As Intended - by management - and Work As 
Done - by operators. This difference caused controversies about the 
acceptability of deviations and compliance with Operational Excellence 
(Winters 2017). Issues emerged on liability and accountability, culminating in 
legislation on Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide. 
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• Erosion of operator flexibility in task performance occurred, in particular in 
conditions deviating from optimal, and in crisis and disaster situations. In 
aviation, a simultaneous operator training was reduced to operate under 
standard situations, accommodating a more flexible and cheaper transition 
between configuration adaptations and software equipment versions in the 
operating environment. This shift from competence-based operator skills to 
compliance-based task performance eroded the notion of operator flexibility 
in dynamic operating environments and conditions to a great extent. It led to 
several catastrophic accidents. In the aviation and maritime industries, ‘Good 
Airmanship’ and ‘Good Seamanship’ came under pressure. 
• A lack of agreement about operator performance, non-compliance with 
established safety standards, and exclusive managerial control created a 
stigmatising role as whistle blowers. This count in particular for substantive 
experts and experienced first line operators in assessing safety critical 
situations that were beyond control and awareness of corporate 
management. 
• Several catastrophic events demonstrated that the neoliberal framework of 
delegating responsibilities tends to erode existing barriers and precautionary 
measures relied-on to prevent disaster. In particular, with the airplane model 
Boeing 737, disruptive developments were introduced, supported by Next 
Generation and MAX branding, while their certification was treated as only 
derivative. A decision-making tool for certification of derivative 
developments proved to be lacking. The Boeing 737MAX crashes have 
become the salutary example of unforeseen consequences of deregulation 
and privatisation of the civil aircraft certification regime with still 
unforeseeable global consequences for its revision and adaptation. 
With the emergence of deficiencies of the neoliberal New Economy philosophy, a 
next generation of safety management philosophies is under development as a 
successor of what behavioural scientists called the ‘old school of safety thinking’. 
With the acceptance of deviation as normal - inevitably manifesting itself by 
emergent properties - the safety debate shifted from the origin of deviations and 
causes of mishaps towards recovery from such deviations and mitigation of their 
potentially catastrophic consequences. Most prominent in this ‘new school’ of 
thinking at the organisational level is the notion of Resilience Engineering (Woods 
and Hollnagel, 2006). At the level of governmental oversight, retrospective 
independent safety investigations were institutionalised under the notion of 
‘Independent Investigations, a Citizen’s Right and Society’s Duty’ (Van 
Vollenhoven, 2001). 
Since the ability to foresee deviation and taking precautionary measures was 
denied due to the assumed impenetrable and inherent complexity of socio-
technical systems, foresight as a notion was no longer incorporated in this safety 
debate. This has had far reaching implications for managing the (scientific) 
knowledge base for enhancing safety in complex socio-technical systems. After a 
seemingly stable situation of validating assumptions and expectations, these 
systems seem to have reached their third and final phase of development (Minsky, 
1986). In this phase, a distinction between derivative and disruptive adaptations is 
lacking, while profit-taking is no longer covered by future developments due to a 
lagging investment in precautionary arrangements and scientific knowledge 
development (Minsky, 1986; Vincenti, 1990). According to Snowden (2007), such 
a final phase may trigger a transition from complex systems into chaotic systems. 
Such a chaotic system potentially creates catastrophic interdependencies due to 
its reliance on operational feedback.   
As deficiencies of the New Economy philosophy become visible, a next generation 
of safety management philosophies is under development’. Most prominent in this 
new school of thinking is the notion of Resilience Engineering (Woods and 
Hollnagel, 2006). Foresight as a notion, however, has yet to be incorporated in this 
safety debate. 
Outside the Anglo-Saxon world, northern European countries have seen the safety 
and risk debate take a different direction with respect to foresight. Based on the 
Rhineland governance model (Stoop, De Kroes, and Hale; 2017), the debate 
adhered to a concept of cooperation and deliberation. Examples of this include the 
Dutch consensual Polder model and the Scandinavian humanitarian philosophy of 
Vision Zero. These differences impacted the approach and development of 
foresight in safety as a societal and strategic value. 
In the Netherlands, several major projects were initiated by the government in the 
public debate on the desirable future and the role of government (Martin 2010). 
The emphasis was on forecasting the consequences of policy making with respect 
to introducing nuclear power, the electronic highway, water management, land 
use planning and large railway infrastructure projects. Several Parliamentary 
Inquiries disclosed emergent market failures in realising these projects and 
invoked the justification of governmental initiatives and interventions in these 
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areas (TCI, 2004; Van Kleef, 2016). To facilitate technological transition strategies, 
network-based Public Private Partnerships were created. Contractual conditions 
for risk liability changed from DC (Design and Construct) to DBFMO (Design, Build, 
Finance, Maintenance and Operations), changing the financial accountability 
relations and risk management responsibilities between public and private 
partners in such networks (TCI 2004). Along with these new contracting forms, 
privatisation and liberalisation became the norm. 
This development was in line with EU initiatives on R&D projects in Framework 
programmes, based on long-term planning, such as the EU Vision 2050. Such major 
projects were supported by the establishment of R&D institutes similar to the 
RAND Corporation in the USA, and the creation of research networks between 
academies, industry, and universities. Educational courses were established, such 
as a faculty of Technology, Policy and Management at Delft University of 
Technology. Leading multinationals, such as Philips, Shell, and Unilever, developed 
in-house methods for innovation and change management in cooperation with 
academia and research institutes (Berkhout, 2000). 
In these developments, safety has competed poorly against other corporate 
priorities such as environment, sustainability, circular economy, and climate 
change challenges (TCI 2004). The decay of safety concerns coincided with 
complacency in government and industrial legacy sectors where safety had 
achieved an outstanding performance level. Transport, nuclear power, and the 
process industry were assumed to be Non-Plus Ultra-Safe, leaving room for only 
marginal safety enhancements at very high costs (Amalberti, 2001). 
1.1.4 Two worlds drift apart 
Foresight on safety in the abovementioned sectors became disconnected from 
their technological developments, while the scientific debates on safety shifted 
from substantive assessments to managing process control, risk perception and 
risk acceptance standards. Safety was assumed to approach a theoretical 
asymptote value of 10e-7 which would leave residual risks as highly unlikely and 
therefore, negligible. Consequently, there was no trigger to explore R&D needs 
and development in safety investigation methodology beyond accident modelling 
and Human Factors research. In the New Economy philosophy, process drives out 
content, market drives out knowledge. Even a question was raised whether safety 
science was superfluous to existing (social) disciplines or was a science at all (Safety 
Science 2014). 
In the scientific debate on recognition of social sciences in the foresight domain, a 
wide variety of different terminologies, paradigms and notions emerged (Martin 
2010). Simultaneously, a dialectic stall emerged in the safety debates, confronting 
safety notions and interpretations from a variety of perspectives (Safety Science 
2014, Stoop, Hale and De Kroes 2017). The variety in terminology created 
confusion and controversies in both domains (Martin 2010, Safety Science 2014). 
As stated by Martin (2010): terminology is vitally important in the social sciences. 
‘The emergence of a new term often heralds the identification of some new 
phenomenon, or at least the recognition of an existing phenomenon that, until 
now, has laid undetected by social scientists. He identifies several threats to 
coining new and unique phrases: a particular choice of phrasing may either greatly 
enhance the prospect or ruin the chances of that research having any appreciable 
impact. It also may create problems in establishing intellectual property claims on 
intractable problems and cause loss of persuasive arguments to incorporate 
foresight in a political philosophy. Finally, while allocation a new and unique label 
may attribute newly discovered phenomena to the reputation of social scientists, 
it may give rise to priority disputes in their discipline and in such disputed cases, 
accusations of plagiarism among colleagues and discrediting or rejection of 
scientific schools of thinking by practitioners (Martin 2010, Zimmermann et al., 
2011; Stoop, 2019).  
A less virulent consequence of coining phrases is the gradual separation that 
occurs across scientific disciplines, in particular between engineering design and 
social sciences, where a ‘debate of the deaf’ occurred. Due to differences in 
language, contexts and operating conditions, separations can also occur between 
various industrial sectors, academic debates and safety investigation practices. 
Such a separation can be observed with respect to safety between resilience 
engineering, safety science and the aviation sector, each developing their own 
reference framework, paradigms, methods, and tools (Zimmermann et al., 2011). 
A striking example of such a difference across sectors is present between the 
process industry and aviation, questioning whether there is a distinction or not 
between process safety, occupational safety, external safety, rescue and 
emergency safety at a governance or corporate level (Stoop 2019). Such 
differences also created diverse problem definitions and problem-solving 
strategies across disciplines and application domains (Martin 2010). Such 
differences also raise doubts about the extent to which the theories and notions 
in foresight generalise to the field of safety, and vice versa. 
        Page 20 of 252 
1.1.5 Feedback from reality 
Each of these disciplines and domains applied specific approaches, covering impact 
assessment studies, probabilistic risk assessment and safety management policies. 
Both legacy sectors and new technologies were submitted to such safety and risk 
assessments, focusing on perception and acceptance of either occupational safety, 
process safety, environmental safety, rescue and emergency, recovery and 
resilience, criticality and vulnerability issues (Van Kleef, 2016). Most of these 
debates were ad hoc and driven by events. Such managerial assessments 
considered residual risks. However, risks assessed as more remote than the 10e-7 
frequency limit, would be deemed negligible and their potential catastrophic 
consequences expelled from the equation. Instead of understanding such events, 
the absence of investigating their nature and context caused ignorance about their 
complexity and dynamics. Devils in the details were not scrutinised. Furthermore, 
their social impact, public perception and acceptance were not considered in the 
decision making on their acceptability. This managerial safety and risk philosophy 
created a category of very low frequency/catastrophic consequence events which 
were not foreseen to their full extent but were nonetheless considered ‘normal’ 
(Perrow 1999). Only in the 1990’s, after a series of iconic disasters, did their 
criticality and social impact became the subject of academic interest.  
The 1990-2000 era revealed complacency in the governmental oversight of this 
category of catastrophic events; concerns were raised about foreseeability and 
acceptability. Notions of prevention, proaction, recovery, resilience and foresight 
became buzzwords in the academic and policy making debate. Safety 2 was coined 
as a proactive, complimentary ’new school’ notion for the reactive ‘old school’ of 
safety 1, accompanied with a plea for a paradigm shift in safety thinking (Safety 
Science 2014, Stoop, De Kroes and Hale 2017). 
At the same time, several iconic accidents in the 1990-2000 era in the high-tech 
industries of various industrialised countries raised concerns about the 
predictability and societal control over major safety and risk events. The main 
examples are noted, below. 
• Several major air crashes occurred shortly after one another in the 
Netherlands:  Bijlmer Boeing 747 (1992), Texel DC3 (1996), City Hopper, 
Schiphol (1994), Eindhoven Hercules (1996), while international TWA 800 
(1996) and Concorde (2000) crashes shook public confidence in aviation. 
• In the railways, train crashes occurred in the UK at Clapham Junction (1988), 
Channel Tunnel (1996), Ladbroke Grove (1999), Hatfield (2000), in the 
Netherlands near Hoofddorp (1992), in Germany at Eschede (1998), and in 
Norway (2000). 
• Passenger ferries capsized in 1987 (Herald of Free Enterprise) and 1994 
(Estonia), while severe oil spills occurred with the Exxon Valdez (1989), Braer 
(1993), Sea Empress (1996) and Erica (1999) 
• Nightclub fires with large numbers of casualties occurred in Sweden 
(Gothenburg 1998) and the Netherlands (Volendam, 2000), while a firework 
explosion in Enschede (2000) and a nitrate explosion in Toulouse (2001) 
destroyed a complete neighbourhood 
• In the process industry, in 1976 the Seveso disaster and in 1984 the Bhopal 
disaster occurred, while Harrisburg (1979) and Chernobyl (1986) disrupted 
the nuclear energy sector. 
 
These accidents became iconic because they served as wake-up calls and triggers 
for change in these industries and in the prevention of such events. Learning from 
accidents to prevent recurrence of similar events became a political topic in order 
to restore public confidence in industrial sectors and regain governance control 
over disastrous events and their aftermaths. Recovery from industrial disaster 
became relevant, while the Hurricane Katrina flooding stimulated resilience 
engineering thinking in the public domain. In addition to already existing subjects, 
new policy domains were explored such as rescue and emergency, public 
governance and oversight, prevention and proaction. In 1997 the Swedish Riksdag 
(Parliament) adopted the concept of Vision Zero; no fatalities in road safety as a 
risk acceptance policy making goal, while several countries took initiatives for 
establishing independent safety investigation agencies. All across Europe, 
investigation agencies broadened their traditional perspective from the transport 
sector to other sectors of industry and public governance on either a single mode 
or multimodal and multisectoral basis. In 1993, the community of independent 
national transport safety boards established an international network, the ITSA 
(International Transportation Safety Association). This sharing of experiences and 
learning from each other by feedback from reality originated from their 
experiences with case based and evidence-based learning. Due to a series of major 
disasters in various domains, the Netherlands took a leading role in this 
development. Independent safety investigations became a governance role model 
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for industrialised countries across the world under the motto of ‘Independent 
Safety Investigations, a Citizens’ Right and Societies’ Duty’ (Van Vollenhoven, 
2001). Safety investigations into specific events provided the necessary feedback 
for prevention and proaction. This investigative approach was acknowledged by 
the European Union (EU) by issuing a series of Directives, institutionalising 
independent safety investigation agencies in various sectors and domains. 
Foresight based on feedback from reality provides a powerful, plausible, and 
credible retrospective approach. However, prospective foresight, based on 
theoretical grounds and scientific methods, was not incorporated in this 
knowledge network development. 
1.1.6 Three driving forces 
This chapter identifies three higher order driving forces that govern relations 
between foresight and safety. These offer a means for long term development. 
Each of these three forces is embedded in a specific context of the science, 
technology, and society (STS) debate: 
• in societal policy making, foresight reflects the acceptability and 
sustainability of the consequences of new technologies and their social 
benefits; 
• in technological innovation, foresight in industries assists the change and 
transition management processes that introduce new industrial 
developments and deliver their economic benefits; but, 
• in the scientific domain, safety and foresight have become separate 
disciplinary activities, both in feedback learning and in the feed-forward 
assessment of new technologies. 
In conclusion, there seems to be a unique opportunity to re-unite and integrate 
safety and foresight by combining a feedback and feed-forward perspective on 
long term future developments. 
1.2 Thinking about the future 
1.2.1 Five different attitudes to future 
Human beings have always been concerned about their place in existence: the 
past, present, or future. Many have been especially concerned about the future 
that lay in front of them individually, in front of their families, or in front of their 
group. Today, we also include the nation, major regions such as EU, and the global 
community. 
An individual’s point of view dictates their attitude towards the future. Almost any 
aspect of belief or identity is pertinent: religious, political, social, economic, 
demographic, commercial and other variables such as ethnicity, age, gender, 
status, and sexual orientation. Some general views: 
• The future as fear and threat (religion, but as heaven in a new life!) 
• The future as happiness and joy (ideology, religion, social engineering) 
• The future as unimportant and immaterial (determinism) 
• The future as characterised by risks, probabilities, and possibilities (science) 
• The future as adaptive and prosperous (technology and socio-technical 
engineering) 
The time horizon may for analytical reasons be divided into short term, middle and 
long term. 
Each of these approaches have been described in religious literature (the Bible), in 
many philosophical books, in scientific works, in technical papers and books, in 
novels and poetry, in science fiction, etc. Many conceptions about our future 
destiny form part of our oral traditions. Famous persons, who have contributed to 
futuristic thinking, include i.e. Leonardo da Vinci, Jules Verne, H.G. Wells, Herman 
Kahn, Johan Galtung, Stephen Hawking, Aldous Huxley, Robert Jung, George 
Orwell, and Alvin Toffler. 
Some recent examples of global threats include studies made by OECD, studies 
concerning opportunities and trends in technology (South by Southwest, 2016) and 
several climate reports.  
Another example which highlights challenges more than threats is Samsung’s 
SmartThings report about Future living. This is an example of a study with a very 
long-time horizon (a 100 years hence); it deals with the huge implications of the 
digital revolution on our lifestyles, homes, cities, and countries. 
1.2.2 Theories and their scientific background 
The scientific approach to foresight dates to the 1950s, with the start of 
Technology Assessment and Forecasting. Today, modern safety thinking has been 
elaborated in many directions and is applied to many different subjects. Foresight 
includes the use of a variety of methods and techniques (Popper 2008 a/b; Jackson 
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2013; Sager 2017). The specific notion of ‘foresight in safety’ is analysed and 
defined in a separate chapter. 
The scientific approach labelled as ‘foresight’ is defined in contrast to another 
discipline called variously ‘future research’ or ‘futures studies’. ‘Future 
research/futures studies’ were often disputed within scientific circles: could such 
an approach – which was not based on theories and hypotheses and tested against 
empirical data - be included as ‘real scientific research’? Or was it an art?  Although 
a final agreement has yet to be reached, it is clear that the study of futures 
(possible, probable, or preferable) has neither the traditional characteristics of 
natural sciences nor the methodology of some social sciences (Selin 2008). 
However, futures studies are now both an academic branch and a business. The 
academic use of futures studies can be found in the environmental/climate sector 
and dedicated research centres, often with scientific programmes. However, far 
more extensive are the semi-commercial (e.g. think tanks) or purely commercial 
consultancies offering a widely sought-after, broad repertoire of techniques, such 
as trend studies/trend analysis. 
As a form of futures studies, strategic foresight studies had many early authors and 
scientists that initiated or anticipated the more systematic and knowledge-based 
understanding which were established after WWII. The use of strategic foresight 
studies grew mainly within defence planning and expanded later to the public 
sector (state/regional innovation), to large regional organisations (such as EU) to 
the private sector (such as multi-national companies). 
1.3 Foresight as an object of research 
1.3.1 The time concept in foresight 
Safety implies change, and change – seen as a process – is embedded in time. The 
time concept represents a fundamental challenge in philosophy because our 
thoughts about the social world and time reside inside time itself. It may be 
debated whether there is anything that exists outside time. As foresight mostly 
deals with the temporal called ‘future’, it is vital to establish a kind of consensus 
within which foresight management can operate. In foresight, the time concept is 
reconstructed. Often, we divide the time span of the future into short, medium 
and long-term perspectives; short being 5-10 years, medium 10-20 and long-term 
20-30 years and beyond. This time perspective is clearly socially constructed, but 
for what purpose? A plausible explanation for the conventional use of time 
horizons in foresight may be found in the purpose of the foresight itself. Since most 
examples of foresight (like safety management) have a clear action orientation, 
they need a trustworthy perspective not stretching into the eternity, rather limit it 
to a few decades. 
Implicitly, most examples of foresight apply an operational definition of time, not 
strictly linear, but still a chronological concept, Karlsen et al. (2010) claim: 
“The past is seen as something that has ended, having no starting point but 
bordering the present, which in turn is defined as the state we experience now and 
actually live in. Now is consequently something which is there all the time, pushing 
the future to a state which is not actually here, other than in our minds.” 
The future is constantly approaching us but is reconstructed in the organisationally 
recognisable time horizons applied in foresight management. The reconstruction 
does not change the ontological characteristics of future, just make it easier for us 
to handle time as an embedded aspect of the changes we imagine when 
undertaking the practice of foresight management. Nordlund (2012) surveyed how 
well-known futurists considered timescales in their central works. Like Karlsen et 
al. (2010) on foresight, Nordlund concludes that ‘the time-scale has not been given 
special attention’, other than when specifying scale terms, like short, medium, and 
long (ibid, p. 413) in futures research and forecasting. Thus, these fields (i.e. 
foresight and safety management) do not have a theory of time, just the 
mentioning of time as a rather loose and boundary condition. 
1.3.2 Brief outline of foresight traditions 
The foresight approach is part of a wider scientific tradition: to use analyses about 
the past, about the present situation (diagnosis), to identify future objects and the 
possibility to reach them (prognosis), and how to reach the future goals 
(prescription). However, here again, the actual studies differ in many ways 
between the two extremes: on one side pure basic scientific research about the 
future, and on the other side pure business studies, e.g. in the context of strategic 
foresight management. 
Georghiou (2001) has defined foresight as an approach that overlaps three other 
disciplines: future studies, strategic planning and policy analysis. Although 
‘foresight’ has been connected to, or partly integrated in, other research fields, the 
foresight tradition as a whole has some unique elements. 
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Some characteristics of the foresight approach are: 
• Process: cross-disciplinary and cross-sectoral participation, and action-    
oriented. 
• Time: medium to long term perspectives (often 5 – 50 years) in contrast to 0 
– 5 years for risk assessment (short perspective). 
• Goal: aimed at present-day decisions and mobility/joint actions by identifying 
possible future developments, driving forces, emerging technologies, 
barriers, threats, and opportunities. 
• Results: outlooks, proposals of future developments, scenarios, visions, 
roadmaps, and actions. 
• Prerequisite: the world is multi-dimensional and basically uncertain and    
complex. 
The importance of foresight studies and explanations can be illustrated by the 
multitude of actors who are using foresight theories and methods. Both individuals 
(researchers, authors, scientists etc.), university institutes and organisations 
(Foresight professional networks, public-sector foresight organisations, and non-
governmental foresight organisations) have allocated resources in order to 
develop and implement foresight studies and results in many sectors.  
As examples may be mentioned as networks World Future Society and World 
Futures Studies Federation, as organisations in the public sector National 
Intelligence Council and NASA /both US), The Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies (EU), Government Office for Science (UK) and Norwegian 
Research Council (Norway), as NGOs Rand Corporation, Hudson Institute, 
Copenhagen Institute for Future Studies, Strategic Foresight Group and Project 
2049 Institute. The reports and findings may be published in journals like Futures, 
Journal of Future Studies, Technological Forecasting and Change, and the Futurist 
magazine.  
1.3.3 A promising future for a new discipline 
Foresight has developed as a scientific research field during the last years and has 
theories, hypothesis and concepts that have been elaborated. Many universities 
around the world now have foresight research on their research agenda, and some 
have also established scientific degrees and education programmes. Outside of 
universities, the foresight approach has been used by several public and private 
institutions, enterprises (especially multinational companies) and consultancy 
firms, think tanks, etc. The main implementation is connected to change 
management, strategic analysis, and policy development.  
The EC was an early adopter of foresight research (technological foresight, regional 
foresight etc.). The EU Commission supported in 2009 the development of a 
European platform in foresight (EFP - Project no.244895). The emphasis by the EU 
institutions stimulated and created innovation across the EEA, as national 
initiatives, and new research programmes. The goal was not only to develop a 
broad spectrum of methods nor to introduce a new kind of thinking or create 
valuable processes, but to direct the processes into action, which could enhance 
constructive changes in today’s practices.  
Some numbers can illustrate the focus the EU has had on foresight. A search of 
publications via the EU Science Hub produces 452 hits on foresight. Among them, 
four books and 180 articles. In addition, EU has organised several conferences, 
workshops, scientific programmes, and expert groups in the foresight field. The 
scope has been very wide, ranging from global perspective, as ‘Vision of the world 
in 2035’ – a foresight report issued by The Defence Technical Information Center 
(US) in 2016, via many environmental topics, such as climate change, land use, 
water usage, wind potentials, weather-related hazards and regional climate, to 
government, migration, employment, and big data in road transport policy, as well 
as nanotechnology, low carbon energy technologies, and sustainable food and 
nutrition security – all key words from reports published in 2018/19. Concerning 
today’s organisation, EU has established a separate Unit for the Foresight, 
Behavioural Insights and Design for Policy at the Directorate General Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) in Brussels. 
In the EU, however, programmes like Horizon 2050 are formulated in terms of 
values and goals and not in terms of quantified performance indicators with 
various options for adaptation and transition strategies. They do not indicate how 
to achieve and how to assess these goals and values. This is left to underlying 
scientific research and development programmes.  Such programmes, however, 
frequently restrict themselves to the early phases of innovation and transition 
processes, as expressed in the notion of Technology Readiness Levels (covering TRL 
1-3 on a scale of 1-10 discriminating 10 phases in the S-curve of system life cycles). 
Later phases of this TRL process are left to applied sciences (4-6), industry (7-8) 
and private entrepreneurs (9-10) which take the final steps to their market. In 
those latter stages, the information on the developments foreseen has become 
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private company confidential assets. By definition, foresight in early phases of 
development should enable democratic participation on the foreseeable 
consequences in the mid- and long term for society in general, based on knowledge 
and insights that are open to scrutiny from different perspectives, values and 
interests. 
Defined in this perspective, foresight is: 
• a process, discriminating several steps; 
• a focus on predefined aspects, symptoms, and patterns; and, 
• a judgement call, identifying values and decisions from a multi-actor 
perspective. 
In general, foresight assessment can be built up by combining tools and techniques 
from different domains and disciplines, stakeholder perspectives and value 
judgements. 
In foreseeing the acceptability of future performance, innovations and transitions 
suffer from a phase called ‘Valley of Death’. After an initial start, setbacks occur 
that may oscillate into unforeseen stagnation and failure. Many promising socio-
technological developments do not survive these setbacks and perish. Because 
such problems may emerge later than foreseeable on the short term, a (specific) 
time horizon should be identified in which foresight is a reliable, plausible, credible 
and feasible predictor for future performance. 
Potential building blocks for such a foresight process are: 
• iterative assessment of findings and change agents by the Cyclic Innovation 
Model (Berkhout, 2000); 
• presumptive anomaly as expressed in the Variation Selection Model (Vincenti 
1990); 
• identification of showstoppers/stealers and disruptive factors in the 
innovation process; 
• identification of societal changes, values, business models and risk 
awareness, perception and appreciation; 
• decomposition of a systems architecture and dynamics with its safety critical 
decisions during design, development, introduction, midlife upgrade and 
demolition; 
• identification of knowledge deficiencies, assumptions, simplifications and 
limitations of the scientific body of knowledge, available during several 
phases of assessment; 
• feedback from reality across domains, disciplines from multiple perspectives; 
• similarities with socio-technological projects in the past as a learning 
experience. 
In addition to the dynamic role the European Commission and its departments 
have had in developing foresight as research and a tool for decision making 
(including the shortcomings), a growing national interest in the foresight discipline 
has, during few decades, fostered several research institutes, research 
programmes, books and reports, conferences, workshops, and education at 
university level throughout Europe (see also 1.3 above). 
1.4 Safety: investigations and the ‘modern’ systems approach  
In the Anglo-Saxon safety debate, a predominant and relatively pessimistic 
retrospection prevails. Systems are believed to be too complex for foresight and 
risk assessment to deal with. Taleb (2008) launched the metaphor of ‘Black Swans’ 
as the ultimate inability to explore and comprehend socio-technical systems. And, 
as Donald Rumsfeld (US Secretary of Defense, 1975-1977 and 2001-2006) 
suggested, ‘unknown unknowns’ may always limit our knowledge of the future. 
Safety science seems to be at the edge of a paradigm shift, both from a theoretical 
and a practical perspective. The European safety science community study a wide 
array of new approaches. Some challenge the validity of safety science as a science 
(Safety Science, 2014), while others proclaim new safety concepts and notions, 
such as Resilience Engineering, a ‘New View on Human Error’ or Safety I and Safety 
II.  Such developments challenge and redefine commonly shared notions such as 
precaution, cause-consequence relations, human performance, cognition, and 
culture with sometimes far reaching consequences for their application. ESReDA 
advocates the generic value and applicability of safety investigations across 
industrial domains and scientific disciplines. ESReDA foresees a predictive foresight 
on safety and its integration in a system engineering perspective. In several 
industrial sectors with a high-tech nature, safety is considered a shared 
responsibility, superseding a single actor or mono-disciplinary perspective.  Life 
Cycle Analysis seems indispensable for an assessing safety throughout the life cycle 
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of complex legacy systems, addressing specific characteristics of transport, 
process, and nuclear power applications.  
Within safety, it may be useful to measure ‘weak signals’ and other indicators. 
There are various approaches that help: investigation, scenarios, risk analysis and 
assessment.  
Future thinking may be in use in different industrial sectors (such as energy 
production, the production of chemical substances and products, consumable 
production, transportation and to some extent also in the consumer-/service 
sector), but often restricted to a short or medium-term time horizon. 
1.4.1 Safety in legacy and modern systems  
Such new thinking was accompanied by a change in moral and ethical values on 
safety. Traditionally, technical design has relied on notions such as failsafe and safe 
rational decision-making theories do not provide satisfactory explanations of 
abnormal life, crash worthiness, damage tolerance, compartmentation, 
redundancy, and reliability. But recent developments show that this is changing. 
With the introduction of ICT as a fundamental new technology, new ethical notions 
such as Value Sensitive design and Responsible Innovation principles have been 
developed. They deal with complexity, system design and integration of safety 
assessment by Encompassing Design and Multidisciplinary Design Optimisation 
methods, Knowledge Based Engineering and Value Engineering. New legal 
definitions dealing with safety assessment and liability have been introduced such 
as Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide; shifting social responsibilities 
for unanticipated consequences back to manufacturers and designers. 
The consequences of application of new materials such as composites, 
technological innovations in ICT, food, system-of-systems networks, and Internet 
of Things cannot be predicted and assessed by today’s evaluation methods. A new 
combination of learning from feedback and feed-forward is not yet developed and 
validated. New thinking, as illustrated by the ESReDA Cube (see chapter 7), has 
indicated several opportunities to tackle such quests. 
Since safety of innovative complex and dynamic systems cannot be assessed based 
on their past performance, new approaches and notions should be developed. A 
distinction between socio-organisational and socio-technical system categories 
becomes inevitable, dealing with their intrinsic, inherent, and emergent properties 
as specific classes of hazard, threats, and consequences. A distinction between 
high energy density systems and dynamic network concepts is necessary to deal 
with massive instantaneous outbursts of energy of a mechanical, chemical, or 
nuclear nature and the way consequences propagate through networks. A new 
distinction should be made between normal, undisrupted performance which is 
highly predictable and controllable, and non-normal situations, emerging from 
drift, natural growth, aging and exceedance of designed performance envelopes.  
New mental representations of human performance become necessary, since 
Tayloristic models of compliant behaviour and behaviour in normal situations or 
normal behaviour in abnormal situations. A Good Operatorship notion dealing 
with competence rather than compliance is under development in several high-
tech sectors such as in aviation and the maritime counterbalancing prospects of 
full automation towards unmanned operated transport systems (Mohrmann et al., 
2015). 
In assessing their safety performance, we can not only deal with new systems and 
technological innovation. Existing systems in their full maturity have long histories 
of past performance and have gone through a series of decisions, assumptions and 
modifications that are hardly fully known, let alone documented. The notion of 
transition management in matured, complex systems with a high level of 
technological change potential is in its early phases of development. A distinction 
between disruptive and derivative technology is crucial to understand its dynamic 
behaviour. Due to the very high-performance levels, such catastrophic 
consequences can manifest themselves as very high consequence and very low 
probability events beyond the responsibility of individual actors and entities. 
Interferences may occur due to unknown interrelations between components that 
have been forgotten, neglected or unexplored. In practice, such dynamics are 
consigned to the category of ‘unknown unknowns’ but are actually discernible as 
design-induced consequences during operations. Foresight also includes 
knowledge and operational experience-based hindsight. 
The role of accident and incident investigations can gain a new dimension if such 
aspects are incorporated in the investigation methodology. A common 
investigation methodology across industries and disciplines should lay the basis for 
such a new approach in order to create a level playing field. This would need legal 
recognition and procedural embedding into practice, such as achieved in aviation 
by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in its Annex 13. 
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1.4.2 Foresight in technological innovation: trends and opportunities 
Traditionally, many industrial companies have concentrated on learning from past 
events and developed internal safety policies and industry norms after that. Past 
events include accidents, production problems, distribution, and usage problems. 
Many safety authorities, including regulatory agencies, have also followed this 
pattern. Feedback to the design of technology and organisations and managing 
safety during operations have greatly benefited from such learning. Social 
scientists designed, created, and proclaimed a category of Non-Plus-Ultra-Safe 
systems, such as aviation. There are, however, necessities and opportunities to 
combine feedback and feed-forward learning, integrating safety as a social value 
at all systems levels and lifecycle phases, equivalent to health, environment, 
wealth, sustainability, and prosperity. 
Safety management based on a systematic combination of learning of past events 
and issues and analysis and methods for insight into the future challenges seems 
still not very widespread within several key high-risk areas. This ESReDA project 
group aims at reinforcing feedback and feed-forward loops between hindsight and 
foresight experiences and expertise. 
Safety is to be revalued as a strategic societal value, instead of the presently 
preferred notion as a key performance indicator within organisations, to be 
assessed against other operational aspects such as economy and efficiency. Safety 
is a public value, not only a corporate value within an ETTO (Efficiency 
Thoroughness Trade Off) decision making context on an operator level. A shift back 
from control to comprehension is inevitable in dealing with modern, complex, and 
dynamic socio-technical and socio-organisational systems in their operating 
environment. 
Only by re-addressing the context of such systems, can a credible foresight on their 
nature and safety performance be established. 
A transition is taking place in safety thinking. It is moving from reactive, to 
proactive, and to predictive thinking. This transition is reflected in thinking about 
both technological change and developments in society: 
• in technological developments with respect to technological innovation and 
disruptive applications; 
• in socio-economic and social developments with respect to risk awareness, 
perception, risk acceptance and management. 
A ‘Zero Vision’ paradigm is emerging: no risk is acceptable and lethal accidents are 
intolerable. At the same time, systems become more embedded, complex, and 
dynamic. In the transport sector, although systems safety performance has 
achieved a Non-Plus Ultra-Safe (NPUS) level, the scale of operations themselves is 
increasing with respect to volumes, numbers and sizes of transport technologies 
and the energies that can be released from them. The law of diminishing returns 
applies to conventional safety management solutions, and new directions are 
needed to achieve improvements. The present authors see a trend towards new 
notions that deal with foresight during operations such as early warning signs 
(EWS), or recovery from non-normal situations achieved through resilience 
engineering. Both developments erode the need to remain vigilant and proficient 
with respect to safety. Investments in road safety have been reduced in some 
European countries.  Consequently, the death toll in Europe is increasing again. 
Safety in aviation is jeopardised by the limits to growth due to the capacity of the 
infrastructure, both airside and landside. Such system related developments can 
be foreseen by analysing their architecture and exploring higher order drivers for 
change and efficiency, such as business models, policy making and governance. 
With respect to socio-technical systems with a non-plus ultra-safe performance 
level (especially those in aviation, railways, maritime, nuclear and the process 
industry) can be considered as belonging to a specific category of high energy 
density systems, capable of creating catastrophic consequences of a physical 
nature. Preventing accidents of an unprecedented magnitude remains a prime 
reason for existence for safety investigations. 
There is no golden bullet that will serves as the single encompassing safety 
performance indicator. An analysis of the safety performance in aviation indicates 
a complex interaction between airworthiness requirements and passenger service 
performance indicators. Rather than aiming at a further decrease of the overall 
accident rate as performance indicators, safety enhancement efforts could be 
invested in a better understanding of the system principles and properties. Safety 
investigations are a pivotal approach to this purpose. 
 
The need for a system change can be recognised in two ways: 
• an incremental shift in the derivative solutions for known problems; or 
• a substantial shift marked by disruptive solutions for new problems. 
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In the second case however, innovation processes and adaptations cannot be 
implemented by a single actor or from a single perspective or discipline. The 
concept of cyclic innovation (Berkhout, 2000). Unlike a traditional, linear design 
model, cyclic innovation emphasises the complex interaction of multiple actors 
and paradigms. This concept promises sustainable effects, which if not predictable 
are at least are descriptive or comprehensible.  
The magnitude of energies that are to be controlled during normal operations and 
can be released during accidents is comparable between aviation, railway, and the 
nuclear sector. However, the variations within each mode of transport are great. 
To demonstrate the nature of classes of socio-technical systems, a specific class of 
high energy density dense systems with specific catastrophic potential is defined. 
High speed trains, large commercial aircraft and nuclear power plants indicates 
Many managers do not want to invest in innovations and push their current 
approaches to the limits with sometimes disastrous results. (see Minsky) 
Such a class of systems requires specific approaches with respect to technological 
foresight. A sudden release of the energy content requires specific control over 
recovery and rescue capabilities. Resilience alone is not enough to take control 
after the release of such amounts of energy. The role of the operator as the 
ultimate manager of the total energy content is critical as the last line of defence 
in controlling the stability of such systems in both normal and non-normal 
situations. If such systems are not inherent stable, a delicate balance must be 
maintained in controlling the stability and flexibility during operations. 
Destabilising such systems by design - such as with the Boeing737MAX, or non-
normal operating conditions - such as with repair and maintenance of NPPs, or de-
qualification of operator skills - such as with deprived basic flying skills of pilots, 
puts high pressure on operating performance standards. Foresight of potential 
failure modes during design evaluation, and operational feedback by weak signals 
- such as whistle blowers, become indicators for timely adaptation, modification, 
and Good Operatorship requirements. 
Weak signals are not weak by definition. Based on signal theory, there are several 
reasons for a weakness of signals: 
• strong signals can be suppressed to weak signals; 
• the signal can be misinterpreted because of distortion during transmission; 
• a signal can be missed in the spectrum at the receiving end; 
• a signal can be overruled by a signal of another nature; 
• the frequency of transmission can fall beneath a perception threshold level. 
In practice, weak signal debates deal with either the technical, behavioural or 
social nature of signals, with primary production processes or secondary 
processes, while the diversity across actors and stakeholders may create confusion 
and disagreement of their validity as service providers for user’s safety or for 
technical reliability. 
Table 1: High energy dense systems (1 MW = 1000 kW) 







Mega Watt  
High Speed 
Train 
430 tons 250 km/h ground level 1053 MW 
 320 km/h ground level 1740 MW 
A380 Jumbo 
jet 
MTOW 575 900 km/h 10,000 m 75,000 MW 
at take-off 
MTOW575 tons 
260 km/h ground level 1500 MW 
at landing 
MLW 386 tons 





Average size   800 MW 
Borsele (Neth)  Sea level 450 MW 
Chernobyl  Sea level 600 MW 
Fukushima  Sea level 784 MW 
1.5 Foresight in a World at Risk 
Many countries have developed contingency plans for tackling worst cases and 
wicked problems. These are most often based on foresight methods and, notably 
those that use scenarios (van der Heijden, 2005) in which the most dramatic 
outcomes are described. Scenarios usually relate to outcomes that can be 
described as probable, plausible, or possible (Voros, 2003). One often finds 
knowledge summaries of experiences that are assumed to have similar outcomes. 
Scenarios are conceivable e; not “wild cards”. 
In scenarios, it is assumed that the development of events is seldom unambiguous 
or predetermined. When conditions are complex, uncertain, and ambiguous—or 
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when one needs to take a long-time perspective—it is difficult and often risky to 
make precise predictions. Renn (2008) proposes a classification for risk 
management where methods and procedures are linked to the concepts of 
complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. The ‘Achilles' heel’ of such risk and crisis 
management models lies in the ‘translation’ from challenges, goals and tools to 
action and active preparedness. 
The Covid-19 pandemic can be used as an illustration of the treacherous nature of 
foresight management, i.e. foresight as a management capability (Amsteus, 2008); 
words and plans are not translated into resilient action. Thus, the scenarios 
preparing for pandemics like this become just stories of a foretold illness and death 
for most countries.  
1.5.1  The Coronavirus pandemic 
On March 11th, 2020, the World Health Organisation officially changed its 
designation of SARS-CoV-2, the illness caused by a new coronavirus, from an 
epidemic to a pandemic.  Earlier, on 31 December 2019, China informed WHO 
about several cases of a new pneumonia, possibly originating from a fish market 
in Wuhan, China. On 7 January 2020, the virus emerged in Europe. Within few 
weeks, it spread globally to become a pandemic that affects an exceptionally high 
proportion of the population. Covid-19 is the unofficial name of the disease caused 
by the SARS-CoV-2 virus. 
What do we (the authors as lay people) know about the coronavirus? At the 
outbreak, not much. We know that coronaviruses are rather common human and 
animal viruses. Four such viruses cause symptoms of the common cold, and three 
(SARS-CoV, MERS-Cov and Covid-19) cause more serious lung infections 
(pneumonia). Like SARS and MERS, the novel Covid-19 is a disease that starts in 
animals and is initially transmitted from animals to people. We also know that the 
virus is not a living organism, but a protein molecule. It is covered by a protective 
layer of fat, which, when absorbed by the cells of the eyes, nose and the inner 
lining of the cheeks, changes its genetic code (mutates) and converts them into 
aggressor and multiplier cells.  Since the virus is not a living organism, it does not 
die as such but disintegrates over time. The disintegration time depends on the 
temperature, humidity and type of material where the virus particle lies.  
Besides these facts, we have learned that the virus is highly contagious and when 
resulting in the Covid-19 disease, may cause severe acute respiratory syndrome, 
and even death, particularly in elderly people. However, the virus is fragile, only 
protected by the thin outer layer of fat. That is why we have learned that washing 
our hands with soap is the best remedy to protect ourselves. The foam dissolves 
the fat layer, the protein molecule disperses and breaks down on its own. 
However, the recommendations from the authorities to wash our hands with soap 
for 30-60 seconds, practice social distancing, avoid travels by public transportation, 
self-isolate when needed, etc., is far easier to say than to practice. To convert the 
habits of the population in such manner is not easy, and the success is rather 
patchy in the global arena.  
1.5.2 Any early warnings? 
The Covid-19 is novel and not identified previously, and it is different from those 
that cause cold or even SARS and MERS. At least in Europe and the US, seemingly 
most public recommendations and measures were reactive and imposed late in 
the transmission cycle when proactive trend spotting, compulsory and collective 
preventive actions, and a genuine global emergency preparedness were needed.  
To identify and analyse weak signals and early warnings is an important brand of 
foresight studies. The core challenge is to recognise phenomena that have crisis 
potential and to assess appurtenant risks and emergency options early enough to 
handle these strategically (Karlsen & Øverland, p. 145-146; Rossel, 2011; Kaivo-oja, 
2012). So, could this corona virus pandemic and the global breakdown resulting 
from it have been foreseen, given the experience with previous pandemics; e.g. 
the Spanish Flu in 1918-20, the Asian flu in 1957, the Hong Kong flu in 1968, SARS 
in 2002, the Swine flu in 2009, the Ebola epidemic in 2014 and the MERS 
coronavirus epidemic in 2015? Arguably, should all nations have been on alert to 
make-sense of the initial indications sent from China? 
Apparently, many medical and scientific authorities and groups projected very 
negative scenarios for the pandemic globally and nationally and these projections 
were intended as warnings. In 2019, the US Department of Health and Human 
Services carried out a pandemic exercise named ‘Crimson Contagion’. This 
imagined a flu pandemic starting in China and spreading around the world. The 
simulation predicted that 586,000 people would die in the US alone. The core 
scenario message was, according to a group of New York Times journalists, rather 
scary (Sanger et al. 2020): 
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WASHINGTON — The outbreak of the respiratory virus began in China and was 
quickly spread around the world by air travellers, who ran high fevers. In the United 
States, it was first detected in Chicago, and 47 days later, the World Health 
Organization declared a pandemic. By then it was too late: 110 million Americans 
were expected to become ill, leading to 7.7 million hospitalized and 586,000 dead. 
However, did this scenario trigger an alert to the US authorities? Hardly. Such 
projections may have generated increased anxiety, but arguably, that is much 
better than complacency. The journalists claimed it only resulted in a (not to be 
disclosed) report, emphasising, ‘how under-funded, under-prepared and 
uncoordinated the federal government would be for a life-or-death battle with a 
virus for which no treatment existed’. Moreover, the US president for weeks 
stubbornly preached that the pandemic was negligible and controllable. By 3 April 
2020, the Johns Hopkins University (JHU) reported that the number of people 
confirmed infected by the virus exceeded 1 million (thereof 250,000 in the US) and 
the death toll over 500,000 globally. Five months later Worldometer reported 27 
million infected and nearly 900,000 deaths . 
MacKay and McKiernan (2004 point out the role that hindsight plays in foresight 
studies. They argue that the past is not an isolated static state, but one that is 
clearly linked with the future. However, biases may influence our perceptions and 
conceptions of the past. These biases act as constraints on our ability to 
understand the driving forces that emerge from the past, play-out through the 
present and become the critical uncertainties in the future. A foresight bias results 
from a shallow perception of history and is characterised by a combination of 
hindsight biases, creeping determinism, and searching for information that 
corresponds to people’s views about both the past and the future. The authors 
propose counterfactual analysis as an antidote to the foresight bias, linking 
counterfactuals with scenarios, thus translating the experiences of the past to 
future challenges. Unfortunately, such techniques seem to have been largely 
neglected in recent scenario studies like the one performed by the US government.  
On the other hand, are better, more useful ideas to be found in the literature on 
‘risk society’, on decision-making in situations of (extreme) uncertainty, or on 
anticipation, resilience, and sense-making?  
1.5.3 From micro-cosmos to macro-chaos 
Seemingly, most governments have not had in place an early warning system and 
supporting decision mechanisms that could have prevented the outbreak or at 
least lessened the spread of the virus to a tolerable extent and at a more 
controllable speed. A capacity for early warning could have made it possible to 
mount a proportionate response at the initial breeding ground in China, and to 
instantly disseminate the information to the rest of the world. In January 2020, 
Chinese researchers had published the genetic code of the virus, a requirement 
necessary to develop test equipment and start developing a vaccine. Some 
countries like China, South Korea, Singapore and Germany effected 
comprehensive testing and other measures and managed to restrict the spread 
and the number of deaths. Iceland is the only country that did a massive testing of 
citizens having no symptoms, which may be a key to understand the real spread of 
the disease.  
However, many countries hesitated to act until the disease exploded in Europe and 
the US in March 2020. This forced governments to adapt their policies ad hoc and 
to express strong opinions in areas they knew little about. Thus, we witnessed 
quite different measures and opinions in various countries, varying from initial 
neglect and laissez-faire to extensive shutdowns of society. In some countries, e.g. 
Sweden, UK and the US, leaders proclaimed that millions had to be infected and 
many thousands of elderly people had to die before the pandemic would burn out. 
Others, e.g. Denmark and Norway, declared the opposite view: vulnerable groups 
(e.g. elderly, disadvantaged, physically impaired people, people living in highly 
exposed housing, etc.) should receive extra attention. Therefore, the Danish and 
Norwegian governments closed schools, bars and restaurants, shops, dentists, 
hairdressers, exercise studios, physiotherapists, etc. Every public place where 
people usually met and mingled posed a threat to these groups and the favourite 
measure was to lock them down.  
The domino effects of the corona crises are widespread and total. In many 
countries the health care system is loaded to maximum capacity. Some countries 
like Italy, Spain and the US, most probably face a collapse or must shift to 
seemingly harsh triage decisions unknown in peacetime. The number of businesses 
that instantly locked down and the number of unemployed skyrocketed after the 
pandemic was declared. The economic pain has spread at a velocity equal to the 
spread of the virus itself. In many countries, the economy falters, as business 
owners and employees wonder if any stimulus package will reach them. The longer 
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the economic meltdown lasts, the more unlikely it becomes that the community 
will recover its former vitality and, moreover, the greater the risk of unsettling the 
social fabric that holds the economy together. Predictions made in popular and 
social media is that the pandemic will change the world forever (Allen et al. 2020).   
1.5.4 Revisiting the Risk Society in a world without a leader 
In 1986, Ulrich Beck published the now classic Risk Society. The book called 
attention to the dangers of environmental and industrial catastrophes and 
changed the way in which we think about contemporary societies. Ever since, the 
global dangers highlighted by Beck have taken on new forms and assumed greater 
importance. Financial crises have produced worldwide consequences that were 
completely out of control, terrorism has shifted from the regional to the global 
arena, waves of pandemics have swept the planet, and climate has been the most 
significant change-maker and defining marker in politics.  
The term risk society describes contemporary social communities that seek to 
organise themselves in response to a future marked by global disasters, e.g.: 
technological vulnerability, climate change, pandemics, terror, military conflicts, 
political, economic, and social unrest. Global structures decouple many of the risk 
factors from defined localities and territories. The impact of today's and future 
risks can be universal. They will cross boundaries between states, geographical 
regions, gender, class, and cultures. Communities that pay close attention to a 
future under uncertain, ambiguous, and complex conditions will launch measures 
to prevent and reduce the impact of both current and future risk factors. In this 
way, they will be reflexive, expanding the capacity to sense and make-sense of 
novel emergence (e.g. a crisis), as well as setting the stage to reconsider the 
conception of a safe and robust society. However, there is a huge gap between the 
present reality and the ideal future solution.  
Arguably, modern society is lacking the proper capability to understand the role of 
the future, given our perception of the past and present. This hampers the capacity 
to intercept emerging global shocks and anticipate novel trends, as well as setting 
the stage to reconsider our conceptions of present human agency. While amid the 
coronavirus pandemic in 2020, the point made by Beck (1999, p. 78) reminds us on 
the unfeasibility of being informed and rational in managing ‘unknown unknowns’: 
“The ultimate deadlock of risk society … resides in the gap between knowledge and 
decision: there is no one who really knows the global outcome – at the level of 
positive knowledge, the situation is radically ‘undividable’ – but we nonetheless 
have to decide … so risk society is provoking an obscene gamble, a kind of ironic 
reversal of predestination: I am accountable for decisions which I was forced to 
make without proper knowledge of the situation”.  
The global nature of this pandemic, and the unknown features of the disease 
Covid-19, is changing world politics, in which risks are handled individually by 
various nation states for political gain. It demonstrates a global inequality and a 
local vulnerability and states a position far from what Beck (2009) calls a 
’cosmopolitan material politics’. Rather, it is what the historian Yuval Harare 
characterises as (2020, p. 42-43), a ‘Disease in a world without a leader’. The acute 
crisis facing humanity is not only due to the corona virus, but also because of a lack 
of trust and solidarity between humans:  
“To defeat an epidemic, people need to trust scientific experts, citizens need to 
trust public authorities, and countries need to trust one another”.  
The effects of the coronavirus pandemic are evident everywhere: empty streets, 
shuttered shops, overflowing hospitals; closed kindergartens, schools and 
universities. Millions of people are laid idle by a State-ordered work ban, by the 
shared lack of business dealings, or by being forced to work from their bedrooms. 
However, despite the similar global effects, the world lacks a leadership with a 
common and unified strategy to cope with the coronavirus pandemic. 
1.5.5 Future global chocks and the need for resilience 
With no vaccine yet available, the pandemic is a drag on the global economy and 
a blight on social life. Arguably, there is a lack of societal resilience, meaning a 
capability to tackle and recover from such global shocks. However, there is 
abundant literature and studies reminding us about the most important lessons 
from past crises. One such is the OECD study on ‘Future Global Chocks: Pandemics’ 
which states (Rubin, 2011, p. 80): 
“The key to any progress against infectious diseases is a structure that brings 
together these diverse interests in a lasting fashion. Without such a structure, the 
commitment to reducing the impact of infectious diseases on our national, 
economic and personal security will be subject to the political vagaries of the 
moment, leaving us unprepared for the next global health crisis.”  
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The OECD study argues of international research centres on for the setting-up 
infectious disease, to serve as a nucleus for safe applications of interdisciplinary 
sciences globally to the benefit of all.  
Another strand comes from the academic world, examining the questions ‘what 
do we talk about when we talk about managing crises’, and ’what are the threats, 
dilemmas and opportunities’? A point of departure may be the book ‘Coping with 
Crises’ (Rosenthal et al., 1989). This addresses major crises during the 1970s and 
1980s and was followed-up ten years later by ‘Managing Crises’ (Rosenthal, Boin, 
and Comfort; 2001). The latter stated that, on its own, learning from the past has 
limited value to improve preparedness or the management of future crises.  
Rather than accept this fatalist position, futures and foresight researchers point 
instead to the benefits of ‘futures literacy’ (Miller 2015, 2018). This is the capacity 
make sense of contemporary trends shaping the future and involves informed 
hindsight of past events.  
In the case of the coronavirus pandemic, the role of social media disrupts the 
supply of objective and valid information. Fake news, speculations and 
unsubstantiated opinions interfere with the control that governments seek to 
achieve through their information channels. In opinion panels, experts are selected 
based on their political usefulness, or play a role as whistleblower—there to 
criticise official theories on what the pandemic is about, its challenges and the 
responses thereto. These contemporary behaviours in the media add considerably 
to the chaos phase in disaster management.  
Informed hindsight must be related to making sense of the trends shaping the 
future. In his chapter on viral epidemics, Alkan (2001; p.267-280) points out that 
communities exist in a fragile equilibrium with their ecological environment. A 
disturbance of this balance can cause epidemics. Alkan argues that preventing 
future outbreaks of deadly epidemics is nearly impossible. What society can do, 
however, is organise for a resilient response that best copes with cruel decisions 
under conditions of uncertainty. Alkan states (2001; p.277): 
‘Crisis management during epidemics is not simply a function of adequate models 
and smart scientists. In the end, crisis managers have to make decisions that 
encompass more than just scientific information. They have to deal with typical 
crisis dilemmas. Making decisions based upon an incomplete data base is the 
hallmark of response to crisis. As viral epidemics emerge and re-emerge, it is 
preparedness, a high degree of suspicion, and rapid appropriate response that will 
limit the spread of these diseases in the future.’ 
Viral pandemics are here to stay, and they are examples of unforeseen, complex, 
transboundary crises with a series of domino effects on social organisation, health, 
and welfare. Alkan (2001, p.278) argues that while modern society is becoming 
more risk averse, viruses continue to modernise themselves.  
If we diagnose the nature and architecture of complex systems, our ability to cope 
with with pandemics will no longer be restricted to responding to the 
consequences of disaster. The coronavirus pandemic serves as an example of a 
wider pattern in which viruses and diseases transfer from animals to humans. 
Wildlife markets, bush meat and other indigenous food chains are a primary source 
of contamination and spreading of new diseases. Changing the food chain and, 
indeed the wider system of food and nutrition is at the root of preventing 
pandemic events like Covid-19. Progress in the agricultural industries and virus 
resistant food chains will stop pandemics at their origin by coping with virus 
mutation, transmission to humans and across population groups, and uncontrolled 
spread to other world regions. Design principles regarding distributed production, 
unravelling chains and disconnecting networks to prevent knock-on effects, are 
already very well established in other industrial sectors. We can learn a lot across 
industry at the level of functional relations and design concepts.  Analysing and 
understanding dynamic system behaviour and the architecture of complex 
systems are a prime challenge to robust systems design (Klir, 1987).  
1.5.6 Chance favours the prepared mind 
A transnational response structure is urgently needed. In his inaugural address as 
a newly appointed professor and dean at the opening of the Faculté des Sciences 
at Lille (7 December 1854), Louis Pasteur claimed that,” In the field of observation, 
chance favours only the prepared mind”. Strategic planning of emergency 
preparedness and management calls for building societal resilience capacity to 
sense and respond to emerging, and often what Beck (1986) named, ‘invisible’ 
risks. The coronavirus is an example of such hidden enemies. People may be 
infected and contagious without knowing, since many of the symptoms are mild 
and resemble more common diseases like colds and flu. Partly, Covid-19 is covert, 
invisible and not identified in large parts of the population, but partly evident, 
contagious and deadly in other population segments.  
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It is urgent to ensure that critical systems are robust, diversified and hold adequate 
reserve capacity. That has apparently not been the case for most countries prior 
to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020. The early warning systems 
were not in place, and even the reactive capacities are seemingly inadequate. 
Furthermore, the global partnerships are too weak and not coordinated to receive, 
share and integrate sources of information conducive to handle the pandemic and 
the societal risks resulting from it.  
We know from research on previous crises that it is more important to understand 
the phenomenon than just to mitigate the consequences. Although we do not 
know all aspects of the coronavirus and the pandemic it has caused, complexity 
can be beaten by transparency, not by simplicity. The focus has been on the 
emergent consequences of exposure rather than on the transmission mechanisms 
themselves. It is the size of the consequences, rather than the nature of the 
pandemic, that has driven governmental responses. This is not an act of resilience 
and anticipation, preparing to prevent a next pandemic; just a firefighting effort to 
save what might be left after the current crisis. Consequently, it pays to be 
prepared.  
1.6 Foresight towards a full information paradigm  
Cacciabue (2004) discriminates two types of risk analysis: retrospective and 
prospective studies. These are complimentary and contribute equally to the 
development of assessment and measures. This approach rests on both empirical 
and theoretical platforms for evaluating socio-technical context and models. In 
practice, retrospection aims to identify data and parameters associated with 
specific occurrences, operational experiences, and context. Prospection, in 
contrast, aims to evaluate consequences of scenarios using a spectrum of 
methods, models and techniques. Taken together, this framework identifies the 
knowledge base needed to foresee future developments, their boundary 
conditions, initiating events, systemic process, and failure modes (Cacciabue 
2004). Applying this approach may provide an encompassing set of safety 
performance indicators for foresight of the safety states of a system and to 
identifying areas of concern. Such areas are based on information collection and 
processing as described by Klir and Godet. 
1.6.1 A full information paradigm  
The simultaneous use of feedback and feed-forward mechanisms can be 
theoretically underpinned by the ‘full information paradigm’ of Klir (1987)—see fig 
1. According to this paradigm, the body of knowledge and experience acquired in 
a system over decades, provides a basis for considering safety and risk (Stoop, 
1990). Such a body of knowledge dominates legacy systems such as energy, 
process industry and transport; it makes the Non-Plus Ultra-Safe (NPUS) safe, but 
also reluctant to change. Their ability to adapt is hampered by vested mental 
constructs, assumptions and simplifications, expertise and consensus on scientific 
paradigms, methods, notions and techniques, both theoretical and practical. 
‘Old views’ have to be discarded and abolished in case of a paradigm shift in safety 
thinking, similar to Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’ on economic theory. 
Otherwise an opaque blending is created by mixing old and new views into a hybrid 
concept. In the past, we have seen a stall of such a dialectic process by proclaiming 
A versus B concept of safety, to be replaced by another version of C versus D. Such 
a debate does not restrict itself to an academic discourse but may hamper progress 
by creating confusion during application of these versions in legacy systems. A fall 
back on old views and repetition of debates across domains and disciplines 
frequently occurs, allocating public, corporate and personal responsibilities for 
safety, emphasising the roles of whistle blowers and regulators.  
 
Figure 1: Full information paradigm (Hierarchical ordered control loops) according to Klir 
(1987) 
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Solving complex problems would be done better if there was greater scope for 
individuals to innovate solutions. To create space for individual competence, 
creativity, flexibility and innovation, we advocate the abolition of three obsolete 
notions: simplified accident models, human-error schemes, and judicial concepts 
of cause and blame. Taking each of these in turn: 
• predefined, simplified accident models should not be used to reconstruct the 
course of an event. This is ‘model-forcing’ rather than ‘model-fitting’. 
Instead, groups of actors should develop shared understanding of an event 
by using the scenario concept; 
• ‘human error’ schemes prejudice problem-solving. Instead, a new view on 
human behaviour should be adopted as this invite, rather than precludes, 
deeper understanding of human behaviour in context; 
• judicial concepts of blame and cause are fitted to the legal context of 
deciding liability in the courtroom. Their application should be challenged as 
a means for actors to understand multilinear interactions. Instead, these 
interactions are better understood using systems concepts, especially as the 
operation of feedback and feed-forward. 
 
Abolition of the use of accident models, the notion of cause and human error as 
proposed by social scientists is likely to meet resistance to change due to: 
• a lack of understanding of system engineering theory by non-technical 
scientists and practitioners; 
• mono-disciplinary paradigmatic perspectives in psychology on human 
performance and cognition; 
• disciplinary demarcation lines between technical and social sciences, and; 
• cognitive stubbornness and resistance to change at both an individual, 
corporate and governance level.  
1.6.2 The Greek Triangle according to Godet 
The Greek Triangle, as formulated by Godet in 1994 and later developed into the 
networking action scheme (Godet 2010), sees prospective strategy as a 
management tool that links anticipation to action through appropriation.  
 
 
Figure 2: The relationship between Anticipation, Action and Appropriation (Source: 
Adapted from Godet 1994, p. 4) 
Godet defines these terms: 
• anticipation is the awareness of the future, and prospective thought;  
• appropriation is joint commitment, collective mobilisation and sharing of 
values; and 
• action is strategic resolve, and planning. 
The triangle helps to discern the plausible future, and to develop strategy 
accordingly. 
The three points of the triangle represent the pull, or image of the future (visual); 
the push, or drivers, of the present (quantitative); and the weight, or barriers, of 
the past (deep structure). 
1.7 Foresight in safety – taking actions for a change  
1.7.1 Corporate foresight 
Corporate foresight is often seen as the capability of an organisation or firm to 
ensure its long-term survival and competitiveness by envisaging trends and 
detecting changes and consequences. 
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Corporate foresight (Rohrbeck, 2010) has been defined as: ‘…an ability that 
includes any structural or cultural element that enables the company to detect 
discontinuous change early, interpret the consequences for the company, and 
formulate effective responses to ensure the long-term survival and success of the 
company.’  
However, due to shortening of product lifecycles, increased technological change, 
increased speed of innovation, and increased speed of the diffusion of innovations, 
the long-term perspective has become hard to defend. Rather, there is a constant 
pressure to explore and develop new business ideas, penetrate new markets and 
compete with aggressive competitors. 
Rohrbeck et al. (2015, p. 8) argue that three novel areas of research within the field 
of corporate foresight should be pursued: 
• Managerial cognition, which emphasises the role of the individual and group 
cognition in shaping perception and influencing decision-making;  
• Forward-looking search, which is based on the behavioural theory of the 
firm. It emphasises that, as individuals are subject to bounded-rationality, 
firm decision-making cannot be conceptualised as purely rational or 
produced by analytical reasoning; 
• Prospective sense-making, which considers organising as a process in which 
individuals build on their past experiences, and collectively reflect on these 
episodes to converge behind common objectives and lines of action. 
Hopefully, such research endeavours would also be conducive to forming a 
research stream on strategic safety foresight in organisations.  
1.7.2 Tools and techniques 
Foresight studies must be integrated into the total safety administration of high-
risk companies, industrial factories, transport enterprises, etc. This means 
adjustment of all the major elements of the current approach as developed over 
decades. These elements include risk analysis, accident investigations, mapping of 
unwanted events, dynamic learning, legal requirements, internal safety standards 
and procedures, competence development, continuous safety education, training, 
and change management. Hindsight lessons, insight competence and foresight 
studies must be part of a holistic safety management system. Debatably, the 
implementation of such a holistic model seems today rather rare in most private 
companies and public enterprises. 
The foresight discipline has developed and enlarged its methodology over the 
years. In particular, the use of scenarios, the Delphi technique, panels, and games 
have become widely used, often in combination with other methods. At the same 
time, the content of the methods has partly changed. Whereas these methods 
were once the province of experts, now they are increasingly participatory; with 
employers, consumers, and citizens as actors.  
Scientists use future techniques in their research (futurists) as do think-tanks and 
similar institutions. They draw on a wide range of foresight methods, including 
those listed in Table 2. The list is merely illustrative, and other methods exist. Note 
that these methods can be used for a wide variety of purposes e.g. diagnosis, 
prognosis, prescription or being normative, predicative, etc. 
Table 2: List of foresight methods. (Popper 2008a&b; Karlsen & Øverland 2010) 
• Anticipatory thinking 
protocols 




• Scenario method 
• Delphi method 






• Futures workshops 
• Failure mode and 
effects analysis 
• Futures wheel 
• Technology road 
mapping 
• Social network 
analysis 
• Systems engineering 







The list is not at all complete. Several authors include other methods in their 
foresight research. The point of this list is that foresight methods may be used for 
different purposes, e.g. diagnosis, prognosis, prescription or being normative, 
predicative, etc.  
Amongst those methods listed in Table 2, trend analysis is particularly widely used 
by e.g. ‘public planners, think tanks, foresight departments in companies and 
multinational enterprises. In fact, trend analysis, which is widespread within 
several commercial sectors, research institutes, and universities, have become a 
necessary tool in strategic planning, including policy making and decision making. 
In a systematic approach to safety, trend analysis should be linked to two 
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important fields: the connection to knowledge, to risk and change management 
and to risk analysis and learning from accidents and incidents.  
Three recent different examples of trend analysis with different perspectives are 
shown below. 
Table 3: Examples of trend analysis topics from three institutions 
Institution Institution Institution 
Simon M Atkinson/IPSOS5 WATCH INSTITUTE6 FORBES7 
1. Dynamic Population 
 Growing Opportunity 
and Growing 
Inequality 




5. Healthier and sicker 
6. Rise of individual 
choice and fracturing 
of the mass market 
7. Rise of the individual 
and decline of social 
cohesion 
8. Cultural convergence 
and increasing 
extremes 
9. Always on versus off 
the grid 













Watch Institute has 
identified 5 
megatrends in each of 
the sector mentioned 
above – and list, 
describe and analyse 
altogether 25 
megatrends. 
1. The increasing datafication 
(sic) of our lives 
2. The Internet of Things and  
how everyday devices are 
becoming more ‘smart’ 
3. Exponential growth in 
computing power is fuelling 
massive tech advances 
4. The incredible rise of artificial 
 intelligence  
5. The unstoppable freight   
train is automation  
6. 3D printing opens up amazing  
opportunities for 
manufacturers (and others) 
7. We’re interacting with 
technology in diverse ways 
8. Blockchains: An invention 
that could change our world 
9. Platforms are the way 
forward for businesses  
                                                                
5 https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/10-Mega-Trends-That-are-Reshaping-The-World.pdf, 
Accessed 06 January 2020 
6  https://issuu.com/megatrendswatch/docs/global-megatrends-preview?ff=true, Accessed 06 January 
2020 
1.7.3 Foresight:  from safety, via anticipation towards resilience 
Park et al. (2013, p. 358-359) claim that in complex systems, risk analysis alone is 
inadequate to fully protect system functions and components.  
This is because: “The classic risk analytic paradigm begins with hazards 
identification – an exercise that is problematic in the context of complex systems 
and emergent threats because hazards may be largely unknown”.  
Instead, they propose to combine risk analysis with what they call resilience 
analysis when working out catastrophe management plans. They claim that 
resilience in a complex systems context is a ‘dynamic, emergent property in the 
context of a specific failure scenario’. Both risk management and resilience are vital 
to every organization.  While risk analysis is well known, especially in private sector 
enterprises, prominent in the resilience analysis are four recursive processes, 
which may be modelled as a cycle (Park et al. 2013, p. 360): 
1. Sensing, by which new system stresses are efficiently and rapidly 
incorporated into current understanding; 
2. Anticipation, by which newly incorporated knowledge gained by sensing 
is used to foresee possible crises and disasters; 
3. Adaptation—the response to the information produced by sensing and 
anticipation; 
4. Learning, by which new knowledge is created and maintained by 
observation of past actions.   
Resilience and anticipation deal with risks in different, but compatible, ways. 
Anticipation is the process of becoming aware of previously unanticipated events. 
According to Wildavsky (1991), anticipation is a mode of control by a central mind 
or actor; efforts are made to predict and prevent potential dangers before damage 
is done. For example, accident prevention is based on anticipating potential 
accidents and is enhanced by three processes of mindfulness: (1) preoccupation 
with failure, (2) reluctance to simplify interpretations, and (3) sensitivity to 
operations. (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001; p.54). It is a strategy which aims to cope 
7 https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/12/04/9-technology-mega-trends-that-will-
change-the-world-in-2018/#23c8f0805eed, Accessed 06 January 2020 
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with known threats that an organization is aware of. Anticipation means to direct 
your resources at one or a few specific threats, so you are best capable of dealing 
with that specific scenario. The point is that anticipation as a safety strategy was 
insufficient in today’s uncertain and complex world. Under circumstances of great 
uncertainty and complexity, resilience is a better strategy than anticipation for 
managing risks. On the other hand, resilience is the capacity to cope with 
unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, learning to bounce back. 
Dealing with unknown hazards ‘as they declare themselves’ is another expression 
for resilience (Wildavsky 1991).  This perspective from Wildavsky has been further 
developed by several scholars within organization and risk management theory. 
One perspective is ‘high reliability organisation’ theory. Another perspective that 
builds on Wildavsky and the literature of high reliability organisations is ‘Resilience 
engineering’. Debatably, Wildavsky`s dissection between anticipation and 
resilience has been blurred in this literature since the resilience concept in the 
Resilience engineering literature includes both what Wildavsky would have 
denoted anticipation and resilience.  
Let us take a closer look at the resilience concept and the theoretical puzzle. As 
stated above, resilience is the idea that an individual, a technological or social 
system has the capacity to handle events that challenge boundary conditions. It 
encompasses the ability to prevent something dysfunctional from happening, or 
the ability to prevent something dysfunctional from worsening, or the ability to 
recover from something dysfunctional once it has happened (Westrum, 2006). 
Dysfunctional challenging events occur because plans and procedures have 
fundamental limits, or because the environment changes, or because the object 
itself adapts, given the changing pressures and expectations for performance 
(Woods 2009). The capacity to respond to such events, (i.e. dysfunctionalities) 
resides in the expertise, strategies, tools, and plans that people in various roles can 
deploy to prepare for and response to specific classes of change. Hence, we expect 
resilience to demonstrate an ability to avoid problems, to handle problems when 
they must be faced and to recover from damage once the dysfunctionality has 
happened.  
Resilience is also the process of being mindful of errors that have already occurred 
and correcting them before they worsen or cause more serious harm. Resilience is 
related to accident mitigation and enhanced by two processes of mindfulness: (1) 
commitment to resilience, and (2) deference to expertise. Organizations 
committed to resilience develop knowledge and skills to cope with and respond to 
errors, capability for swift feedback and swift learning, speed and accuracy in 
communications, flexible role structures, quick size-ups, experiential variety, skills 
at re-combining existing response repertoires, and comfort with improvisation. 
Such organizations move decision-making rapidly to those with the necessary 
expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe 2001). 
Besides, resilience may be seen as a ’dynamic non-event‘ (Weick 2001), it is both 
dynamic and invisible. It is dynamic because it is an ongoing condition in which 
problems are instantly controlled due to compensating changes in components. It 
is invisible in the sense that it does not reveal the worst case scenarios, i.e. how 
many mistakes and breakdowns could possibly happen and in the sense that 
reliable outcomes are constant, i.e. there is nothing to pay attention to since 
nothing seemingly is happening inside the intended performance envelope. 
Visibility should be enhanced by identifying operational scenarios other than 
incidents and accidents. 
Hindsight is the ability to understand, after something has happened, what should 
have been done or what caused the event. It is another way of describing 
retrospection. Hindsight is a useful skill that can be cultivated. Hindsight often 
refers to a lesson learned from something that went wrong. In hindsight, you'd 
know you should've paid attention to the giant ‘danger’ sign.  In the context of 
foresight studies, hindsight is a form of organisational sense-making, and resilience 
is seen as the capacity to bounce back to normal operations after a catastrophe or 
some other major mishap. 
Arguably, such concepts should contribute to the ambition of linking the 
theoretical world of foresight and the practical world of safety closer together, by 
explicating key concepts and implicit assumptions in both fields. However, the 
concept of resilience seems almost ineffable: it resists definition and description.  
if resilience is meant to encompass both the capability to respond, to monitor and 
to anticipate and by the end of day also learn both from successes and failures, 
resilient engineering research should illustrate the necessity to link these aspects 
when building resilience in organisations.  An open question is - what concrete 
things and conditions could an observer use to make sense of resilience in airline 
operations, railways, NPPs and other sectors mentioned earlier in the chapter?  
Besides, the theoretical puzzle prevails: How do we recognise resilience in 
ontological terms as long as we do not expect a person or system having a total 
breakdown? Subsequently, how do we perceive the ontological and 
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epistemological aspects of resilience to be visualised and presented? Resilience is 
not only a technological device, but also covering an organisational or an individual 
capacity meant to prevent dysfunctions to materialise or to appear if, and only if 
something totally unexpected happens. We may say that resilience is a systemic 
phenomenon that is not expected to be activated, i.e. it is not foreseen to have a 
future. However, if a breakdown happens, resilience is expected to serve as a 
safety net recovering the capacity of the system or the individual. Can this puzzle 
ever be solved? 
1.7.4 What next? 
More research beyond the level of short term, specific impact assessment studies, 
is needed at both national and EU levels to identify adequate and appropriate 
methods; and to investigate the utilitarian value of applying corporate 
(management) foresight perspectives to safety in a medium and long-term 
perspective. 
1.8 Foresight in safety: the new approach 
1.8.1 Five major elements in the new approach 
Innovation and pioneering work is needed to apply foresight theories and methods 
in the field of Safety. Apart from national security, food and nutrition safety and a 
few other fields, safety seems to be rather absent as research object in the 
foresight tradition.  
The new approach of the ESReDA Project Group ‘Foresight in Safety’, largely 
informed by the situation in European high-risk industries and public safety 
institutions. It can be characterised by five factors:  
1. A broad perception of the concept safety which may benefit from the 
scientific foresight tradition. So far, it seems that safety in general has had a low 
priority in the development of the theories and the methods as well as in the 
practical application of foresight insights. PG’s work may therefore be looked at as 
a kind of pioneer work trying to combine a basic area in the modern society (safety) 
with a very promising and innovative scientific research discipline (foresight).  
2. The time horizon assumed in this study is essentially the near future (0 – 
10/15 years?).  This is not aligned with the traditional foresight approach which 
emphasises the value of a middle, or long-term, time perspective. 
3. The safety setting is pragmatic. The goal of foresight work in safety should 
help to promote and increase safety. This study emphasises the value of hindsight 
experiences and learning from past events, but at the same time including 
proactive methods and measures: as data from early warning signs, lessons from 
whistle-blower-cases, the challenges with loss of memory in companies and public 
institutions etc.  
4. We will promote a holistic programme to enhance safety in industry, 
transportation, public serves etc.: combining hindsight and foresight, combining 
lessons learned from past experiences with future trends and studies, combing 
systematic safety approaches from own sector and own company with experiences 
from other similar companies – also abroad. 
5. Lastly, we will propose to explore the possibilities to meet the safety 
challenges (defined as total safety) within your sector with the positive effects of 
a synergy approach which includes a wide perspective:  the potential of enhancing 
safety by cooperation both within and across sectors, across national borders, 
across scientific disciplines and traditions, combining hindsight and foresight etc.  
This background is reflected in the various topics which are covered in the present 
work.  
1.8.2 Implementing the foresight approach 
Foresight as an academic, scientific discipline is, above all, characterised by three 
fundamental, complementary dimensions: uncertainty, complexity, and dynamic 
interactions. 
The first dimension, uncertainty, is a consequence of choosing the future as the 
subject. Uncertainty increases with the choice of time frame: with near, medium 
and above all long-term horizons (30 – 50 years) the uncertainty factor is extremely 
large. In addition, a number of other choices contribute to increase the degree of 
uncertainty: as organisational level (group, municipality, region, nation, 
continent), choice of approach (such as political, social-economic, cultural etc.), 
choice of sector (such as business and multinational enterprises, government 
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institutions or enterprises, ideal companies or various types of organisations, 
including NGOs and supranational institutions and organisations).  
The second dimension, complexity, highlights the everyday phenomenon that we 
seldom predict the results of an innovative development. Technological innovation 
leads to brand new products, and new patterns of technical and social interaction. 
The development of products such as colour TV, personal computing, tablet 
devices, mobile phones, electrical and driverless cars or buses, are just a few 
examples from the past decades. The emergence of social media and the 
widespread use of digital tools such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Google, 
Wikipedia, have gained within a few years, are others. The very complex 
interaction between the climate and the environment, changes in the settlement 
pattern (from rural to urban domination) are other examples. An important 
feature of the complexity of today is the tempo at which these changes occur. The 
pivotal function that knowledge production has gained in social developments and 
the enormous resources that multinational corporations can allocate to innovative 
operations further accelerate the tempo. The combination of complexity and 
accelerating tempo underline the importance of foresight methodology.  
The third dimension, dynamic interactions, deals with the dimension of time. This 
dimension covers various time scales, both short term—during operations—and 
long term—throughout the system lifecycle. In foresight, time also covers 
transition phases and system states that emerge during the transition from one 
phase or state to another. In such transition periods, hybrid situations and 
conditions may create temporary disruptions and deviations from optimal 
performance which could be foreseen and addressed. Such hybrid periods may 
both create a better or worse performance that anticipated (Vincenti, 1990). They 
can be submitted to system erosion and deliberate interventions by extrapolating 
performance beyond design parameters (Minsky, 1986). In a foresight approach, 
resistance to change, system stability and system oscillation should be considered 
in advance as inherent/intrinsic properties to prevent emergent behaviour (Stoop, 
2019).  
The implementation of foresight theories and methods in the future safety work – 
with these three dimensions integrated – needs further research and studies, a 
willingness to share insight and experiences across frontiers, being between 
enterprises, authorities, research institutions, think-tanks, organisations – also 
across national borders. 
1.9 Conclusions and recommendations 
1.9.1 Objectives in an uncertain and complex future 
‘The future is complex and uncertain, and so are its threats to safety and security. 
These threats are in a different league to our existing approaches to safety, which 
operate on timescales that are too short, and with scopes that are too narrow. The 
fact that our approach to safety is outclassed by the threats we face [survival of 
mankind, climate and environmental problems, new artificial products …] seems 
to be either fatalistically accepted or simply not faced at all. Our contention is that 
these threats are tractable, but that it requires rethinking what we think we know 
about safety, and a readiness—urgency, even—to explore new ways. Foresight, 
we think, symbolises this new frontier.  
1.9.2 Foresight and safety 
Foresight can benefit safety. Some of the foresight methods and concepts 
reviewed in this chapter can be adapted to this end.  
However, success is likely to be greater if the foresight community and the safety 
community communicate with each other.  
• The foresight approach seems to have high potential utilitarian value for 
finding safety enhancements in the short term. 
• The use of foresight notions and methods has so far only to a small degree 
been incorporated in systematic safety management at a governance and 
corporate level. 
• The impact of residual risks and side-effects should be part of a foresight 
approach considering the long-term dynamics and uncertainty of innovative 
developments. 
• In the foresight approach, the full information paradigm should be applied, 
benefiting from a feedback and feed-forward learning process 
• In the foresight approach, higher order driving forces should be considered, 
as they represent socio-economical innovations, political philosophy, and 
social values. 
The answer to complexity is transparency: de-risking of disruptive architecture 
facilitates foresight.  
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• The legacy of systems, their technological nature and temporal dynamics 
should be considered as inherent constraints. Before introducing them, the 
long-term effects of innovations in complex systems need to be better 
predicted and discussed by all affected, incl.  across life cycle borders. 
• More research is needed at both national and EU levels to identify adequate 
and appropriate methods and to investigate the utilitarian value of applying 
foresight in safety in a medium and long-term perspective. 
• Explore the value of importing experiences and knowledge about the use of 
foresight methods to the safety arena. 
 
The present authors see foresight located alongside safety insight and oversight: 
• First, gain insight by safety investigations in critical events and occurrences as 
described in the ESReDA approach. 
• Then, gain oversight by putting these events in the architecture of a systemic 
context, discriminating structure, culture, content and operating context 
• Finally, gain foresight by understanding and predicting future behaviour of 
the system  
Safety is an indispensable strategic value in the transition process from derivative 
to disruptive solutions in developing innovative as well as legacy systems. The main 
challenge for safety professionals is to develop new notions, methods, tools and 
techniques to cope with the challenges that accompany such a transition. These 
efforts could benefit from unexplored and so far uncharted domains and 
disciplines. Foresight is a promising prospect when addressing safety. But it will 
need global leadership. Will the UN, OECD, EU and WHO jointly support such an 
endeavour? 
To paraphrase Richard Booth (1979) in his inaugural lecture in 1979:  
“Safety is too important a matter to be left to futurologists”. 
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2 Foresight between whistle blowers and resilience 
John Stoop, Kindunos, The Netherlands 
2.1 Executive summary 
In the safety debate emphasis is laid on the need for a paradigm shift: 
• From reactive to proactive 
• From prescriptive to responsive 
and: 
• coping with the unanticipated.  
In short: the relation between safety and foresight has become a focus of attention 
in both theory and practice. 
Several successive schools of thought can be identified in the socio-organisational 
and -psychological scientific domain. The role of operational feedback in each of 
these schools -in particular from the hot seat- is quite different. After a period of 
exclusion of operator feedback and compulsory compliance with a single actor -
managerial- control, a re-integration of operational feedback and multi-actor 
involvement is emerging. A recognition of ‘weak signals’ in their systemic context 
is emerging as a means to cope with system complexity and dynamic interactions. 
Such recognition acknowledges the value of human variability in task performance, 
irrespective of blaming, shaming or framing. Such recognition should facilitate 
foresight on acceptable safe operator performance. 
Due to the very nature of socio-technical systems however, foresight historically 
has been assessed in a wider context than operations variability to reduce 
uncertainty on unanticipated and unacceptable future performance. New 
technologies, disruptive designs and innovative concepts demand foresight on a 
safe performance without the benefits of future operational experience and 
feedback. From our analysis it is concluded that the old school of Reason and 
Rasmussen is deficient while the new school of resilience is not yet fully capable of 
coping with foresight in legacy systems such as aviation. 
Economic theories, disruptive designs and innovative technologies, professional 
airmanship and subject matter expertise are identified as prime change drivers in 
socio-technical systems of a legacy nature. Such drivers determine the acceptance 
of schools of thought beyond their own internal rationales or scientific paradigm. 
Reflecting on the role of foresight it is concluded that new approaches such as 
resilience engineering have potential but can only applied successfully if they take 
into account the inherent properties of the legacy of the systems in which they are 
applied. In resilience engineering, the outsiders role of whistle blowers becomes 
obsolete as subject matter expertise is acknowledged as input from within the 
system. Such input is not restricted to individual operational experts, but is also 
covering independent and qualified safety investigations and inspections during 
both design and operations on the organisational and institutional levels. 
2.2 Introduction 
This paper explores the role of resilience engineering contributing to foresight in 
general. It focuses on feedback from reality and dealing with complexity with 
respect to reducing uncertainty and predicting future behaviour. It delves into 
several rationales that have come up in the debate about foresight and resilience 
engineering and puts these rationales in the context of managing risk and safety. 
This chapter discusses the role of whistleblowing and resilience in assessing weak 
signals as indicators for mishaps in matured and established socio-technical 
domains, referred to as legacy systems. Several competing schools of thought in 
the socio-psychological domain about human behaviour are explored, contrasting 
the ‘old’ school of Reason and Rasmussen with the ‘new’ school of resilience 
engineering. Questions are asked about the validity of assumptions and the role of 
operational feedback in such concepts, in particular regarding whistle blowers. 
Moreover, these socio-psychological schools are confronted with technological 
thinking about foresight, in particular in the aviation domain. Aviation as a legacy 
sector is based on technological flexibility through the variation-selection process 
and knowledge management as a driver for innovation. How aviation as a unique 
socio-technical system has been dealing with uncertainty and foresight is explored 
in view of acceptance of resilience as a new notion in legacy systems. A revision of 
resilience engineering, with additional essentials ‘initiative’ and ‘reciprocity’ opens 
up opportunities to accept resilience as an engineering approach in aviation. Such 
acceptance complies with Good Airmanship principles in this legacy system 
integrating foresight in system feedback processes on both the individual, 
organisational and governance level. 
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2.3 Foresight in context 
Over the past few years, a crisis in safety science and risk assessment is proclaimed 
(Safety Science 2014; Stoop, De Kroes and Hale 2017). In exploring new 
perspectives, a literature analysis indicated a reconsideration of fundamentals of 
safety management, risk analysis and risk management (Aven 2016, Pasman and 
Reniers 2016, Lannoy 2016) and a generic applicability of independent safety 
investigations (Vuorio et.al. 2017). Simultaneously, changes in a socio-economic 
context from New Economy to Circular Economy, raise questions about the validity 
of existing safety notions and paradigms. There is an increasing interest in 
resilience engineering, recovery from non-normal situations and feedback of 
operational experience from practitioners. Such interest is aiming to bridge the 
gap between Work as Done and Work as Imagined (Hollnagel 2011). Evidence 
Based Interventions in the medical sector are discussed as a prospective approach 
in processing empirical data, based on best available evidence to justify a remedy, 
given the state of the art in the disciplines involved. In high tech transport sectors 
such as aviation, railways and the maritime, forensic engineering is acknowledged 
as a powerful approach in providing an evidence-based intervention (Strauch 
2002, Stoop 2015). Field operators and engineers are concerned with ‘weak 
signals’ as indicators for immanent failure. ‘Weak signals’ are considered a 
symptom of degradation of a system in its operational phase, exposing their 
assumptions, simplifications, linearizations and knowledge limitations (Dekker 
2011, Dekker and Pruchnicki 2013). Safety theories and notions as developed in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s are criticized, based on experience and expertise of 
practitioners in various domains. Rather than hindsight, foresight should be 
favoured to predict, analyse and control imminent danger (Roed-Larsen and Stoop 
2017).  
In essence, the safety foresight debate is about uncertainty and predictability. 
Foresight is required because disasters are unpredictable and unacceptable, in 
particular in complex socio-technical systems. Foresight is concerned with 
questions such as: where to find data, how to interpret the information and how 
to adapt and change? In this quest, a specific role for whistleblowers is proclaimed. 
Whistleblowers fulfil a role of interpreters of scarce and uncertain information, 
based on their professional, domain specific knowledge and experience. How such 
a role can be conducted however, seems to be dependent on the specific reporting 
culture and type of feedback in their sector. In the nuclear sector, operational 
experience feedback is advocated, in the transport sector, independent safety 
investigations are institutionalized, in the medical sector, resilience engineering is 
preferred. Although not fully similar to whistle blowing in a strict sense, in the ICT 
sector hacking and sabotage are predominant as failure coping mechanisms, 
requiring a specific form of ethical engineering (Van den Hoven 2013). 
The debate on feedback from operations has been dealt with from two 
perspectives: 
• Feedback during recovery from major disruptions after an event 
• Feedback during normal operations exploring the gap between theory and 
practice. 
In dealing with uncertainty, flexibility, variety, divergence and adaptive potential, 
allocation of these systemic, dynamic properties can result in two equivalent, 
primary system configuration options: 
• Keep organisations and institutions constant and vary technology. This 
system configuration is referred to in the Cynefin model of Snowden (2007) 
as ‘complicated’ 
• Keep technology constant and vary organisational and institutional 
arrangements. Such a system configuration is referred to in the Cynefin 
model as ‘complex’. 
Keeping both technology and organisations constant creates closed, rigid systems 
without the ability to respond and adapt, while keeping both technology and 
organisations variable will create chaotic systems lacking effective control options 
on disruptive technologies.  
These options require reflection on two main issues in such a configuration 
allocation to either man or machine: 
• Human performance and the debates between the ‘old school’ of human 
factor thinking and the new ‘Resilience school’ of organisational thinking 
• Engineering design in high tech systems and sectors with respect to 
variability and selecting either derivative or disruptive designs, discriminating 
adaptation from innovation. 
These perspectives, options and configuration allocations will be dealt with in the 
next paragraphs by analyzing the aviation sector as a case study. 
        Page 44 of 252 
2.4 Unravelling complexity 
2.4.1 Competing paradigms 
In establishing a new way of thinking in safety, an artificial contrast is frequently 
created between an ‘old’ and ‘new’ view. Over the past decades, debates in safety 
have been initiated in distinguishing between occupational versus process safety, 
internal versus external safety, deterministic versus probabilistic thinking, 
technological versus social safety, safety versus security and Safety I versus Safety 
II. Such dialectic controversies have not been fruitful due to a seemingly endless 
variation on the same theme of contrasting and mutually exclusive notions and 
competition between scientific disciplines and industrial domains. 
In their battle for recognition of humanities as a scientific discipline in safety issues, 
a disdain for technology and engineering design as a scientific activity has been 
expressed. Over 40 years, phrases were launched such as: ‘Safety, too an 
important matter to be left to engineers’ (Booth 1979) or expressed by Edwards in 
his presentation to the British Airline Pilots Association Technical Symposium 
advocating a dominant role for human factors in aviation safety (Edwards 1972). 
This plea coincided with the roll out of the first of a new generation of wide body 
aircraft, the Boeing 747, representing a leap in technical reliability and safety. 
Putting safety first as an objective in the Vison Zero philosophy is criticized as a 
‘shining example of altruism’ from the perspective of trading- off safety against 
other system goals. Claiming zero accidents as a goal should be ‘equivalent to the 
cries of fundamental religious groups on the right path to salvation or paradise’ 
(Hale 2006). In 2017 however, this ‘hard and shining ideal’ of zero fatal accidents 
was actually achieved (sic!) by the international community of commercial aviation 
(CASV 2017). More recently, the right to exist of safety science as an academic 
discipline as superfluous to psychology and organisational theory was brought up 
in a Special Issue of Safety Science of August 2014 (Safety Science 2014).  
Without achieving consensus and a synthesis that is both theoretically consistent 
and generically applicable in a new socio-economic and technological context, 
such debates frustrate progress. Rather than dialectically designing a new variation 
of safety notions within the same scientific paradigm from a theoretical supply 
perspective, a demand driven approach could be favoured with a general, basic 
understanding of complex socio-technical systems and the context in which they 
operate. Woods suggests to overcome this dialectic stall in the safety debate by 
defining a new unit of analysis: the man-machine-interface unit, replacing the 
either man or machine perspective (Woods 2016). 
In the academic safety debate two competing paradigms exist: a technological 
systems engineering perspective and a resilience engineering perspective (Stoop 
2015): 
• A systems engineering approach provides a new perspective by shifting from 
a disciplinary to a problem solving oriented approach (Stoop 1990, Stoop 
2017/1) 
• A resilience engineering approach provides a new paradigm by shifting from 
a technical, causal approach to a socio-organisational approach with a focus 
on consequences and recovery from mishap and disaster (Hollnagel et.al. 
2011). 
As postulated by resilience engineering professionals, the latter approach conflicts 
with some of the fundamental assumptions which define human factors, 
ergonomics and socio-organisational theories as applied in industry (Zimmermann 
et.al. 2011).  
They state that Resilience is ‘the antithesis of the traditional and still prevailing, 
human factors and safety paradigm’, referred to by Hollnagel as the ‘Traditional 
Safety Perspective’ (Zimmerman et.al. 2011). Adhering to this traditional 
perspective should not meet the needs of ultra-safe, complex modern industries 
such as aviation and may prevent further progress. Traditional ideas seem to 
‘remain entrenched in the perspectives and approaches of industry practitioners’. 
According to Amalberti, matured systems such as commercial aviation may no 
longer have the flexibility for dramatic or profound change (Amalberti 2001). 
Adaptations are supposed to remain restricted to the same underlying scientific 
paradigm. Their adaptation in safety thinking applies an epidemiological model as 
an extension of the usual sequential models.  Although commercial aviation is 
highly standardised and regulated at an international level, there should be room 
for interpretation and variation of how people perform, understand and manage 
their work (Zimmermann et.al. 2011). Zimmermann et al. claim that it was their 
aim to advocate Resilience Engineering attitudes by the rejection/acceptance of 
the Traditional Safety perspective. They pose the question whether aviation is 
ready to make the paradigm shift to Resilience in view of -to their opinion- an 
apparent much-needed paradigm shift. They intend to ‘dispel the myth that 
aviation is a purely technical domain in which standardisation has eliminated all 
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variations in how people do their work’. To their opinion, ‘flying, controlling and 
maintaining aircraft involves more than just checklists, radio frequencies and 
torque settings’ (Zimmermann et.al. 2011). Cultural differences between world 
regions should justify striking a balance between rule following and creativity, in 
particular in a context of diminishing resources and skills. Coping with adverse 
situations and conditions should not only advocate resilience on the micro level, 
because the macro level has stretched assets and resources too far. The system as 
a whole should favour resilience as a property. Although not yet formulated in 
terms of resilience, this is exactly what the aviation sector has achieved since the 
foundation of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). Aviation has 
adopted a system life cycle perspective with continuous adapting, multiple 
feedback loops across life phases, actors and system levels (Stoop and Kahan 
2005).   
Zimmermann et al. (2011) notice a paradox in the relationship between Resilience 
and Safety: ‘an unsafe system may be more flexible, more cautious, and may 
inadvertently foster resilience at the micro level.  Similarly, a stable, safe system 
would have difficulty maintaining flexibility’. They observe a ‘natural’ tendency to 
increase production levels when things go right. Increasing production could 
increase the inherent –volume driven- risks, reduce flexibility and tighten coupling. 
They state: ‘As aviation keeps evolving towards higher levels of standardisation, 
automation, procedures and stability, we must recognise that this comes at the 
expense of Resilience’ (Holling 1973). Such a strive for operational excellence in 
order to increase production is driven by New Economy arguments of optimizing 
production algorithms (Winters 2017). 
In proclaiming the myth that aviation is a ‘purely technical domain in which 
standardization has eliminated all variation in how people do their work’, social 
scientists are ignoring the technological and design assumptions and restrictions 
that are inherent to high tech safety critical systems in which open, global network 
configurations dominate. Since its conception, ICAO has dedicated its attention 
and efforts to all aspects of the aviation system performance regarding fees and 
fares, tariffs and trades (Freer 1986). ICAO has created an encompassing and 
coherent framework of Annexes to the ICAO Convention since 1951. Eventually, 
the civil aviation community has achieved a Non-Plus Ultra-Safe state (Amalberti 
2001). In aviation, a distributed and delegated responsibility was allocated to the 
operators under the notion of Good Airmanship to avoid rigidity in their task 
performance and to enable them to deal with unanticipated situations. To avoid a 
chaotic system with too many degrees of freedom and disruptions, ICAO chose a 
strategy with technology as the flywheel for progress, keeping organisational and 
institutional standardization and harmonization as the prerequisite for access to a 
high level playing field (Freer 1986). 
The desire of Zimmermann et.al. to introduce Resilience in aviation as a paradigm 
shift raises fundamental questions (Zimmermann 2011): 
• Is there a need to make a paradigm shift in safety thinking in aviation? 
• Does aviation need resilience to make such a shift? 
• How did aviation become so safe in the first place as a Non-Plus Ultra-Safe 
system? 
• What have been the safety achievements in this legacy system? 
• Can we identify ‘natural’ tendencies as change agents for adaptation? 
• How can aviation deal with foresight in view of major changes in its socio-
economic, geo-political and technological context? 
• Which scientific paradigms, theories and notions obstruct a transition to a 
Next Generation aviation industrial concept and system architecture? 
In answering these questions, we elaborate on: 
• Feedback loops such as whistle blowers and establishing institutional 
arrangements  
• Change drivers such as economic business models 
• Forensic engineering  as a knowledge development and diagnostic potential 
• System architecture regarding choices about stability, uncertainty, flexibility 
and trade-offs 
• Creative destruction of obsolete constructs such as human error, drift into 
failure and complexity by replacing them with new constructs such as 
resilience engineering. 
Developments towards resilience as a new concept for safety enhancement have 
their origin in criticisms on the human performance and organisational 
management as developed by Reason and Rasmussen. These concepts have 
allocated a specific role for whistle blowers and their foresight capabilities. 
2.4.2 Reason: the traditional approach revisited 
In his early work, Reason (2015) focused on the systemic factors underlying what 
he defined as ‘organizational accidents’. Such accidents should differ in sharp 
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contrast from ‘individual accidents’ where damaging consequences have limited 
impact, restricted to their direct environment. In addition, they are supposed to 
have ‘quite different causal pathways’ compared to organisational accidents, 
resulting merely in loss-time injuries. Individual accidents should not have 
potential for predicting the likelihood of organisational accidents. In his revisited 
perspective on organisational accidents, Reason shifts the focus of intervention 
and control potential from management to those who are in the first line of 
defence: the operators on the spot. They are supposed to have an improved error 
wisdom and the power to halt the accident trajectory before harm or damage can 
be done. In his approach, awareness is a pivotal notion. A system safety approach 
should require the integration of systemic factors –labelled as collective 
mindfulness- and individual skills – labelled as personal mindfulness-. Political and 
commercial pressure are considered underlying factors for senior management to 
underplay in hindsight emergent, obvious threats. Because incompatible goals and 
organisational shortcomings may lead to disregarding clear warning signals, there 
should be no unambiguous responsibility for responding to weak signals by senior 
management. Reason advocates a shared responsibility with line management, 
and newly defined Safety Duty Holders, as the subject matter experts in assessing 
risks. All employees should be made aware of their individual safety 
responsibilities, supported by standards, procedures and job descriptions.  A state 
of chronic unease should be maintained in the safety war (Reason 2015). 
Reason allocates a specific responsibility to designers in their “frequent lack of 
awareness of the capabilities and limitations of the end user” (Reason 2015). 
According to Reason, many design-induced errors arise because “designers 
underestimate the extent to which necessary knowledge should be allocated in 
reality rather than in theory”. In his opinion, organisational accidents are assumed 
to be the result of a mismatch between theory and practice. Training the mental 
skills of operators on underlying risk awareness are considered hallmarks for High 
Reliability Organisations. In order to make front-line workers more vigilant, 
organisational support from management is required. Individual mindfulness of 
danger needs to be informed, sustained and supported by a collective mindfulness 
of the operational risks (Reason 2015). This should enhance system resilience, 
converted to a lasting mental skill of foresight and maintaining situational 
awareness. By applying mindfulness, as Reason states, it is possible to foresee and 
recover from an accident. Predefined knowledge, theories and models, generated 
by safety scientists may even displace or marginalize existing local or system-
specific safety knowledge embedded in operational practices. Hiring external 
safety professionals and experts with well-intended efforts, might even have a 
detrimental effect (Almklov, Rosness and Storkersen 2014) because their subject 
matter expertise might dominate managerial expertise. Reason emphasises an 
indispensable role of error for front-line workers: ‘an incident story without 
mention of error or individual wrong actions is a story without a beginning. 
Accidents and incidents are inevitable in complex and tightly coupled systems and 
–hence- they are normal’. Due to hindsight biases and distorting influences in 
dealing with unexpected events, a narrowing of focus on the systemic factors may 
induce a ‘premature closure on the actions of those at the sharp end’, disregarding 
the balance between individual and collective mindfulness. Local factors 
distinguish systems that suffer from accidents from those that do not, because 
local circumstances are necessary and sufficient. Organisational factors are only 
conditions, not causes and insufficient to bring about the disaster (Reason 2015). 
Towards a shared responsibility 
Changes in the initial conditions of –complex- systems of systems create difficulties 
in understanding their behaviour and adaptation to the changes. These changes 
may incrementally decline a system into disaster by environmental pressure, social 
processes and unruly technology that normalize increasing risk (Harvey and 
Stanton 2014). Adapting to such changes throughout the lifetime of systems of 
systems, may be too short to enable the development of sufficient knowledge and 
experience to cope with the consequences. While responsibilities for systemic risks 
remain at an organisational level, regulations are to be developed to shift the 
official ownership of risk from organisation to the individual. Placing 
responsibilities at an individual level, is based on the assumption that each 
individual will do everything within their power to mitigate the risk. This 
assumption ensures a more rigorous safety management than the old approach of 
assigning risk at an organisational level, where accountability was more difficult to 
ascribe (Harvey and Stanton 2014). These insights in assessing risk should explicitly 
take into account recent incidents, changes to policies, predicted changes in 
government, predicted lifespan of technical components and 
national/international economic climates. Assessing a ‘Risk-to-Life’ comes down to 
trust in the skills and experiences of the subject matter expert involved in the risk 
assessment.  Such a moral and ethical burden puts high demands on foresight 
capabilities and their potential role as ‘early warning’ signalling expert. Such an 
individual responsibility institutionalizes a role as potential whistle blower for a 
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subject matter expert and Safety Duty Holder. They are faced with the 
responsibility to communicate with stakeholders across disciplinary and 
paradigmatic borders of a technical, social and organisational nature. 
2.4.3 Rasmussen’s’ role on systems modelling 
In the domain of human behavior a shift of focus occurred from inferred and 
uncertain states of mind towards characteristics of human factors that can be 
framed in generic performance models. Rasmussen takes this shift one step 
further by proclaiming a distinction between stable conditions of the past, versus 
a present dynamic society (Rasmussen 1997). The present society is allegedly 
different by a very fast change of technology, a steadily increasing scale of 
industrial installations, a rapid development of information and communication 
technology and an aggressive and competitive environment which influence the 
incentives of decision makers to use short term financial and survival criteria. 
Rasmussen states that modeling can be done by generalizing across systems and 
their particular hazard sources. Risk management should be modeled by cross-
disciplinary studies, considering risk management to be a control problem and 
serving to represent the control structure involving all levels of society for each 
particular hazard category. This, he argues, requires a system-oriented approach 
based on ‘functional abstraction rather than structural decomposition’. Therefore, 
task analysis focused on action sequences and occasional deviation in terms of 
human errors, should be replaced by a model of behavior shaping mechanisms in 
terms of work system constraints, boundaries of acceptable performance and 
subjective criteria guiding adaptation to change (Italics added). System models 
should be built not by a bottom-up aggregation of models derived from research 
in the individual disciplines, but top-down, by a systems oriented approach based 
on control theoretic concepts. 
According to Rasmussen, rather than striving to control behavior by fighting 
deviations, the focus should be on making the boundaries explicit and known. Risk 
management should provide opportunities to develop coping skills at boundaries. 
For a particular hazard source, the control structure must be identified, including 
controllers, their objectives and performance criteria control capability. 
Information should be available about the actual state of the system. Control over 
the pace of technology at a societal level created a specific role for the regulator 
in protecting workers. By stating safety performance objectives, safety becomes 
just another criterion in multi-criteria decision making and becomes an integrated 
part of normal operational decision making in a corporate setting. In this way, the 
safety organization is merged with the line organization. This requires an explicit 
formulation of value criteria and effective means of communication of values 
down through society and organizations. The impact of decisions on the objectives 
and values of all relevant stakeholders are to be adequately and formally 
considered by a newly introduced notion of   ‘ethical accounting’ (Reason 2015).  
A full scale accident then involves simultaneous violations of all the designed 
defenses. The assumption is that the probability of failure of the defenses 
individually can and will be verified empirically during operations even if the 
probability of a stochastic coincidence is extremely low. Monitoring the 
performance of the staff during work is derived from the system design 
assumptions, not from empirical evidence from past performance. It therefore 
should be useful to develop more focused analytical risk management strategies 
and a classification of hazard sources in order to select a proper management 
policy and information system. When the anatomy is well bounded by the 
functional structure of a stable system, then the protection against major 
accidents can be based on termination of the flow of events after release of the 
hazard. When particular circumstances are at stake, the basis for protection should 
be on elimination of the causes of release of the hazard. Design of barriers is only 
accepted on the basis of a predictive risk analysis demonstrating an acceptable 
overall risk to society. When the predicted risk has been accepted, the process 
model, the preconditions, and assumptions of the prediction then become 
specifications of the parameters of risk management. Preconditions and 
assumptions must be explicitly stated in a Probabilistic Risk Assessment. In this 
view, fortunately, Rasmussen states, it is not necessary for this purpose to predict 
performance of operators and management. Data on human performance in 
operation, maintenance, and management can be collected during operations and 
used for a ‘live’ risk analysis. Thus, predictive risk analysis for operational 
management should be much simpler than the analysis for a priori acceptance of 
the design. This also should require far less subject matter expertise. Such 
performance data should be collected through other sources than accident 
investigations; incident analysis and expert opinion extraction may compensate for 
the lack of abundant accident data. According to Rasmussen, the models required 
to plan effective risk management strategies cannot be developed by integrating 
the results of horizontally oriented research into different features of hazard 
sources and systems configurations. Instead, vertical studies of the control 
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structure are required for well bounded categories of hazard sources, although 
uniform control strategies would suffice (Rasmussen and Svedung 2000).  
In conclusion, in their advocacy for managerial control, Reason and Rasmussen 
initially have positioned the feedback from design and operators in an outsiders 
role of whistleblowing. This has only partly been compensated in their revision by 
introducing a Safety Duty holder and ethical accounting for shop floor workers. The 
assumptions, limitations and simplifications of Reasons’ and Rasmussens’ concepts 
have initiated a debate among sociopsychological and -sociological researchers on 
a successive concept for operational control and managerial oversight in safety 
critical systems: the resilience engineering concept. 
2.4.4 The fallacy of lack of foresight and management control 
Claiming a role for resilience engineering 
In his theory, James Reason shifts stability of systems from the individual operator 
level to the organisational level. Such a stability is shifting from individual control 
to organisational and hence, managerial control. As stated by Hollnagel (2011), 
individuals have a natural and uncontrollable variance in behaviour, restricting the 
ability of higher management order to control individual behaviour as compliant 
to their desired/imagined pattern. 
Resilience is discriminating between organisational control and predetermination 
of planned tasks and procedures. While organisational control deals with variety 
in performance (As Done), predetermination is controlled by the specifics of task 
and mission characteristics (As Imagined). The nature and imagined behaviour of 
the systems is determined by both complexity/coupling and legacy/change rate of 
its technology. 
Discrepancies and anomalies between performance and the potential role as ‘early 
warning’ signalling expert as Imagined and as Done are either intentional 
deviations -stigmatized as ‘violations’ from rules and regulations- or unintentional 
-triggered by internal patterns of slips, lashes or mistakes-. Reason developed a 
generic and normative categorization of human error, based on individual 
characteristics (Generic Error Modelling System, GEMS).  
In aviation, anomaly management occurs on an organisational level: compliance 
with predefined performance is organised by compliance to drafting a flight plan, 
pre-flight preparation and in-flight responses based on scenarios and Standard 
Operating Procedures. Various modes of operations are foreseen, based on the 
specifics of flight phases, as the ability to switch between operational modes and 
balancing stability and manoeuvrability, while maintaining flexibility and adaptivity 
to variety in cultural and conditional aspects. Operational excellence can be 
achieved by organisational robustness and managerial control (Winters 2017). 
Table 1 Organisational and technological control 













Fishing industry ICT 
 
There is an increasing role for resilience moving from high organisational control 
and high predetermination to low organisational control and predetermination, 
with a shift from proactive to reactive interventions. 
Such characterizing of systems by their legacy, high tech nature, change rate and 
complex/coupled properties identify strategic choices that have to be made in 
controlling modes of operations of systems: do we select organisational resilience 
instead of technological resilience (Zimmermann et.al. 2011)? Can we rely on 
collecting precursor data of what went right as ‘proactive’ -and consequently 
superior-instead of investigating what went wrong as a ‘reactive’ reduction of 
uncertainty. Or do we need both to comply with the full information paradigm (Klir 
1987, 1994)? 
Resilience engineering revisited 
With the distinction between organisational control and technological control, 
Zimmermann et.al. (2011) suggest a dilemma in choosing either one of them as 
the exclusive approach.  Such a dilemma however, does not comply with the 
evolution of a socio-technical nature, such as aviation.  Reluctance to accept 
resilience engineering as the new way forward did pose the question: is the 
aviation industry ready for resilience (Zimmermann et.al. 2011)? The other 
question: is resilience engineering ready for the aviation industry as a legacy 
systems of a Non-Plus Ultra-Safe nature, is as appropriate. 
        Page 49 of 252 
Woods identified several initial fundamentals for resilience engineering from a 
sociological perspective (Woods 1996). In his inquiry to make progress in resilience 
engineering thinking, he identifies two additional fundamentals: initiative and 
reciprocity (Woods 2016, 2019). 
In overcoming brittleness in complex systems, he heavily leans on engineering 
design principles that are basic knowledge in aerospace engineering, in particular 
the principles of operating envelope and graceful degradation. He coins the 
fundamentals of a new notion of ‘graceful extensibility’ to cope with inherent 
variability and surprise events in a continuous changing world (Woods 2019). In 
coping with immanent failure, he turns to exploring the design of governance 
mechanisms and system architecture in order to control long term performance of 
complex systems, facing multiple cycles of change. In his exploration of initiative 
and reciprocity, a specific role for communication and interaction across system 
life phases and system states emerges. Feedback from operational experience to 
planning and design could be re-integrated in such systems design. This could 
provide a timely interference with actual system performance, based on foresight 
and proactiveness. Implicitly, Woods introduces the principle of Good Airmanship 
for all industrial sectors. Explicitly he acknowledges the value of complementarity 
across engineering, biological, social and cognitive sciences. This creates 
opportunities for new thinking of systems design and operations, combining socio-
psychological notions with engineering design methodologies. Optimization and 
control strategies could be developed from an integral systems perspective. In 
such a perspective, there is ample room for disruptive and innovative thinking, 
necessitated by changes in environment, economy and risk perception. 
2.5 Selecting strategic options 
Creating a disruptive change should comply with both economic and technical 
developments in complex systems as the new context for developing intellectual 
constructs on dynamic systems behaviour, mobilizing new domains and disciplines. 
Selecting either organisational or technological change is dictated by the sector 
and its inherent technology to avoid a drift into chaotic systems. 
2.5.1 Economic developments 
It is doubtful whether there is a ‘natural’ tendency to increase production when 
things are going right. Trade-offs between efficiency and thoroughness in a 
traditional economy are frequently conducted at the expense of safety. Such 
trade-offs are realised by increasing flexibility and organisational resilience. 
Eventually, new opportunities are being created in a New Economy market model 
for aviation. Subject matter expert(ise) frequently plays the role of whistleblowing 
in such situations. They are labelled also frequently as ‘resistance to change’ or 
‘unconscious cognitive stubbornness’ in objecting such change (De Boer 2012). 
Resistance to change and unconscious cognitive stubbornness may have a positive 
or negative effect on performance. On one hand they may block sharing of mental 
models in a team, hindering a shared understanding of the situation. They may 
create a cognitive lockup in supervisory control tasks, change blindness, cognitive 
mismatch, fixation and eventually may create accidents in dealing with 
contradicting signals. On the other hand, they may stimulate vigilance, danger 
avoidance, stimuli detection and rapid reflection on immanent situations. They 
may induce less automatic, intuitive behaviour and enhance analytic competences. 
These notions are considered instrumental attributes of Good Airmanship and 
Good Seamanship. 
New Economy models focus on lean efficient production, eliminating superfluous 
costs and waste.  They do not take into account the consequences of reductions in 
training costs and subsequent, decay of proficiency and basic flying skills of pilots, 
as demonstrated by the AF447 disaster. 
With respect to economic developments and models, Minsky identified four 
different phases of driving forces for business models at a macroscopic level of 
economy (Minsky 1986).  : 
• Optimizing expectations on a short term with operational trade-offs at a 
corporate level 
• Speculative extrapolations of these expectations in a seemingly stable 
situation 
• Profit expectations on a long term despite stalling investments and erosion of 
precautionary measures 
• Innovative powers of disruptive solutions and creative destruction of old 
concepts, disclosure of new markets, substantiated by research and 
development investments to achieve value preservation. 
Such disruptive innovations are supported by disclosure of unchartered scientific 
domains and a new interdisciplinary cooperation (Woods et.al. 2016, Woods 2019, 
Stoop 2017/3). 
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In particular in the domain of human decision making, the work of Slovic (2004) on 
emotions and empathy, Kahneman (2013) on cognition, intuition and perception 
and Taleb (2008) on rare events and after the fact explanations have drawn 
attention in the safety science community.  
Over the past decade, circular economy principles have been developed. In the 
environment, zero emission, recycling and closing circular chains are advocated. 
Sustainability requirements lead to disruptive technologies, new business models 
and entrepreneurial competences (Berkhout 2000). Systems should be intrinsically 
safe, while safety is considered a strategic asset in the value chain. Such changes 
in the socio-economic environment also require disruptive changes in safety 
thinking and scientific interests. Traditional scientific constructs may run short in 
explanatory potential (Stoop 2017/2).  
According to Troadec, the chairman of the French safety investigation authority 
BEA, based on the experiences of the Air France AF447 accident, only flight 
recorder retrieval clarified operating circumstances. Combination of ergonomics 
of warning designs, training conditions and recurrent training processes DID NOT 
generate expected behaviour, showing limits of current safety models of human 
behaviour (Troadec 2013). The AF447 case triggered new and unchartered 
scientific interests in the man-machine interaction domain, focusing on non-
normal situations, intuition, habituation and exploration of the ‘startle’ effect 
(Mohrmann et.al. 2015). 
2.5.2 Technological developments 
With respect to developments in aviation in 1949 at the foundation of ICAO, 
technology was chosen as the flywheel for progress (Freer 1986). Technological 
flexibility, variability and technical adaptation were chosen as the prime system 
change agents (Vincenti 1990) under conditions of tight coupling to an 
international institutional framework of ICAO standards and operational practices. 
This choice was evident: during the negotiations at Yalta in 1945 between 
Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill on the progress of aviation after the ending of the 
Second World War, none of the participants was willing to grant primacy to 
another economic system than their own, being either a Capitalist, Communist or 
Commonwealth model. The only alternative was to agree on a technological 
harmonisation and standardization for reasons of interoperability and accessibility 
of the international aviation network (Freer 1986). Such a flywheel function was 
readily available for technology after the world war due to the huge R&D and 
production potential in the aviation industry in the USA, UK and Soviet Union.  
This selection of technology as the flywheel for progress demands a very high 
organisational continuity and stability at the corporate level to introduce a high 
level performance (safety) playing field. Harmonization was achieved by 
introducing certification and supranational standardization such as at the sectoral 
level ICAO Annexes structure for all primary systems functionalities. The role of the 
State as the prime mover for change was selected as the natural entity for 
imposing legislation and enforcement on their State owned carriers. 
Simultaneously, a very high technological flexibility to adapt to new developments 
and operational conditions, constraints and specificity was required, introducing a 
rapid technological development in the context of private corporations, 
stimulating competition and innovative exploration. 
As a consequence, a combination of high technological flexibility –nowadays 
indicated as ‘unruly technology’ and low organisational or individual flexibility –
nowadays labelled as ‘resistance to change’ and ‘cognitive stubbornness’ – are two 
complementary notions that in conjunction enable both flexibility and reduction 
of uncertainty in acceptance of technological innovations. The fading role of the 
State as the leading entity in this development process and the merging of a 
multitude of aircraft manufacturers into a limited number of leading global 
companies has called for reflection on the future of aviation. Tensions have arisen 
with respect to the pace and rate of innovation and organisational adaptation in 
adapting to new global economic, market and environmental developments. 
Programmes like Horizon 2050 have been created, facilitating innovative research 
and development programmes on a sectoral level.  
Advocating resilience engineering has not been embraced by the aviation 
community (Zimmermann 2011). Resistance to organisational change, cognitive 
stubbornness and underspecification of technological development have been 
noticed as obstacles for such an acceptance. These phenomena however are 
functional and complementary in making progress under conditions of minimizing 
uncertainty. Unruliness is a precondition for technological adaptation and 
innovation. This property of technology has been recognized already in 1949 with 
the foundation of ICAO. It has been described by Vincenti as a basic property of 
aerospace engineering design (Vincenti 1990). To reduce uncertainties in this 
technological developments and to guarantee a safe operational performance, an 
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elaborated system has been developed, linking the various phases of the system 
life cycle. Exchange of knowledge and experience is established by an international 
agreed system of certification and licensing by modelling, simulation, testing, 
training and investigations. In due course, the scope expanded from aircraft 
airworthiness criteria to flight envelope and system viability criteria (Stoop 
2017.2). 
2.6 Vincenti: the variation selection model 
Specifications and regulations are considered properties of control mechanisms at 
a sectoral high performance level that enable progress. Simultaneously, they 
create resistance to organisational change and facilitate underspecification of 
technological development to enable deviation and adaptation. At a sectoral level, 
harmonization and standardization and sharing design and operational 
experiences and knowledge are prerequisites to implement this philosophy of 
technological progress. Foresight on operational behaviour of innovative and 
disruptive solutions is established by a sophisticated framework of Annexes to the 
ICAO Agreement by certification, testing and training.  
In his analytical study on aerospace engineering methodology, Vincenti indicates 
the transition from craftsman thinking in experimental progression towards 
knowledge based design of artefacts and evidence based learning (Vincenti 1990). 
In the 1930’s the empirical and experimental design of aerofoils was gradually 
replaced by analytical and mathematical understanding of the mechanisms that 
ruled aerofoil design. Such transition from scientific theory and aerodynamic 
models as developed by Bernouilli, Navier Stokes, Mach, Schlichting and others 
towards a knowledge-based design was supported by wind tunnel testing of scale 
models and flight tests. Scientific research focused on the role of viscosity, 
transition between laminar and turbulent flow, laminar flow aerofoils and elliptic 
lift distribution. This application of scientific research in order to reduce 
uncertainty in the attempts to achieve increased performance created a growth in 
knowledge. This knowledge was applied directly in the design of new combat 
aircraft. The British Supermarine Spitfire was designed based on elliptical lift 
distribution on its wings. The US North American Mustang was designed based on 
the laminar flow characteristic of its aerofoils. Both aircraft represent a leap in 
aerodynamic performance. The German Messerschmitt Me 262 marked the 
transition from piston engine powered to the fighter jet age.  
Many technological innovations became available for civil aviation applications in 
the desire to expand civil aviation to a global network after the war and beyond. 
In the fourth generation of fighters, the application of IT controlled thrust 
vectoring enabled the Russian Sukhoi SU-35 to perform the Puchachev Cobra 
manoeuvre. 
2.6.1 Presumptive anomalies 
Increased knowledge in turn acts as a driving force to further increase knowledge. 
As defined by Constant (quote by Vincenti 1990) the phenomenon of ‘presumptive 
anomaly’ may stimulate better understanding of the behaviour of an artefact: 
“Presumptive anomaly occurs in technology, not when the conventional system 
fails in any absolute or objective sense, but when assumptions derived from 
science indicate either that under some future conditions the conventional system 
will fail (or function badly) or that a radically different system will do a much better 
job.” 
Vincenti concludes that presumptive anomaly, functional failure and the need to 
reduce uncertainty in design act as driving forces to a growth of engineering design 
knowledge.  
Challenging design assumptions, model simplifications and operational restrictions 
in examining the validity of this knowledge store have contributed to the growth 
of design knowledge. Through safety investigations, systemic and knowledge 
deficiencies were identified, leading to novel safety principles in engineering 
design. Eventually, this has led to Knowledge Based Engineering and 
Multidisciplinary Design Optimization as a specific school of aeronautical design 
thinking (Landman 2010, Torenbeek 2013, Van Tooren 2003). 
The search for performance optimization and reduction of uncertainties has 
created a continuous exploration of design variations and selection of better 
performing design solutions. This has created generations of commercial and 
military aircraft designs with similar morphology, configurations and properties. 
Such solutions can either have a derivative or disruptive nature. Vincenti 
elaborates on the role of this variation-selection process in the innovation of 
aerospace design (Vincenti 1990). Developing ‘anomalies’ should be considered in 
a historical context of design requirements, gradual changes in the operating 
context and consequences of design trade-offs. 
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Although ‘anomalies’ may temporarily deviate from prevailing engineering 
judgement, specific concerns may force to deviate from this mainstream in 
exploring innovations. 
Foresight on performance has been both tested at the component and subsystem 
level prospectively by modelling and simulation and retrospectively by flight 
testing and operational feedback. Such ‘unforesightedness’ comes with balancing 
gains as well as costs. The outcomes of such a balancing may favour specific design 
trade-offs, but should be considered in their historical context and operational 
demands. As speed increased, drag became dominant in the design trade-offs in 
designing retractable gears. The generalized knowledge that retractable gears 
were favourable, was the product of an unforesighted variation-selection process 
and was valid for a specific class of aircraft designs (Vincenti 1990). Similar trade-
offs in context can be observed in the design of modern commercial aircraft in 
balancing weight and fuel consumption versus structural integrity and dynamic 
stability (Torenbeek 2013).  
Flight envelope protection was introduced to refrain the pilot from entering the 
margins of the operational envelope (De Kroes and Stoop 2012). The application 
of automation in cockpits has a proven track record of substantial gains in safety, 
efficiency and accuracy, but comes at a cost of loss of pilot situation awareness in 
critical situations, increased cognitive task loads and loss of basic flying skills. In 
aviation, the notion of ‘unforesightedness’ due to trade-offs has been 
acknowledged  on both the component and the systems level.  
Warnings against costs in trade-offs in design and operations requires subject 
matter expertise: an understanding of the relations between technological and 
socio-organisational aspects is indispensable. Otherwise, an undefined and 
compiled notion of ‘complexity’ is generated to disguise the ignorance of 
understanding ‘emergent’ properties –as defined by Rasmussen- and dynamics of 
‘complex systems with tight couplings’ –as defined by Perrow-, which might -
according to Turner- ‘drift into failure’ due to ‘human error’ –as defined by Reason-
. In such a combination of undefined notions, the ability of ‘foresight’ is easily lost, 
in particular when analysing design trade-offs and feedback from reality by safety 
investigations have been dismissed from the diagnostic toolkit. Losing specific and 
context dependent knowledge in safety critical situations resulted in loss of 
understanding why in a specific case an accident could occur. By losing oversight 
over the nature of a triggering event, remedial control options are lost as well.  
All this occurs in Non-Plus Ultra-Safe systems where Vision Zero has been achieved 
for the first time ever in large commercial aviation due to the fact that in 2017 no 
fatalities occurred. Such an achievement has crossed the – according to Amalberti- 
‘mythical barrier‘ of the 10-7 , falsifying the assumed asymptotic nature of safety 
performance and all their derivative assumptions in such systems (Amalberti 
2001). It also questions the ambitions of human behavioural sciences to serve as a 
promising and needed ‘antithesis’ for a ‘conventional’ technological perspective. 
According to Troadec and Arslanian of the French BEA on the AF 447 case, factual 
evidence in air safety investigation experiences have demonstrated limitations of 
present human performance scientific thinking. 
Rather than challenging the interpretation of various scientific schools of thinking, 
a descriptive diagnosis of the nature and dynamics of complex systems should 
provide insight in their architecture and developments towards a next safety 
integrity level. Unravelling rather than accepting their complexity becomes of 
prime importance for achieving Vision Zero and First Time Right principles in a 
safety for design approach (Stoop 1990). 
2.6.2 Complexity, a social construct 
In order to control the complexity of this development process, a distinction is 
necessary between structural complexity (single functional structures) for the 
benefit of flexibility and functional complexity (multifunctional structures) to 
enable adaptation. Since combining both types of complexity creates 
uncontrollable uncertainty in performance variations, limiting any trustworthy 
foresight of intended behaviour, such a combination of complexities can only be 
combined in one design at a high cost of increased uncertainty and reduced 
controllability.  A choice should be made for either structural complexity or 
functional complexity. Additional design properties such as robustness, 
redundancy, reliability and resilience of technical artefacts to reduce the 
uncertainty in the design, should be guaranteed throughout the design process 
and operational life. To the purpose of foresight in aviation safety, various safety 
design principles were derived from theoretical notions, experimental design 
evaluations and safety investigations: fail safe, safe life, damage tolerance, crash 
worthiness, graceful degradation, self-relianceness, situation and mode 
awareness. In this process, the role of accident investigations and forensic 
engineering to disclose failure cannot be underestimated (Petroski 1992, Noon 
1992, Carper 2001, Barnett 2001, Arslanian 2011).  
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This design philosophy of preferring technology as the flywheel for progress has 
been specific for the aviation industry. In the process industry the choices have 
been different: technology was chosen as a constant, while organisational variety 
and change was selected as the engine for change for multinational companies 
without State interference. The context of multinational corporations in a different 
socio-economic competitive and political climate with the state of technology and 
its inherent maturity level, differs from the aviation industry. In aviation 
international cooperation, interoperability, accessibility of global networks and a 
harmonized and standardized high performance level playing field prevail. This 
sector has seen the development of several generations of aircraft of similar 
configuration, performance and operating envelopes. 
In the process industry technological development has been different across 
multinational companies, each with their specific organisational constitution and 
structures (De Rademaeker et.al. 2014, Pasman and Reniers 2014, Lannoy 2016). 
Safety is embedded in the organisation rather than in its technology, 
differentiating between line or staff responsibilities, creating tensions between 
subject matter expertise resources, foresight capabilities and operational feedback 
responsibilities. Such differences raise questions about the role of technology, its 
variability, unruliness and physical boundaries of its production principles and 
operational processes. But above all, such a choice for organisational change raises 
questions about the control over organisational change and technological change 
and vice versa, by either subject matter experts, corporate management, national 
public governance or supranational institutions. This dilemma between 
technological and organisational has created a specific role for whistle blowers in 
an organisation and a choice between top-down or bottom-up initiation of change, 
including the power relations in an organisation. In the engineering design 
community, the role of designers and technical experts is quite different, where 
the role of change agent is fulfilled by inventions and disruptive changes according 
to the theory of Vincenti’s  on presumptive anomalies and the variation-selection 
model. In aviation, the role of pilots as the delegated and distributed responsible 
expert operators is established by the notion of Good Airmanship, providing 
feedback from reality while safety investigations provide feedback form 
anomalies, deficiencies and failure. 
2.7 Foresight and whistle blowers, an analysis 
2.7.1 Some observations 
In describing the development of safety in the aviation sector, technology has been 
chosen as the flywheel for progress, keeping organisational and institutional 
arrangements constant. The way technological design alternatives were developed 
and selected has gone through a process of variation-selection, testing ‘anomalies’ 
on their trade-offs by feedback from reality. In such a validation process, a distinct 
role has been allocated to safety investigations to provide evidence of the system’s 
functioning under normal and non-normal conditions. Reducing uncertainty and 
variance in operator behaviour has been covered by the notion of Good 
Airmanship, covering delegated and distributed responsibilities between 
corporate and individual performance in the global network. The role of design in 
reducing uncertainty has evolved towards Knowledge Based Design and Value 
Engineering paradigms. 
In order to decide on the consequences, feasibility and acceptability regarding the 
safety properties of derivative or disruptive solutions, new safety notions have to 
be developed.  
Resilience engineering has presented itself as a serious prospect candidate.  
However, ‘old school’ safety notions, such as human error, drift into failure and 
normal accidents have dominated the debate over the past decades, accompanied 
by mathematical and quantitative assessment of risk. Such old school notions have 
been challenged by sociological theories about ‘complexity’ and 
‘unforesightedness’, popularized by notions such as ‘unknown unknowns’ and 
‘unpredictability’. Such a reductionist approach from a socio-organisational 
perspective does not pay credit to technological and systemic analytic potential 
that is practically available in the engineering design community. The link between 
technology and organisation as two primary and mutually independent 
characteristics is yet to be reinstalled by adhering to a socio-technical systems 
approach, acknowledging both hierarchical and network characteristics (Woods 
2016, Boosten 2017). In such an approach, both operational performance, 
organisational arrangements and institutional conditions have to be taken into 
account for the sake of innovation (Berkhout 2000). 
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2.7.2 Analysis of assumptions 
In proclaiming fundamental shifts in dealing with human behavior, Rasmussen 
disconnects design from operations, eliminating the feedback and feed forward 
relations between these two life cycle phases of systems. He replaces a design 
orientation with an operational orientation, controlled exclusively by corporate 
management. Systems performance is only to be discovered by deviations from 
normal and intended performance during operations through ‘emergent’ 
behavior. The role of the State is reduced to providing performance standards, 
criteria and limits. In his construct, there is no room for accident investigations. 
Minor accidents are considered statistical aberrations from normal, while major 
accidents are unique events, beyond control and learning. Eliminating safety 
investigations -providing operational transparency and knowledge on a system’s 
life time behavior- reduces a control perspective from dealing with cause to only 
dealing with consequences after the release of a hazard. As stated by Perrow 
(1999), consequences are consequently assumed to be ‘normal’ to any complex 
system behavior. By taking this perspective, Rasmussen reduces safety from a 
sectoral strategic value to a corporate operational constraint. Rasmussen also 
applies a different definition of ‘systems’. In this construct, systems are considered 
open horizontally organized networks, while in the engineering perspective, a 
hierarchical dimension prevails at the sectoral control mechanism with a 
distributed allocation of responsibilities and control mechanisms. Such an 
engineering perspective does not notice a paradox in almost perfectly safe systems 
as proclaimed by Amalberti (Amalberti 2001). The reductionist perspective of 
Rasmussen on systems as horizontal networks and his restriction to a corporate 
level opens up debates on discrepancies between Work As Imagined (by 
management) and Work as Done (by operators). This perspective leaves out the 
assumptions as formulated during the design and the development of the system 
itself. 
The shift in perspective as proclaimed by Reason and Rasmussen also rejected the 
tools and techniques that were readily available in the engineering domain. 
Rasmussen suggests to replace the engineering toolkit by tools and techniques 
from the mathematical domain –QRA in particular-. In validating the applicability 
of QRA to this managerial construct, frequent criticisms on their assumptions and 
limitations have been formulated by the QRA and resilience engineering 
community (Aven 2016). Over time, Reason’s and Rasmussen’s assumptions 
proved to be inadequate: later versions of human behavior reinstalled an interest 
in operational feedback from incidents, Just Culture and High Reliability 
Organization behavior. A shared responsibility between management and 
operators is proclaimed, introducing the notion of ‘mindfulness’ with allocation of 
a prime responsibility to the shop floor level of performance. The ‘ethical 
accounting’ as defined by Rasmussen introduces the phenomenon of 
Whistleblower. Any impact of decisions on the objectives and values is inevitably 
normative: they are either undesirable and non-compliant with established ethics 
in an organization –defining a negative connotation for a whistleblower- or are the 
ethical responsibility of a corporate employee, -defining individual mindfulness- 
and contribution to a ‘Risk-of Life’ assessment of risk.  
Accepting any of the newly proposed paradigms as successor of ‘old school’ – 
including their obsolete- notions should be accompanied by an assessment of 
residual risks and side effects.  
Such acceptance should not be restricted to the individual level of ‘whistle blower’ 
functionality. At the institutional level, safety investigations by independent 
agencies have seen a global development in the aviation sector. It is a part of the 
legacy of aviation, supported by forensic engineering and governance as distinct 
scientific disciplines (Stoop and Dekker 2010).  
In its efforts to enhance safety in aviation further, ICAO has drawn up a set of 
management processes based on the theories of Reason and Rasmussen, that 
could be adopted by corporate management (SMS) and state safety programs 
(SSP). This initiative was not to suggest to exclude, discount or downplay other 
preventive activities. An empirical analysis of Farrier (2017) showed an unintended 
outcome of the role of safety investigations in aviation.  It has become clear that 
ICAO’s various moves to consolidate guidance on SSPs has been to downplay the 
role of accident investigations in the SMS environment, or even to disconnect them 
entirely from other preventive processes.  
The trend seem to be to discount investigations as a part of the larger preventive 
process. He concludes that for a variety of reasons, investigations -including their 
recommendations that result from them- are not always a good fit with each other. 
Farrier notices inherent tensions between the two philosophies: a focus on what 
might happen versus what has happened: a desire to consider hazards in the 
abstract instead of focusing on concrete experiences of actual loss. A focus on 
Hazards as Imagined versus Hazards as Experienced shift the attention from 
perceived issues to ‘precursors’, expecting a higher added value of the latter. A 
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downplaying of ‘reactive’ investigations takes place against support for ‘proactive’ 
management efforts. In practice, the underlying philosophy of Reason and 
Rasmussen supports the notion that ‘safety culture’ has preventive value and costs 
a lot less than investigations and design based safety impact assessments. Farrier 
concludes: accident investigations and their recommendations need to be properly 
baked into the fabric of current and future safety management systems. 
‘Proactive’ outcomes need not be pursued exclusively through ‘proactive’ sources 
of data. Safety investigations should form the basis for follow-up inquiries and 
analysis, while their recommendations should be scrupulously tracked and 
managed. This is in accordance with the principle of the Full Information Paradigm 
(Klir 1987) that feedback and feed forward should be combined to achieve full 
information on systems behaviour.  
Farrier states (2017): Introducing new concepts such as Safety Management 
Systems and State Safety Programs puts two principles of safety management and 
safety investigations in opposition instead of leveraging their respective 
advantages. Such opposition pits the active against the passive, the hard work of 
investigation and analysis against the easy tasks of collecting and recording. Both 
have their place in the aviation safety professionals’ toolkit, and neither should be 
disregarded or discounted (Farrier 2017). In discarding safety investigations from 
the analytical toolkit, such investigations are expelled from foresight from within 
a system and forced into a role of adversary whistle blowers (Vuorio et.al. 2017, 
Wilson and Straker 2018). 
Such an exorcizing also has consequences on the investigative functionality of the 
capability to change systems. This introduces two problems (Karanikas, Roelen and 
Piric 2018). 
First, the interpretation of investigative findings is submitted to differences in 
perspectives between investigators and safety managers. Investigation reports are 
consensus documents on the investigative reconstruction of an event. A transition 
from what happened to how to deal with the consequences has to take place by 
analytic interpretation and adaptive intervention on those investigative findings. 
Such a transition depends on the capabilities, responsibilities, resources, response 
capabilities and intervention strategies of each of the stakeholders in the safety 
enhancement process.  
Second, such an intervention strategy lacks procedures for transforming drafting 
investigative recommendations into incorporating these findings in a safety 
management system in a specific corporate, stakeholders and governance context. 
2.8 Discussion 
In making an inventory and analysis of the role of whistle blowers in foresight 
various scientific opinions about uncertainty, variety, flexibility and controllability 
emerge. There are different perspective with respect to how to maintain control 
over complexity of socio-technical systems. 
2.8.1 Old school of thinking 
‘Old school’ human factor thinking has become deficient: it contains a normative 
opinion about human performance due to ‘human error’, has little predictive 
potential due to an unnoticed ‘drift into failure’ and has no control over 
consequences due to ‘normal accidents’. There is a wilful decline of cause in favour 
of consequences. The rejection of accident investigations as a source of 
information deprives the concept from operational feedback. Foresight should be 
provided by incidents, early warnings and whistle blowers. While a first version 
claims managerial control responsibility over the system performance, a revisited 
version shifts responsibilities back to front line operators and designers, 
demanding a permanent awareness and mindfulness to predict, to cope and to 
anticipate disaster. Managerial responsibilities are reduced to only ‘conditional’ 
factors, replacing safety as a sectoral, strategic value.  
Warnings against costs in trade-offs in design and operations requires subject 
matter expertise: an understanding of the relations between technological and 
socio-organisational aspects is indispensable. Otherwise, an undefined and 
compiled notion of ‘complexity’ is generated to disguise the ignorance of 
understanding ‘emergent’ properties –as defined by Rasmussen- and dynamics of 
‘complex systems with tight couplings’ –as defined by Perrow-, which might -
according to Turner- ‘drift into failure’ due to ‘human error’ –as defined by Reason-
. On the instrumental level, safety oversight was replaced by a Safety Case 
approach as the coping mechanism for management over emerging risks. 
In their claim for exclusive control over organisational safety performance, 
oversight was replaced by a shared but undefined responsibility to evade liability 
and accountability (Koivisto et.al. 2009) 
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In such a combination of undefined notions, the ability of ‘foresight’ is easily lost, 
in particular when analysing design trade-offs and feedback from reality by safety 
investigations have been dismissed from the diagnostic toolkit. Such reframing of 
the theoretical concept of foresight and uncertainty in socio-organisational terms 
fitted in quite well with the New Economy principles that were favoured in the 
1990’s by the UK government (Martin 201, Stoop 2017.2). Consequently, 
operational safety feedback warning systems -such as Good Airmanship and 
Seamanship in aviation and maritime- could not be reconciled with such exclusive 
corporate management responsibilities. For subject matter experts, an 
antagonistic role emerged as a Whistle Blower for early warnings of immanent 
systemic mishaps.  
Losing specific and context dependent knowledge in safety critical situations on 
the operational level resulted in loss of understanding why in a specific case an 
accident could occur. By losing oversight over the nature of a triggering event, 
remedial control options are lost as well. 
2.8.2 New school of thinking 
The ‘new school’ thinking in human factors claims a necessary paradigm shift but 
still focuses primarily on consequences instead of causes, on operations instead of 
design and prefers to analyse the positive rather than the negative. They apply a 
multi-actor approach and take a non-normative perspective in an operational 
environment. The emphasis is on organisational flexibility, irresponsive of 
technology, legacy and socio-economic context of the systems under scrutiny. This 
school does not (yet) reinstall a highly necessary relation with technology, 
engineering design and system theory as fundamental characteristics of socio-
technical systems.  
Consequently, their plea for adhering to resilience may favour recognition of their 
discipline and perspective, but may not fulfil the needs of highly elaborated and 
matured industrial legacy sectors such as aviation.  
The needs of such sectors and systems are dictated by their specifics and 
operational context. Rules of a higher hierarchical order, economic market 
mechanisms and control strategies at the level of system architecture and 
configuration, public governance, economic and business models and social 
culture prevail. 
Advocating resilience without taking into account such a context and hierarchy 
may even jeopardize the goals of such legacy systems in disregarding strategic 
decisions and choices made in the past. These strategic decisions have been 
successfully applied in aviation by avoiding slipping complex systems into chaotic 
states, achieving an unprecedented non-plus ultra-safe performance level. In 
aviation, a high organisational and institutional stability combined with 
technological change has accommodated permanent economic growth, 
adaptation to new business requirements and societal constraints. Institutional 
arrangements were made at the sectoral level such as establishing ICAO. Selecting 
technology as the flywheel of progress and independent investigations at a State 
level proved feedback from reality, combined with delegated responsibilities to 
the cockpit crew by Good Airmanship principles (McCall 2017). Such Good 
Airmanship principles are derived from the maritime history, where a very open 
operating environment forced to comply with Good Seamanship and standardized 
operating procedures to survive unexpected situations. The very high rate of 
diversity and open operating environment did not allow room for variation and 
interpretation, but adaptation to the margins of a physical operating envelope in 
non-normal situations. 
2.9 Conclusion 
The debate about applicability of resilience has brought about the need to have 
foresight on future performance and stability in a dynamic operational 
environment, relative to the ‘old school’ of safety thinking (Zimmermann et.al. 
2011). For aviation however, there is no need per se for proselytizing to a new 
belief of Resilience. A more pragmatic approach of incorporating useful notions in 
the needs of the sector prevail. Taking both technological and organisational 
variety on board may jeopardize the overall stability of the sector and threaten the 
present non-plus ultra-safety performance of the sector.  Creative destruction of 
old paradigms is a necessary step towards innovation but is a serious risk to the 
sector in a phase of expanding capacity and growth combined with developing into 
a next generation of aircraft, airports and traffic management systems. There is no 
‘natural tendency’ towards increased productivity, but as Minsky has shown, socio-
economical market mechanisms and societal developments of a higher order 
dictate change. A chaotic system may emerge from such uncontrolled series of 
changes if technological and organisational configurations are made flexible 
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simultaneously. Such a transition from complex to chaotic also changes the role of 
subject matter experts as professional safety assessors into whistle blowers and 
restricts the ability to incorporate their foresight during such changes. Although 
Reason and Rasmussen have revised their concepts, fundamental deficiencies 
have not been addressed (Reason 2015). Advocating new concepts as such to 
accommodate the enhancement of safety during changes is a valuable and 
necessary plea. There are some valid hesitations in the aviation community to 
embrace resilience engineering. Aviation may ‘drift into failure’ by disrupting the 
architecture of the sector too much, not only on the safety aspects. Releasing 
organisational variety may cause stagnation of technological innovation by 
emphasizing legal liability and accountability to failure as unforeseen 
consequences. Recent British legislation on Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide has aggravated the legal liability situation after the Concorde 
crash in July 2000 by introducing massive repercussions for manufacturers after 
failure of their products. There is an unexplored relation between Resilience and 
Safety. In such a context, the role and position of whistle blowers is undefined.  
Foresight is about reducing uncertainty and predicting future performance. New 
approaches, theories and notions are still open and their desirability, feasibility 
and applicability is still undetermined. The future role of the State, increase in 
automation, security, sustainability and circular economy principles are not yet 
fully explored, let alone validated regarding their consequences. There are no 
Golden Bullets in enhancing safety in such developments.  
Revising resilience engineering by adding two fundamentals -initiative and 
reciprocity- may create a basis for cross-disciplinary participation, communication 
and commitment. This could make the outsiders role of whistle blowers obsolete 
and could reinstall their role as subject matter experts from within the system. 
Such a transition poses challenges on creating a shared repository of expertise, 
experiences and knowledge management, combining feedback and feed forward 
loops to design and operations of complex systems. As such, it may benefit 
foresight in safety by identifying early warnings of system degradation. 
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3 Failures of Foresight in Safety: Fantasy Risk Analysis 
and Blindness 
Nicolas Dechy, Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire (IRSN), France,  
Yves Dien, Collectif heuristique pour l’analyse organisationnelle de sécurité 
(CHAOS), France,  
Jan Hayes, RMIT University, Australia,  
Nicola Paltrinieri, Norges teknisk naturvitenskapelige universitet (NTNU), Norway. 
3.1 Executive summary 
In order to foster the continuing debate about the best strategies to enhance 
foresight in safety, the aim of this chapter is to characterise some of the failures to 
foresee negative outcomes from a safety point of view. The approach followed is 
to review the lessons that should be learned from negative event, especially the 
accidents, across industrial sectors. It will enable some typical patterns to be 
identified that explain why companies and their regulators have recurring 
difficulties to anticipate risk related scenarios and accidents.  
One such recurring theme is the inability to make the right assumptions when risk 
analyses are performed. It shows that some fantasy planning may occur especially 
when addressing major risk assessments. Seeking to identify a worst-case scenario 
is a useful concept, working in principle but not always in practice. Another 
recurring difficulty is mainly in recognising an accident waiting to happen. Indeed, 
early warning signs are usually available before an accident, but they may be too 
weak to trigger a learning loop or a risk analysis process. Some signals are strong, 
but they are not treated accordingly. The pathologies are some form of blindness 
(failure to see warning signs) and deafness (failure of those in charge to act on 
concerns raised). Those patterns of difficulties show some features of the foresight 
pitfalls thus giving directions for implementing measures for better anticipation. 
3.2 Key messages 
Failures of foresight in safety recall how difficult the challenge of risk anticipation 
is, especially for low probability and high consequence events including black 
swans. All actors in high-risk industries should remain humble.  
Many provisions for foresight in safety have been implemented, but accidents 
highlight some of the flaws of the processes to anticipate risks. The exhaustiveness 
and efficiency achieved with traditional risk analysis systematic approaches 
remains a myth.  
The implications are to remain sceptical and critical, to permanently update 
models and to challenge assumptions. Others are to seek out early warning signs, 
to prioritize risks in order to focus the available resources on critical risks. 
Risk identification is a social construct. It is performed by analysts, designers, 
operators, and it involves decision-makers within resource (time, budget, 
expertise) constraints and should remain under scrutiny to avoid fantasy planning. 
Analysis of risks, events and early warning signs can be assisted by tools. However, 
those tools integrate the designer’s worldviews and purposes and may not be 
relevant to address some sociotechnical dimensions. Analysts use artefacts (tools, 
documents) to formalise their analysis, which may excessively constrain their 
questioning and attention, leaving them blind in important areas. To better 
capture risks, more open risk analysis approaches including different worldviews, 
opinions, transparent and flexible approaches to anticipate the unthinkable are 
required.  
Most accidents are not inevitable but are preventable. Disasters are hard to obtain 
and not created overnight. They develop during an incubation period and during 
this time actors have an opportunity to identify latent flaws or early warning signs. 
Such signs and alerts provide opportunities to challenge safety beliefs and act but 
they are not always seized upon. It can lead to actions that are too little, too late.  
One challenge is to develop high quality intelligence which requires fragmented 
data and disjointed information to be connected, in order to identify patterns like 
in a puzzle. This requires data and information structures, and processes but also 
people to make the expert link to the risk. Interpretation relies on worldviews, 
lenses and paradigms that should be debated. Assumptions and old patterns 
should be challenged, while new interpretations should be welcome.  
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Organisations are defined by what they chose to ignore and forget. Many 
deviations are normalised for too long. Memories of lessons from accidents are 
not kept and revived. Foresight in safety shifts organisations from fantasy risk 
planning, blindness, deafness, denial, apathy and inaction to the need to sustain 
proactive action on safety and thereby robust and resilient performance.  
3.3 Introduction: defining challenges in foresight in safety  
In order to foster the continuing debate about the best strategies to enhance 
foresight in safety, the aim of this chapter is to characterise some failures to 
foresee adverse events (serious incidents, accidents and disasters). By taking this 
approach, we aim to complement some of the literature in foresight in safety 
regarding conditions that favour failures of foresight. We have chosen case studies 
that we estimate are important to share and help to highlight some key 
vulnerabilities, rather than attempting a broad review of disaster cases.  
3.3.1 Foresight and management 
In everyday life, it seems that our abilities to foresee adverse outcomes from our 
daily activities are challenged by the limits of our planning. We tend to rely on 
overly optimistic assumptions that fail to integrate the surprises and unexpected 
events we seldom face. The same is true of organisations.  
A century ago, formalisation of management as a new discipline recognised 
foresight as a key capability especially for engineers, managers and leaders (Stark, 
1961): ”’Managing means looking ahead’, gives some idea of the importance 
attached to planning in the business world, and it is true that if foresight is not the 
whole of management, it is an essential part of it. To foresee, in this context, means 
both to assess the future and make provision for it (Fayol, 1916)”. In summary 
(Kingston and Dien, 2017), foresight is about imagining the future possibilities 
based on knowledge of the past and present. 
Stark (1961) considers the future in terms of extensions of the present which are 
potentialities or temporal possibilities. He defines foresight as a "productive 
thinking with the elementary rules of logic its only constraint"’. Part of foresight is 
‘reproductive’ based on past experiences while another part is more ‘creative’. He 
                                                                
8 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (which decided a significant reduction in production 
and an embargo against the United States and the Netherlands after the Yom Kippur War) 
considers that prediction can be conducted after foresight: prediction is rather a 
judgmental thinking with the establishment of subjective probabilities to a 
relatively narrower set of scenarios or period of time. Prediction is measured at a 
given time and verified after the event while foresight can be continuously 
assessed.  
Ansoff (1975) already remarked that anticipating "strategic surprises" in a military 
perspective and business perspective has historically been a key issue. Many 
companies were surprised by the petroleum crisis in the seventies, although 
advance forecast about potential actions of OPEC8 were publicly available and on 
the desks of some surprised managers. Ansoff points out that the assumption that 
those organisations were unaware because they lacked a forecasting and planning 
system was falsified as many had such a capability. Corporations and industries 
who had those planning processes were also surprised by other discontinuities. 
Discontinuities and surprises differ significantly from extrapolation of experience. 
Depending on levels of information and uncertainty and associated states of 
knowledge and ignorance, Ansoff (1975) opposed strategic planning which is 
adequate for strong signals, prepared periodically and organisation-focused; while 
strategic issue analysis is promoted to respond to weak signals and discontinuities, 
and requires a continuous, problem focused process.  
With this distinction in mind, Ansoff (1975) identified “an apparent paradox: if the 
firms wait until information is adequate for strategic planning, it will be 
increasingly surprised by crises; if it accepts vague information, the content will not 
be specific enough for thorough strategic planning”. Ansoff invites development of 
a “gradual response through amplification and response to weak signals” […] 
“which permits gradual commitment on the part of the management”.  
3.3.2 Challenges in foresight in safety 
Within a reliability and safety perspective, Lannoy (2015) recalled that foresight 
requires a forecast to be made in an uncertain, ambiguous, controversial context 
or to construct a likely future by using information from the past, present and some 
expected future trends.  
Turner (1976, 19789) considers that administrative organizations may be thought 
of as cultural mechanisms developed to set collective goals and make 
9 We have to note that the pioneering book by Barry Turner (‘Man-made disasters’) was published with 
the working subtitle ‘The failure of foresight’. 
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arrangements to deploy available resources and attain those goals. To manage 
safety in high-risk industries, risk anticipation activities received a lot of attention 
and resources for several decades in order to engineer safer systems and to 
demonstrate control to the regulators. In other words, risk anticipation or foresight 
in safety is socially constructed (Short, 1984) by different actors and through 
different processes, provisions and procedures. 
In our experience with high-risk industries, the work of ‘risk anticipation’ or 
‘foresight in safety’ currently relies on four main strategies:  
• planning especially through risk assessment when addressing safety 
threats; 
• monitoring the system (e.g. indicators), detecting and treating the early 
warning signs, weak or strong, indicating a threat to safety;  
• setting up an operational feedback process for learning the lessons from 
past, internal and external events, in order to improve the system; 
• preparing for the unexpected and crisis management which implies 
development of adaptive capabilities such as resilience. 
In this chapter, we will not address the fourth strategy, though some research in 
these directions also provides some concepts and case studies related to weak 
signals of a crisis waiting to happen (e.g. Lagadec, 1994; Roux-Dufort, 2003) and 
also some indicators of brittleness (Woods, 2009).  
In a conference organised by the French Institut pour la Maîtrise des Risques in 
2015 titled “Exploring the unpredictable: how and how far?”, in the aftermath of 
several unexpected disasters (Fukushima, German Wings, Deepwater Horizon, 
Eyjafjöl,…), several terms were employed by the authors in relation to foresight in 
safety and its failures (in table 1), with some synonymous, and some addressing 
different categories (Dechy et al., 2016). 
With no surprise, the time dimension is essential to distinguish categories of 
foresight. However, the terms of the first line (atypical, unimaginable, 
inconceivable, unthinkable) underline the capabilities required to identify and 
recognise some scenarios with some difficulties to establish causal links between 
fragmented elements and limits of knowledge to model the phenomenon. Terms 
in the second line highlight the temporal difficulties to anticipate, either ultimately 
(unforeseeable) or about the occurrence time (unpredictable). Terms in the third 
line refer to their occurrence frequency or likelihood on a given period of time. The 
fourth category integrates the time dimension but refers to its prevention.  


























estimate in a 
time period 
Probable, likely Unlikely, improbable, 
‘black swan’ 
Prevention until 
the period end 
Avoidable, preventable Unavoidable, inevitable 
 
Risk assessment is about imagining and foreseeing what could go wrong and 
estimating how bad it could be in order that controls can be put in place. Poor risk 
assessment can lead to ineffective risk controls – controls that are ineffective or 
inadequate in several ways. In this way, risk assessment is a form of planning. As 
Clarke said, organizations that ‘don’t plan are seen as ineffective, poorly managed, 
irresponsible or sometimes just plain dumb’ (Clarke, 1999, p 1). In this way, high 
risk industries mobilize engineers to identify process and system risks and related 
accidents scenarios, to model their causation, likelihood and severity. To conduct 
their work, they use several tools and procedures which may involve 
workers/experts at all levels of sociotechnical systems.  
When uncertainty is high, planning is no longer simply "a straightforward 
instrumental activity (a means to an end)"(Hayes and Hopkins, 2014, p 83) rather, 
it can become a symbolic undertaking. When planning takes on a primarily 
symbolic role, the purpose of the plan becomes "asserting to others that the 
uncontrolled can be controlled" (Clarke, 1999, p 16). In this situation, symbolic 
plans represent a "fantasy" (Clarke, 1999) – in the sense of a promise that will 
never be fulfilled – and are often couched in a special vocabulary which then 
shapes discussion. The danger is that the plan itself takes on a life of its own and 
organizational effort is focused on managing the plan, rather than taking care of 
the physical system itself. 
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On top of the strategy to anticipate risks and related critical scenarios, a 
complementary strategy to prevent an accident is to foresee an ‘accident waiting 
to happen’ by relying on the feedback of system performance, especially its 
deficiencies such as safety related events, weak signals, precursors, near-misses 
incidents but also trends and drifts in key and safety performance indicators (KPIs, 
SPIs). Within this ESReDA FiS project group, we choose to label them ‘Early 
Warning Signs’ (EWS) as it enables to cover several concepts recalled hereafter.  
Ansoff (1975) provided some elements of a definition of weak signals related to 
strategic management of companies and strategic surprise as “early in the life of a 
threat, when the information is vague and its future course unclear”. A later 
definition was provided (Ansoff and Mc Donnell, 1990, p. 490) “[a] development 
about which only partial information is available at the moment when response 
must be launched, if it is to be completed before the development impacts on the 
firm.”  
Some EWS of potential hazards of a system can be captured while it is designed 
and operated. Indeed, in-depth investigations of some accidents showed that 
some weak signals, precursors of accidents, near-misses (Vaughan, 1996; Llory, 
1996; Carroll, 2004; Dechy et al., 2011; Jouniaux et al., 2014; Dien et al., 2012, 
2014) have been recognized, at least by some actors, during an ‘incubation period’ 
(Turner, 1978) but they were disregarded. Notice that Vaughan (1996) introduces 
the distinction between weak signals (that are ambiguous to their link to a risk), 
mixed signals (signs of potential danger that are followed by signs that all was well) 
and routine signals that frequently recur and even if they are serious, perception 
of them is altered as they recur without damage. 
For some of accidents, the missed opportunities to recognize the threats relates to 
issues of blindness and deafness. However, this is not an easy task and one should 
remain humble, vigilant and proactive. Indeed, several researchers warn 
investigators regularly that some signals of danger become clear only with the 
benefit of hindsight (Reason, 1990; Vaughan, 1996, Woods, 2009). It may lead to 
the following limit (Woods, 2005) “the past seems incredible, the future 
implausible”. Though retrospective bias is a risk of event analyst, empirical analysis 
of several accidents showed that some signals are recognised by several actors and 
processes (auditing, learning) prior to a major accident (Dechy et al., 2011) 
showing that identification is possible without the benefit of hindsight. 
Therefore, Turner (1976, 1978) considers that the challenge in normal operations 
is to develop "high-quality intelligence" (in a military context) to connect "disjunct 
information" distributed in complex systems so as to recognize an "ill-structured 
problem" (Simon 1973, Turner 1976). We would add to that point that the 
information is rooted in the history of the system and other systems (e.g. lessons 
from incidents in other countries, from similar systems and on generic aspects such 
as organisational failures). This organizational capability goes beyond effective 
communication as it requires an organization, processes, people to connect 
different fragment of information, to interpret them, to establish a link between 
them, referring to the "puzzle" metaphor (Lesca, 2001), to resolve ambiguities and 
to establish a well-structured problem (Turner, 1976).  
In a French research project of Institut pour la Maîtrise des Risques (Jouniaux et 
al., 2014), the weak signal recognition process was defined in three phases:  
• link data and fragments of information by experts or by data analytics pre-
treatment;  
• link this information to a risk or scenario; this relationship’ relevance has 
to be qualified by experts;  
• the signal is amplified when risk is redefined by management; strong 
signals can be minimized. 
The two first steps can be aided by data analytics pre-treatment (e.g. big data, 
natural language processing), but any suspected link, or correlation, or surprise has 
to be qualified by an expert (Jouniaux et al., 2014). For more development on this 
issue, see chapter 10 by Marsden et al. (2020).  
Near-misses and surprises are therefore opportunities to re-assess assumptions 
and effectiveness of risk prevention measures but also to imagine what could 
happen in other circumstances (applying the ‘what if’ motto).  
This is not new, as Weick (1991) (quoted by Reason, 1997) was approaching the 
issue with a few proposals: “we know that single causes are rare, but we do not 
know how small events can become chained together so that they result in a 
disastrous outcome. In the absence of this understanding, people must wait until 
some crisis actually occurs before they can diagnose a problem, rather than be in a 
position to detect a potential problem before it emerges. To anticipate and forestall 
disasters is to understand regularities in the way small events can combine to have 
disproportionately large effects”. 
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3.3.3 Failures of foresight in safety literature 
Accidents continue to happen despite risk anticipation, foresight in safety and the 
implementation of risk control measures. Moreover, accidents recur that 
demonstrate failures to learn. Several opportunities to identify the risk or the 
accident waiting to happen were missed. All the prevention and protection 
measures, including foresight, come under scrutiny after a serious event during 
the investigation process.  
Woods (2009) recalls that: 
• “establishing foresight encompasses extremely difficult forms of 
cognitive work and is an unstable process, given pressures on or from an 
organization’s management; 
• the difficulties arise from basic dynamic and cyclic patterns in how 
adaptive systems behave;  
• emerging measures of how and where a system is brittle or resilient 
provide a critical resource for developing and sustaining foresight when 
organizations need to achieve high performance (faster, better, cheaper) 
and high safety (Hollnagel et al., 2005)”.  
Turner (1976, 1978) considers a disaster as a "cultural collapse", because of the 
inaccuracy or inadequacy in the accepted norms and beliefs. The end of an 
accident is defined not in technical terms but refers to the "full cultural 
readjustment" that occurs when risk representation and risk management 
measures are changed. These deep changes do not occur for every near-miss.  
Derived from an empirical analysis of several accidents, Turner (1976) identifies a 
sequence that leads to failure of foresight (table 2). 
Table 2: Sequence of events of a failure of foresight (Turner, 1976, p381) 
The sequence of events associated with a failure of foresight 
Stage I Notionally normal starting point: (a) Initial culturally accepted beliefs about 
the world and its hazards (b) Associated precautionary norms set out in 
laws, codes of practice, mores, and folkways. 
Stage II Incubation period: the accumulation of an unnoticed set of events which 
are at odds with the accepted beliefs about hazards and the norms for their 
avoidance. 
Stage III Precipitating event: forces itself to the attention and transforms general 
perceptions of Stage II 
Stage IV Onset: the immediate consequences of the collapse of cultural precautions 
become apparent. 
Stage V Rescue and salvage -first stage adjustment: the immediate post collapse 
situation is recognized in ad hoc adjustments which permit the work of 
rescue and salvage to be started. 
Stage VI Full cultural readjustment: an inquiry or assessment is carried out, and 
beliefs and precautionary norms are adjusted to fit the newly gained 
understanding of the world. 
 
The key stage regarding the failure of foresight process occurs with missed 
opportunities during the "incubation period"’ when events accumulates, either not 
known to anyone or not fully understood by all concerned as it will be the case 
after the disaster, either it did not lead to changes in the risk controls.  
Turner further invites us to identify conditions that make it possible for unnoticed, 
misperceived and misunderstood events to accumulate in a manner that leads 
eventually to cultural disruption. Turner (1976) identified several of those 
conditions that occur in stage II of ‘incubation period’: 
• "failure to comply with existing regulations": they failed to realize that 
regulations apply or to implement them (this belongs to stage I and II 
about inadequate initial beliefs and norms); 
• "Rigidities in perception and belief in organizational settings": accurate 
perception of the possibility of disaster was inhibited by cultural and 
institutional factors; ‘collective blindness’; 
• "The decoy problem": attention is focused on "well -structured problems" 
and is distracted from "ill structured problems" in the background; 
• "Organizational exclusivity": disregard of non-members’ point of view, 
outsider's information or alerts are dismissed, considering the better 
knowledge of insiders, which can lead to forms of arrogance; 
• "Information difficulties": associated with ill-structured, vague and 
complex problems; on top of communication difficulties (necessary but 
not sufficient condition); disjointed information is common in large 
organizations and the organizational risk is that they are not intelligently 
treated which leads to unresolved ambiguities of warning signs, orders 
and procedures, and responsibilities and controls; 
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• "Involvement of strangers": some people involved in the system are 
uninformed and untrained, which creates difficulties on top of 
oversimplified stereotypes about their likely behaviour; 
• "Minimizing emergent danger": failure to see or appreciate the 
magnitude that remains under-estimated; under-valuation of evidence by 
the more complacent group and fearing the worst outcome; when 
impossible to ignore, (surprisingly) strengthening the response is not 
systematic; it may even lead to shift the blame or to believe in the use of 
quasi-magical means. 
When reviewing Turner’s added value, Weick (1998) warns that all organizations 
appear more vulnerable than they admit, because all develop culturally accepted 
beliefs and associated norms, and then accumulate unnoticed events that 
contradict with these world views. “‘Assumptions […] carry an organization’s 
learning as well as its blind-spots’. […] ‘Assumptions conceal warning signals, 
deflect attention to safe issues, leave signals unnoticed because they are undefined 
and set the stage for surprises that necessitate revision in administrative 
practices’”.  
Westrum (1992) distinguished three organizational cultures10 according to the way 
they deal with safety-related information: 
Table 3: How different organizational cultures handle safety information (Westrum, 1992) 
Pathological culture Bureaucratic culture Generative culture 
Don’t want to know. 
Messengers (whistle-
blowers) are shot. 
Responsibility is shirked. 
Failure is punished or 
concealed. 
New ideas are actively 
discouraged. 
May not find out. 
Messengers are listened to 
if they arrive. 
Responsibility is 
compartmentalized. 
Failures lead to local 
repairs. 
New ideas often present 
problems. 
Actively seek it. 
Messengers are trained 
and rewarded. 
Responsibility is shared. 
Failures lead to far-
reaching reforms. 
New ideas are welcome. 
 
Beside the processual, organizational and cultural views of foresight in safety, 
Perrow (1982, 1984) insisted on the inherent cognitive limits of operators and 
                                                                
10 Other cultures may be categorized (e.g. Hudson (2001) added reactive, calculative, and proactive 
(replacing bureaucratic, between pathological and generative) within a safety culture maturity model). 
engineers to anticipate all interactions and cascading effects in complex systems. 
To some extent, many accidents are ‘impossible accidents’ at least from the 
perspective of those involved (Perrow, 1984). ‘Accidents appear to be the result of 
highly complex coincidences which could rarely be foreseen by the people 
involved. The unpredictability is caused by the large number of causes and by the 
spread of information over the participants… Accidents do not occur because 
people gamble or lose, they occur because people do not believe that the accident 
that is about to occur is at all possible (Wagenaar and Groeneweg, 1987). In 
Perrow’s view, foresight is always limited and some technologies should not be 
used because accidents are inherent, indeed can be said to be ‘normal’.  
3.3.4 Approach, structure and content of this chapter 
First, in the next section (§3.4), we draw on past major disasters across a range of 
sectors (chemical, oil and gas, space) to identify patterns of failures of foresight. 
This empirical approach, that relies on case studies of accidents to highlight 
patterns of accident causation and especially organizational patterns of failure of 
foresight, has been implemented by several researchers on accidents and safety 
(e.g. Turner, 1976, 1978; Perrow, 1984; Llory, 1996, 1999; Reason, 1997; Dien et 
al., 2004; Llory and Montmayeul, 2010, 2018).  
Indeed, from a practical point of view, those accidents and disasters investigation 
reports are often public and have been produced by large expert teams in relation 
to presidential or parliamentary commissions or independent safety boards 
(ESReDA, 2005). Their reports of several hundred pages may provide "thick 
descriptions" (Geertz, 1998), meaning very detailed accounts about daily activities 
of people, interactions and organizational and institutional processes. Those 
reports are of various qualities. Some can be considered as school cases that every 
safety specialist should read and know [e.g. Ladbroke Grove trains collision in 
United Kingdom in 1999 (Cullen, 2000); loss of space shuttle Columbia in 2003 
(CAIB, 2003), Texas City refinery explosion in 2005 (CSB, 2007)]. In other cases, 
some reports are criticised publicly and associated with controversies in relation 
or not with the judicial investigation. No reports should be considered as perfect: 
the investigation may have grey zones or uncovered scopes and so can be 
complemented by other published material.  
Notice that several sub-cultures or maturities co-exist within the same organisation, department which 
questions their overlapping, integration and interactions. 
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More fundamentally, this approach aims at identifying organizational 
"vulnerabilities". Indeed, accidents offer the ‘gift of failure’ (Wilpert according to 
Carroll and Fahlbruch, 2011) - an opportunity to learn about safe and unsafe 
operations. Accidents are the "royal road" (Llory, 1996) to access to real (mal) 
functioning of organizations11, as some hidden phenomena in the "dark side" of 
organizations (Vaughan, 1999) may become more visible in accidents. This strategy 
is opposite to the study of normal operations and banality of organizational life 
(Vaughan, 1996) that is often conducted to identify “best ways” to cope with 
variability, to enhance reliability and to adapt and recover from adverse events 
(‘High Reliability Organizations’ (Roberts, 1990, Laporte and Consolini 1991), 
‘Resilience engineering’ (Hollnagel et al., 2006), and ‘Safety II’ (Hollnagel, 2014)). 
Second, analytical developments start in section §3.5 by discussing how risk 
analysis can fail and continue in section §3.6 with blindness patterns. This analysis 
also relies on our investigator and risk analyst’s practical experiences in the field, 
either within high-risk industries, expert’s institutes that support the safety 
regulation and consultancy firms, or also as researches in risk assessment and 
management. We provide a few conclusions and perspectives in section §3.7. 
3.4 Accidents that highlighted some failures of foresight 
3.4.1 Toulouse disaster in 2001 in France 
On 21st September 2001, a powerful explosion occurred at the AZF fertilizer and 
chemical plant in Toulouse suburbs which lead to significant damage and effects12. 
The direct causes are still under debate and controversy between prosecution, 
lawyers for Total and other stakeholders even after the third trial in 2017 (Dechy 
et al., 2018). In summary, the explosion of off-specification ammonium nitrate was 
not prevented and turned into disaster due to several failures in risk assessment, 
management, governance, control and regulation (Dechy et al., 2004). 
This accident belongs to the category of ‘atypical’ accidents (Paltrinieri et al., 
2012). It means that this low probability-high consequence accident was not 
among the worst-case scenarios captured by traditional risk analysis and 
                                                                
11 In reference to Sigmund Freud's metaphor: "Dreams are the royal road to the unconscious. " 
formalised within the safety case submitted under Seveso I and II directives by the 
licensee to the regulator, nor one of the scenarios used in the eighties and nineties 
to establish land use planning and emergency planning. This striking lesson 
revealed flaws not only in the risk analysis process used to identify the relevant 
scenarios but also in the negotiations upon the scenario’s basis on which to define 
safety measures. 
An underlying reason is that the residual scientific uncertainty on ammonium 
nitrate chemical sensitivity were underestimated. There were ambiguities in the 
behaviour of ammonium nitrate that belong to the category of “occasional 
explosives” (Médard, 1979). In some conditions (e.g. contamination by chemical 
impurities, fuel, air pressure…), inherent and residual explosion risk could increase. 
In addition, lessons from accidents in the last century were assumed to be learned, 
and also gave decision-makers confidence to exclude the occurrence of those 
conditions and initiators if industries operate normally. The conservative approach 
was therefore limited. There were also deficiencies in knowledge management 
about accidents lessons and chemical properties. Also, the fertilizer industry lobby 
pushed to consider that the “worst-case scenario” for ammonium nitrate storage 
were fires with toxic fumes, because such consequences are more likely, rather 
than a massive explosion. Imagination was therefore limited though the explosion 
risk remained inherent, especially if conditions were gathered. In addition, the 
“envelope approach” of safety case studies lead the licensee and regulator to focus 
on other scenarios of the plant and of the neighbouring plants which were more 
severe (several toxic cloud release) than a potential ammonium nitrate explosion.  
Once approved in 1989, the land use planning (LUP) process and plan enabled local 
authorities to freeze further nearby urban development, but it was too late as 
buildings and houses were already close by, and the plan had no retroactive force 
to expropriate people (Dechy et al., 2005). In addition, the effects’ distance was 
under-estimated because scenarios were rather incidents than worst cases. This 
occurred as an outcome of negotiation between the regulator and operator after 
Seveso I regulation. A reason was that regulator and operators wanted to find an 
incentive such as a way to value the financial investment in prevention measures 
with an impact on a reduced safety distance that impacts the land-use.  
12 31 fatalities, estimates of French national health institute (InVS) are about 10 000 injured, 14 000 
post-traumatic acute stress, 27 000 houses/flats damaged, 1,5 to 2,5 billion euros of damages; Dechy 
et al., 2004a). 
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3.4.2 Buncefield accident in 2005 in United Kingdom 
The Buncefield oil depot fire and explosion the 11th of December 2005 destroyed 
a large part of the site and the surrounding area. The immediate trigger for the 
catastrophe was a large petrol storage tank that overflowed whilst being filled 
from a pipeline. About 300 tons of petrol escaped from the tank, 10% of which 
turned to a flammable vapour cloud. Once ignited, the magnitude of the resultant 
vapour cloud explosion (VCE) was much greater than anyone knew was possible. 
The effects were fortunately more limited (43 injuries) as it occurred at 6 am of a 
Sunday morning (MIIB, 2008; COMAH Competent Authority, 2011).  
The Buncefield oil depot was subject to the so-called ‘‘Seveso-II’’ Directive, but the 
scenario that occurred was not taken into account in the mandatory safety report, 
as in the case of Toulouse accident (Paltrinieri et al., 2012). Formation of a vapour 
cloud due to tank overfilling and consequent VCE were not deemed possible, 
neither by the company nor by the competent authorities. The design of the tank 
itself may have contributed to the vapour/mist formation in a manner that was not 
foreseen by designers. The tank was fitted with a deflector plate that led to a 
cascade of petrol droplets through the air. Moreover, most of the remaining fuel 
running down the wall hit a structural stiffening ring and detached from the tank 
wall, creating a second cascade of droplets. These conditions promoted the 
evaporation of the lighter components of petrol, (e.g. butane), which were allowed 
in higher concentration in the winter season. The unexpected strength of the 
subsequent VCE was caused by presence of equipment and trees increasing the 
turbulence of the flow and/or providing a certain level of confinement and a 
substantial energy of the ignition source (MIIB, 2008). 
The worst credible scenario included in the site safety report was a major liquid 
fuel pool fire (COMAH Competent Authority, 2011). Although, risk analyses of oil 
depot in France in the early 2000’s considered potential leaks that could form an 
explosive cloud especially for volatile hydrocarbons, the risk considered was the 
one of unconfined vapour cloud explosion, implying that it did not lead to 
overpressures over 200 mbar. Therefore, pool fires were often the worst case for 
safety cases reports with envelope effects out of the plant site. For this reason, the 
actual accident scenario can be defined as “atypical” (Paltrinieri et al., 2012).  
Hazard identification has important aims: it may highlight possible malfunctions of 
the systems, outline related losses of containment and describe potential 
consequences. An atypical accident may occur when hazard identification does not 
produce a complete overview of hazards due to a lack of specific knowledge and a 
low awareness of associated risks, because it deviates from normal expectations 
of unwanted events or worst-case reference scenarios (Paltrinieri et al., 2013). This 
qualitative pre-assessment is the foundation of risk management. For instance, 
Seveso safety reports are supposed to conservatively evaluate worst-case 
scenarios and safety measures that are used for the operation licensing, 
calculation of effects’ distance used in emergency response planning and in the 
design of safety area in land use planning (LUP).  
Further accident databases analysis and research (Paltrinieri et al. 2012) 
demonstrates that VCEs in oil depots were not unknown before. In fact, since the 
middle of 1960s, there is record of VCE accidents occurring approximately every 
five years in oil depots around the world. Effective knowledge management 
searching for and considering such historical lessons and strong warnings was 
missing in Buncefield. It can be speculated that this was due to the inaccuracy of 
the analysis process (availability of resources to seek for accident data?) while 
assessing related risks, whose results were (only apparently) validated because it 
was consistent with similar process safety studies (addressing similar plants or the 
former plant documents) and within the basic experience. In other words, the risk 
analysis process was affected by social conventions and by an implicit code of 
practice that failed to integrate some knowledge about accidents. 
3.4.3 Texas City refinery accident in 2005 in USA 
On March 23, 2005, an explosion and fire at the BP refinery in Texas City lead to 
15 deaths and 180 injuries. The CSB (2007) noted that: “The Texas City disaster was 
caused by organizational and safety deficiencies at all levels of the BP Corporation”. 
The board member and CEO of the US Chemical Safety Board (CSB), Carolyn Merritt 
(2007) underlined: “cost cutting, production pressures, and a failure to invest left 
the BP Texas City refinery vulnerable to a catastrophe.”  
Failures in major risk assessment have been noticed. The risk of the blowdown 
drum releasing a potential explosion cloud was identified as it was known as an 
“antiquity of the fifties” by the operator and the industry standard had changed to 
require a flare for new designs. It was known by the regulator (OSHA) who 
requested the removal of antique flare, but the operator (Amoco in the nineties) 
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relied on ‘grandfathering’ 13to avoid the need for modification and replacement by 
a safer equipment. Internal audits of the BP group in early 2000’s already blamed 
the BP refinery ‘check book mentality’ for maintenance of equipment, for safety 
policy and more generally for selection of risk controls.  
The failures to learn (Hopkins, 2008) and the blindness to process safety 
deterioration and alerts (e.g. loss of containment incidents were increasing) have 
been eased by the confusion with worker safety metrics that were improving 
(further explanations in section §3.6.3). CSB (2007, p18) investigation found that 
“warning signs of a possible disaster were present for several years, but company 
officials did not intervene effectively to prevent it.” Merritt added (2007) that 
“adhering to and enforcing federal regulations already on the books would likely 
have prevented this accident and its tragic consequences.” 
Indeed, the CSB investigation showed that some BP members had identified the 
rise of major risks already in 2002. The new director of BP’s South Houston 
Integrated Site observed in 2002 that the Texas City refinery infrastructure and 
equipment were “in complete decline”. (CSB, 2007). An internal follow-up analysis 
concluded that “the current integrity and reliability issues at TCR [Texas City 
Refinery] are clearly linked to the reduction in maintenance spending over the last 
decade” (CSB, 2007, p153). Several other internal studies, surveys, audits and also 
serious incidents alerted and signalled the severity of deficiencies but the response 
of BP managers was “too little and too late” (Merritt, 2007). For example, there 
was a poor (only 30% of corrective actions were implemented) and declining 
implementation of corrective actions. Furthermore, a safety culture assessment 
conducted by an external company (Telos Group) alerted the managers in January 
2005 about the critical and degraded state of the refinery. The Telos report 
identified the organisational and process safety problems that were found by the 
CSB in retrospect.  
3.4.4 San Bruno pipeline failure in 2010 in USA 
In September 9, 2010, eight members of the public were killed when a gas 
transmission pipeline ruptured at San Bruno, California (NTSB, 2011). The rupture 
occurred when a longitudinal seam weld failed. The weld had been poorly made 
during construction of the pipeline in 1956. The line had not been inspected or 
                                                                
13 ‘Grandfathering’ is a legal process that gives the benefits of anteriority to existing processes over new 
legal requirements which have no retroactive force.  
tested since that time. Failure of pressure control at the upstream terminal led to 
a pressure rise in the line to close to the maximum allowable operating pressure 
(MAOP). Control room operators chose to troubleshoot the pressure problems but 
not to isolate the downstream pipelines. After exposure to higher than normal 
pressure for approximately one hour, the line failed.  
Integrity management of ageing buried pipeline networks is an exercise in 
managing risk. In this case, the involved operating company PG&E (Pacific Gas and 
Electric) had put significant effort into developing a risk model of the system but 
the primary focus of the system was not on fault identification and repair. Indeed, 
the database contained inaccurate data, inappropriate risk algorithms and lacked 
any real-world connection. In summary, shortcomings in the GIS (geographic 
information system) and associated procedures include (Hayes and Hopkins, 
2015): 
• The database used as the basis for risk ranking included physical data that 
was optimistic and / or incorrect and there was no system of data 
checking in place. 
• Algorithms for establishing inspection priorities averaged risk scores for a 
given pipeline segment across all threats to pipeline integrity thereby 
hiding problems, rather than highlighting them. 
• Regardless of the identified threat, higher risk segments were mostly 
subjected to external corrosion direct assessment, a type of inspection 
which finds pipeline integrity problems for external corrosion threats 
only. 
• There was no system in place to review the performance of the integrity 
management system overall i.e. to compare high risk segments identified 
with inspections done and with actual leaks seen to determine if the 
system was effective and/or how it might be improved. 
• The system produced only a prioritised list of pipeline segments based on 
threats to integrity. Whilst such a system could, in theory at least, be used 
to determine where funds should be spent to improve integrity, it makes 
no attempt to comment on overall risk acceptability and the total budget 
required. 
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Another significant factor in this accident was the MAOP for the pipeline segment 
that ruptured. It had been determined based on the highest operating pressure 
seen in the system in the previous five years, rather than by testing. This was 
specifically allowed for pipelines of this age under the relevant regulations. Newer 
pipelines are required to be hydrotested but pressure testing requirements of the 
relevant standard had been grandfathered in this case, in a similar way to the old 
design of the Texas City refinery blowdown system. Given the flawed weld, it is 
unlikely that the pipeline would have passed a hydrotest and yet such a test was 
not required by the regulator, nor seen as necessary by the operating company. 
3.4.5 NASA space shuttle losses in 1986 and 2003 
On the 28th of January 1986, after an unusually cold night for Florida (minus seven 
degrees Celsius) which required a launch delay due to ice on the shuttle launch 
pad, the space shuttle Challenger exploded 73 seconds after its launch with all 
seven astronauts killed. The technical explanation of the accident centred on the 
failure of the joint between two segments on the right Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). 
The O-rings that were intended to seal this joint from hot gases leaking through 
the joint failed to perform properly, due to the extremely low temperatures for 
the intended launch environment. This leak allowed a flame to emerge from the 
SRB and to impinge upon the external fuel tank (Rogers et al., 1986). 
On 1st of February 2003 the space shuttle Columbia disintegrated during its re-
entry phase into the Earth's atmosphere after a 16-day mission on orbit around 
the Earth. The seven astronauts died in the accident. The Columbia mission was 
the 113th space shuttle flight. The technical cause for the loss of Columbia is clearly 
identified. During the shuttle's ascent phase, a piece of insulating foam separated 
from the left bipod ramp located on the external fuel tank. It struck the leading 
edge of the orbiter's left wing at a relative speed of about 800 km/h. The impact 
caused a hole in the shuttle thermal protection system, a particularly vulnerable 
area during re-entry in the dense layer of Earth’s atmosphere (CAIB, 2003). 
Beyond direct technical causes of the accidents, there is a similarity in the 
organizational patterns of the two accidents, with “echoes” of Challenger’s causes 
in Columbia’s (CAIB, 2003). Both disasters can be seen as symptoms of foresight 
blindness. Indeed, for the Challenger case, organizations (the NASA and its 
contractor Morton Thiokol Inc.) were unable to fully acknowledge the design flaw 
                                                                
14 Knowing that no data were available on the fatal Challenger mission. 
of the rocket joint: they fail to recognize it as a problem to be fixed and they 
perceive it as an acceptable flight risk. According to the Presidential Commission it 
was “an accident rooted in history”. There were warnings from several lower-level 
engineers from the subcontractor and concerns within some NASA engineers, that 
the joints were poorly designed, including one report that said they could cause a 
catastrophe. Unfortunately, it had no significant impact on decision makers. 
Warnings were unheeded by top managers.  
In addition, NASA did not retain memory of the lessons learned. As Diane Vaughan 
noted (1996, p. 422): “Few of the people in the top NASA administrative positions 
exposed to the lessons of the Challenger tragedy are still here. The new leaders 
stress safety but they are fighting for dollars and making budget cuts. History 
repeats, as economy and production are again priorities”. One effect of this policy 
is the feeling that as long as no serious problem occurs, the situation is seen to be 
under control (“so far, so good!!”): “success-engendered safety optimism” (CAIB, 
2003, p. 114) and “it could lead to a tendency to accept risk solely because of prior 
success.” (CAIB,2003, p. 114). Risk is measured by past successes: “The acceptance 
and success of these [past Challenger] flights is taken as evidence of safety” 
(Feynman, 1986). Example of the Columbia accident is typical of inability to take 
account of small failures “forgotten” during the risk analysis carried out during the 
design phase. The fatal flight was the 113th mission of a space shuttle. The various 
shuttle orbiters had been hit by debris for each of the previous 112 missions14. It 
was the 7th detachment from the left bipod, knowing that a detachment from the 
right bipod was never seen. Those events were identified as safety issues by 
designer that defined specifications to prevent them. The consequence of these 
multiple failures was not a risk (re)assessment but a progressive shift in evaluation 
of the severity of incidents, gradually, mission after mission:  
• From “safety of flight issue” to a “turnaround issue” (simple 
maintenance); 
• From "Out-of-Family" problem (operation or performance outside the 
expected performance range for a given parameter or which has not 
previously been experienced) to "In-Family" problem (a reportable 
problem that was previously experienced, analysed, and understood); 
• In other words, from jeopardizing safety to acceptable risk. 
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3.5 Failures of foresight due to inadequate risk assessment 
Risk prevention through anticipation relies especially on the ability to identify 
safety threats and to model risk levels adequately in order to ensure proportionate 
risk control measures. It is mainly depending on what is imagined and considered 
in input, at the modelling phase of risk analysis and finally about what is done with 
the output to prevent accidents. These processes are collective and socially 
constructed and relate to engineering standards and regulation.  
When addressing low frequency-high consequences events that are for some 
beyond experience, this becomes more challenging. Many accidents have taken 
companies apparently by surprise as a result of poor engineering risk assessments. 
Among the mechanisms highlighted by accidents, the next paragraphs discuss 
some of the failures, especially on complexity modelling, imagination, 
quantification, and point to some recurring flaws and biases that downgrade these 
activities.  
3.5.1 Limits in capturing the complexity of reality 
Engineers have developed several formal methods in safety and reliability to 
identify (e.g. What if? Systematic questioning) and assess risk (e.g. failure mode 
and defects analysis, preliminary risk analysis, HAZOP, fault trees, bow-ties…) and 
more complex tools (e.g. 2D, 3D) to model physical and chemical phenomenon 
(fire, explosion…). A first limit stands in the inability to capture the complexity of 
reality into risk assessment approaches and risk modelling. The use of scenarios is 
fairly common, providing benefits and showing limits as well (see chapter 5, 
Ferjencik et al., 2020).  
A striking lesson of both the Toulouse disaster and the Buncefield accident was 
that their scenarios were not identified as the worst-cases scenarios that were 
integrated in the safety case studies reports, emergency and land use planning 
area. We therefore called them "atypical" (Paltrinieri et al., 2012) as they are not 
enough typical to serve for those purposes. This recurring finding hampers the 
legitimacy of such engineering plans to anticipate risk and prepare emergency 
procedures (with the risk of becoming a “fantasy” (Clarke, 1999)).  
Everyone knows that models are a simplification of reality. Similarly, some 
researchers (Perrow, 1984) have criticized system designers’ abilities to address 
the complexity of sociotechnical systems and even to prevent and protect from 
inevitability of accidents in such settings. Though this ‘normal accident’ theory has 
been challenged for different reasons (Hopkins, 2001; Dechy et al., 2011; Dien et 
al., 2013) mainly because in most accidents, warning signs (weak or strong) are 
available before the major accident, but often not treated accordingly, the warning 
from Perrow should lead to vigilance attitude when establishing such scenarios.  
The more we study risk assessment practices and failures of foresight, the more 
we become cautious about the interpretation of results provided by the 
application of formal approaches of risk analysis (e.g. hazard identification 
techniques) as they oversimplify reality [e.g. Buncefield with bow-tie, HAZOP, 
Paltrinieri et al., 2012; with FMEA, Thellier, 2017, 2018]. Several incidents, events, 
near-misses reveal some unexpected scenarios with unanticipated interactions 
and combinations of systems, sub-system, and component failures that were not 
captured in the risk analysis format. Then the question can become to wonder if 
they are used as opportunities to learn about those missed scenarios applying the 
‘what-if’ motto as a driver for risk imagination.  
Finally, it is widely acknowledged that engineering approaches poorly address and 
even divert from addressing human and organisational factors and the 
sociotechnical interactions and complexity (Rasmussen, 1997, Wilpert and 
Fahlbruch, 1998; Thellier, 2017; Vautier et al., 2018, Llory et al., 2018). This remains 
a major blindness and favours the "cultural collapse" mentioned by Turner.  
3.5.2 Failures of imagination in defining the worst case  
Preventing accidents through foresight requires safety threats to be identified. 
Efficiency criteria are the ‘imagination’, ‘exhaustiveness’ and the ‘filtering’ or 
defining a "hierarchy of risks". For decades, deterministic approaches have been 
widely used in several industrial sectors in order to specify appropriate measures 
and barriers to deal with major risks and protect workers and neighbours of 
industrial plants. This approach requires conventional scenarios to be defined and 
studied by postulating some “worst-case scenarios” that can lead to the complete 
degradation of a storage and pipe in order to study “envelope effects” 
(Hourtoulou, 2002, Libmann, 1996). Notice that the nuclear reactor meltdown was 
not formally postulated in conventional scenarios (Libmann, 1996) before Three 
Mile Island accident in 1979, though it had been imagined by some nuclear 
engineers, even before the WASH1400 probabilistic risk assessment report 
(Rasmussen, 1975). Though this report brought some advances, it was also largely 
reviewed and criticized. 
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For some researchers (e.g. Clarke, 1999, 2006), the “worst-case approaches” 
become an exercise in “fantasy planning” when they convince their users and fool 
them. It can lead to fantasy land use planning around pipelines (Hayes and 
Hopkins, 2015) or petrochemical plants if we look at Toulouse and Buncefield 
accidents. Indeed, in our experience (Dien and Dechy, 2016), the imagination is 
often limited by a dose of realism.  
First, some initiators are excluded: e.g. at Toulouse disaster in 2001, some 
explosion triggering factors were excluded such as the confinement or the 
contamination factors, considering that those conditions would not occur in 
“normal operations” thus preventing any explosion. The industry lobby focused on 
the more likely event of a fire as the worst-case scenario, (Dechy et al., 2004, 2005). 
In the nuclear sector, some phenomena were not taken into account until recently 
(e.g. tornado in France) and the severity of natural hazards was under-estimated 
in Japan as shown by Fukushima accident (Diet, 2012) and worldwide. Meteorites 
are excluded by all industries.  
Then, major risk modelling is supposed to espouse the so-called ‘conservative 
approach’ but in practice there are limits. “Worst case-scenario” are supposed to 
display “envelope effects” but are not always the maximum physically possible. All 
the parameters that influence them are not integrated in the model with all at the 
highest intensity. In France, in the early 2000s, for oil storage tanks in an open 
environment, it was considered that the highest overpressures of unconfined 
vapour cloud explosion were below 200 mbar. During the Buncefield accident 
(2005), overpressures were over one bar in some locations, due to differences in 
the initiating energy, the oil mist, the nature of hydrocarbons and turbulence 
factors. The impact of those parameters was more or less known by some experts 
and researchers but often not modelled by practitioners. But, in addition specific 
adverse conditions occurred. Indeed, trees acted to increase turbulence and 
played a role of flame accelerator (MIIB, 2008; COMAH Competent Authority, 
2011; Paltrinieri et al., 2012). The oil mist explosion was very energetic because a 
deflector increases droplets when the liquid was leaking along the tank; there was 
a higher concentration of relatively more volatile components in the gasoline (in 
winter it is allowed by law).  
At Fukushima, a tsunami wave with a height level of 14 meters was imagined 
before the accident but excluded for probabilistic reasons. Therefore, the 
chairman of the independent commission concluded "It was a profoundly 
manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and prevented. And 
its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human response" (Diet, 
2012, p9). 
In the end, the exhaustiveness and efficiency achieved through the use of these 
systematic approaches remained a myth for some time. These beliefs (Turner, 
1978) are better challenged today as some stakeholders of these analysis would 
maintain some doubts that the residual risks have been achieved (e.g. for French 
nuclear safety after Fukushima, Couturier et al.; 2016).  
To better capture risks, our main lesson to share is to support more open risk 
analysis approaches including different worldviews, opinions, transparent and 
flexible approaches to anticipate the unthinkable. 
3.5.3 Traps of quantification 
Several benefits but also several traps from quantification can be identified 
(Lannoy, 2016). Probabilities and frequencies of accidents are commonly 
underestimated in several industries by more than an order of magnitude, before 
accidents occur and for several reasons. We could insist here only on a few limits 
that appear to us as noteworthy.  
A first limit that appears to us as quite important is expert dependence or 
sensitivity to the expert approach. A European research project, ASSURANCE 
(Hourtoulou, 2002) showed that for the same chemical plant, with seven different 
experts from Europe who selected their scenarios, their modelling tools and data, 
the results could differ by a factor of 6 in effects distances modelled for worst-case 
scenarios and by three orders of magnitude for probability estimates. 
A second limit, relies on the beliefs in quantification that can lead to perverse 
effects that can be detrimental to safety. Before the Challenger launch decision, 
engineers were asked to “quantify their doubts” about the robustness of the O-
rings, as the engineer perceptions were treated as “subjective”, “uncertain”, 
“qualitative”, “affective”, “emotional” and could not comply with a technical 
culture that required quantitative data (Vaughan, 1996). Of course, the engineers 
would have been equally stumped if they had been told to demonstrate 
numerically that the system was safe, showing that it is not quantification itself 
that is necessarily a problem but the way in which it is brought to bear in decision 
making. 
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Problems with pipeline integrity management at PG&E are similar in that the data 
used for quantification was significantly incorrect. Some critical information had 
been entered into the system as ‘dummy’ values when a new database was 
introduced some years before the accident. This "garbage in" resulted in graphical 
output showing that risk was declining whereas, in fact, pipeline integrity 
management was grounded in ‘garbage out’ results. 
Third, there can be some inappropriate use of statistical laws which are often used 
in reliability of equipment due to great number laws. For example, Gaussian 
distribution towards the average that are applied inadequately to low probability 
events and high consequences, infrequent extreme events, some of them could be 
considered as black swans hidden in the “fat tail” of statistical distribution (Taleb, 
2007). We see this in the San Bruno case specifically where the entire pipeline 
network was divided up into several hundred segments with a risk score produced 
for each possible threat to integrity (external corrosion, ground movement, design 
and materials, third party interference) and each segment. The problem, however 
was that all threats for a given segment were averaged, thus effectively hiding high 
scores. In some cases, the use of multi-criteria decision analysis procedures may 
prevent some of the quantification traps (Linkov and Moberg, 2017; Merad and 
Trump, 2020). 
3.5.4 Cognitive biases and social conventions 
In addition, one should remember that the map is not the territory; therefore 
analysts and managers should be very cautious about the limits of the approaches, 
especially the dependency on experts with regards to the limits in their 
background knowledge, their procedures to treat limited data, their tools (e.g. 
Dien et al., 2012, Maguire and Hardy, 2013; Power, 2016; Merad and Trump, 2020). 
There are several cognitive biases especially with perception of low probability-
high consequences events (work of Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Taleb, 2007; 
Merad et al., 2016). A famous example is also related to the NASA space shuttle 
Challenger explosion, with under-estimates by NASA managers of the likelihood of 
a failure of a launch (Feynman, 1986).  
The constraints in which risk assessments are performed should be addressed, as 
risk assessment are projects conducted under constraints (Merad, 2010). The 
resources, the methods or level of guidance and aiding, the level of openness and 
flexible mindset, should be questioned.  
Several “worst-case scenarios” are conventions that are a social construct (e.g. a 
vapour cloud explosion could not occur on an oil depot because of lack of 
confinement). They may inherently integrate residual risk (Couturier et al., 2016) 
that is not treated accordingly (e.g. occasional explosives such as ammonium 
nitrate fertilizer that are not inherently safe (Dechy et al., 2004; Marlair and 
Kordek, 2005)). These conventions are changed especially after disasters and are 
in retrospect better acknowledged to be some fantasy planning (Clarke, 1999, 
2006) that fooled their users for a while. 
3.6 Failures of foresight due to blindness 
First, we should notice that “blindness” may refer to several phenomena. It is 
obvious that it puts an emphasis on the inability to see and recognise from a 
cognitive and cultural point of view the early warning signs. But it can also be 
related to some failures to learn the lessons from strong signals such as lessons 
from accidents, by lack of memorisation or poor knowledge management. And it 
could also be understood as the inability to react to weak signals and change the 
course of actions as planned. Those contradictory signs may offer opportunities to 
reassess assumptions, models, controls and barriers, but are they seized? At some 
point, from a pathology such as blindness, it can shift to the inability to listen to 
and ear the alerts (deafness) or even some denial, apathy and inaction. 
3.6.1 Engineering failures to reassess models against warning signs 
The previous sections describes possible pitfalls in model development. The focus 
here is on issues with models in use. As the map is not the territory, in principle, a 
key preoccupation for risk analysts is to benchmark their predictions against real 
observations and collect new information that could challenge or help them to 
update and increase the reliability of their models. However, evidence from 
accidents shows that this is not always performed adequately either by the 
analysts in charge or by the professional community. This first argument hereafter 
relates to quality assurance in risk modelling; while the second addresses the 
opportunities to revise assumptions based on EWS treatment.  
The strength of the explosion of Buncefield accident was unexpectedly severe. 
However, history shows (see next table n°3) that it was not the first accident with 
important effects for unconfined vapour explosion. Moreover, several modelling 
approaches were available to take into account various parameters that influence 
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explosion strength (e.g. multi-energy methods by TNO15 since the eighties aimed 
at better taking into account turbulence and confinement parameters). The 
explosion in Saint-Herblain in 1991 in France was also surprisingly severe and did 
help to some extent to reveal to some experts (e.g. in France at INERIS, Lechaudel 
and Mouilleau, 1995) some under-estimates in unconfined vapour explosion 
modelling. However, common practices of risk analysts for such modelling were 
not so aware of this kind of phenomenon.  
Beyond a quality assurance approach to benchmark the quality and the reliability 
of risk modelling, a complementary strategy is to be reactive to EWS. Those EWS 
should be proactively seized as opportunities to check safety assumptions, risk 
modelling, and therefore relevance of designs, rules and decisions. EWS should be 
both captured and treated within an engineering loop (redesign a design flaw) or 
operational loop (monitor or change the organisation).  
To some extent, this issue deals about the treatment of risk under uncertainty. 
Several accidents (e.g. Therac-25, (Leveson and Turner, 1993), DC-10 crash in 
Ermenonville, (Llory, 1996)) have revealed these difficulties to be reactive and 
proactive to different magnitude of EWS.  
As described above, PG&E operated a risk-based model for pipeline integrity 
management to determine inspection priorities. The major problems with the data 
and algorithms on which the model was based might have been identified before 
the San Bruno failure if only a link had been made between field experience and 
model predictions. Two kinds of field data were available (inspection results and 
pipeline leaks) and neither of these were used to verify that the risk model was 
operating as intended.  
NASA engineers observed that O-rings of space shuttle boosters were damaged. 
Specifications of designers required no damage. The engineers discussed 
redesigning the system but this would take two years and could introduce new 
risks. Engineering preferred to choose evils that were known rather than unknown 
(Vaughan, 1996). This position was supported by the success of ongoing launches 
with anomalies but no major failures, which was taken as proof of safety, despite 
the fact that it was rather a confusion with reliability (Dien and Llory, 2006).  
                                                                
15 https://www.tno.nl/en/ 
The Challenger accident provided another lesson on this issue on the eve of the 
launch, when low temperatures in Florida generated concerns for some engineers 
from the subcontractor and manufacturer of the booster. Engineers lacked data to 
challenge prevailing assumptions about O-rings behaviour for low temperatures 
and were asked to quantify their doubts in order to convince NASA managers to 
set-up a new safety criterion for the decision to launch space shuttle.  
For this reason, an extended strategy of dynamic risk management is suggested by 
Paltrinieri et al. (2015) to define an appropriate decision-making process based on 
comprehensive monitoring activity. It should also integrate a dynamic learning as 
a follow-up from events (ESReDA, 2015) as described hereafter. 
3.6.2 Failures to learn, to memorize and to manage knowledge 
After an event, investigations seek to identify lessons to avoid a similar accident in 
the future, here and elsewhere. Failures to learn were numerous in BP’s Texas City 
refinery before their major accident (CSB, 2007; Hopkins, 2008) and are a common 
root cause of accidents, potentially an “ultimate root cause” (Dechy et al., 2009, 
2011, 2018; Dien et al., 2012; ESReDA, 2015).  
Dynamic learning should avoid blindness, forgetting and continuous improvement 
should be observed. Accidents, however, recur (Kletz, 1993) with similar 
organisational root causes, as for NASA space shuttles and BP accidents. Losses of 
memory of lessons from accidents do occur (Kletz, 1993; Ferjencik and Dechy, 
2016, Dechy et al., 2016), with both individuals and organisations forgetting (see 
chapter 4 by Ferjencik and Dechy, 2020). One should humbly acknowledge that 
learning to prevent the next accident, remains a high challenge.  
Some accidents show that lessons from accidents are missed which highlights a 
lack of awareness and poor knowledge management. Problems with the modelling 
of unconfined vapour cloud explosions at Buncefield have already been described. 
Surprisingly, the trend to underestimating the overpressure that could be achieved 
continued after the event, highlighting the difficulty to learn and change systems.  
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Table 4: VCE events in oil depots caused by gasoline LOC before and after the Buncefield 
accident (Paltrinieri et al., 2012) 










Houston, Texas, USA April 1962 Leak from a gasoline tank 
Baytown, Texas, USA 27 January 
1977 
Overfilling of a ship with gasoline 
Newark, New Jersey, 
USA 
7 January 1983 Overfilling of an unleaded 
gasoline tank 
Naples, Italy 21 December 
1985 
Overfilling of an unleaded 
gasoline tank 


















Overfilling of a gasoline tank 
Jaipur, India 29 October 
2009 
Valve left open 
 
The ammonium nitrate accidents in 1947 at Texas City (United States) and Brest 
(France) ports, occurred in specific configurations with fuel and confinement in 
cargo of ships. Those accidents were used as a proof of the need for the two 
necessary conditions to have explosions. It led the fertilizer industry to consider 
that these two conditions could not happen in open ground storage in normal 
operation therefore explosion risk could be excluded. Scientific knowledge 
management and information sharing about physical properties is sometimes 
considered as insufficient and not addressed by systematic risk analysis 
procedures. Even in the study of better known physical and chemical 
phenomenon, surprises can happen. The case of “occasional explosives” (Médard, 
1979) is typical; specifically, for ammonium nitrate where some residual risks were 
not intrinsically excluded thus forgotten (Dechy et al., 2004, Gyenes and Dechy, 
2016) as dramatically recalled by the 2020 Beyrouth disaster. Several properties at 
the limits are not discovered through quality tests but could be more likely if safety 
and research tests were conducted more often. In the nuclear industry, some 
phenomenon are still research subjects, fifty years after the first nuclear power 
plants started.  
An explanation of the severity of the consequences of the Texas City refinery 
explosion in 2005 (15 fatalities) comes from the location of temporary buildings 
for maintenance workers that were too close to the hazardous processes 
highlighting an inadequate siting procedure. It showed a lack of vulnerability 
analysis and worst case approach, but also a failure to remember the logic of 
targets removal learned from explosions in refineries (e.g. after La Mède (France) 
accident in 1991, control rooms became "blast proof"’) or in silos (e.g. with the 
Blaye (France) explosion in 1997 where the administrative quarters were below 
the silo causing the death of workers not directly necessary to the process.  
It can be seen in these cases that lessons from past incidents were not always 
explored with the aim "what if", rather past accidents were reinterpreted as proof 
of reliability or resilience instead of warnings of danger. The December 1999 storm 
that devastated western Europe and created an emergency situation at the French 
nuclear power plant of Blaye due to loss of power after a flooding of equipment, 
was fortunately properly managed. The side-effect is that it did not trigger an 
international strong learning process as Fukushima did. It is considered in 
retrospect as one of the precursors of Fukushima – an EWS that was lost. 
3.6.3 Failures in monitoring and in listening EWS, failures to change 
Early warning signs are often missed but there are opportunities during the 
incubation period to recognise them, to listen to alerts from people, especially 
during windows of opportunity (Edmondson, 2005) to implement changes. Here 
again, the challenge is not easy especially in highly complex systems with many 
EWS, a lot of noise, some difficulties to filter issues and determine the priorities. 
This is additionally more difficult for major risk prevention with low frequency and 
probability events.  
In the Buncefield accident, the Automatic Tank Gauging (ATG) system preventing 
tank overfilling had been stuck 14 times in the months before the accident. 
Sometimes this was logged as a fault by the supervisors and other times it was not. 
Moreover, the contractor company that installed the ATG system never considered 
that the gauge should be investigated, even if they had been frequently called to 
rectify the matter (COMAH Competent Authority, 2011). The problem with 
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measurement of the critical parameter of tank level was therefore known by many 
people and yet it was not fixed.  
The Texas City refinery explosion in 2005 (CSB, 2007) highlighted a few design flaws 
with latency effects, such as the “antique” flare (build in the fifties) which was 
abandoned in petroleum standards available since the eighties. The opportunity to 
remove it was investigated by a former owner of the refinery in the nineties 
especially under regulatory pressure, but the cost was used as a factor to postpone 
the corrective actions, as well as the ‘grandfathering’ argument. These missed 
opportunities to comply to a new regulation in order to improve safety (Ferjencik 
and Dechy, 2016) were normalised by control authorities.  
But one of the most striking lesson from this accident remains the inability to learn 
(Hopkins, 2008) implying a difficulty to change which was “too little, too late” 
(Merritt, 2007). The numerous latent flaws (Reason, 1990, 1997) caused by the 
lack of maintenance were severe "cost cutting, production pressures, and a failure 
to invest left the BP Texas City refinery vulnerable to a catastrophe" (Merritt, 2007). 
Their severity was visible before the accident by many actors at the refinery 
(managers, operators "closest to the valves", health and safety engineers, 
investigators, auditors) (Dechy et al., 2011). A 2003 internal BP audit warned that 
the reasons for “such a poor state” of the infrastructure “in complete decline” 
were known to be “culture and money”. The check book mentality was under-fire 
but was not turned around. The hindsight bias excuse does not apply here (and not 
only here, see chapter 11 about whistle-blowers, Dien et al., 2020)! It was not a 
failure of detection of weak signals, nor a myopia or blindness, but rather some 
deafness and denial to strong signals and inaction. CSB (2007) found: “warning 
signs of a possible disaster were present for several years, but company officials 
did not intervene effectively to prevent it.” 
In addition, BP managers failed to manage major risks and process safety, as they 
over relied on the wrong metrics related to worker safety (CSB, 2007; Baker et al., 
2007). Notice that BP is not the only company that made this error, it remains a 
preoccupation in health and safety management. This tragic confusion contributed 
to their own blindness and deafness. Indeed, process safety and major risks are 
recognised to be hard to measure in safety literature and practice. However, 
several efforts have been made by industries to define key performance indicators 
to benchmark, leading and lagging risk indicators, safety performance indicators. 
In process safety, a famous indicator is the "loss of containment" (LoC) that is a 
precursor of an accident (fire, explosion, toxic cloud), which defines the separation 
between prevention and protection. At Texas City, this indicator was measured 
and was degrading over time: "the number of loss of containment incidents at the 
Texas City refinery increased each year from 2002 to 2004" (Baker et al., 2007, 
p187)” "with an increase of “52 percent from 399 to 607 per year” (CSB, 2007, 
p168). These indicators were not in the main picture of SPI’s monitored by BP 
management. They relied too much on worker safety performance indicators and 
were measuring an improvement in the lost time injuries statistical indicator. This 
indicator was among the key performance indicators of the management 
especially for attributing bonuses to managers (Hopkins and Maslen, 2015) and 
communicating to control authorities.  
The temptation to use a measurable indicator is a common issue as recalled by 
(Kingston and Dien, 2017) which can lead to the 'McNamara Fallacy' which is 
attributed to Daniel Yankelovich (Smith, 1972) and is described in four steps: 
• “The first step is to measure whatever can be easily measured. This is okay 
as far as it goes”.  
• “The second step is to disregard that which can't be measured or give it 
an arbitrary quantitative value. This is artificial or misleading”.  
• “The third step is to presume that what can't be measured easily really 
isn't very important. This is blindness”.  
• “The fourth step is to say that what can't be easily measured really doesn't 
exist. This is suicide”.  
More generally, the blindness process is more subtle. It can for instance come from 
over reliance of management tools and processes that put under the light some 
phenomenon leaving in the shadow some others, reinforcing “organisational 
blinkers” (Largier, 2008). They can produce "an effect of blindness by producing an 
artefact of rationality. They participate to the setting on frontstage of a unique 
definition of the organisational situation, though other definitions are always 
present, but stay in the backstage" (Boussard, 2003). Often "the most used 
indicators give more consistency and resistance to some organisational 
representations" (Boussard, 2001).  
Listening to divergent opinions (as promoted by Navy Submarine in CAIB, 2003) 
and to ‘bad news’ (e.g. at Texas City, "bad news was not welcome", CSB, 2007) is 
not always easy especially for managers under pressure to achieve high 
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performance without adequate resources. Divergent opinions on the new NASA 
policy "Faster, Better, Cheaper" associated with cost-cutting, by new administrator 
Dan Goldin were dismissed: "When critics would raise the possibility that such cuts 
were going to affect safety the CAIB notes "Goldin described himself as "sharp-
edged" and could often be blunt. He rejected the criticism that he was sacrificing 
safety in the name of efficiency. In 1994 he told an audience at the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory, "When I ask for the budget to be cut, I'm told it's going to impact safety 
on the Space Shuttle ... I think that's a bunch of crap." (CAIB, 2003). EWS come from 
alerts from staff, analysts and auditors who may provide another interpretation. 
While managers value coherence and coordination in action, for fostering foresight 
in safety they should value more the diversity of analysis. Indeed, in Cybernetics 
theories, researchers valued the diversity of views with Ashby’s principle of 
requisite variety that implies a greater diversity of the controlling system to be able 
the control a complex system (Ashby, 1956; Vautier et al., 2018).  
3.7 Discussion and conclusions 
High-risk industries invest many resources every day in risk anticipation and many 
measures have already been in place for many years. However, the failures of 
foresight recalled here, highlight how industries, their experts and their regulators 
can fail. Every contributor to risk anticipation and foresight in safety should remain 
humble, cautious and sceptical and voice their doubts towards the challenge of 
accident prevention as it remains very difficult in practice. Anticipating and 
preventing accidents is a continuous struggle or never-ending war, bringing new 
changes, new risks and new threats, and also new safety degradation to discover 
before it is too late.  
"Disasters ‘are not created overnight"’ (Turner, 1976, 1978); accidents are 
therefore "hard to obtain" (Perrow, 1984); and require a "rare conjunction of a set 
of holes in successive defences"’ (Reason, 1997). Accidents are not the result of one 
error but a combination of multiples causes, conditions and influence factors 
(Dien, 2006, ESReDA, 2009). Accidents develop (Guillaume, 2011) during an 
"incubation period’ (Turner, 1976, 1978), which sometimes lasts for years (with 
"latent defect"(Reason,1997); in the example of San Bruno for more than 50 years). 
"Latent conditions"’ and "resident pathogens" within the workplace and 
organizations are "time-bombs" that can be identified and removed before the 
event (Reason, 1997) but sometimes they are not. In contrast to Perrow’s view 
(1984), the majority of accidents are not inevitable (Dechy et al., 2012, Dien et al., 
2013), because of the frequent occurrence of EWS prior to serious events, with 
some of them recognised by some actors. This empirical accident modelling makes 
clear the possibility of accident prevention. But will the opportunities to recognize 
an accident waiting to happen, be seized in the time window available? Indeed, 
some windows of opportunity and recovery (Edmondson et al., 2005) are 
recognised by some actors and require responses which are not always 
implemented in due time showing a form of apathy.  
While high-risk industries devote time, money and analysts to identify hazards, 
assess risks, learn from early warning signs, near-misses and from others’ hard 
lessons and best practices through benchmarking, many flaws in risk prevention 
are found in accident reports and sometimes in internal audits and event reports 
prior to the accident or in external regulatory inspections. These flaws are among 
the root causes of accidents. The few accident cases (Toulouse, Buncefield, Texas 
City, San Bruno, Challenger and Columbia) used as references for this analysis have 
highlighted some of the flaws in risk anticipation and prevention. 
There are many techniques, tools and procedures to identify risk and assess 
related scenarios. Some of the methods have limits, domains of validity, and 
conditions for being adequately applied and used, but these are sometimes 
forgotten. For instance, are they adapted to address extreme events or black 
swans (Taleb, 2007)? Also, we find it necessary to fight the recent growing trend 
that defines high consequence/low probability as black swans, against which little 
or nothing can be done. Risk assessment may be incapable of thoroughly 
quantifying them, but this should not be taken as an excuse. Accidents are made 
up of a chain of events and focusing on what we already know and understand may 
help to break such chain and lower both the probability and severity of disasters. 
Beyond the methods, implementation is dependent on the judgement of risk 
analysts. So, who are the analysts (Dien et al., 2012), what are their competencies, 
what are their collective resources to perform the job of conducting ‘risk work’ 
(Power, 2016) or risk expertise (Merad and Trump, 2020)?  
Stark (1951) already claimed that foresight is partly reproductive and partly 
creative. Therefore, foresight in safety requires ‘out-of-the-box’ thinking and there 
are some processes to foster imagination better than with traditional risk analysis 
methods. In other words, although the use of techniques can bring a systematic 
approach useful to demonstration of safety management to a regulator, 
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identification of risks requires imagination and creativity. Identification of risks 
requires diversity in the ways of thinking when questioning ‘what-if’. Diverse views 
can be shared in brainstorming including in debates over work practices, in ‘speak-
up’ (Edmondson, 1999), listening to divergent opinions, listening to ‘bad news’ or 
to those who disagree even outside the industrial system with citizens, residents, 
consumers, NGOs (Dechy et al., 2016). In a systemic perspective, this diversity of 
views is a way to obtain requisite variety to control the system.  
As risk is a social construct (Short, 1984) so is foresight in safety. Failures of 
foresight can be approached as a ‘cultural collapse’ because of the inadequacy of 
accepted norms and beliefs (Turner, 1976). A key implication is to remain critical 
on the processes of risk identification, risk assessment, performance monitoring to 
detect EWS. As identified by Clarke (1999), ‘fantasy planning’ may occur 
sometimes at the expense of actors’ consciousness when stakeholders put too 
much confidence in their collective choices which rely on inadequate assumptions 
and are impacted by a multitude of biases and constraints. This can lead to the 
"decoy problem", focusing on well-defined problems rather than ill-defined 
problems which can lead to collective blindness (Turner, 1976).  
“Organizations are defined by what they ignore – ignorance that is embodied in 
assumptions – and by the extent to which people in them neglect the same kinds 
of consideration” (Weick, 1998; p74). Engineering underlying assumptions are not 
often challenged during these processes. Expected scientific procedures are 
sometimes inadequate and may lead to inadequate beliefs from stakeholders. Risk 
management by companies and regulatory science are subject to criticism. 
Different values and goals may lead to controversies between regulators and high-
risk industries but negotiations do also occur. Worst case scenarios are reduced to 
realistic scenarios and only reasonable changes after near-misses are made. Norms 
and standards which have been approved by expert groups, institutions are 
"normalised" (Vaughan, 1996) within the organizational culture and it becomes 
harder for those in the system to question and challenge. "Fresh eyes” or Candide, 
external auditors and investigators can help and this is known for decades. But, the 
challenge is for actors of the system to challenge themselves, their competencies, 
their tools, their assumptions which require some mindset shift, to become more 
than a sceptic (questioning or doubt attitude in safety culture concepts).  
As remarked by Weick (1998, p72) about Turner’s input on cultural failures of 
foresight, the issue is not only about world-views, lenses and paradigms. The 
“mastery of pattern generation with sufficient requisite variety to match and 
register the patterned variety in the complex events […] is best captured by the 
imagery of kaleidoscope’: ‘just as the image of switching lenses can represent the 
changing of patterns in the realist schema, the changing of turning a kaleidoscope 
can represent the changing of patterns in the subjectivist schema, since the 
patterns of kaleidoscope may be internally generated with minimal dependence on 
information from outside. Turning a kaleidoscope can: (1) dislodge old patterns, (2) 
generate new patterns and (3) foster awareness that numerous configurations are 
possible” attributed by Weick to Nord and Connell (1993, p117).  
This remark invites organisations to create spaces and times where diversity of 
views and thinking fosters ‘requisite imagination’ (Westrum, 1992), that can help 
to recognize patterns, share explicitly doubts and uncertainties about systems 
behaviour, to identify well-defined and ill-defined problems. The goal is also to 
understand the assumptions, the artefacts, the tools used, the constraints met by 
operators, engineers, experts, managers, regulators in conducting their ‘riskwork’ 
(Power, 2016) and even to put under questions and scrutiny the expert work and 
regulatory science (Vaughan, 1996; Llory 1996; Maguire and Hardy, 2013; Boudia 
and Demortain, 2014; Merad and Trump, 2020). Every study of risk can be 
considered as a project (Merad, 2010) that has inherent constraints in the 
resources. The goal or ‘preoccupation with failure’ (in HRO, Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007) is to wonder if ‘safety imagination’ highlights or hides risks (Pidgeon and 
O’Leary, 2000). Spaces may be self-organized informally by groups of engineers 
such as observed with the ‘Debris assessment team’ at NASA to characterise the 
foam strike consequences or institutionalized such as ‘tiger teams’ after Apollo 13 
crisis. During the Columbia mission in space, the informal team was not given the 
status of a tiger team, and its conclusions were dismissed by mission’ managers.  
The challenge of foresight in safety is to identify all risks and recognize all EWS. But 
this is impossible in practice in general and at a given time. A reduced scope is to 
focus on major risks which implies the critical scenarios, those which escalate and 
damage system, assets and stakeholders. Some filtering of important signals is 
necessary otherwise channels are flooded with more and more data to treat. 
Making sense, prioritising are key processes to develop the relevant focus of 
resources with issues at risk, and proportionate the risk controls and implement 
them in due time. Decisions and trade-offs must be made, aided and revised. 
Safety margins and the burden of proof should be challenged. Especially, time is 
providing new opportunities to capture new signs and new knowledge to revise 
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assumptions and judgments. Dynamic learning and risk management approaches 
should be developed and promoted (ESReDA, 2015; Paltrinieri, 2015). 
Often, people within the system recognised early warning signs before the 
accident (Turner, 1976, 1978). These recurring empirical findings reject the 
hindsight bias excuse (Reason, 1990; Vaughan, 1996; Woods, 2009). This does not 
mean to reject the risk of the hindsight bias. In Texas City accident, several actors 
and several processes (auditing, learning) recognised EWS of safety degradation 
(Dechy et al., 2011). It is clear that some signals are blurred, contradictory or are 
“mixed signals” (Vaughan, 1996). But organisations are not monolithic (Dien, 
2014), and some workers, engineers and managers may know that safety is 
deteriorating. Many employees, whistle-blowers and citizens have warned before 
disasters (in chapter 11, Dien et al., 2020). In some case, beyond blindness and 
myopia pathologies, deafness, denial and apathy are major obstacles to change. 
The problem is not anymore, a problem of foresight but rather becomes 
managerial and political related to a lack of adequate reactions. 
Echoing Weick’s suggestion (1988) to define organisation by what they choose to 
ignore, organizations should also be defined by what they choose to remember 
and forget. Barriers and failures to learn are numerous. Accident and event reports 
often fail to address root causes (CAIB, 2003; Dien et al., 2012) and can themselves 
be considered as ‘fantasy’ documents (Birkland, 2009). There are losses of memory 
and similar accidents recur even in the same organizations (e.g. NASA, BP). 
Organizational patterns that lead to a failure of foresight are similar (Turner, 1976, 
1978). In-depth analysis of accidents already provided the "hard lessons" to be 
learned especially from other industries (Dien et al., 2004). These lessons are part 
of an international history of industrial accidents, from which can be derived some 
"knowledge of accidents" (Dechy et al., 2010, 2016). It can provide useful 
frameworks to interpret EWS and organizational weaknesses in normal operations 
(Dechy et al., 2016, 2018) and can develop some specific attitudes, such as 
vigilance, doubt and prudence as components of safety culture, and 
‘preoccupation with failure’ (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). The alternative (Reason, 
1997) is that managers forget to be afraid and allow drift to occur. In summary, 
foresight in safety relies on exploitation of existing knowledge and resources and 
exploration mechanisms (related to innovation, changes) (March, 1991). 
After all, practically speaking, what can be done? In addition to previous remarks 
and suggestions, one key factor to mention here is temporality. Foresight is 
fundamentally about time which highlights the dynamic nature of managing risk 
that is either improving or eroding. Time is potentially an enemy with pressures on 
decision and action but is also a resource as an opportunity to investigate and 
collect more information about an ill-structured problem, to help make a more 
objective judgment, to recalibrate a risk model with new data from the real world. 
Engineers have to make assumptions and decisions, but they have to remain 
sensitive to warning signs that would confirm or otherwise the safety envelope and 
margins. Managers are under business and time pressure to make decisions 
sometimes with insufficient information to understand all implications and side-
effects (Ansoff, 1975). Decisions with their rationale and information should be 
formatted and recorded in order to be monitored with regard to new signals and 
effects of actions, changes or inactions. In high-risk industries with many risk 
management provisions, degradation of safety can be insidious, but is announced 
to some extent by EWS that may be recognised by some actors and may provide 
windows of opportunity to take a reactive action if only those in control are 
listening. Will these opportunities be seized or will the reaction be ‘too little or too 
late’? 
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4 Loss of Memory as a Cause of Failure of Foresight in 
Safety 
Milos Ferjencik, University of Pardubice, Czech Republic 
Nicolas Dechy, Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire, France 
4.1 Executive Summary 
Loss of memory that degrades foresight in safety, especially implies a loss of 
knowledge of Early Warning Signs. With this focus, four aspects of memory playing 
a crucial role in foresight are identified which enable four different abilities 
(awareness for vigilance, recognition for sense-making, investigation for detection, 
and follow-up). They are associated with three faculties of human memorisation 
(encoding, storing, retrieving). Thus, difficulties for maintaining the memory useful 
for foresight fall into twelve categories of loss of memory. The individual aspects 
of memory important for foresight are distributed among different humans on 
different levels of hierarchy in socio-technical system. Organisational memory is a 
complex concept, phenomenon and system which relies on several aids, functions 
and artefacts (documents, procedures, processes, structures). Safety management 
measures can reduce some kinds of loss of memory without duplicating efforts but 
organisations should direct proactive specific measures against relevant categories 
of loss of memory. 
4.2 Key Messages 
• Loss of memory is a recurring root cause of disasters. 
• Knowledge from the past, hindsight knowledge is still useful for insight 
and foresight.  
• Part of the foresight is ‘reproductive’ based on past experiences while 
another part is more ‘creative’. 
• Loss of memory represents a loss of knowledge about early warning signs 
resulting from learning deficiencies. 
• Four aspects of memory playing a crucial role in foresight have been 
identified and enable different abilities (awareness for vigilance, 
recognition for sense-making, investigation for detection, and follow-up). 
• There are three key faculties of human memorisation (encoding, storing, 
retrieving). 
• Loss of memory useful for foresight can fall into twelve categories defined 
by the combination of four aspects and three faculties of memory.  
• This classification applies not only to human memory but also to 
organisational memory. 
• Organisational memory is a complex process that integrates memories of 
all humans within the organisation and sustain collective memory, 
supporting safety management aids and functions, and all the artefacts 
(documents, procedures, structures, processes) that integrate the 
experience of designers, operators and managers.  
• For each part of memory, contributing persons, aids and devices and 
supporting functions of the local safety management could be identified.  
• Some of generic safety management measures may prevent loss of 
memory and there is no need to duplicate efforts. However, there is still 
an effort to convert the question of what increases or decreases loss of 
memory to the measures or specific functions in local safety management 
that sustain overall safety performance including the memorisation 
aspects and faculties.   
4.3 Introduction 
It may seem paradoxical to address foresight, while its perspective is towards the 
future, with an issue such as “loss of memory” which perspective is towards the 
past. Indeed, knowledge from the past, or hindsight knowledge is still useful for 
insight and foresight. To face risks in the future, we are convinced that history still 
matters even with the forthcoming era of big data and artificial intelligence which 
implies duties for establishing some safety history to remember. 
First and as a reminder according to Stark (1961), part of the foresight is 
‘reproductive’ based on past experiences while another part is more ‘creative’. For 
Ricoeur analysing the relationship between history, memory and forgetting (2000), 
“the important is that the projection towards the future is now solidary to the 
retrospection on the past times”. In summary (Kingston and Dien, 2017), foresight 
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is about imagining the future possibilities based on knowledge of the past and 
present. In chapter No.°5 dedicated to the use of scenarios (Ferjencik et al, 2020), 
we have explained how the use of scenarios for foresight in safety is both 
prospective and retrospective. 
Second, one should remind that our society that is currently driven by ‘creative 
destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1942) which puts an emphasis on innovation and 
adaptation and highlights how experience and knowledge can become obsolete in 
face of changes that accelerate. Indeed, in management science, Abernathy (1978) 
proposed a paradigm shift that considered that innovation and experience should 
be understood as rival forces and strategies for companies. This dilemma between 
the two rationales was later reformulated by March (1991) within organisational 
learning framework: one would relate to the exploration of new knowledge while 
the other would relate to the exploitation of the existing knowledge. However, one 
should acknowledge that not all changes are disruptive, some are incremental and 
some designs last for several years. We believe foresight in safety has to consider 
both dimensions as it is done in the whole book. In this chapter, we focus more on 
the failure to use existing safety knowledge. 
Third, the quote ‘Loss of Memory’ (LoM) is a fairly common explanation of the 
reasons or the way an unwanted event recurred or occurred despite early warning 
signs.  
In the context of this ESReDA book on the issue of Foresight in Safety, we limit our 
scope to situations where LoM is used to explain some failures of foresight (Turner, 
1976; Kletz, 1993; Llory, 1996; Vaughan, 1996; Reason, 1997; CAIB; 2003; Woods, 
2009, Dechy et al, 2011, Ferjencik and Dechy, 2016). These are situations where 
LoM represented a failure of foresight, or memory loss has caused some ‘Early 
Warning Signs16’ (EWS), ‘weak-signals’, ‘latent flaw’, ‘precursors of accidents’, 
‘near-misses’, or ‘alerts’ to be omitted or unrecognised, during an ‘incubation 
period’ (Turner, 1978), which created an ‘accident waiting to happen’.  
In other words, loss of memory is a root cause of numerous disasters. Indeed, the 
situations we may encounter and should explain by the term LoM are diverse. Loss 
                                                                
16 EWS is the acronym for Early Warning Sign. "EWS are discriminated from all information and signs 
faced every day; EWS are those where a link towards risk identification and management has been 
made by a field actor, a manager, an analyst…. The relevance of the link, either intuitive or formal (e.g. 
data correlation), has to be assessed by experts. It can become a signal of danger when it is signalled 
of Memory could actually be considered itself as a generic and transversal kind of 
EWS. However, it is a term that remains so vague and broad that different forms 
of LoM need to be analysed.  
To address the challenge of making the concepts ‘foresight in safety’, ‘EWS’ and 
‘LoM’ operational, we therefore attempt in this chapter to identify different forms 
of LoM and classify them. The resulting categorization can help to highlight a few 
specific LoM examples to better focus repetitive prevention efforts through safety 
management. 
In this analysis of LoM forms or patterns, we assume first that LoM represents a 
loss of knowledge about EWS resulting from learning deficiencies (as described in 
Part 4.4). Accordingly, LoM forms can be divided into four groups which relate to 
several (in-)abilities (lack of awareness that leads to lack of attention or vigilance, 
lack of recognition or sense-making abilities, lack of investigation abilities for 
detecting EWS, and lack of follow-up after EWS). This will be explained in Part 
4.4.3.The second step of the analysis (in Part 4.5) starts from the position that the 
term LoM tends to relate to human memory and can be approached as a process. 
Some definitions on human memory is provided. This leads to a distinction 
between three types of deficiencies in encoding, storing and retrieving information 
and knowledge; this represents the second dimension of the proposed 
classification scheme as later explained in Part 4.5.2. Combining these two 
dimensions together, it leads us to propose a framework of twelve categories of 
risks for LoM to manage (see Part 4.5.4).  
In general, however, LoM does not only concern human and individual memory. 
For about the third generation we already live in a world where the term memory 
is commonly used outside the description of the human mind as a component of 
machines and systems and ultimately as a component of socio-technical systems 
(Rasmussen, 1997). Today we are not surprised to use the term loss of group 
memory, collective and also organisational memory - see Stemn et al. (2018). The 
legacy of Kletz (1993) “lessons from disasters: how organisations have no memory 
and accidents recur” was a triggering key message for this chapter and especially 
a more controversial warning that “organisations have no memory, only people 
by someone in the system. Not all EWS are signalled by somebody. Weak or strong signals of danger 
can be either amplified (change of risk models and actions taken strengthen risk management 
measures) or weakened (no action to reassess risk assessment assumptions or to take provisions for risk 
management). See Part 4.4.2 for further developments and relationships between concepts.  
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have”. This statement is therefore discussed towards foresight in safety 
challenges. An analysis of this ‘organisational memory’ term will lead us to explain 
the paradoxical statements about LoM that we may come across (in Part 4.6). This 
will complement our knowledge of LoM forms. 
At the end of the chapter (in Part 4.7), we consider what can counter LoM. A few 
approaches and tools within safety management are shown that could be used to 
prevent different categories of LoM. 
Though we will provide insights from different scientific literatures, our goal was 
still to propose to safety practitioners (analysts, managers) some guidance to 
tackle this challenge and to make some links with management of safety. Some 
industrial and day-to-day examples will be used for the purpose as well. 
4.4 Loss of Memory Relates to Learning and Knowledge 
4.4.1 Failures of foresight in safety due to a loss of memory 
Several disasters occurred or recurred and highlighted various kinds of loss of 
memory. Former astronaut Dr. Sally Ride who was a member of both NASA space 
shuttle accident investigation teams observed that there were “echoes” of 
Challenger accident (in 1986) in Columbia accident (in 2003). Indeed, the CAIB 
noticed (2003) that “The foam debris hit was not the single cause of the Columbia 
accident, just as the failure of the joint seal that permitted O-ring erosion was not 
the single cause of Challenger. Both Columbia and Challenger were lost also 
because of the failure of NASA’s organisational system” (CAIB, 2003, p. 195). These 
deficiencies to learn and to correct organisational failures have been pointed out 
by the CAIB: “First, despite all the post-Challenger changes at NASA and the 
agency’s notable achievements since, the causes of the institutional failure 
responsible for Challenger have not been fixed. Second, the Board strongly 
believes that if these persistent, systemic flaws are not resolved, the scene is set 
for another accident. Therefore, the recommendations for change are not only for 
fixing the Shuttle’s technical system, but also for fixing each part of the 
organisational system that produced Columbia’s failure” (CAIB, 2003, p. 195).  
Moreover, we can also mention the premonitory conclusion in 1996 of her book 
about the study of the Challenger accident by the sociologist Vaughan: “After the 
Challenger disaster, both official investigations decried the competitive pressures 
and economic scarcity that had politicized the space agency, asserting that goals 
and resources must be brought into alignment. Steps were taken to assure that 
this happened. But at this writing, that supportive political environment has 
changed. NASA is again experiencing the economic strain that prevailed at the time 
of the disaster. Few of the people in top NASA administrative positions exposed to 
the lessons of the Challenger tragedy are still there. The new leaders stress safety, 
but they are fighting for dollars and making budget cuts. History repeats, as 
economy and production are again priorities” (Vaughan, 1996, p. 422). 
Unfortunately, NASA is not the only organisation that was responsible for recurring 
accidents. BP had several accidents with “striking similarities” in their 
organisational root causes (CSB, 2007; Merritt, 2007): fires and explosions in 
Grangemouth refinery in Scotland (in 2000), explosion and fires in Texas City 
refinery in USA (in 2005), pipelines leaks in Prudhoe Bay in Alaska (in 2006), 
Deepwater Horizon oil rig blow-out at Macondo in Gulf of Mexico (in 2010). They 
were preceded by several early warning signs, some of them were recognised and 
signalled by some workers and managers but also within internal audits, but the 
follow-up was poor leading to “too little, too late” reactions (Merritt, 2007). 
This phenomenon of loss of memory in relationship with failures to learn (Hopkins, 
2010) and limits in enhancing organisational learning (Dechy et al, 2011; ESReDA, 
2015) should not be restricted to one organisation or one worldwide company with 
many sites. It should be addressed transversally across countries and across 
sectors as well.  
The ammonium nitrate industry faced a long history of accidents since the 
beginning of 20th century (Gyenes and Dechy, 2016) and the recent tragedy in 
Beyruth these last days is recalling that some lessons of the most recent ones (e.g. 
Toulouse disaster in 2001 in France (Dechy et al, 2004) and West major accident in 
Texas in 2013 (CSB, 2016)) are still not learned by different stakeholders (regulator, 
government, judicial department, operator, subcontractor). They all showed a low 
awareness of explosion danger and inherent risks of ammonium nitrate fertilizers 
but also some lack of follow-up after EWS or alerts. Similarly, within the explosive 
manufacturing industry in Europe, the analysis of three accidents showed some 
missed opportunities for improvement after near-misses, external accidents in 
other countries and regulation changes, but also a loss of designers’ intentions 
throughout the lifetime of operation of the plant, especially on critical incident 
scenarios (Ferjencik and Dechy, 2016). Similar observations about losses of 
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awareness and follow-up of previous lessons from accidents have been made on 
Buncefield disaster (in 2005), as similar explosions occurred in history prior to 
Buncefield and even recurred after (Paltrinieri et al, 2012) (see the list of accidents 
in chapter 3).  
4.4.2 Early warning signs and foresight in safety 
Early warning sign (EWS) is an event or more generally a condition that if it is not 
detected and acted upon can lead or contribute to an incident. EWS is a broad term 
that covers several others  such as weak signals (Vaughan, 1996, Llory, 1996), 
precursors of accidents (Carroll, 2004), near-misses, latent flaw (Reason, 1990) and 
extends to alerts made by operators, safety analysts, managers, inspectors or 
whistle-blowers.  
The word ‘early’ means that it can be early detected, prior a more severe accident, 
during an ‘incubation period’ (Turner, 1978). If EWS are correctly recognised, they 
can inform of ‘time-bombs’ in the system (Reason, 1997). Early warning signs 
should be detected as early as possible in order to take proper actions in due time 
to prevent or mitigate incident. This is one of the main purpose of foresight in 
safety. 
Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS, 2012) writes about incident warning 
signs which are subtle indicators of a problem that could lead to an incident. 
Warning signs precede incidents or contribute to them as a condition.  
While some EWS are weak, subtle, ambiguous, and may raise some uncertainties 
and are difficult to hear and filter from the background noise, some are strong 
signals such as near-misses, incidents, deviations which are normalised (Vaughan, 
1996) or weakened (Guillaume, 2011), or external accidents lessons that should be 
learned. Some strong signals can be weakened and can lead to issues in the follow-
up of actions, which are sometimes ‘too little, too late’ as remarked by US CSB 
former Chair C. Merritt (2007) about Texas City refinery accident in 2005 (CSB, 
2007). 
In conventional risk terminology, early warning sign can be understood as an 
indicator of hazard strengthening or of weakening of a safety measure (control) or 
                                                                
17 Metaphor of puzzle for recognizing EWS in strategic management is attributed to several researchers 
(Rouibah and Ould-ali, 2002). Those authors propose to consider the concept of early warning sign 
rather than weak signal. 
of an increase of the vulnerability of the targets, which can result in an increase of 
likelihood of occurrence or in an increase of potential severity of consequences of 
scenarios causing damage. Simply said, we can consider that an early warning sign 
is an indicator of increase of risk. 
The relationship between data, information and risk is sometimes not easy to 
establish at all. To recognise some EWS, investigation and data collection are 
necessary to produce pieces of information. However, all data, information and 
signs cannot be called EWS. An interpretation effort is required and implies to filter 
from the background noise, select some signs (Lesca, 2001; Rouibah and Ould-ali, 
2002) and link several pieces of information “such as in a puzzle”17 to discover a 
hidden form or pattern. This pattern that links several information to a risk is 
considered as a safety signal. This sense-making can be performed by a worker 
‘close to the valves’ (CSB, 2007) or a manager or an analyst at different position in 
the sociotechnical system. This interpretation is then challenged towards its links 
to the risk or even to a scenario (Jouniaux et al, 2014). This process involves 
individual and collective expertise, which relies on knowledge (e.g. models, 
theories and studies of risk but also on frameworks, stories and patterns) that are 
learned and memorised.  
4.4.3 Four aspects of memory useful for foresight in safety 
Such a way, foresight in safety means capability to indicate increase of risk with 
the help of EWSs. In order to be able to implement foresight in safety, this 
capability has to be conscious and it has to be acted accordingly.  
Speaking about the ability to indicate EWSs, four conditions related to memory 
have to be maintained that are shown in Table 1. 
The four conditions from Table 1 describe four aspects of memory considered to 
be a necessary instrument for foresight in safety. In our view, memory plays a 
crucial role in foresight in safety as much as imagination addressed in other 
chapters of the ESReDA book. In our definition or proposal, ‘loss of memory’ in any 
of above aspects of memory corrupts foresight in safety. 
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Table 1. Four aspects of loss of memory related to foresight in safety. 
N° Aspect of memory to be maintained Ability 
1 Remember that such indicators of safety problems 
(EWSs) can arise 
Awareness, attention, 
vigilance 
2 Remember what forms of EWSs are possible (in order to 
be able to identify them) 
Sense making, 
recognise 
3 Remember how presence of EWSs can be detected Method to detect 
4 Remember EWSs that were detected until they are 
reasonably responded (in order to be able to respond) 
Follow-up 
 
Indeed, memory useful for foresight in safety means knowledge of EWSs that can 
be activated with abilities to be vigilant, to make sense, to investigate and to 
follow-up EWS. It does not matter how the knowledge of EWSs has been acquired. 
In any case, knowledge of EWSs is a result of lessons learning. Such a way, loss of 
memory relates to unlearning and forgetting. Lessons learning may be based on 
use of scenarios (including stories), both retrospective and prospective (see in 
Chapter 6 dedicated to the use of scenarios, Ferjencik et al, 2020).  
4.4.4 Applied example: the kitchen dangers 
To explain our proposal and related definitions, the four aspects mentioned in 
Table 1 can be easily illustrated using the example of Kate and William in the 
kitchen (Kate and William are married; they have sometimes slightly different 
views on what is dangerous in their kitchen; see Chapter 6 (Ferjencik et al, 2020)). 
The first aspect is related to a situation when both Kate and William do not 
recognise their kitchen to be a dangerous place where EWSs may warn against 
possible incidents. They do not remember (they have not learned) that EWS can 
arise in their kitchen. If a person in the kitchen is not ‘aware’ that frying oil is 
combustible and frying can cause a fire, then it is natural that this person is not 
‘vigilant’, and does not ‘pay attention’, because he or she does not understand that 
leaving the frying pan on a hot ceramic hob unattended is an early warning sign. 
This person probably suffered a loss of the first aspect of memory. 
The second aspect can be illustrated by a situation when they both understand a 
possibility of fire but do not recognise that a bottle of oil standing at the hob may 
be a problem. A person in the kitchen who realizes that the oil is combustible and 
hence the pan cannot be left unattended during frying, but does not realize that 
also the presence of a plastic bottle with the oil in the vicinity of hob can contribute 
to the fire, suffered a loss of the second aspect of memory. 
The third aspect can be described as a situation when both William and Kate 
understand that a decreased capacity of safety valve on pressure cooker is an EWS 
but they do not know that or how the presence of this EWS can be detected. In 
this case, they suffered a loss of the third aspect of memory. 
The fourth aspect means that they know about the above bottle of oil or about 
degraded pressure cooker safety valve but have given up all the attempts to 
improve the situation. A situation where a person recognizes that the presence of 
plastic bottle with the oil in the vicinity of hob is an EWS, but then places the bottle 
on the same place again, can be related to the loss of the fourth aspect of memory. 
4.4.5 Other examples from industry 
The first aspect of memory means that people who are important to the system 
are aware of facing a hazard, etc., and that, therefore, some EWSs exist at all. It 
seems trivial, but this triviality is sometimes forgotten in industry. It can be 
illustrated by the case of West in Texas in 2013 described by CSB (2016). People 
who are important to the behaviour of the system have not realized that their 
storage of ammonium nitrate represents a hazard. Therefore, it is understandable 
that even repeated warnings about electrical installation faults were not 
considered to be EWSs related to this hazard. 
We can imagine examples very similar to those from kitchen in a chemical 
laboratory. For instance a situation in a lab where a flammable liquid is used that 
is volatile and has a specific odour. Odour in the lab however is not considered to 
be an EWS. 
Other examples have been briefly described in Part 4.4.1 and cover the four 
aspects of loss of memory. 
4.4.6 The four aspects of LoM: description related to hazards 
As we earlier defined, an early warning sign is the result of an interpretation 
process. An EWS can be recognised as a sign of the strengthening of a hazard or 
the weakening of a control over the hazard or an increase of vulnerability in the 
targets exposed to hazards. As such, if proper studies are conducted, it can be 
determined as a cause of causal event (explanation see Chapter 6, Ferjencik et al, 
2020) or as an indicator of causal event or of a cause of causal event. 
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Differences in four aspects of memory can be well explained when we realize that 
EWSs are associated with the existence of hazards, controls of hazards and 
environmental conditions that affect hazards within the system and the exposed 
targets. EWSs can be recognised as signals of adverse changes in hazards, controls 
of hazards or environmental conditions affecting hazards or of vulnerability of 
targets.  
1. Loss of the first aspect of memory means loss of knowledge that certain 
hazards and relevant controls and environmental conditions are present 
in the system. If one is not aware, then it's natural not to know, not to pay 
attention and to become vigilant about EWSs that can signal their 
unfavourable changes. 
2. The second aspect of memory can be degraded in situation where 
hazards, controls, and environmental conditions are known, but there is 
a lack of knowledge of some EWSs that may signal their degradation. The 
sense making abilities are poor enough and do not allow a proper 
recognition of the EWS. 
3. Loss of the third aspect of memory would be identified if EWSs signalling 
adverse changes in hazards, controls of hazards or environmental 
conditions affecting hazards are known but means enabling their 
detection are not known (improper data collection, measurement of 
wrong indicators). 
4. The fourth aspect of memory is damaged e.g. in a situation where 
hazards, controls, and environmental conditions are known, and the 
occurrence of some EWSs indicating their degradation has been 
identified, but the existence of these EWSs had been routinized, 
normalised and forgotten before they could be responded. 
It is visible from the above explanations that the loss of the first aspect of memory 
is close to what is described as a loss of sense of vulnerability (see e.g. CCPS, 2007). 
Reason (1997) recall that sometimes, especially after success or when 
preoccupation with production goals is too high, actors can lose sight of dangers 
and forget to be afraid. Similarly, the loss of the fourth aspect of memory is close 
to the normalisation of deviance (Vaughan, 1996) or standardization of deviance 
(see e.g. Rosen, 2015).  
4.5 The Process of Loss of Memory  
Foresight in safety is to be realized in socio-technical systems by people. In a first 
step (in this part), the memory of humans working in socio-technical system is 
considered to be crucial for foresight in safety. In a second step (next part), the 
collective and organisational dimension of memory will be addressed.  
4.5.1 Memory and forgetting 
Memory work is directed against the forgetting. Forgetting is linked to memory, by 
being its negative side and it is its condition (Ricoeur, 2000). Todorov (1995) recalls 
that the integral restitution or reproduction of the past is impossible. Memory 
implies inevitably a choice (some traits of the events will be stored while others 
are immediately excluded or later eliminated and forgotten). However, though 
accessibility of the past is a requisite, past should not rule present, which questions 
the adequate re-use in the new context. 
"To forget is sublime" was popularised by Tom Peters a management guru (in 
Forbes, 1994). Indeed, in intensive innovation capitalism (Le Masson et al, 2006), 
the value of experience over time decreases, with forms of quick obsolescence 
(e.g. in computer and electronic industries). “Unlearning theory” in management 
(e.g. Hedberg, 1981) studied the need to intentionally get rid of outdated 
experience, habits and routines in order to be able to innovate.  
Knowledge is partly and directly acquired by learned-by-doing and repetition 
which materialise by a learning curve (Argote et al, 1990). Other kind of learning is 
indirect through learning from others, from failures and good practices.  
Some risks of unintentionally forgetting, can imply a decay in the knowledge 
‘commodity or assets’ and ‘practices’. These risks were recognised as well 
(Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2011) and may imply the loss of important technical 
knowledge and competence, the loss of identity and personal networks, the ability 
to learn from errors and to remain accountable from mistakes.  
This can lead to knowledge losses or crash (Ermine, 2010) and costly crisis of 
relearning (Garcias, 2014). This phenomenon was encountered by nuclear 
engineering after years of downsizing in the aftermath of Three Mile Island and 
Chernobyl accidents. 
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4.5.2 The process of memorising: three key faculties 
According to Sherwood (2015), memorising process is the faculty of the human 
mind by which information is encoded, stored, and retrieved:  
• Encoding or registration: receiving, processing and combining of received 
information 
• Storage: creation of a permanent record of the encoded information in 
short term or long term memory 
• Retrieval, recall or recollection: calling back the stored information in 
response to some cue for use in a process or activity. 
In our view, ‘information’ is a very broad term than encompasses data, information 
and knowledge learned (patterns, stories, models). 
4.5.3 The process of loss of memory useful for foresight in safety 
According to the above-mentioned definition that relies on a human perspective, 
loss of memory represents a failure in one of the three key faculties of the 
memorising process, for the individuals involved in the risk prevention process. 
For the case of foresight in safety in a socio-technical system, according to the 
proposal made in the previous part, loss of memory means that information and 
knowledge cover four aspects mentioned in Table 1. 
Therefore, for the four aspects of memory, the danger is that they are not 
encoded, stored, or retrieved properly by humans who can influence the design, 
structure and behaviour of the sociotechnical system. 
This description of loss of memory is very general (more general than descriptions 
from ESReDA (2015)) since it encompasses not only information that was present 
and later was forgotten, but also the information and knowledge that should have 
been present but was not present.  
Visibly a large variety of causes can contribute to the loss of memory. Typical 
causes of loss of memory represent insufficient knowledge, training or support of 
four aspects of memory. For instance, the refreshment of some training needed to 
maintain a skill is very dependent from the frequency of use in the daily practices, 
differentiating rescue skills from daily health and safety skills for operating (Lawani 
et al, 2018). 
Frequently, such problems become highly visible when turnover of workers bring 
a loss of experience, transfers of obligations to new people, outsourcing, 
subcontracting, or ageing of personnel especially when the generation of ‘baby-
boomers’ is retiring. Within the presented approach also all these problems point 
to the insufficient knowledge, training or support of four aspects of memory. For 
example, the subcontracting issue was raised for Toulouse disaster about the likely 
lack of awareness about the danger of chemical incompatibility between 
ammonium nitrate based wastes and chlorinated compounds. In addition, LoM 
happens between groups of workers and phases of operations, especially when 
modifications are made by operators forgetting the designers’ intentions and limits 
of the system (Ferjencik and Dechy, 2016). LoM can occur as a consequence of 
changes and transitions (e.g. technological, regulatory, cultural and societal) 
(Mangeon et al, 2020), which are especially at work these years.  
Such a way, not only situations when a specific knowledge or ability has been 
forgotten (i.e. it was not possible to be retrieved) are covered by these four aspects 
of loss of memory. In addition, situations are covered when this knowledge or 
ability has never been present (encoded and stored) in memory or has been 
present (and retrieved) but the ability and will to use it has not been observed. 
4.5.4 Twelve categories of loss of memory 
The three human faculties of memorising – encoding, storing and retrieving – allow 
to distinguish three kinds of failures leading to LoM. Failures of individual faculties 
can occur in each of four aspects of memory mentioned in Table 1 (awareness for 
vigilance, recognition for sense-making, investigation for detection, and follow-
up). Thus, this leads to consider a two-dimensional scheme that is depicted in Table 
2 that classifies LoM into twelve options, each representing a failure of one faculty 
in one aspect. E.g. LoM marked L2C3 represents failure of faculty #3 in aspect #2 
or information is not retrieved on what forms of EWSs are possible. This division 
of LoM forms may help to sort various difficulties for maintaining the memory and 
possible safety management actions against the loss of memory. 
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Table 2. Twelve categories of loss of memory. 
  Memorising faculties 











that Early Warning Signals can arise 
(awareness) 
L1C1 L1C2 L1C3 
what forms of Early Warning Signals 
are possible (recognition and make 
sense) 
L2C1 L2C2 L2C3 
that and how presence of Early 
Warning Signals can be detected 
(method) 
L3C1 L3C2 L3C3 
about EWSs that were detected 
until they are reasonably 
responded (follow-up) 
L4C1 L4C2 L4C3 
 
4.5.5 Applied example: loss of memory in the kitchen 
As long as Kate or William are alone in the kitchen, it may seem that all the LoMs 
that may occur are truly connected to their individual memories, of their individual 
experiences. Even with Kate and William both in the kitchen, we can only associate 
memory with the brains of these two people. Notice that they can develop a 
collective memory of their experiences in this kitchen or previous ones, with their 
parents or as students, and make it a topic of discussion. In the end, several 
hazards and practices to manage risks become implicit and do not need an explicit 
communication and analysis of the risks in the kitchen and on how to handle them. 
But this approach becomes unsustainable, especially when Kate and William want 
to involve their teenagers in the kitchen. The process of learning and memorising 
has to start all over again. 
It cannot be assumed that from the very first moment they enter the kitchen, 
George, Charlotte or Louis will have the same information about EWSs as their 
parents. William and Kate will teach and train their children, on the relevant 
information to consider and the knowledge to learn that is important for managing 
risks and foresight in safety. And they may use some tools to do this - for example, 
a list of EWSs detectable in preparing the pressure cooker for use. What if William 
and Kate fail to put an item on the list and Charlotte or Louis get an unwanted 
event? In this case, it was probably the loss of human memory classified in Table 2 
as L3C1. But what if the critical item was originally listed but ceased to be readable, 
for example due to the effects of kitchen fumes? In this case, it could be an L3C2 
LoM, but only on condition that we accept the list of EWSs as part of the memory. 
This example shows that in organisations (even a couple and a family can be 
considered as a group or as sub-unit of an organisation) it makes sense to extend 
the term memory beyond the human mind to address the aiding mechanisms that 
support and/or replace human memory (especially considering turnover risk and 
retirement perspective). The existence of such aids is a normal situation. Memory 
support is one of the tasks of safety management systems. Management system 
and culture should support memory of personnel. Hardware and software of socio-
technical system may contain tools that help memory of humans (e.g. proper 
databases and/or procedures for identification of EWSs). We will address some 
features of organisational memory in the next chapter and some functions of the 
safety management system to support it (in Part 4.7). 
4.6 Loss of Memory and Organisational Memory 
4.6.1 Extension from human to organisational memory 
The previous daily-experience example of the kitchen can serve as an explanation 
for the need to extend the perimeter of memory of risks that is to be managed and 
applied to an organisation. Obviously, organisational memory includes memories 
of all humans and groups within the organisation, who contribute to make the 
information and knowledge on all four aspects of EWSs encoded, stored and 
retrieved as described in Table 2. It includes the collective memory of some 
experiences and tacit rules of groups of workers related to danger (or within the 
family for the kitchen example). But in addition to human minds, it is also necessary 
to consider in organisational memory all the safety management aids and 
functions implemented by an organisation in relation to the aspects and faculties 
of Table 2. Indeed, the memory of many kitchens risks faced over decades and 
centuries should be somehow treated by the designers of kitchen, and they should 
implement man-machine interface to secure some processes (e.g. confirmation 
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request when programing, alarm, fail-safe,…). To us, this is a rather radical 
extension.  
Indeed, Kletz (1993) already warned that if organisations had no memory, 
accidents would recur. ESReDA (2015) underlined that the loss of knowledge is one 
of symptoms of the numerous barriers and failures to learn listed in that report: 
"There is a natural tendency that memory fades over time. People forget things. 
Organisations forget things. The lessons learned from incidents and accidents are 
slowly lost if no measures are taken to make them alive." This quote already 
associated LoM with the organisation. Not only people, but organisations lose 
information from classes L1C1 to L4C3 as shown in Table 2.  
In addition, ESReDA (2015) stressed the importance of keeping memory: "Keeping 
memory of past events, lessons to be learned or not forgotten, and changes made 
is a key learning function”. Expanding ESReDA (2015) and other proposals 
(Ferjencik and Dechy, 2016), organisations must therefore set-up a dedicated 
process to remember important safety issues and struggle actively against natural 
tendency to loss of memory that increases with time (erosion of memory, turnover 
of people, loss of designer intentions…). The management of LoM require some 
functions that we associate, with concerns of synergy and limited resources in real 
world context, with safety management as well as functions that support the 
retention of information from classes L1C1 to L4C3. 
4.6.2 Nature of organisational memory 
Organisational memory is not a simple concept. The human memory metaphor 
with its three faculties is often used, but it is criticised for the anthropomorphism 
risks it generates when addressing organisational memory. Organisational 
memory is defined (Walsh and Ungson, 1991) as “stored information from an 
organisation’s history that can be brought to bear on present decisions”. Another 
author insisted more on knowledge than information (Stein, 1995) “Organisational 
memory is the means by which knowledge from the past is brought to bear on 
present activities, thus resulting in higher or lower levels of organisational 
effectiveness”. Often seen as internal, some researchers (De Cuffa et al, 2018) 
proposed to widen its scope as practitioners mobilise other means such as social 
networks outside the organisation’s control and responsibility. 
Knowledge is also a much debated concept that can be seen in three different ways 
according to scientific disciplines. Some scholars in knowledge management 
(combining cognitive and economic resources based approaches) consider 
knowledge as a commodity with a “stock” of knowledge and often focus on the 
codification of the information content and the flow of its dissemination. 
Organisations can be seen as collections of knowledge assets (Wenger, 1998). But 
this approach is criticised for the reification of knowledge and inadequate 
understanding of ‘situated action” and impact of context. A few scholars in 
organisational learning approach it as a capability for organising (Carroll, 2004). 
While scholars in theories of action study practices and approach knowledge 
rather as a process embedded in practices of learning and doing, called knowing, 
that is acquired by doing. It is also acquired by sharing experience and 
appropriating knowledge in context of use with community members (Cook and 
Brown, 1999; Gherardi, 2006)). Knowledge is dynamic, is a process and an 
outcome. “Knowledge is a flux mix of framed experiences, values, contextual 
information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and 
incorporating new experiences and information. It originates and is applied in the 
minds of knowers. In organisations, it often becomes embedded not only in 
documents or repositories but also in organisation routines, processes, practices 
and norms” (Davenport and Prusak, 1998).  
Polanyi (1975) insisted on the personal character of knowledge “all knowing is 
personal knowing”, especially in relationship to the concept of tacit skill. Bell 
(1999) considers that “knowledge is the capacity to exercise judgment”, especially 
“to make competent use of categories and distinctions constituting that domain of 
action” (Wenger, 1998). But the judgment and competent use are influenced by a 
collective and organisational dimension that provides shared understandings, 
heuristics, knowledge repertoires and rules of action, which then relates to 
organisational memory. These ideas enabled Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001) to 
propose that: “knowledge is the individual capability to draw distinctions, within a 
domain of action, bases on an appreciation of context, or theory or both. 
Organisational knowledge is the capability members of an organisation have 
developed to draw distinctions in the process of carrying their work, in particular 
concrete contexts, by enacting sets of generalisations whose application depends 
on historically evolved collective understandings”. Within similar focus on 
knowledge for action, Gherardi (2006) addresses safety (in the construction 
industry) as an object of knowledge, the result of a practical activity of knowing, 
and the context in which that activity is performed and institutionalised as 
‘organisational practice’.  
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Knowledge categories often distinguished (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) are 
explicit, tacit but also declarative and procedural, and even judgmental (Girod-
Séville, 1996). In the famous SECI model (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), they require 
four different process for being extracted, transferred and used (e.g. socialisation, 
externalisation, internalisation and combination).  
The organisational memory systems are “sets of knowledge retention devices, 
such as people and documents, that collect, store, and provide access to 
organisation’s experience” (Olivera, 2000). Some means are tangible artefacts 
(intranets, databases, smartphones, procedures, products, people, social 
networks) and less tangible (culture). They are more or less dispersed and 
centralised. Three levels can be distinguished: individual, groups dispersed, 
centralised (Girod-Séville, 1996).  
However, when conceived as a passive depository of data, knowledge and 
information is doomed to remain of little use (Bannon and Kuuti, 1996). The key 
issue is that the use relies on an interpretative process that takes into account the 
context of use. Codification removes context and the challenge to codify without 
knowing the context of use is not obvious (Koornneef and Hale, 2004). While use 
of organisational memory highlights processes of memorising and remembering 
that should compensate loss of context, but should also co-produce 
complementary knowledge adequate to the new context, implying that is not just 
an application of knowledge. In other words, there will always be some 
improvisation in context. 
Their accessibility (retrieval in our labelling) is a key variable for their use. Indeed, 
some research show that people were considered as the most effective memory 
system, especially for easy access, specific filtering of content (Olivera, 2000) and 
for experiential knowledge (Arasaki et al. 2017). While dependence to 
technological means has increased, the reliance on “who knows what” is still a key 
(Jackson and Klobas, 2008). The speed in access to information and the nature of 
activity shape a distinction between administrative jobs which rely more on 
centralised technological systems of explicit organisational memory while 
operational jobs prefer access means with tacit content (De Cuffa et al, 2018). 
External social network means are more used than expected blurring the frontier 
between internal and external organisational memory means. While French 
nuclear power plants started to invest in the nineties (Girod-Séville, 1996) some 
resources in official memory (made of centralised memories of declared, 
procedural and judgmental), the research showed that in daily activities, the 
organisational memory was rather coming from the unofficial underground 
individual and collective memory (declarative, procedural and judgmental). This 
parallel and redundant system remains a key but is under-invested by 
management. It relies on key experts (Girod-Séville, 1996), and pillars of 
experience (Llory, 1996) that have a lot of judgmental experience, especially about 
networks of people and incidents. It is vulnerable to turnover. The official memory 
is rather used for legitimising the management choices towards the control 
authorities. Both systems interacts. 
According to Lévy (1990), the new technologies of information and communication 
are creating a third pole “computer and medias” that follows the writing and oral 
poles. From integration and incarnation by humans in oral mode, it shifted to 
written archives, losing its connection to individuals and context, being 
objectivised in technical provisions and artefacts. To counter the danger of 
forgetting, among the combination [individual-writing-computer], companies 
invest too much in technology. While doing so, they promote an official memory 
that is not so used in daily practice. In this sense, Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001) 
warn that in knowledge management, digitalisation cannot be a substitute for 
socialisation. 
An effective memory relies on interactions and a good combinations of the three 
modes (oral, written, computer and medias). It also relies on the connexions 
between people, units that build the meta-memory on the location of its memory 
resources. Expert-systems (popular in nineties) failed to capture the know-how of 
experts. A better reliance on key individuals, old and pillars of experience, or 
“filters” that compensate loss of context (Koornneef, 2005) remains an important 
strategy. Also, investing on formalisation of organisational history, on stories which 
are valuable and convey culture, beliefs, values and help decision-making (Girod-
Séville, 1996; Hayes and Maslen, 2014; Duffield and Whitty, 2015). Communities 
of practice with focus groups are also a key to develop knowledge sharing about 
skills and know-how. The role of facilitators, mentors is a key (Duffield and Whitty, 
2014).  
4.6.3 Extension accords with nature of organisational memory 
The foregoing overview of the nature of organisational knowledge and memory 
has accumulated a number of perspectives that would require further explanation 
and commentary. For example, differences in memory versus knowledge, 
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relationships between the human mind, written documents and computerized 
media, or the boundaries between external and internal.  
All this scientific knowledge informs us how complicated is the field we enter when 
considering loss of memory in socio-technical systems. However, they do not 
suggest that the description of the organisational memory that we have proposed 
here in a safety practitioner perspective is fundamentally incorrect. 
In summary, we consider that organisational memory includes: 
• memories (that are encoded, stored and retrieved) of all humans within 
the organisation, who contribute to make and communicate the 
information and mobilise their knowledge on all four aspects of EWSs, 
• the collective memory of experiences and tacit rules of groups of workers 
related to danger, 
• the safety management and safety culture aids and functions 
implemented by an organisation in relation to the twelve categories of 
loss of memory, 
• all artefacts that directly support human actions (documents, 
databases,…) or indirectly influence activities and interactions where 
organisational memory has been embedded into the equipment design, 
organisational structures and processes. 
In this chapter, we assume that the decisive role in this description is played by the 
description of the safety management system, its tools and functions. To refine 
and use this description it is necessary to use a modern and up-to-date description 
of the safety management system (see Parts 4.7.5 and 4.7.6). 
4.6.4 Paradox of organisational memory 
An important starting point of this ESReDA book chapter, is to discuss the legacy 
of Trevor Kletz and its provocative statement: indeed, Kletz (1993) has warned that 
'organisations have no memory, only people have'." 
To our interpretation, Kletz did not want the notion of memory to be exclusively 
associated with the human brain, but at the same time realised the needs for 
organisations to work actively on their memory. In addition to the above strongly 
critical statement about organisations that have no memory Kletz (1993) also 
stated: "the leitmotiv of this book: the need for organisations to learn and 
remember the lessons of the past", which is coherent with our findings and 
research (Ferjencik and Dechy, 2016; Dechy et al, 2016). So Kletz (1993) was 
warning us about the paradox that is also mentioned in ESReDA (2015): 
organisations do not strictly have human memory and at the same time need to 
remember. 
4.6.5 Complexity and fundamental difficulty for maintaining the memory 
The extended description of organisational memory clearly shows how 
complicated the organisation's memory is and exposes how fundamentally difficult 
it is to maintain the memory. It will likely remain a root cause of accidents if this 
issue is not address by a strong program and without specific management actions. 
The fundamental difficulty for maintaining the memory is that the individual 
aspects of memory important for foresight in safety are distributed among 
different humans and groups on different levels of hierarchy in socio-technical 
system. 
In addition to people and groups, other devices and tools (databases, 
documents…) may be involved and help to centralise and sustain part of the official 
memory. Machines can also play a supporting role in foresight. In a simpler case 
they help the humans to remember, identify, by providing aids and cognitive 
prosthesis like databases, etc. Basically, any aspect of memory (be aware - identify 
- detect – respond) can nowadays be accomplished by or with machines, and men-
machine interfaces. 
But we should consider that all system meta-components such as machines, 
equipment, procedures, processes and structures of organisations, are all 
embedding some of the memory of their designers, their operators, their 
managers and some of the organisational memory. Some memory is internal while 
other is external; some is formal while other is informal (e.g. kept within a group 
oral culture, such as a story on an incident), and their accessibility varies according 
to the work situations where it could be used. In summary, any organisational 
artefact integrates some organisational memory and by interacting with other 
meta-components of the sociotechnical system is more or less making alive the 
organisational memory. 
The interactions of meta-components are permanently formed and influenced by 
formal and informal organisational interactions, rules and approaches 
(management system and culture). Hence all actors (operators closest to the 
valves (e.g. in Texas City), safety analysts such as auditors, managers) are 
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concerned by the four aspects of memory (awareness, making sense, investigating, 
follow-up) and may be exposed to difficulties in the three faculties of 
memorisation process.  
The role of all is important towards treatment of EWS for foresight in safety. 
However, we want to insist on the point that the knowledge on the highest levels 
of hierarchy where local safety culture is promoted, is regulated, is scrutinized for 
the alignment it implies, is of extraordinary importance. As it is suggested above: 
humans on the highest levels of hierarchy need the knowledge about the EWS that 
can arise in order to motivate their vigilance and their commitment to identify 
EWSs, detect EWSs and respond to EWSs. Indeed, the notion of weak signals in 
safety has been inspired by one of its origin in strategic management (Ansoff, 1975; 
Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990) and military management (‘intelligence’ in Turner, 
1978), especially when uncertainty is high and to avoid strategic surprises. Loss of 
this knowledge and commitment would represent a fundamental loss of memory 
in the system. 
4.7 Activities against the Loss of Memory 
4.7.1 Use of extended description of memory 
Though we previously understood that taking care of human, group and 
organisational memory useful for foresight is quite complicated, we assume that 
in many ways it merges with general care of good safety culture and safety 
management.  
However, to avoid the danger of dilution and lack of will if one considers that LoM 
is already addressed by existing provisions in safety management, the foregoing 
text also offers one aid that may be useful in identifying more specific measures 
that may decrease LoM. Using the scheme in Table 2, local organisational memory 
can be divided into twelve categories. The scheme can be applied to any activity 
within the organisation.  
For each Table 2 category separately, the following questions can be asked:  
• What is the memory of important hazards according to the different 
actors? 
• Who are the pillars of experience holding critical knowledge and memory 
about risks and EWS? 
• Are there some processes to formalise some of this knowledge and to 
train newcomers on an informal basis within day-to-day practice? 
• Is the continuity and stability of groups and communities of practice 
considered? 
• Are the lessons from other plants, units, competitors, countries, sectors 
learned? 
• What are the threats in the near and longer term to human, group and 
organisational memory owned by the organisation? 
• Are some persons from the local hierarchy involved in actions to maintain 
organisational memory?  
• Which aids and devices contribute to make available this memory?  
• How much organisational and human memory is embedded in the 
designs, structures, and processes and how is it known to daily users? 
• Which functions of the local management system do support it?  
• Are the operators and managers trained to methods to detect EWS? 
• Is the follow-up of critical risk reduction actions adequate? 
• … 
Of course, the list of questions remains open and can be further developed. Such 
an analysis could help detect, for example, under-covered parts of local 
organisational memory. 
As an illustration, example of cooking in the pressure cooker can be used (see Parts 
4.4.4 and 4.5.5). If we focus on detection categories L3C1 and L3C2, then the above 
question can draw our attention to the fact that there is a threat that newcomers 
will not realize that detection of safety valve throughput is necessary before 
cooking. An aid reminding this act as inherently as possible should be incorporated.  
4.7.2 Against the loss of first aspect of memory 
Examples of approaches that can help against the loss of individual aspects of 
memory are given in this and next sections. 
Kletz (1993) already suggested some ways of improving the organisational 
memory. Starting from the belief that organisations had no memory, he tried to 
promote the memory of insiders especially with regard to safety in design and 
production. Writing about memory, he concentrated on the need to remember 
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the lessons learned from the past undesirable events. He already recommended 
to processing the lessons learned into the form of short messages (stories) which 
are spread, discussed and taught. These lessons should be referenced anytime 
they caused a change of a code, standard or operating instructions. Old messages 
should be made permanently accessible.  
The CAIB (2003) compared NASA practices with US submarines. Indeed, the US 
Navy submarine had two major submarine loss in 1963 (the Thresher) and 1969 
(the Scorpion) which resulted in renewed efforts to prevent accidents. Some of 
them are redirected towards loss of memory (pp183-184). CAIB noticed: “The 
submarine Navy has a strong safety culture that emphasizes understanding and 
learning from past failures. NASA emphasizes safety as well, but training programs 
are not robust and methods of learning from past failures are informal” and “The 
Navy implements extensive safety training based on the Thresher and Scorpion 
accidents. NASA has not focused on any of its past accidents as a means of 
mentoring new engineers or those destined for management positions”. 
All these ideas seem to be perfectly right if the first aspect of loss of memory - 
missing knowledge, awareness and therefore vigilance about EWS that can arise in 
the system - is to be prevented. Such messages can vividly and convincingly remind 
the existence of EWSs, support this knowledge and motivate the will and 
commitment to identify EWSs and respond to EWSs.  
Nevertheless, such activities cannot be considered as sufficient with regards to 
prevention of other aspects of loss of memory. Activities recommended by Kletz 
(1993) provide examples of EWSs arising in the system but do not warrant that any 
possible EWS will be identified and responded during the learning from 
undesirable events, both internal, and external. Completeness of identification is 
not warranted. 
4.7.3 Against the loss of second aspect of memory 
Woods (2009) states that the safety field still lacks the ability to identify EWSs. He 
also recommends the alternative way to desired indicators – adaptive stance –, 
but this is not the main issue here, except if some EWS invite to set-up an adequate 
and adaptive response to prevent further safety degradation. Contrary to this 
opinion, CCPS (2011) means that warning sign surveys are feasible and offers a tool 
to identify EWSs – a list of catastrophic incident warning signs that flows from the 
description of safety management system in book (CCPS, 2007) and which is 
supplemented by a list of physical warning signs. Based on this list classes of EWSs 
that can be distinguished and most probable classes of EWSs may be identified for 
a specific socio-technical system. This list seems to represent a tool that may help 
to identify EWS in a socio-technical system when it arises. Such a way it gives a 
strategy on how to identify EWSs during learning from experience and at the same 
time the ability to prevent second aspect of loss of memory. 
4.7.4 Learning acts against the loss of memory 
Since LoM related to foresight in safety is a matter of forgetting the safety lessons 
learned by people and organisations, suitable recommendations can be found in 
texts about learning (e.g. ESReDA, 2015). For example, if we share the empirical 
statement that learning is quite often not satisfactorily efficient (ESReDA, 2015 ; 
Dechy et al, 2011) and is among the major recurring root cause (Hopkins, 2010, 
Dechy et al, 2018), For the sake of completeness, it should be noted at this point 
that Marsden (2017) suggests other possible root causes of LoM in addition to 
ineffective learning. He summarizes them as short-termism, loss aversion, regret 
aversion, ambiguity-driven indecisiveness, and dilution of responsibility.  
The paper by Lawani et al. (2018), on the other hand, makes recommendations on 
how to make people's training more successful with a better memorisation if the 
frequency of use of the knowledge and skill is low (e.g. contrasting daily safety 
practices and emergency and rescue practices only performed during refreshing 
exercises). 
Stemn et al. (2018), in a retrospective analysis of a fairly large set of articles, tried 
to describe how and why failure to learn from safety incidents do occur. To 
understand where breakdowns in learning from incidents are occurring, a bowtie 
analysis was used to organise the literature on failure to learn from safety incidents 
in a way that informs researchers and practitioners of priority areas. Stemn et al. 
confirmed in their retrospective analysis the importance of safety management 
functions for learning and memory. 
In our analysis of three accidents in a very particular type of industry in Europe 
(Ferjencik and Dechy, 2016), we have seen the importance to learn the “hard 
lessons” “from others”, especially from accidents that occurred abroad. This is not 
a new idea but still there remains huge margins for progress. This remark is to be 
extended to generalizable lessons coming from accidents in other industrial 
sectors (e.g. Can we learn and transfer the lessons learned from Columbia space 
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shuttle loss to others sectors in Dien and Llory, 2004). Again, the knowledge basis 
to consider for memorisation should integrate the history and knowledge of 
recurring patterns of accidents (Dien et al, 2004; Dechy et al, 2016). We are 
convinced that this knowledge and the stories of accidents are useful for the four 
aspects of memory described in Table 1. The CAIB (2003) noticed “Recurring 
Training and Learning From Mistakes: […] For example, since 1996, Naval Reactors 
has educated more than 5,000 Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program personnel on the 
lessons learned from the Challenger accident.” 
In addition, lessons from good, reliable and safe practices or new requests from 
regulations appear from time to time as well and challenge the status quo of the 
knowledge base. If they are not seized as opportunities for improving safety 
management and preventing next accidents, they can be considered as a flawed 
process of management of actions and to some extent of memorisation.  
Last but not least, the importance to keep memory of designers’ intentions 
(Ferjencik and Dechy, 2016), while taking care of the danger of loss of information, 
knowledge and memory at every step of the life-cycle of the sociotechnical system 
(Stoop, 1996; Leveson, 2004) remains a key issue. In this perspective, CAIB (2003) 
observed that “Both Naval Reactors and the SUBSAFE have “institutionalized” their 
“lessons learned” approaches to ensure that knowledge gained from both good 
and bad experience is maintained in corporate memory. This has been 
accomplished by designating a central technical authority responsible for 
establishing and maintaining functional technical requirements as well as 
providing an organisational and institutional focus for capturing, documenting, and 
using operational lessons to improve future designs. NASA has an impressive 
history of scientific discovery, but can learn much from the application of lessons 
learned, especially those that relate to future vehicle design and training for 
contingencies. NASA has a broad Lessons Learned Information System that is 
strictly voluntary for program/project managers and management teams. Ideally, 
the Lessons Learned Information System should support overall program 
management and engineering functions and provide a historical experience base 
to aid conceptual developments and preliminary design”. 
The importance to formalise stories of incidents and accidents in order to facilitate 
the lessons sharing and remembering has especially been invited by Kletz (1993). 
Incidents databases have been established and the development of computers 
(and in the future with big data) has provided many new possibilities for better 
storing and retrieving data lessons (ESReDA project group in the nineties focused 
on the databases issue, produced several deliverables and organised a few ESReDA 
seminars). More recent work has highlighted the role played by stories in the daily 
decision-making processes (Hayes, 2013) but also in the mentoring of younger 
colleagues (Hayes and Maslen, 2014; Maslen, 2014). Beyond the formal training, 
and the databases, stories are particularly efficient from the memorisation 
standpoint and for transferring skills and values. As we recalled, US Navy 
implemented this lever and NASA did not (CAIB, 2003). 
A last aspect deals with human resources management, to retain knowledge from 
critical competence (Ermine, 2010) by codifying, but also socialised ‘pillars of 
experience’ (Llory, 1996) with novices, or build through career paths management 
and other provisions. CAIB (2003) highlighted some provisions to retaining 
knowledge within US submarines: “Naval Reactors uses many mechanisms to 
ensure knowledge is retained. The Director serves a minimum eight-year term, and 
the program documents the history of the rationale for every technical 
requirement. Key personnel in Headquarters routinely rotate into field positions 
to remain familiar with every aspect of operations, training, maintenance, 
development and the workforce. Current and past issues are discussed in open 
forum with the Director and immediate staff at “all-hands” informational meetings 
under an in-house professional development program.” 
Among all these knowledge sources, some may be enough as they are to raise 
awareness, to be used as cognitive resource to recognise EWS, to investigate and 
to maintain rigour on the follow-up. However, with the goal of enhancing foresight 
in safety and proactivity in safety management, we believe that some dedicated 
efforts to extracts from this knowledge, the frameworks useful for awareness, 
interpretation of EWS are still necessary, as well as socialisation processes with 
pillars of experience and management of communities of practices. 
In addition, not all EWS will be predefined. Some detection, investigation, sense-
making processes will require imagination, further investigations to collect 
additional data and discussions with peers, analysts and managers to converge 
towards new type of dangers and EWS. To some extent, discussion with 
whistleblowers will provide an opportunity to revise beliefs, existing dangers and 
EWS lists. (see. Chapter 12, Dien et al, 2020). 
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4.7.5 Role of safety management system functions 
Two ideas emerged in the previous parts: 
1) Loss of memory can be divided into four aspects (awareness for vigilance, 
recognition for sense-making, investigation for detection, and follow-up) and three 
faculties (encoding, storing, and retrieving). Combination of both results in division 
of loss of memory into twelve categories. 
2) Speaking about memory, not only human memory but also a group and 
organisational memory have to be considered; in operational perspective, they 
combine a careful resource management of human brains and bodies (skills) with 
aids from safety management system including safety culture. 
The above ideas will be further developed in this and following parts. The close 
relationship between categories of loss of memory and functions of safety 
management system will be made visible. To be operational and synergistic with 
resources constraints, we will show that the question on what decreases certain 
category of loss of memory can be converted into the question of what improves 
the performance of specific functions in local safety management. Beware that a 
complementary strategy is however needed to address tacit skills and personal 
knowledge and knowing (Polanyi, 1975). It would require long term human 
resource management that includes socialisation processes (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995), invest in key experts (Girod-Séville, 1996) that can share judgmental 
experience within communities of practices (Wenger, 1998).  
Safety management has many definitions as well. Harms-Ringdhal (2004) 
formulates probably the simplest one: 'Safety management is a way of managing 
the hazards (safety risks) of a company.' Number of more detailed descriptions of 
safety management can be found in literature. They differ from a brief information 
in Meyer and Reniers (2013), formal description in BSI (2007) to very detailed 
explanation in CCPS (2007). Their recommendations can be considered valid 
despite the fact that completeness of even the most detailed description is not 
warranted. For example, Broadribb (2018) shows that CCPS (2007) may lack 
recommendations for "Sharing and Learning Lessons". 
For purposes of this chapter, we need a systematic and detailed description of 
safety management system that is generally respected. Suitable safety 
management system has to cover much broader range of functions than mere risk 
management (see Meyer and Reniers, 2013). It has to include even functions 
considered usually to be a part of safety culture. 
Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) model of safety management system by CCPS 
(2007) is used in this chapter. Article by Frank (2007) can be recommended for the 
introduction to this model. RBPS model consists of twenty elements. The elements 
are grouped into four main themes that is to say four safety management pillars: 
Commit to Process Safety, Understand Hazards and Risk, Manage Risk, and Learn 
from Experience. Relations between pillars can be illustrated by Figure 1. 
For each of twenty elements, the RBPS model identifies key principles associated 
with the implementation of the element. Further, essential features required to 
support each key principle are identified. Such a way, a four-level hierarchical 
description of functions of safety management system is created that identifies 
several hundreds of safety management system functions. 
 
 
Figure 1. Relations among four safety management pillars from the Risk Based Process 
Safety model (CCPS, 2007). 
Failures of safety management system functions are often considered to be among 
the underlying causes of undesirable events. Since EWS can be determined as a 
cause (including root cause) of causal event, links between safety management 
system and loss of memory start to be visible: early warning signs may be 
interpreted as failures of safety management system functions. This idea 
complements the two from the start of this part such a way that decrease of LoM 
can be converted to the improvement of the performance of specific functions in 
local safety management. 
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4.7.6 Safety management against the loss of memory 
RBPS model of safety management system systematically describes functions and 
tools that may be applied as a protection against incident scenarios. Scenarios are 
always connected to hazards.  
In previous Part 4.4.6 we explained how EWSs are associated with the existence of 
hazards, controls of hazards and environmental conditions that affect hazards. 
EWS represent causes or indications of failures in these hazards, controls of 
hazards and environmental conditions that affect hazards.  
Altogether, we have strong arguments that the improvement of specific safety 
management system functions decreases specific categories of loss of memory. 
The practical problem that remains is to identify those particular relationships 
between functions and categories. These relationships provide an opportunity to 
convert a problem from the area of loss of memory to the area of safety 
management. In addition, if both the loss of memory category identification and 
the safety management system function identification are satisfactorily detailed, 
these relationships will provide useful support against the loss of memory. 
The RBPS model is so detailed that for a particular activity it enables to precisely 
target safety management system measures against a particular category of loss 
of memory.  
We will illustrate this with an example of a specific activity from our kitchen 
example, which was already used in sections 4.4.4 and 4.5.5. As shown in Table 3, 
we focus on detection categories L3C1 to L3C3 during preparation of pressure 
cooker for use. 
In our example, we consider three possible findings of loss of memory, which we 
denote a) to c). We assume that we have found that information about what can 
detect a failure of the safety valve that protects against a specific hazard 
(overpressure during cooking in a pressure cooker) was not a) encoded, b) stored, 
c) retrieved. Each individual function of safety management system is described as 
a chain composed of a pillar, an element, a key principle, and an essential feature 




Table 3. Conversions of categories of LoM to functions of safety management. 
Failed 
activity 




Memory of information/knowledge that and how presence  
of Early Warning Signs can be detected is not 













(i) in case that parents 
ignored to prepare the 
information: Commit to 
Process Safety - Process 
Safety Competency - 
Maintain a dependable 
practice - Develop a learning 
plan; 
 
(ii) in case that parents did 
not encode due to poor 
understanding: Understand 
Hazards and Risks - Process 
Knowledge Management - 
Protect and update process 
knowledge - Ensure 
accuracy; 
 
(iii) in case that parents 
forgot an item: Manage Risk 
- Asset Integrity and 
Reliability - Address 
equipment failures and 
deficiencies - Promptly 
address conditions that can 
lead to failure 
Understand 
Hazards and 














(i) in case that 
children were not 
able to retrieve: 
Understand Hazards 




knowledge in a 
manner that 
facilitates retrieval - 
Document 
information in a user-
friendly manner; 
 
(ii) in case that 
children did not try to 
retrieve: Manage Risk 
- Asset Integrity and 
Reliability - Develop 
and maintain 
knowledge, skills, 
procedures, and tools 
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4.8 Conclusions 
Foresight is not only about imagination and exploration, but it also relies on 
reproduction and exploitation of existing knowledge; prospective views remains 
linked to retrospective views.  
In an era that shows an acceleration of innovations and changes (technological 
such digitalisation trend, industry 4.0, but also societal, such as with short and 
potential long term impacts of COVID-19 pandemics), the value of experience in 
the time dimension is threatened and may become obsolete. However, history and 
memory still matters for expert knowledge at the age of big data and artificial 
intelligence, especially in systems governed by incremental changes. 
If we take the current disaster of Beyruth, some authorities lost awareness and 
follow-up capabilities after alerts received. If we look at the major scale crisis of 
COVID-19, we forgot some lessons even from the 1918-1919 Spanish-flu, the worst 
pandemic on 20th century which killed 50 to 100 millions of people, 2 to 5% of 
population, much more than the world war one (Vinet, 2018). And we repeated 
patterns of minimising threats, late reactions to EWS, normalised health system 
vulnerabilities.  
At the end of this journey, we are more than ever convinced that conducting 
generic and specific actions integrated in management of safety against loss of 
memory is a strategic investment to prevent accidents. One should remain humble 
in front of the complexity of “managing” human and organisational memories, and 
in front of the huge and everlasting tasks that require a dedicated dynamic and 
recurring program. The difficulty is not so much in the imagination, but it is rather 
in the complexity of the distributed meta-components of the system that should 
be used to lever organisational memory. In addition, it requires a dedicated 
commitment and constant attention. We believe that top management can 
provide organisational resources to pay attention to key safety issues, such as EWS, 
but also they can lever the practices if they are committed as exemplary 
leadership.  
The accidents we referred in the dynamite and ammonium nitrate industries, the 
case of NASA and US Navy, and the pandemics are tragic stories but perfect 
reminders of how these issues matters. They also provide an alert to remain 
proactive towards the external lessons to learn and extend the perimeter of 
‘organisational memory’ to other industries and countries. The everyday practice 
in your kitchen can be also the reminder of hidden and embedded aspects of 
individual, group and organisational memory and trigger your thoughts on how to 
make the EWS alive in daily practices with family and friends and on how to 
transfer those practices at work. 
We are conscious that a strategy that would use the synergy with safety 
management actions for preventing loss of memory is necessary but not enough. 
There is also a general tendency to emphasize the knowledge management tools 
especially at the time of digitalisation, big data and artificial intelligence. One 
should accept that not all context can be captured in formal tools of knowledge 
management when codifying and storing information. In addition, the re-use will 
always imply a critical distance and adaptation to the context of use, within local 
practices that require a form of creativity. Indeed, “all knowing is personal 
knowing” (Polanyi, 1975) which invites to consider individual memories related to 
tacit skills and abilities to make judgment, which are coupled to socialisation 
mechanisms. This is done by the people who filter, who are the pillars of 
experience, within groups or communities of practice. So, on the one hand, a 
greater care and respect to worker expertise should be acknowledged, especially 
in face of particular turnover and skills losses with retirement waves. And on the 
other hand, organisational learning and making alive memory of others ‘hard 
lessons’ from failures is not trivial as well. 
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5.1 Executive summary 
Incident scenarios are a practical tool for thinking about risk. Scenarios may be 
results of prospection or retrospection. Both prospective and retrospective 
scenarios can be used for lessons learning.  
Any incident scenario can be reduced to a set of causal events. Lessons learning 
can reach Early Warning Signs (EWS) through the identification of causal events. 
EWSs are causes and indicators of causal events. 
This chapter shows that results of lessons learning via scenarios can be used:  
• to prevent loss of memory, 
• to list all possible EWSs, 
• to identify whether a failure/error/condition represents an EWS, 
• to prioritize EWSs. 
All preceding claims are illustrated by examples. 
5.2 Key Messages 
Foresight requires determining the events/conditions that are to be considered 
EWSs. The incident scenarios may play useful roles since EWSs can be determined 
from scenarios obtained by both prospective and retrospective analysis. The path 
to determine EWSs leads via the determination of causal events. 
With the use of incident scenarios, both identifying and prioritizing the EWSs is 
possible. They help make visible the EWSs, and select EWSs that deserve special 
attention (e.g. real-time monitoring). 
Scenarios as an investigation component of lessons learning help to determine sets 
of EWSs that should be searched for and tracked during the analyses. 
Scenarios as a documentation component of lessons learning help the 
determination of whether a specific failure/error represents an EWS.  
5.3 Introduction 
This chapter is based on ideas presented in the paper by Ferjencik (2017). The text 
uses terminology that is standard in publications issued by the American Institute 
of Chemical Engineers. Readers interested in a reminder of the meanings and 
relations of terms such as hazard, control, initiating event, scenario etc. may find 
instructive illustrations in articles by R. F. Blanco, e.g. in Blanco (2014). A new term, 
i.e. 'causal event', is introduced in this chapter. 
When scenarios are discussed, both accident or incident scenarios are implied 
throughout this chapter. The word ‘scenario’ has the same meaning as the term 
‘accident sequence’ in Benner’s paper (1975), i.e. a possibly multilinear sequence 
of events representing individual actions of animate or inanimate actors that leads 
to an injury or damage. If one of the actors fails or is unable to adapt, the 
perturbation starts the accident sequence. Thus, the scenario begins with a 
perturbation (initiating event) and ends with the last injurious or damaging event 
in the sequence. 
Scenarios represent a tool for lessons learning. Both prospective and retrospective 
scenarios can be used for lessons learning. Lessons learning in this chapter focuses 
on early warning signs (EWS). EWSs are part of lessons learned resulting from the 
lessons learning process. The main concept introduced in this chapter states that 
the EWSs can be identified with the use of scenarios via the identification of  
‘causal events’.  
Additionally, scenarios can be used as an investigation and documentation tool. 
Use of scenarios as an investigation component of lessons learning helps to 
identify sets of EWSs that should be searched and tracked during the analyses. As 
a documentation component of lessons learning, it helps to determine whether a 
specific failure/error represents an EWS.  
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This chapter shows that results of lessons learning via scenarios can be used:  
• to prevent loss of memory; 
• to list all possible EWSs; 
• to identify whether a failure/error/condition represents an EWS; 
• to prioritize EWSs. 
All preceding claims are illustrated by examples. 
Moreover, the list of attributes necessary for the tools of lessons learning 
according to Benner and Carey (2009) is reproduced in this chapter. The question 
is discussed whether and under what conditions the scenarios and EWSs can carry 
all these attributes. 
5.4 Early warning signs 
5.4.1 Definition of EWSs 
In this part, only a brief introduction into the concept of EWSs is sketched. CCPS 
(2012) writes about incident warning signs, which are subtle indicators of a 
problem that could lead to an incident. Warning signs precede incidents or 
contribute to them. 
In conventional risk terminology, early warning signs can be understood as an 
indicator of strengthening a hazard or of weakening a safety measure, which can 
result in an increase of frequency or severity of consequences of scenarios causing 
damage. Since both an increase of frequency and an increase of consequence 
severity cause an increase of risk, then, briefly, an early warning sign is an indicator 
of an increase of risk.  
Outside the risk based schemes of thinking, but not in contradiction with them, the 
occurrence of EWSs could be interpreted as an increase of vulnerability. Thus, 
foresight in safety could mean the capability to flag an increase of risk with the 
help of EWSs.  
General explanation of foresight can be found in Chapter 2, Røed-Larsen et al., 
2020.  
5.4.2 EWSs are part of lessons learned and a result of lessons learning 
Within the analysis of lessons learning system functions, processes and practices, 
Benner and Carey (2009) observe that divergent views exist about whether lessons 
learned are causes, cause factors, conclusions, findings, issues, statements, 
recommendations or scenarios described in text in narrative reports. 
Clearly, they are right. Large accessible literature about incident investigations and 
lessons learning is not consistent in terminology and approaches. Nevertheless, in 
this text it is considered that identification of early warning signs is part of lessons 
learned. EWSs are considered here to be a desirable result of lessons learning. 
Consequently, lessons learning tools, like scenarios, are expected to detect EWSs. 
5.4.3 Examples of EWSs: Kitchen 
A simple example shows that in a known environment, some people tend to 
identify EWSs intuitively. 
Kate and William are married; William is taking a parental leave from work. He 
takes care of the children and also he cooks. He likes cooking. In connection with 
cooking, he frequently makes small changes – hopefully improvements – in the 
kitchen.  
Kate is glad that William likes cooking; however, she does not agree with all his 
improvements in the kitchen. For instance, she does not like the bottle with oil in 
close proximity to the stove, or a heavy bowl in the shelf above the ceramic hob. 
In addition, she hates William’s habit of leaving the frying pan on the stove 
unattended.  
When they had a disagreement over this the last time, William argued that nothing 
had happened. Kate answers that all these changes are indicators of problems that 
could lead to an incident. In accordance with CCPS (2012) she calls them warning 
signs or early warning signs (EWS) and insists that William should avoid making 
changes in the kitchen that could lead to increasing the risk. 
5.5 Scenarios represent a tool for lessons learning 
5.5.1 Example: Intuitive use of scenarios 
William, in our example, replies that he does not see anything serious in the 
changes he made in the kitchen. Kate states that this is because he is not 
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intentionally imagining any incident scenarios. Thinking about danger with the 
help of scenarios comes natural to Kate. The experience gained through the 
realisation of hazards serves as a stimulus to develop this skill that Kate has. The 
experience does not need to be personal; knowledge-based experience will be 
enough. When Kate, for instance, sees a picture where a ceramic hob from a 
kitchen is damaged by a fall of canned food, she realises that any heavy object 
above the ceramic hob is a hazard, and starts thinking about scenarios initiated by 
falls of heavy objects, and about relevant preventive/mitigating controls. 
5.5.2 Hypotheses about roles of scenarios 
This is quite a common way of thinking. Information about incident serves as an 
empirical information about a hazard and its behaviour. The term behaviour is 
used here in accordance with Benner and Carey (2009). When they write about 
behaviour, they mean actions of animate and inanimate actors (examples, in case 
of Kate and William’s kitchen, could be William’s behaviour or behaviour of 
ceramic hob). 
It is possible that the ability to spontaneously develop incident scenarios based on 
experience gained from observing hazard behaviour is a result of evolutionary 
selection. For example, we know that for our ancestors living in the cave, the 
presence of the sabre-tooth tiger in the neighbourhood represented a hazard. It is 
undeniable that the ability to imagine a scenario initiated in this hazard (ability to 
predict what can happen if a tiger lurks in front of the cave) and the ability to 
prepare appropriate preventive/mitigating controls in order to minimise the 
damage caused by the realisation of this hazard was an advantage during human 
evolution.  
Kate bases her identification of EWSs on the idea of possible incident scenarios. 
She imagines the scenarios of possible fires in the kitchen and therefore she 
perceives the above-mentioned EWSs as unacceptable. Kate actually says what is 
well known from risk analysis: 
• Scenarios make it possible to foresee the risk comprehensively.  
• Scenarios are a practical tool for thinking about risk.  
In addition, since the EWSs are indicators of increased risk described by scenarios, 
it is expected that Kate may add: 
• Early warning signs (EWSs) can be derived from scenarios.  
• Scenarios are a practical tool for identifying and prioritising the EWSs. 
This set of statements or hypotheses about roles of scenarios will be used as 
milestones in the following text. First, the usefulness of scenarios for lessons 
learning will be highlighted. Then it will be shown that (i) lessons learning using 
scenarios can reach EWSs through the identification of causal events, (ii) results of 
lessons learning via scenarios can be used for various purposes, and (iii) the use of 
scenarios as a tool to obtain EWSs has many of the required attributes of lessons 
learning tools. 
5.5.3 Scenarios make it possible to foresee the risk comprehensively 
Origins of danger are called hazards. Definition from CCPS (2008) states that hazard 
is a physical or chemical condition that has the potential for causing harm. Hazards 
in the industrial environment is usually associated to the presence of a dangerous 
substance or a possibility of an undesirable reaction or an accumulation of energy.  
In case of William’s kitchen, the three hazards identified are the following: bottle 
with oil close to the stove, potential for oil in the frying pan to ignite, and heavy 
bowl on the shelf above the ceramic hob falling. In case of an industrial plant, the 
three hazards may be the following: presence of volumes of explosives, potential 
of decomposition reaction in the explosive, and the energy of compressed air in 
piping of filling machine.  
Hazards can be systematically identified. Several suitable techniques were 
developed for this purpose. Probably the most universal techniques for hazard 
identification in industrial installations are FMEA and HAZOP (See CCPS 2008).  
Mere identification of hazards however does not say too much about the risk that 
is connected with a process or with an operated system. Presence of the bottle 
with oil in the kitchen means only that the risk connected with the use of kitchen 
cannot be zero. Three reasons exist why mere knowledge about present hazards 
is not enough:  
• The article by Kaplan and Garrick (1981) reminds us that risk increases with 
the increasing presence of hazards, but it also decreases according to 
measures which are intended to keep control over hazards. Some of such 
measures may prevent realisations of hazards, and others may mitigate the 
effects of realisations. Various types of these measures are called barriers, 
safeguards, regulations, or layers of protection. Here we will mostly use the 
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term controls or preventive/mitigating controls, which seem to be the most 
general.  
• The risk is not only influenced by the interaction of hazards and controls, but 
also by the interaction of hazards among themselves. This refers to the terms 
domino effect or knock-on effect. For example, the ignition of the oil in the 
pan can develop into the ignition of the oil inside the bottle.  
• The magnitude of the risk is also influenced by local environmental conditions 
that change, regardless of hazards and controls. For example, the 
development of a fire in the kitchen may be different depending on whether 
the door and/or the window are open. The risk of the industrial plant varies 
according to the propagation of the shock waves and the gas clouds.  
All three reasons mentioned above explain that scenarios describe the complexity 
of real danger much better than mere hazards. Kaplan and Garrick (1981) 
consequently argued for this and defined risk as a set of scenarios si, each of which 
has a probability pi and a consequence ci. Although this approach has its limits 
which are discussed in (Aven, 2008), it is preferable when we think about the use 
of scenarios. 
5.5.4 Scenarios are a practical tool for thinking about risk 
Crowl and Louvar (2011) state that scenario is a description of the events that 
result in an incident or accident. According to Marshall and Ruhemann (2001) 
scenarios describe how the situations can develop when a hazard starts to realise. 
The above verb “realise” means the process of an event or events by which the 
potential in a hazardous system becomes actual. In accordance with this idea, the 
scenarios are sequences of events in which the first event (initiating event) starts 
the realisation of a hazard. The sequence can, but does not have to, include other 
- developing - events in addition to the initiating event. See Figure 1. Developing 
events may be undesirable events in the hazard, failures or successes of different 
controls, application of different environmental conditions, or escalation of 
development to other hazards present. 
 
Figure 1. Scenario. 
In the kitchen, Kate thinks about fire scenarios; in the plant, she would imagine 
explosions related to the production of emulsion explosive charges. For example, 
in the kitchen, a scenario may start by the ignition of the oil in the frying pan; 
followed by extinguishing of fire or by escalation of fire triggering other hazards, 
including the oil bottle in the vicinity of the stove; and develop until the fire spreads 
to the entire fire load in the kitchen.  
Such scenarios are called incident scenarios since they cause non-negligible 
damage. Such scenarios have two substantial properties:  
1. Each scenario represents one possible interaction of real conditions in the 
process/system. The scenarios not only take into account the hazards in the 
process/system but also the ways in which these hazards are realised, how the 
controls fail or succeed, how the hazards interact and how environmental 
conditions contribute to the development of the incident.  
2. Each scenario represents one contribution to the risk of process/system. Each 
incident scenario represents one possibility of how damage may arise in the 
process/system. Or each scenario represents one part of the risk according to the 
classical definition by Kaplan and Garrick (1981).  
Kate obviously has in mind both these two properties when saying that scenarios 
make it possible to see the risk comprehensively. In accordance with the article by 
Kaplan and Garrick (1981), the risk of process/system is for her a set of all 
conceivable incident scenarios in the process/system. 
Kate also feels how important the description of scenarios is for thinking about 
risk. If the scenario describes a specific accident/incident that happened in the 
past, its description will contain the information relevant to the understanding of 
its origin, i.e. the origin of this specific part of risk. If a scenario describes a generic 
incident/accident that may happen in the future, it in fact represents a group of 
similar specific scenarios. It is accordingly called a representative scenario and 
explains the origin of a subset of risk. 
Having in mind all the preceding properties of scenarios, we start to be aware of 
another very important feature of scenarios: their clarity and transparency makes 
them very powerful in explaining the risk to the general public. Scenarios may 
serve as an extremely useful communication tool with the general public. 
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5.5.5 Incident scenarios may be results of prospection 
Prospective scenarios arise by developing initiating events in hazards. Event trees 
are commonly used to represent and create them as it is described e.g. by CCPS 
(2000, 2008). An example event tree is in Figure 2. Figure 3 contains the same list 
of scenarios as the event tree in Figure 2. 
When an analyst constructs an event tree, he starts from a known initiating event 
in a hazard, knows the behaviour of hazards, and is aware of controls and 
environmental conditions. He usually begins by considering how and in what order 
after the initiating event, the controls and environmental conditions should be 
applied to minimize the damage caused. This sequence of events is called success 
scenario. Success scenario defines heading of event tree. In Figure 2 it consists of 
the initiating event and three developing events.  
The analyst then considers what the negations of controls and environmental 
conditions may cause in the development of an incident. He records the findings 
in the tree graph below the heading. This way he creates a list of prospective 
incident scenarios, which start with the selected initiating event. 
 
Figure 2. Event tree. 
 
Figure 3. List of incident scenarios from event tree in Figure 2. 
Regarding risk analysis, which is essentially a list of scenarios, sometimes it is said 
that classical approaches to the identification of possible scenarios, which are 
described by CCPS (2000, 2001, and 2008), do not necessarily reveal all possible 
scenarios. Scenario-based techniques such as red-teaming (DoD 2003) and 
anticipatory failure determination (Kaplan et al 1999) can also be used to challenge 
existing safety cases, attempting to find gaps in the accident scenarios that have 
been analysed (Masys 2012). 
Scenario-based exercises can also be used for simulation-based training exercises 
which aim is to improve system resilience by strengthening operators‘ knowledge 
of system and safety barriers operations. 
5.5.6 More about prospective scenarios 
Event trees do not represent the only way to identify the prospective scenarios. 
Event sequence in an event tree that starts by an initiating event and resulting in 
an outcome, may be a relatively long and detailed. But it may be simplified and 
reduced to a mere pair of initiating event and related outcome. This approach 
represents a starting point for layer of protection analysis (LOPA) described by 
CCPS (2001). 
A bow tie according to CCPS (2008) or according to Hatch et al. (2019) represents 
another alternative to an event tree. Bow tie is more detailed than the event tree, 
since the initiating event is expanded into a tree of event causes. 
In Part 5.5.4. it can be noticed that a single prospective scenario usually represents 
a group of similar specific scenarios and is accordingly called a representative 
scenario. In majority of cases, when individual prospective scenarios are 
mentioned they could be replaced by sets of scenarios. If bow-ties were used 
instead of event trees to illustrate scenarios, this would be evident. 
Extensiveness, complexity, and level of detail of representative scenarios depend 
substantially on how the individual events in the sequence are described. Above 
all, the resolution whether the sequences are characterised in terms of (i) 
fulfilment of safety functions, (ii) intervention of protection systems or occurrence 
of physical phenomena, (iii) successes and failures of individual components, may 
substantially influence the extensiveness and specificity of scenarios. Zio (2007) 
discusses this problem in more detail. 
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However, whether event trees, LOPA pairs or bow-ties are used to represent 
scenarios, it can always be said that scenarios can be used in fully quantitative, 
semi-quantitative and fully non-quantitative modes. The first one is suitable for 
quantitative risk estimation, the latter for communicating on risk with non-
specialized people, which is mentioned at the end of Part 5.5.4. 
5.5.7 Incident scenarios may be results of retrospection 
Retrospective accident scenarios are created as a result of the reconstruction of 
incidents in the process/system. According to Johnson (2003), such reconstruction 
is always necessary during the investigation regardless of the method used to 
analyse the causes of the incident.  
Retrospective scenario is a sequence of events. But its first event does not 
necessarily have to be identical with the initiating event that starts the realisation 
of a hazard. The sequence can, but does not have to, include developing events. 
Developing events are not limited to undesirable events in hazards, failures or 
successes of different controls, applications of different environmental conditions, 
or escalations of development to other present hazards. In addition, the most 
surprising and unpleasant difference of retrospective scenarios from prospective 
scenarios is that they do not consist only of one line of events but may variously 
branch and splice. Example of a retrospective scenario is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Example retrospective scenario. 
Retrospective scenarios generally represent multilinear sequences as described by 
Benner (1975). Excessive events result from a descriptive effort that does not take 
into account only undesirable events in hazards, failures or successes of different 
controls, applications of different environmental conditions, or escalations of 
development to other present hazards. Branching and splicing (examples can be 
seen in Figure 4) is result of taking into account different actors, as described by 
Benner (1975). 
In the kitchen, Event1 can be “Start of frying in the pan”, Event2 “Chicken breast is 
fried in oil”, Event6 “William attempts to take the bowl from the shelf above pan”, 
Event7 is “Bowl falls down on the pan and ceramic hob”, Event8 may be “Ceramic 
panel above electric heaters is broken”. Event3 may be “Frying pan overturns” and 
Event4 may be “Spilled oil ignites”. In such a case Event7 will be determined as an 
initiating event according to Benner’s (1975) definition. Event8 and Event3 are 
failures of controls, and Event4 is an undesirable event in hazard. 
Again, the picture resulting from the retrospection may be more complicated as 
events in the diagram (for instance Event7), may be expanded into trees of their 
causes. The overall picture may then resemble a bow-tie diagram. 
5.5.8 Both prospective and retrospective scenarios can be used for lessons 
learning 
Today's designer or an operator of an industrial system, or for instance, a food 
safety regulator (see Afonso at al., 2017) may think about the realisation of hazards 
just like Kate thinks about heavy objects over a ceramic hob or like a cave dweller 
thought about a lurking tiger. For such thinking, it is necessary to know the 
behaviour of the relevant hazards, to understand them based on natural science 
or to have experience with them. Scenarios can then be used as a tool that 
supports the thinking. The effectiveness of such thinking can be enhanced by 
adopting appropriate techniques.  
Benner and Carey (2009) do not limit the use of the term “investigation-oriented 
lessons learning data sources” only to retrospection related to experienced 
accidents or incidents, but also to potential or hypothesised accidents or incidents 
originating from hazard and risk analyses.  
Similarly, also here investigation is related both to retrospection and prospection. 
Incident scenarios can arise in two ways: as a result of retrospection (incident 
analysis) or prospection (risk analysis). These two options will be discussed in detail 
in Part 5. 
5.5.9 Desirable attributes of scenarios as tools for lessons learning 
Based on the preceding considerations, together with Kate we would like to use 
the scenarios as a tool for lessons learning, namely for the development of EWSs. 
Benner and Carey (2009) analysed desired attributes of lessons learning tools. They 
showed that the development of lessons learned can be divided into investigation 
and documentation. Investigation should support production of lessons-to-be-
        Page 110 of 252 
learned source data. Documentation should facilitate satisfaction of desired user 
criteria. 
If scenarios are to be used in investigation, they need attributes like:  
1. A stated investigation purpose of providing lessons learned leading to changed 
future behaviours.  
• For example, Kate could intend to investigate accidents in all the kitchens of 
all the Williams living throughout the UK, to improve their safety during 
cooking. 
2. An input-output framework for describing what happened, enabling lessons 
learned data sets, to describe behaviours to change in non-judgmental and 
logically verifiable terms.  
• For example, Kate would require every kitchen accident to be described as a 
finite set of sequences of simple sentences beginning with an initiating event 
and ending with a damage description.  
3. A focus on behaviour data acquisition and processing, to enhance efficient 
documentation of lessons learned from accident-generated lessons learning 
source data.  
• For example, the sentences in the sequences would have to describe actions 
of animate or inanimate actors, or behaviour. 
4. Specifications for behavioural building block structure, grammar, syntax, and 
vocabulary and a structure for input data documentation, to ensure data 
consistency and economy, and facilitate data coupling and support for 
documenting lessons learned.  
5. Machine support for input data sequencing, parsing, coupling, concatenation, 
data set display and expansion capabilities, to facilitate lessons learned processing 
and dissemination, and to reduce latency.  
6. Objective quality assurance and validation process for behavioural data sets.  
The three above-mentioned examples show that scenarios are able to fulfil the 
requirements of attributes #1 to #3. Attribute #4 requires the introduction of 
certain standards on how the events are described, and how the conditions are 
replaced by the events. Vocabulary can be limited to definite lists of actors and/or 
actions using checklists. Such a standardization is easier to reach in the industrial 
environment than in a kitchen since in the industry it may be supported by a 
marking system. In the kitchen it would need to use, e.g. for the bottle with oil, 
always the same term. 
Attribute #5 is connected with the use of computers for recording the scenarios, 
which is achievable especially when the attribute #4 is fulfilled. Attribute #6 states 
only that the use of scenarios for lessons learning cannot be considered 
satisfactory if it is not subjected to quality assurance. 
5.5.10 Attributes of scenarios desirable for documentation part of lessons 
learning 
According to Benner and Carey (2009), desired attributes for documentation 
would include:  
1. Efficient tools to facilitate documentation of behaviour data sets, and reduced 
latency.  
2. Specifications for lessons learned behavioural data outputs meeting users’ 
needs, harmonized with other learning organisation lessons learned sources or 
knowledge management artefacts, with maximised signal-to-noise ratios, 
providing context, minimising interpretive and analytical workload for users, and 
reducing latency.  
3. Machine lessons learned processing support and repository uploading 
capabilities, to accelerate lessons learned documentation and deployment into all 
repositories.  
4. Internet lessons learned output data repository and notification capabilities, to 
facilitate “push” or “pull” lessons learned data dissemination, enable wide 
deployment, and minimise latency.  
5. Rapid repository access, search and filter capability, to minimise user access 
time, cost and workloads.  
6. Objective lessons learned quality assurance and validation functions, to enable 
developer to ensure lessons learned quality before entry into repositories.  
7. Lessons learned repository modification or updating capability, to ensure lasting 
lessons learning quality.  
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The second set of attributes by Benner and Carey (2009) seem to be very 
demanding, much different from the state existing in many industrial 
environments. Evidently, they saw the attributes from a very general perspective 
and created a description of “an ideal state”. Doubtlessly, without the use of 
computerised database tools they cannot be achieved nor even approached. But 
hopefully in very simple cases as our kitchen case, the documentation of scenarios 
may be reasonably used for lessons learning even if it does not achieve the most 
ambitious standards. 
5.6 Lessons learning can reach EWSs through the identification of 
causal events 
5.6.1 Causal events in retrospective incident scenarios 
The main purpose of lessons learning is to identify what behaviour of actors was 
wrong and what behaviour has to be improved in order to prevent or mitigate the 
recurrence of an incident. Identification of wrong and improvable behaviour is 
possible, as soon as the incident scenario is reconstructed. The reconstructed 
scenario usually contains not only individual events, but also a description of 
context in which the events occurred. Context is described as a set of conditions.  
If the analysis of the retrospective scenario is aimed at preventing the repetition 
of the same or similar scenarios, it must focus on those events in the scenario that 
worsen the control over a hazard. The events in the sequence have to be identified 
that influenced unfavourably the behaviour of actors and thus, contributed to the 
incident.  
These events are often called causal factors. CCPS (2003) defines causal factor as 
a negative event or undesirable condition that, if eliminated, would have either 
prevented the occurrence (= incident scenario) or reduced its severity or 
frequency. Since this definition permits causal factor to be a condition, we will 
modify it slightly. We will require the conditions always to be linked to events 
which context they describe (we suppose that such a state is always achievable). 
Then we leave the term causal factor and define causal event as a negative event, 
including its context that if eliminated would have either prevented the occurrence 
or reduced its severity or frequency.  
Let us suppose that Event5 in Figure 4 is “William uses the fire extinguisher”. This 
event itself does not seem to be a causal event. But if Event5 happened in the 
context that William was not able to initially use the extinguisher and hence, the 
extinguishing started much later than possible, then the Event5, including its 
context, would visibly be a causal event. 
Another approach to retrospective scenarios requires to replace all the conditions 
within the chart by (sequences of) events. This approach relates to the 
explanations added as Epilogue to the original article by Benner (1975). The 
advantage is that constraining the flow chart to events is always possible and 
solves the problem. (Way to the exclusion of conditions is commented in the end 
of Part 5.6.6) Causal factors will be then represented only by events and be 
identical to causal events. 
Ideally, the set of causal events represents the set of necessary and sufficient 
events explaining HOW the incident occurred, while the scenario itself explains 
WHAT occurred. A reconstructed incident scenario is reduced to a set of causal 
events during the retrospective incident analysis. 
For the incident scenario that might be represented by Figure 4, the set of causal 
events is Event7 (bowl falls on the pan and ceramic hob), Event8 (ceramic panel 
above electric heaters is broken), Event3 (Frying pan overturns), Event4 (spilled oil 
ignites) and Event5 (William uses fire extinguisher later than possible). 
5.6.2 Causal events in prospective incident scenarios 
Analysis of incident scenarios using event trees uncovers possible interactions of 
real actors in the system, i.e. interactions of present hazards, controls and 
environmental conditions. For most of the events in the tree, it is valid that they 
can change within a certain range without changing the scenario. For example, if 
in the tree in Figure 2 the initiating event is the ignition of oil in the pan, and the 
first developing event is a fire intervention with a lid, then the fire intervention can 
take place at any time within a certain time interval of about tens of seconds 
without changing the course of the scenario. An event tree analyst considers the 
ranges within which the events can be changed. Individual scenarios from the tree 
thus represent whole classes of somewhat different scenarios, which however do 
not differ in qualitative terms, i.e. by the type of events involved. The event tree 
thus contains representative incident scenarios. For more details see, for example, 
article by Kaplan et al. (2001).  
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Prospective scenario analysis can be used even before the precise form of the 
individual conditions in the process/system is known. Once an initiating event is 
defined, all the safety functions that are required to mitigate the incident must be 
defined and organised according to their time of intervention as Zio (2007) 
describes it. In the case of ignition in the frying pan, we could consider immediate 
firefighting, limitation of propagation, delayed firefighting, and extinguishing by an 
external fire brigade. Defining safety functions can be very useful in the design 
phase because it can be used to define controls.  
Prospective analysis typically seeks to investigate systematically all representative 
initiating events and related incident scenarios. Scenarios created by prospective 
analysis take the form of conjunctions of events from which no event can be 
removed. When thinking about risk, events in scenarios that represent 
degradation of control over hazards are at the heart of interest. If the convention 
is kept that the tree heading contains a success scenario, then events that 
represent degradation are both initiating events and all events that negate 
successes from the heading, i.e. all the events starting in Figs 2 and 3 with the word 
"non".  
Above we defined causal event as a negative event including its context that if 
eliminated it would have either prevented the occurrence or reduced its severity 
or frequency. This is the exact description of both initiating events and negating 
events in the event tree. Thus, initiating event and negating events in the event 
tree can be called causal events.  
Therefore, prospective analysis using event trees can serve as a tool for the 
systematic identification of all possible (representative) causal events in the 
process/system. Visibly, this conclusion does not depend on the form of scenarios 
mentioned in Part 5.5.6.  
In addition, it can be shown that the simplified prospective scenarios used in the 
layer of protection analysis by CCPS (2001) can serve as a tool for the identification 
of possible causal events in the process/system. In this case, failures of layers of 
protection can be identified as causal events. 
Similarly, we suppose that all other methods of identification of prospective 
scenarios can be used to identify causal events. 
5.6.3 Comparison of role of causal events in prospection and retrospection 
While prospective analysis attempts to predict all possible causal events that might 
occur, retrospective analysis identifies the combination of causal events that 
actually occurred. If analyses are flawless, then retrospective analysis should result 
in one of the scenarios created by prospective analysis.  
Nevertheless, if we have a set of possible incident scenarios created by a 
prospective analysis for the process/system, it is not certain that the scenario 
generated by the incident retrospection in this process/system can be quickly 
identified with one of the prospective scenarios. There may be several reasons for 
unsuccessful identification: 
(i) Retrospective analysis may mix several scenarios that took place concurrently;  
(ii) Scenario events in retrospective analysis are determined in more detail than 
those in prospective scenarios;  
(iii) Certain conditions that worsen the control over a hazard in real undesirable 
event in the process/system may be omitted in prospective analysis.  
These practical findings represent some of the motivations for achieving the 
attributes quoted in Parts 5.5.9 and 5.5.10 when using scenarios as a lessons 
learning tool. Theoretically, such problems should not arise if all the attributions 
according to 5.5.9 and 5.5.10 are reached. Nevertheless, we know that reality still 
is quite far from Benner and Carey’s (2009) ideal. 
Nevertheless, it is true that the most important common finding is as follows: in 
both prospective and retrospective scenario analysis, the main outcome in terms 
of safety is always a set of events that represent a worsening of control over the 
hazards to which our attention should be focused. In other words, in both cases 
our interest focuses on events called causal events. 
5.6.4 Scenarios make visible the threatening conditions in the 
process/system 
The previous parts have shown that any incident scenario can be reduced to a set 
of causal events. The set of causal events represents a combination of events 
worsening the control over the hazards. They are at the same time the 
combination of necessary and sufficient conditions for consequences and 
frequency of this incident scenario. The causal events can be represented by the 
following: 
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• initiating event in the hazard, or  
• failures of the measures intended to mitigate the realisation of a hazard, or 
• failure of the measures intended to prevent the realisation of additional 
hazard, or 
• events adversely affecting the environmental conditions influencing the 
realisation of hazards.  
This result shows that the scenarios make visible the ways in which hazards realise 
(come to be) in a particular process/system. They visualise the real role of hazards 
and related controls and environmental conditions in a particular process/system. 
This visualisation is the basic purpose of both risk analysis and undesirable event 
analysis. 
5.6.5 Better than prospection or retrospection is the combination of both 
Retrospectively, i.e. based on experience with specific undesirable events, only 
specific accident scenarios can be revealed within the incident cause analysis. From 
a logical point of view, this is an inductive process. Its advantage is that it identifies 
the real weaknesses of control over the hazards, usually the most likely ones. It 
may also reveal weaknesses that within risk analysis remain hidden from our eyes 
for their delicacy. The disadvantage is that it reveals only some weaknesses and 
scenarios, not necessarily those that most contribute to the risk. The disadvantage 
may also be that, in the analysis, causal events are not identified in a sufficient 
manner. The results may mistakenly adhere only to the partial weakness, which is 
only a contribution to the general causal event.  
Prospectively, i.e. based on a process/system analysis, the risk analysis can reveal 
theoretically all possible incident scenarios. From a logic point of view, this process 
is deductive. (This means, of course, that it also contains the inductive component 
- general rules on behaviour of hazards and controls based on experience). The 
advantage of this approach is that it systematically searches for all weaknesses in 
the control across all the hazards. It is able to reveal all the weaknesses and 
scenarios, including those with low frequencies. It can also reveal weaknesses that, 
by mere application of experience, remain hidden from our eyes. The disadvantage 
of the prospective approach, however, is that the analysis cannot avoid various 
neglects and simplifications because of which some substantial interactions of 
hazards and controls may be omitted. Hence, the outcome of the prospection may 
appear to be complete, but in reality, substantial scenarios are missing.  
Since it is difficult to avoid the above-mentioned errors when using these 
approaches, the combination of a prospective and a retrospective approach seems 
to be a practical and realistic approach to identifying scenarios. 
5.6.6 Early warning signs are causes and indicators of causal events 
We realised in the previous parts above that a set of scenarios makes the risk of 
the process/system visible as a set of sets of causal events. As we have already 
mentioned in Part 5.4.1, the essence of foresight is the capability to see EWSs or 
indicators of problems that could lead to an incident, or the indicators of risk 
increase. In the context in which risk is decomposed into incident scenarios, and 
incident scenarios are in turn decomposed into causal events, foresight thus, 
means the ability to see the signs that some identified causal events could actually 
occur. In particular, we would like to be able to see signs of possible occurrence of 
causal events that contribute most importantly to the risk.  
It follows from the previous paragraph that the EWSs can be identified as the 
causes of causal events including causal events themselves, or indicators of causal 
events, or indicators of causes of causal events. (Among indicators, the leading 
indicators are preferred.) 
This finding means that a correct and complete identification of causal events is of 
essential importance. An unidentified causal event (CE) represents an invisible set 
of EWSs, existence and importance of which stay unknown. 
In this context it has to be strongly recommended to follow the Epilogue by Benner 
(1975) and exclude any possibility that a causal event would stay hidden given the 
presence of conditions within the scenario (retrospective) description. There are 
various ways how to do this. An approach shown by Accou and Reniers (2018) is a 
promising way that excludes conditions from a descriptive chart of a scenario and 
replaces conditions by events. The universal model of safety management 
activities (safety fractal) promises to help identify a possibility and sort of such a 
replacement for any condition within the chart. 
Also it is recommended to perform a check of identified causal events by rewriting 
each of them as an adverse influence acting on a vulnerable target due to missing 
barriers or regulations. This approach originates in MORT by Johnson (1973) and 
warrants that all CEs identified correspond with the definition of causal events. 
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5.6.7 Possible approaches to identification of event causes 
Unfortunately, the concept of causes does not have clear and unambiguous 
content. If we talk about the causes, we can talk about many kinds of events and 
ideas. Nevertheless, it can be repeated here, that the EWSs represent causes of 
causal events, whatever the causes mean. 
In technical practice, at least direct causes and underlying causes are usually 
distinguished. Smaller differences exist with respect to direct causes. They are 
physically detectable failures, errors, states, conditions, the combination of which 
leads to an occurrence of causal event.  
But there are quite different ideas in various approaches to incident analysis about 
what are the underlying causes. In the relatively common root cause analysis (RCA) 
methods, the underlying causes are called root causes and represent deficiencies 
in the implementation of a safety management system. They could also be referred 
to as organisational causes.  
Verschueren (2018) is focused on the organisational causes and their relation to 
EWSs. He underlines the importance of organisational dysfunctionalities. 
According to Verschueren (2018) organisational dysfunctionalities can be detected 
and can act as EWSs. 
General acceptance of contemporary focus on organisational causes is confirmed 
in Hollnagel (2014):“In the thinking about types of causes, we see a development 
that goes from technology to the human factor and, most recently, to the 
organisations and to culture.” In accordance with this, most part of contemporary 
methods of cause analysis agrees with the idea that organisational causes have to 
be searched for. They attempt to identify them. 
A hierarchy of checklists, called root cause map, is often used to determine 
underlying causes in RCAs and improved RCAs. Such an approach is described in 
CCPS (2003). An example of elaborated analysis method that is nowadays used in 
industry can be found in a paper by Nicolescu (2018) where the method of the 
Investigation Body of Norway, AIBN, is applied to identify causal events (direct 
causes) and a tool named SMS wheel is applied in order to identify underlying 
causes.  
Improved RCAs such as described by Ferjencik (2014) would include also the 
underlying causes in safety culture or attitudes of local management. As shown in 
the article by Ferjencik, guidelines by CCPS (2007) are useful for this purpose.  
There are at least two examples of alternative methods to determine direct and 
underlying causes. Symptoms would be determined with analysis by ESReDA 
(2009). Failing processes would be identified instead of root and underlying causes 
in an analysis by Leveson (2004). Nevertheless, for both approaches, the 
identification of causal events according to the definition used here would be the 
necessary starting point. For Leveson’s approach, it is shown in Stoop and Benner 
(2015). Leveson’s analysis process starts with a step Identify the systems and 
hazards involved in the loss. This requirement can be translated into Identify the 
controls and hazards involved in the loss. Causal events point to such an 
identification.  
This diversity means that EWSs and searching for EWSs can have very variable 
forms. While these differences in our understanding of causes can discourage us, 
they all point to the same general fact: EWSs can be determined from incident 
scenarios as (partial) causes of relevant causal events. 
Example: The determination of causal events is very easy in conventional event 
trees. Four causal events are present in Figure 2 according to Figure 3: I-event, non-
D-event1, non-D-event2, and non-D-event3.  
Various techniques and approaches can be used for the identification of causes of 
causal events. Fault tree analysis (FTA) that is recommended in book CCPS (2003), 
is very productive in prospective analysis. Figure 5 shows possible results of 
application of FTA to two causal events. It can be observed from Figures 2, 3 and 5 
that cause1, cause2, and cause3 represent EWSs for all scenarios S1 to S4. Cause4 
and cause5 are EWSs only for scenario S3. Cause2 indicates the possibility of 
formation of both causal events at the same time. Cause2 may represent a sort of 
common cause failure. Typically, the EWSs with common-cause nature may be the 
deficiencies in the local safety management system i.e. underlying causes.  
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Figure 5. Causes of two causal events from Figure 2 and 3. 
5.6.8 Steps to the identification of EWSs 
The identification of EWSs begins when the incident scenarios are constructed. 
They make visible the realisation of hazards, which is the main purpose of the 
construction of incident scenarios. Scenarios allow the identification of causal 
events. They make visible the roles of hazards and controls of hazards. Once causal 
events are known, a way to make EWSs visible is open. Therefore, the visibility of 
the EWSs emerges through the visualisation of the role of hazards and controls of 
hazards. 
Scenarios can help see the EWSs in two steps. In the first step, we determine the 
causal events in the incident scenarios; in the second step we determine the causes 
of the established causal events and indicators of causal events and their causes.  
In prospective analysis, causal events are determined as:  
• events in hazards that initiate realisation of hazards,  
• events in hazards that escalate damages, 
• events that represent failure of controls over realised hazards,  
• events that allow damage escalation by setting up adverse environmental 
conditions.  
In a retrospective analysis, causal events are selected as events that meet the 
definition of causal event.  
In case of prospective analysis both the elaborated form of scenarios that is used 
within quantitative risk analysis (and modelled with the help of ETA, FTA, and HRA 
or with the help of bow ties), and the simplified form of scenarios typical for layer 
of protection analysis (modelled as an initiating event – consequence pair) can be 
exploited. 
Practical note: 
To be used efficiently as a tool for EWS identification, the set of scenarios should 
not be excessively wide, the scenarios should not be too specific, and the 
identification of EWS should not be limited to specific direct causes represented 
by the failures/errors. The set of scenarios should: 
• be limited to selected critical scenarios,  
• have description of scenarios that prefer functions (not elements),  
• have EWSs that are identified in underlying layers, too, i.e. as deficiencies of 
the safety management system.  
5.6.9 Variability in identification of EWSs 
As it is visible from preceding parts of the chapter, the detailed understanding on 
what are early warning signs can be substantially variable. There is no single 
possible way to identify EWSs. Nevertheless, a few important findings can be 
stated: 
• Based on the definition and procedure for identification of EWSs, it can be 
understood why we may have known and unknown EWSs and what their 
existence may signify.  
• Based on the understanding of relations of causes, it can be understood why 
there may be synergic relationships among EWSs.  
• Based on the fact that EWSs may be causes it can be understood that Cube 
(Chapter 8, Stoop et al., 2020) may be applied to identifications and checks of 
EWSs.  
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5.7 Application of scenarios as a tool for lessons learning 
5.7.1 Example: Kitchen prospection 
A frying pan filled with oil is a hazard in the kitchen. Kate worries that the oil in the 
pan may ignite - she considers the ignition of the oil in the pan to be a possible 
initiating event. Rapid extinguishing by laying the lid on the pan minimizes damage 
after the initiating event. If this does not happen, further development depends 
on whether there is another hazard near the pan - a plastic bottle of oil. If it is not 
there, the damage is minimized, i.e. it can be expected that the oil in the pan will 
burn out, the smoke will cause damage, but the fire will not expand further. If the 
bottle with cooking oil is present and stays nearby, it is a matter of time when a 
large amount of burning oil is spilled on the stove and on the floor. At this point, 
the rapid use of a suitable fire extinguisher can minimize damage. If the 
extinguisher is not used quickly, the fire will spread across the room. Further 
development depends on whether the door is opened into the adjoining dining 
room or whether it is closed. Closed door minimizes damage, in the sense that 
when the fire breaks out, the window and becomes noticeable from the outside of 
the house, no further rooms are hit so far. If a fire-fighting car arrives in time, it 
will save most of the house from the fire. The success scenario consists of an 
initiating event and five developing events. 
 
Figure 6. Analysis of possible developments of ignition of oil in frying pan. 
Three of the developing events are the use of controls, one event is the realisation 
of another hazard, and one can be considered to be the application of the 
environmental condition. The entire event tree (Figure 8) contains seven incident 
scenarios.  
Six causal events are determined: ignition of oil in frying pan; fire is not 
extinguished by a lid; fire spreads to a bottle of oil; fire is not extinguished by a fire 
extinguisher; dining room door is open; fire cannot be extinguished by intervention 
vehicle. EWSs in the kitchen can be determined as analysis results of possible 
causes of individual causal events. For example, William’s habit of leaving the 
frying pan unattended may contribute to the causes of the initiating event and is 
the cause of the failure of the first developing event. It is therefore a clear early 
warning signal. Presence of the bottle of oil in close vicinity of ceramic hob, as well 
as the absence of fire extinguisher in the kitchen will be identified among EWSs. 
5.7.2 Example: Kitchen retrospection 
Let's imagine that a fire broke out in the neighbourhood of William and Kate. The 
fire destroyed the neighbour's kitchen. Investigations have shown that the real 
incident scenario in the kitchen took place as the scenario in Figure 7 shows. 
 
Figure 7. Scenario of real incident in William's neighbour's kitchen. 
The scenario recalls scenarios S5 and S7 from Figure 6. Because the information 
about the dining room door status is missing in the scenario, it is not to be expected 
that this reconstruction of the incident could identify the EWSs causing the door 
to be opened. On the contrary, the causal event CE1 is identified in the 
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reconstructed scenario, which is missing in the scenarios in Figure 6. The presence 
of the extra causal event in the scenario can be explained by point (ii) in Part 5.6.3 
Causal event CE1 is the cause of causal events that we find in scenarios S5 and S7 
from Figure 6. Therefore, this external incident does not bring Kate any new facts 
she would not know from the prospection. On the other hand, this retrospection 
makes William change his undesirable habit. 
5.7.3 Example: Industrial unit prediction 
Let us move from the kitchen into the industrial environment. As an example we 
will use a unit for production of emulsion explosive charges. (The example is 
inspired by Ferjencik and Dechy, 2016.) Figure 8 shows a basic arrangement of this 
plant. Protective walls surround a light building inside of which the automatic filling 
machine produces explosive charges from the explosive paste. In this 
environment, William may play a role of personnel and Kate represents his 
manager.  
Initiation of detonation during the start of filling machine represents a possible 
initiating event in unit for production of emulsion explosive charges. In case that 
the individual events in the sequence are described as fulfilment of safety 
functions (see (i) in Part 5.5.6), resulting event tree may look as it is shown in Figure 
9. 
 
Figure 8. Unit for production of emulsion explosive charges (bird’s-eye view). 
 
Figure 9. Scenarios of possible incidents in unit for production of emulsion explosive charges. 
Causes of sympathetic detonations (inevitable transmission of detonation) have to 
be analysed in order to identify early warning signs. Typical EWSs that correspond 
with the second and third identified causal events are excess amount of explosives, 
inappropriate deployment of explosives, and insufficient resistance of unit. 
5.7.4 Example: Industrial object retrospection 
Figure 10 shows the scenario that actually occurred in unit for production of 
emulsion explosive charges.  
 
Figure 10. Scenario of real incident in unit for production of emulsion explosive charges. 
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The scenario contains causal event CE3 that is not 
identified in the event tree in Figure 9. CE3 represents a 
fatal impact of a shock wave on three persons present 
in the he building due to missing protective barriers that 
could warrant their protection and due to missing 
regulations that could warrant their absence in the 
room. This reformulation in accordance with MORT 
(Johnson, 1973) shows that CE3 really represents a 
causal event. In this case, the real event revealed a 
deficiency in the prospective analysis of Figure 9. As 
stated in Part 5.6.3, point (iii), it was overlooked that 
controls during the start of filling machine should also include the care of ensuring 
the absence of surplus persons in the building. In this case, the retrospective 
analysis reveals EWSs that prospective analysis was not able to detect. An event 
tree suitable for the identification of relevant EWSs would have to be created by 
extending the event tree of Figure 9. Its head would include the third developing 
event “Presence of personnel within the reach of detonation effects is minimised”. 
This example, which is taken from real experience, illustrates the opinion that the 
combination of both prospection and retrospection is 
the better approach, rather than either of them on their 
own. 
5.7.5 Example: NPP retrospection 
Figure 11 is reproduced from the paper by Strucic (2017). 
The figure describes a real incident scenario from a 
nuclear power plant. The failure of the chiller condenser 
coil led to the shutdown of all three units at the site. 
Colour conventions are applied in the scenario. Events 
are represented by green rectangles, conditions by blue 
ovals. Red rhombus represents a causal event. In this 
case, only one causal event is identified (which is 
identical with an initiating event). The brown circle 
describes scenario consequences. 
The identification of early warning signs requires, in this case, the analysis of 
causes why the fouling of the control bay chiller outlet condenser coils resulting in 
a high temperature of the outlet water may occur. 
 
Figure 11. Incident scenario from NPP according to Strucic (2017). 
Figure 12 reproduces the summary of the analysis of causes of the causal event 
from Figure 11 according to Strucic (2017).  
 
 
Figure 12. Causes of a causal event from NPP according to Strucic (2017). 
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Undoubtedly, this graphical summary originates from the analysis that belongs 
into the family of RCA. This analysis classifies the causes into categories of causes 
(yellow ovals) in accordance with a manual (i.e. with a list of checklists) and visibly 
the categories refer to organisational problems. Hence, the analysis uses a 
prefabricated list of root causes. Terminology of the original analysis is, however, 
different from the terms used here. Our causal event is called deviation and the 
term causal factor is reserved for classified root causes. 
This cause analysis could be complemented by a fault tree analysing all possible 
technical causes that can cause fouling of the chiller coil. Some of relevant causes 
are listed in the description of the condition in Figure 11. Indicators of the causal 
event or causes of the causal event can be added to the list of EWSs. Increase of 
temperature on the outlet of chiller or increased presence of willow fly can be 
examples of such indicators. 
5.7.6 Results can be used to list all possible EWSs 
Identification of EWSs may result from the identification of causes of specific 
undesirable events called causal events. Although none of the above examples 
contains a satisfactory detailed cause analysis, the examples show the way how 
the identification of early warning signs can be performed and demonstrate that 
scenarios are suitable for this purpose. 
Prospective scenarios are appropriate for the identification of EWSs. They are 
suitable for a comprehensive analysis of all generic causal events and for the 
identification of all possible EWSs. This analysis may represent a modification of a 
systematic risk analysis. Analogous obstacles endanger completeness of the 
identification of EWSs as completeness of any risk analysis. 
Examples also show that retrospective scenarios are appropriate for the 
identification of EWSs. Nevertheless, the retrospective scenarios cannot be 
expected to provide a complete list of possible EWSs. They focus our attention only 
on a certain segment of the complete list. On the other hand, retrospection may 
easily draw our attention to imperfections and inconsistencies of the specific 
attempts to identify a complete list of EWSs. This is why in real industrial 
environment the combination of prospective and retrospective analysis should be 
considered to be the best possible way to identify early warning signs. Inspiring 
explanations related to the identification of EWSs in industrial environment can be 
found in Chapter 7, Strucic, 2020. 
5.7.7 Results can be used to prevent loss of memory 
Loss of memory means that information, such as: 
• the fact that EWSs can arise, 
• possible forms of EWSs, 
• methods to detect EWSs, 
• EWSs that were detected until they are reasonably responded, 
(four aspects of memory) is not encoded, stored, or retrieved in minds of humans 
who can influence form and behaviour of the system. 
In accordance with the above description of four aspects of memory, three forms 
of loss of memory may be distinguished: 
• missing knowledge that an EWS can rise in the system, 
• missing ability to identify an EWS when it arises,  
• missing ability to respond to the EWS that was identified. 
These three forms of loss of memory cover all situations, not only those when a 
specific knowledge or ability has been forgotten (i.e. it was not possible to be 
retrieved). In addition, situations are covered when this knowledge or ability has 
never been present (encoded and stored) in memory or has been present (and 
retrieved) but the will to use it has not existed. 
Encoding, storing, and retrieving the above-mentioned information about EWSs 
represent the documentation of EWSs resulting from lessons learning. 
Documentation of EWSs can build on the scenario documentation. Documentation 
of scenarios forms the basis of risk analysis documentation. There is a number of 
risk analysis documentation technologies ranging from simple procedures to 
software and database tools. 
Kate probably will not require formalised documentation of EWSs resulting from 
examples in Parts 5.7.1 and 5.7.2. Results of examples in Parts 5.7.3 and 5.7.4 
however require proper documentation. The stored results may represent a subset 
of prioritized process safety information for given socio-technical system according 
to Wincek (2011). The highest documentation requirements are expected in 
extremely complicated and sophisticated systems, such as NPP from example in 
Part 5.7.5. In this case, for instance, a software like Risk Spectrum (refer to 
www.riskspectrum.com) is conceivable as a documentation tool. More 
information can be found in Chapter 12, Simic, 2020. 
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Encoding, storing and making the knowledge about EWSs retrievable are supposed 
to be actions against the loss of memory. Scenarios as a generally utilised tools 
make the realisation of EWSs documentation possible. 
5.7.8 Results can be used to identify whether a failure/error/condition 
represents an EWS 
Any form of scenarios between an elaborated form of scenarios typical for 
quantitative risk analysis (modelled with the help of ETA, FTA, and HRA) and a 
simplified form of scenarios typical for layer of protection analysis (modelled as an 
initiating event – consequence pair) is expected to be documented. 
Regardless of what form of scenarios are being used, the documentation of lessons 
learning is expected to contain, in addition to scenarios, the causes of causal 
events. Comparing a specific failure/error/condition with the recorded EWSs 
makes it possible to determine whether the failure/error/condition represents an 
EWS. 
5.7.9 Results can be used to prioritize EWSs 
If the list of identified EWSs is compared with prioritized process safety 
information for a given socio-technical system, it may serve as a simplified risk 
analysis of the relevant safety impact or accident near-miss potential of EWSs in 
other circumstances. As a result, the list of EWSs may be divided into two 
categories: (a) EWSs, which are important from risk perspective, and thus worth 
responding; and (b) EWSs not important and not worth responding. 
The stored results of risk analysis (critical scenarios) should be characterised in 
terms of fulfilment of safety functions. Relevant systems, components and/or 
failure modes or classes of EWS should be readymade within a database serving as 
a tool for simpler realisation of the task. 
Prioritisation of EWSs can be done analogously as determination of quantitative 
importances of components according to Vesely et al. (1981). Let us assume that 
prospective analysis of the process/system results in the list of incident scenarios 
si, where i = 1 to N. Let us assume that point estimates of frequency fi and of 
damage xi are determined for each scenario. Point estimates of scenario 
frequencies are determined with the use of point estimates of frequencies of 
causes of individual events in scenarios. Point estimate of risk of the 
process/system R can be determined as a sum of all products fi × xi for i =1, ..., N. 
Let us determine a modified point estimation of risk R(EWS) as a sum of products 
fi(EWS) × xi for i =1, ..., N, where frequencies fi(EWS) are determined with the use 
of point estimate of frequency of EWS = 0/year. Priority of cause EWS is p(EWS) = 
R - R(EWS). The higher the priority, the greater the risk reduction can be achieved 
by suppressing the occurrence of the EWS. 
5.7.10 Resulting EWSs may have many of required attributes 
Kate may require an ambitious investigation purpose of providing lessons learned. 
For example, it was suggested in Part 5.5.9 that she may intend to investigate 
accidents in all the kitchens of all Williams living throughout the UK, to improve 
their safety during cooking. 
In such a case, she needs corresponding software tools, such as Risk Spectrum 
mentioned in Part 5.7.7, which includes both graphical editors to facilitate 
investigations and databases to facilitate documentation. With such a powerful 
tool, it can be expected that resulting EWSs will have many of attributes required 
in Parts 5.5.9 and 5.5.10. 
At this moment, it can be supposed that Investigation attributes 1-3 are easily 
present and attributes 4-6 can be present. Similarly, Documentation attributes 1-
7 can be present. 
5.8 Conclusions 
This presents scenarios as an extremely useful tool that may support foresight in 
safety. The concept of scenario is understood here as general as possible.  
Both prospective scenarios, mainly derived from risk analyses, and retrospective 
scenarios, mainly derived from undesirable event investigations, are usable for 
foresight.  
There are no restrictions on how the scenarios are presented. All methods are 
available, from the simplest pairs of initiating event - consequence to relatively 
complex bow-tie diagrams. 
The chapter introduces the concept of casual events, representing a 'skeleton' of 
a scenario, no matter the type and form of the scenario. Casual events enable 
visibility of early warning signs, which is a condition for foresight in safety. The path 
to the determination of EWSs leads through the determination of causal events. 
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The examples presented in the chapter show: 
(i) Scenarios as an investigation component of lessons learning help the 
determination of sets of EWSs that should be searched and tracked for during the 
analyses, and  
(ii) Scenarios as a documentation component of lessons learning help the 
determination, whether a specific failure/error represents an EWS.  
5.9 Acknowledgements 
To our reviewer, Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano. 
5.10 References 
Accou, B. and Reniers, G. (2018). Analysing the depth of railway accident 
investigation reports on overspeeding incidents, using an innovation method 
called “SAFRAN”. In 55th ESReDA Seminar (Session 5), Bucharest, Romania, 
October 2018. 
Afonso, A., Garnett, K., Noteborn., H., and Maragkondakis, P. A. (2017). Emerging 
Risks in Food and Feed, the Importance of Foresight. In 53rd ESReDA Seminar, 
Ispra, Italy, November 2017. 
Aven, T. (2008). Risk Analysis. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, England. ISBN: 978-
0-470-51736-9, 194 pages. 
Benner, L. (1975). Accident Investigations: Multilinear Events Sequencing Methods 
(modified by Epilogue added), accessible from ludwigBenner.org, accessed on 
March 27th, 2018, original article Journal of Safety Research, June 1975, Vol. 7, 
No. 2. 
Benner, L. and Carey, W. D. (2009). Lessons Learning System Attributes: An 
Analysis. In 36th ESReDA Seminar, Coimbra, Portugal, June 2009. 
Blanco, R. F. (2014) Understanding Hazards, Consequences, LOPA, SILs, PFD, and 
RRFs as Related to Risk and Hazard Assessment. Process Safety Progress 33, 
208-216. 
CCPS (2000). Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, 2nd 
edition. American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, USA. ISBN: 0-
8169-0720-X, 754 pages. 
CCPS (2001). Layer of Protection Analysis – Simplified Process Risk Assessment. 
American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, USA. ISBN: 0-8169-0811-
7, 270 pages. 
CCPS (2003). Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents, Second 
Edition. American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, USA. ISBN: 0-
8169-0897-4, 452 pages. 
CCPS (2007). Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, 
New Jersey, USA. ISBN: 978-0-470-16569-0, 698 pages. 
CCPS (2008). AIChE Center for Chemical Process Safety. Guidelines for Hazard 
Evaluation Procedures, Third Edition. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, New Jersey, 
USA. ISBN: 978-0-471-97815-2, 542 pages. 
CCPS (2012). AIChE Center for Chemical Process Safety. Recognizing Catastrophic 
Incident Warning Signs in the Process Industries. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, 
New Jersey, USA. ISBN: 978-0-470-76774-0, 227 pages. 
Crowl, D.A. and Louvar, J.F. (2011). Chemical Process Safety, Fundamentals with 
Applications, 3rd edition. Pearson Education, Boston, MA, USA. ISBN: 978-0-13-
278283-8, 705 pages. 
Defence Science Board Task Force (2003), The Role and Status of DoD Red Teaming 
Activities, Defence Science Board Task Force, Washington, DC. 
ESReDA (2009). Guidelines for safety investigation of accidents. Technical report, 
ESReDA. Available from 
http://www.esreda.org/Portals/31/ESReDA_GLSIA_Final_June_2009_For_Do
wnload.pdf  
Ferjencik, M. and Dechy, N. (2016). Three accidents in European dynamite 
production plants: An attempt to improve the external lessons learning. Journal 
of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 44, 12-23. 
Ferjencik, M. (2014) IPICA_Lite—Improvements to root cause analysis. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety 131, 1–13.  
        Page 122 of 252 
Ferjencik, M. (2017). Roles of Incident Scenarios in Foresight. In 53rd ESReDA 
Seminar, Ispra, Italy, November 2017. 
Hatch, D., McCulloch, P. and Travers, I. (2019) Enhancing PHAs: The Power of 
Bowties. Chemical Engineering Progress, February 2019, 20-26. 
Hollnagel E. (2014). Safety-I and Safety-II. The Past and future of Safety 
Management. Ashgate Publishing Ltd., Surrey, England. ISBN: 978-1-4724-
2305-4, 187 pages. 
Johnson, C.W. (2003) Failure in safety-critical systems: a handbook of incident and 
accident reporting. Glasgow University Press, Glasgow, UK. ISBN: 0-85261-784-
4. 
Johnson, W.G. (1973) The Management Oversight & Risk Tree – MORT. SAN 821-
2, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Division of Operational Safety. Available 
from www.nri.eu.com. 
Kaplan, S. and Garrick, B.J. (1981). On the Quantitative Definition of Risk. Risk 
Analysis 1, 11-27. 
Kaplan, S., Haimes, Y. Y. and Garrick, B. J. (2001) Fitting Hierarchical Holographic 
Modeling into the Theory of Scenario Structuring and a Resulting Refinement 
to the Quantitative Definition of Risk. Risk Analysis 21, 807-819.  
Kaplan, S., Visnepolschi, S., Zlotin, B., Zusman, A. (1999). New Tools for Failure and 
Risk Analysis. Anticipatory Failure Determination (AFD) and the Theory of 
Scenario Structuring. Detroit: Ideation International Inc. 
Leveson, N. (2004) A new accident model for engineering safer systems. Safety 
Science 42, 237–70.  
Marshall, V. and Ruhemann, S. (2001) Fundamentals of Process Safety. Institution 
of Chemical Engineers, Rugby, UK. ISBN: 0-85295-431-X, 298 pages.  
Masys, A. J. (2012). Black swans to grey swans: revealing the uncertainty. Disaster 
Prevention and Management: An International Journal, 21(3), 320–335. doi: 
10.1108/09653561211234507 
Nicolescu, M. (2018) A freight train derailment analyses using Accident 
Investigation Board Norway method and Safety Management wheel tool. In 
55th ESReDA Seminar (Session 6), Bucharest, Romania, October 2018. 
Stoop, J. and Benner, L. (2015). What do STAMP-based analysts expect from safety 
investigations? Procedia Engineering 128 (2015) 93-102. 
Strucic, M. (2017). Use of Event and Causal Factor Short Cart Reports to Assess and 
Simplify Accident Reports. In 53rd ESReDA Seminar, Ispra, Italy, November 
2017.  
Verschueren, F. (2018) Learning from organisational dysfunctionalities. In 55th 
ESReDA Seminar (Session 2), Bucharest, Romania, October 2018. 
Vesely, W.E., Goldberg, F.F., Roberts, N.H., and Haasl, D.F. (1981) Fault Tree 
Handbook NUREG-0492. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC, 
USA.  
Wincek, J. C. (2011). Basis of Safety: A Concise Communication Method for Critical 
Process Safety Information. Process Safety Progress 30, 315-318. 
Zio, E. (2007). An Introduction to the Basics of Reliability and Risk Analysis. World 
Scientific Publishing, Singapore. ISBN: 978-981-270-639-3, 222 pages. 
 
        Page 123 of 252 
6 Visibility of Early Warning Signs 
Miodrag Stručić, Joint Research Centre, European Commission, The Netherlands 
6.1 Executive summary 
Visualisation of early warning signs is critical for clear understanding of existing 
weaknesses’ roots and to define effective actions to prevent their escalation. The 
process of visualisation is described by use of fictional devices and features to 
emphasize the importance of different phases in the process.  
In the first phase of the visualisation process, "detectors" are used for detection of 
warning signs - "signals". Their "output" is further “modulated” through reporting 
systems to provide a robust repository of important facts, but also attributes about 
issues, as well as to increase awareness in our socio-technological Organisation. 
These signals are then "amplified" to an appropriate level of visibility, by which we 
are able to fully understand vulnerabilities of the Organisation. These insights, 
combined with the knowledge and experience of operations and design, provide 
necessary ingredients for smart decisions in fighting potential threats. 
6.2 Introduction 
Warning Signs, like the signs defined by road traffic regulations, provide 
information about immediate, delayed or potential danger. In every case they 
should be treated as Early Warning Signs (EWS), and every warning sign, if 
processed in the right way, will eliminate the possibility of its escalation. This is 
true even if an immediate event occurs – registered and processed through an 
efficient Operational Experience Feedback system can help affected stakeholders 
and those responsible for similar Organisations to prevent similar events. 
There are many Early Warning Signs (ESW) that can be detected and adequately 
treated before they transform into a bigger problem. Some EWS however are too 
weak to be recognised as a threat to safety, but are still detectable. Once detected, 
those signs-signals should be “modulated” and "amplified" to an appropriate 
visibility level that can be justified as a treat by stakeholders. When signals are 
visualized and presented as a real threat, they can be efficiently treated to prevent 
further development into new incident or accident.   
The main objective of this chapter is to define or give directions to define how to 
reveal or visualise EWS in socio-technological environment. Not only in-house, but 
also external and publicly available data, should be used to help in determination 
of EWS. Better understanding i.e. visualisation of this data can help Organisations 
that didn’t experience the same or similar incident to foresee safety hazards, 
assess the risk of its occurrence, and initiate adequate measures. 
It is not easy to quantify the contribution to safety processing of external 
experience, but due to similarities of hazardous industries in their safety concepts, 
the basic reasons for reported deviations should be examined with the same 
respect and effort as for their own.   
6.3 Detection 
Signals of decreased safety – Warning Signs in Hazardous Organisation - should be 
recognised and confirmed by any individual regardless of his/her organisational 
level (IAEA, 2018). Reporting these signals is of the highest importance for 
Organisation, not only because of immediate prevention of an undesirable event, 
but also to enable a system of multi-dimensional assessment whose main purpose 
is to improve the safety level of the Organisation i.e. reduce the probability of 
severe accidents. Detecting these signals is easier if they are obvious, but signals 
identified by "out of routine" practice could be very difficult to detect. 
However, information about deviation, no matter how it is detected (Stručić., 
2016), should activate the system which is able to "visualize" any warning signal.  
Good definition of EWS could improve their detection and treatment. For this 
purpose, it is equally important to define main detection modes and categorise 
them. To better understand detection modes it is necessary to distinguish different 
types of "detectors". 
6.3.1 Built-in / Surveillance Detector 
Most EWS are discovered by design. These include all forms of alarms and 
annunciators, as well as indicators and records required to monitor processes 
during all phases of operation. Also check/verification-lists predefined in written 
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form (audits, QC, operating procedures) present an efficient tool to detect warning 
signals.  
Good examples of built-in or Surveillance detectors are annunciators' panels in 
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Main Control Room (MCR). Even in the case that some 
"unimportant" signal is created in one of the less important locally controlled 
systems, the alarm from local panel will send a signal to the MCR and the Main 
Control Board alarm for local panel will go off. MCR operators usually ask the local 
operator for signal confirmation and react to this alarm in accordance with a well 
defined procedure. Process failures that often occur are treated instantly but they 
are also recorded in Log Books, Process Information System or reported through 
Corrective Action Program - CAP (IAEA, 2005).  
Furthermore, some non-wired detection processes, e.g. auditing, are strictly 
following a prepared plan and procedure so that all non-conformances are 
recorded and reported through a final report. The same is true of Quality Control 
inspections which are performed in accordance with strictly defined check-list 
items. In the case of a verification procedures (e.g. Line-up checks) performed by 
an operator, the response to a discovered deviation is similar to the response to 
an automatically detected deviation.  
Detection of these deviations usually brings immediate solutions and they are not 
followed by deeper investigations. These approaches produce large numbers of 
recorded items, but in our moment of Organisational and technological progress, 
it is still acceptable to leave most of them for later deeper assessments. In other 
words, there is still no available automated system18 to connect all detected items, 
compare them, use available “experience” and immediately process them in the 
best way for optimized and safe further operation. Although technological design 
experts are striving to build a system that can predict all deficiencies and warn 
operators or auto-correct them, would it be ever possible? Certainly it would never 
be possible using only built-in/surveillance detection as the abandoned IAEA ASSET 
program showed.19  
                                                                
18 Or Artificial Intelligence system 
19E.g. abandoned IAEA ASSET program for prevention of incidents and accidents where the main input 
was surveillance data which was not sufficient to foresee enough incidents to prove effective. 
6.3.2 Advanced systematic approach Detector 
There are also Early Warning Signs which could be detected by assessment tools 
(IAEA, 1997) - Focused Self-Assessments, Safety Assessments (Risk Analyses), Peer 
Reviews, Advanced Surveillance programs20, Performance Indicators programs, as 
well as Preventive and Predictive Maintenance. These tools enable discovery of 
the EWS in a systematic, predefined way, many times by teams with expertise and 
experience in specific areas. Although some of these approaches overlap with 
Built-in approaches, they enable discoveries of deviations thanks to performers' 
incisive and experienced approach, i.e. they give freedom to performers to 
examine a wider range of assessed items. 
The advantage of the team approach lies in the fact that experts, who are usually 
not part of the specific assessed process, reveal deviations using their experience, 
knowledge, skills and techniques, and many times seeing things with "different 
eyes". They can reveal hidden deviations not visible to staff doing routine work in 
their field. It could be e.g. human or organisational issue easily visible from team 
member chosen from management or non-related domain experts.  
Advanced surveillance programs, i.e. non-built-in detectors, give freedom to 
performer(s) to find unexpected inconsistencies or discover that faulty equipment 
or systems point to the deeper reason for a given anomaly. A typical example 
would be detecting a fault induced by ageing of a component21 which is, almost by 
default, applicable for all other items in the corresponding group or system. Thus, 
Operating Organisation will not just fix the problem, but also launch actions to 
assess the system and find optimal solutions.  
EWS discovered by one of these approaches is not always pointing to the main 
problem, therefore the assessments’ results should be analysed for deeper causes. 
E.g. Performance Indicator detects negative trend of "Number of Overdue Work 
Requests", but additional effort is needed to find deeper reasons for this trend.  
20 Various surveillance techniques and tools that are not originally installed in the Organisation. Those 
include e.g. advanced electronic diagnostic equipment components, new process data analysis 
programs etc.,   
21 Note that Ageing monitoring scope can overlap with Built-in detectors 
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As mentioned, these approaches can overlap with Built-in ones, but their results 
are less predictable. This also means that trends of number of detected issues can 
vary significantly over time. In the case of a decreasing trend, an Organisation may 
think that further use of one of these tools is unnecessary, but in fact it is just the 
opposite – the declining trend should stimulate the Organisation to improve their 
detection program (explained more in Trends in detection of deviations 
subchapter – 6.3.5). 
6.3.3 Analysis of Operational Experience and Technological-Organisational-
Human performance Detector 
A hidden EWS could be detected by revealing latent weaknesses using Causal 
analysis of internal and other industry's events. Good examples can be found 
conducting Root Cause Analyses which compile event investigation results. 
Thorough investigation followed by systematic definition of causes reveals 
warning signals which contributed to the evolution of an analysed event. E.g. 
Figure 1. Event and Causal Factor Short Chart – Loss of Cooling event 
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factors connected with Personal Work Practice could reveal that Lack of Peer 
Check in Critical Task is one EWS. 
There are many approaches, techniques and tools used in analysing events 
(Ziedelis and Noel, 2011) or Near misses (subchapter 6.4.1), but one technique 
often used for events in NPPs is Event and Causal Factor Charting (E&CFC). An 
important advantage of this charting technique is that visual presentation of 
analysis transparently shows the causes of an event that can then be easily used 
to define adequate action plans. This advantage could be used also for the purpose 
of presenting events after the analysis is performed. In two examples (fig 1. - 4.) of 
not-so-significant events in NPPs some not very transparent issues are highlighted 
(Strucic, 2017).  
Example in Fig 1. presents an event in one NPP that had no adverse safety 
consequences but its Root Cause Analysis revealed some potential causes which 
the affected plant then eliminated by adequate actions to prevent a more serious 
event. What is not explained in the analysed report, is how one of the revealed 
problems was treated in the past. In this concrete case, non-use of operating 
experience or ineffective corrective actions are typical possible causes of repeated 
problems. It is visible in the highlighted part in Fig. 2. 
The second example in fig 3. shows hidden Human and Organisational Factor (HOF) 
problems not revealed in the published report and most likely not in the original 
one either. While the Organisation could be satisfied that the revealed cause 
points to deficiency in the specific software, behind this cause there are possible 
warning signals of deficiencies in HOF domain which could create more serious 
problems. It is visible in the highlighted part in Fig. 4. 
These examples show how to reveal additional or hidden warning signals which 
could be ignored or missed in routine Condition/Deviation report processing. This 
approach can be used by any similar Organisation interested in safety 
improvement of their own installations. The Operating Organisation where the 
event occurred can benefit the most, but all other similar Organisations can also 
find it useful.  
Figure 2. Event and Causal Factor Short Chart – Loss of Cooling event highlight 
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It should be mentioned that short E&CFC diagrams (fig. 1-4) can quickly give to 
external operating Organisation the essential information needed for fast 
qualitative risk assessment of a potential similar problem (Strucic, 2017). Evolution 
of event is presented in the Primary event line – in the upper horizontal row. An 
experienced and knowledgeable stakeholder can find out if the event is applicable 
to his/her Organisation and what is the potential hazard. The mechanism of each 
defined deviation (red rhomb) genesis is explained in below connected boxes by 
the most appropriate answers to how and why questions.  
Figure 3. Event and Causal Factor Short Chart – Steam Line Failure event 
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Understanding causality of deviations gives the stakeholder an idea of vulnerability 
of the operating Organisation under his/her responsibility. Knowing potential 
hazard and how vulnerable the Organisation is to similar or same deviation 
provides stakeholder the rough estimation of their own risk. Therefore, 
stakeholders can easily decide if action for changes or further self-assessment in 
the Organisation is needed. 
6.3.4 Detection by "chance” 
Many times, the problems, especially of human or Organisational nature, are 
discovered during activities different than ones described in previous subsections. 
Those could be just a "side product" of activity like meetings, trainings, work-
related trips or even some activities outside the regular working hours or 
Organisation premises.  
Also “Equipment related” deficiencies can be detected by “chance”. As a concrete 
example, when one NPP unit experienced an unplanned Reactor Shutdown and 
activated some systems important to safety (IAEA, 2015), two major systems faults 
were discovered. Fortunately, the safety system activation wasn’t required and 
these deficiencies didn’t result in unsafe conditions. This case clearly showed that 
surveillances, tests or any other defined assessment approach could not detect 
these problems. A good lesson from this event teaches operating Organisations to 
thoroughly examine all their major unplanned transients and find deficiencies that 
couldn’t be found by regular established processes. 
Since reporting requirements are not able to address items detected by “chance”, 
they may not be processed and easily can be forgotten. However, deviations found 
"by chance" could be of high importance since other systematic and well-defined 
processes didn’t detect them and probably won't. Therefore, Organisations should 
increase their awareness of all minor, hidden or accidentally found warning signals 
and encourage employees to report them too. 
6.3.5 Trends in detection of deviations 
In any discussion of detectors, it is important to mention the possibility of trending 
detection modes. The Topical study of Nuclear Power Plants design deficiency 
(Stručić, 2016) reviewed the worldwide operating experience from NPP events 
where design deficiencies are addressed. One of the outcomes, the trend graph, 
has been created during this study (Figure 5.).  
The Detection Mode trend graph, based on information provided in IAEA 
International Reporting System (IRS) (IAEA, March 2020, https://nucleus.iaea.org), 
shows that the number of events with actual consequences is increasing over time, 
which suggests both that other detection approaches should be employed and 
existing detection should be improved. A sudden drop in the number of events 
that are detected by surveillance and reviews may be an indication of obsolete or 
inadequate deficiency detection methods. 
Figure 4. Event and Causal Factor Short Chart – Steam Line Failure event 
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Fig 5. Trend graph of detection modes of design deficiency in IRS 
The graph of detection mode trends could indicate if the main tools for detection 
of deviations are becoming inefficient. If there is no appropriate recording and 
coding/categorisation of events in operating Organisations, it could be difficult to 
create trend graph, otherwise this could be used as one Performance Indicator as 
well. 
6.4 Reporting system 
The simple concept of Problem-Screening-Analysing is a natural approach for 
handling any problem. Hence, it can be very practical to use Corrective Action 
Program (IAEA, 2005) concept for any kind of problem (IAEA, 2012).  
It worthwhile to note the definition of USA Nuclear Regulatory Commission - CAP 
is the system by which a utility finds and fixes problems at the nuclear plant. It 
includes a process for evaluating the safety significance of the problems, setting 
priorities in correcting the problems, and tracking them until they have been 
corrected (USA Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 2020, 
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/corrective-action-
program.html). 
6.4.1 Deviation Report 
Whatever the source or detection mode of EWS is, the first step in any CAP process 
is to record the detected deficiency (acquisition phase in fig. 6) through a 
Condition/Deviation Report Form. Practically, the whole process of visualisation is 
useless without input – acquired anomalies, errors, mistakes, discrepancies, 
wrongdoings, or simply, any deviation or problem. Operating Organisations should 
promote a Reporting Culture (Reason, 1998) and encourage all employees to 
report all noticed deviations and potential problems.  
Furthermore, there are many definitions of Near Misses but are they really 
necessary? "Things are never so bad they can't be made worse", a favourite 
Humphrey Bogart quote (Brainyquote.com, March 2020, 
https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/humphrey_bogart_108860) is relevant – it 
reminds us that all events, major or minor, need only some small effort of evil or 
bad luck to become worse. By this interpretation all events can be considered as 
Near Misses. And, needless to say, any event labelled Near Miss can easily 
propagate under some realistic circumstances to become a disaster. Thus, all 
undesirable events, regardless of the consequences, should be reported and 
analysed.  
Organisations should be aware and avoid traps of non-reporting. The first notice 
or record of any deficiency or irregularity is the crucial step which is easily missed, 
e.g. because the person who discovers it cannot foresee all possible consequences, 
interactions or users of reported/recorded information, and doesn’t consider it 
important to report through the official reporting system.   
The reporting system should be easily accessible and user friendly for all 
employees, regardless of their position or duty. The reporting form should include 
questions about: 
• What happened? 
• Time, location and involved subject(s); and 
• Author – This is important for evaluators to know whom to ask for 
possible additional question. But it must be emphasised that anonymous 
reporting should be encouraged as well and always be an option; 
The author should be encouraged to include all information necessary for further 
processing (equipment number, coordinates, time of discovery, procedure used, 
circumstances, misbehaviour, outcome, proposed action etc.). Reporting 
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application could ease this input with predefined lists of equipment or persons, as 
well as other relevant categories. 
Once the record is created, screening of the deficiency should be performed as 
soon as possible.  
6.4.2 Screening and categorisation 
When the first key step is done, i.e. the deviation is registered in the Reporting 
System, the responsible personnel should take care of further processing of the 
report as soon as feasible. Besides technological classification (equipment 
numbers, mode of operation, failure mechanism…), additional categories should 
be entered: If there is an urgency to react; what corrective measures are taken; 
what could be possible consequences; what is a safety significance level; which 
department and person is responsible; dissemination list etc. - information 
necessary to effectively fix the problem, transfer lessons and experience, and 
provide basis for possible deeper evaluation. 
This phase is partially automated, and may be further automated in future, but 
human involvement is indispensable. Having a good knowledge of design, 
operation and Organisation increases the accuracy of categorisation and enables 
more efficient further processing. A broad understanding of possible data used by 
different stakeholders or by other programs in the Organisation is one of the 
benefits of having experienced and knowledgeable screeners.  
A good example of an efficient screening process highlights two levels of screening 
phase. All reported deviations from previous day are discussed at morning 
multidisciplinary Screening Committee meeting where decisions are made how to 
treat the reported issues and who will be responsible for further actions. It is 
usually organised immediately after Operations’ meeting where often first-hand 
information about safety and technical issues are given. In parallel, the 
Independent Safety Engineering Group is taking care of coding, administration and 
coordination of all CAP items. This experienced staff is further involved in analyses 
and trending of events, which is a highly important part of whole CAP process 
(Bach, 2007).   
                                                                
22 Note that “Modulation” of signal in this metaphorical model is mainly used in sense of transforming 
EWS to the factual “signals” – Cause or Probable Cause’s Effect – input to “Amplifier” module (6.5.1). 
6.5 Visualisation 
As explained in the previous sub-chapter, the destiny of each item in the CAP 
depends, in the first place, on screening. Typically, after screening of the 
Deviation/Condition Report, Apparent Cause Analysis is performed, tasks are sent 
to responsible persons and information is disseminated. Very few of events are 
immediately investigated and more deeply analysed by Root Cause Analysis. 
Whatever method or tool is used, it is important that the deviation's causes are 












Fig 6. Simplified diagram of whole process from signal detection to action 
All deviations present Warning Signals of unsafe or unreliable operation. 
Obviously, causes are not all deeply investigated for all reported deviations and, 
accordingly, there are also many Hidden Warning Signs which look "invisible", but 
still, all of them are producing Weak Signals that can be captured, modulated22, 
amplified and treated (Fig 6). Fortunately, all conditions are kept in a Reporting 
System database and could be assessed any time and analysed by some additional 
assessment processes.  
Typically, Common Cause and Trend analyses (IAEA, 2012) use CAP database for 
later identification and assessment of latent deviations. Furthermore, there are 
other processes like Focused Self Assessments (Stručić et al., 2006) or Peer Reviews 
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that always look in CAP for analysis inputs. Correctly performed, all these 
assessment tools would reveal hidden signals and find solutions for each. Together 
with use of Root Cause Analysis tools, they should bring to light all Warning Signals 
and their causes that can be efficiently treated to prevent recurrence of events or 
occurrence of similar events, and their escalation into accident. 
Therefore, Weak or Hidden Warning Signals can be and should be visualized to the 
level where effective corrective actions can be easily defined and implemented. 
6.5.1 Amplification 
Corrective Action Program (IAEA, 2005) or any other similar approach that requires 
further processing of internally reported deviations, events and Near Misses is 
intended to correct their causes. Depending on the Organisation's policy and 
procedures, screening process usually results in Direct Action, request for 
Apparent or Root Cause analysis, or just report closure without corrective actions. 
Whatever is the outcome of screening, it is necessary to optimise resources and 
ensure that all information is preserved for later use. Fear of “feeding the beast” 
with a large amount of reported items should be alleviated through policy, to 
support a strong reporting culture. In the case that the reported item is not 
immediately fully processed, i.e. the report is closed, it can be managed in another 
self-assessment process such as Performance Indicators program or Common 
Cause analysis to assess the causes of reported deviations. 
In any case, each revealed "Cause", which produced, contributed or might produce 
an undesirable Effect, is a Warning Signal too. The same "Cause" could be also the 
Weak or Hidden Warning Signal of deeper problem inside the Organisation. 
Therefore, it should be amplified to become widely visible and manageable. 
Figure 7 presents the process of amplification of this deficiency signal, i.e. cause. 
Each signal (cause) should be tested for necessity of deeper investigation. That is 
usually true for direct causes, which if corrected will not necessarily prevent 
reoccurrence of the event or creation of a bigger accident (Ziedelis and Noel, 
2011). Thus, it would be necessary to investigate it and find deeper cause, i.e. to 
find why this cause existed. This cause, in this metaphorical model, is processed as 
effect of deeper cause. Note that C/E (Cause/Effect) converter is used for this 
transformation. 
Hence, a “signal” is “amplified” through the “Amplifier” module, i.e.  investigated 
one level deeper to define the immediate cause of this effect. The new cause is 
tested if it is deep enough and manageable by Organisation (Roed–Larsen et al. 
2005). If not, it should be investigated further.  After some iteration, Deepest 
Manageable Cause is defined as final output of the Amplifier Module. This process 
reveals “invisible and unknown” facts, which are basically unrecorded deviations 
of the Organisation. Note that this iteration process can go in many directions: 
from finding specific cause that could be eliminated with surgical precision, to 


















AMPLIFIERMODULATOR ACTION  
Figure 7, Amplification of Weak or Hidden Warning Signals 
In addition to different types of "Causes", such as Root Cause, Direct Cause, 
Apparent Cause or Contributing Cause, it is important to recognise the Probable 
Cause too (fig 2 and 4). Many times, guided by Cause Analysis procedure, and 
requested by authority or required by legal requirements, some Facts are not 
required to be deeper examined although they are indicating existence of other 
important causes. Although not investigated yet, it can be assumed by our best 
judgement why these Facts exist. Since these causes are not proved, we can call 
them Probable Causes (Stručić, 2017). In figure 7, a Fact generated by a Possible 
Cause is presented as an Effect. Needless to say this Effect is a Warning Signal too. 
It is also important to note that the module, which processes other causes, 
processes Probable Cause too, but since it is just assumed, one step back is needed 
to extract its Effect and process it through an “Amplifier”.  
6.5.2 Elements of Amplifier 
The purpose of good event analysis is to prevent recurrence of event i.e. to find 
the proper cause and enable its elimination. Therefore, the question “Deepest 
Manageable Cause?” is used in subchapter 6.5.1 to emphasise the main 
characteristic of the hunted cause - it examines the cause and compares the 
implied action based on that cause to the ability of the Organisation to efficiently 
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implement that specific action. If this action is too demanding: e.g. exceeding the 
Organisation's resources; cannot be arranged due to external subject's 
unavailability or just missing external approval, then the corresponding cause 
should be further examined. Furthermore, the same should be done to "Shallow" 
causes which produce work requests usually "just to fix the problem" (Ziedelis 
2014). 
To examine or re-examine cause, the other fictional element "Cause/Effect 
converter" (C/E) is used to transform cause into effect. Since every cause is an 
effect of another deeper cause, investigating a "new" effect should result in a new 
finding which represents the deeper cause of an examined deviation. Deeper cause 
emphasizes the nature of the weaker cause and should easily prescribe appropriate 
action. If not, the process of "amplification" has to be repeated. 
For Effect's Cause determination, it is essential to determine why the effect 
occurred which is done by use of different RCA tools (Ziedelis and Noel 2011). To 
simplify the approach, 5-Why's RCA tool could be used as good example.  Thus, 
Effect's Cause element provides answer to question "what is the cause of this 
effect?" i.e. "Why does this effect exist?".  In this illustration, the Amplifications 
Module should be used five times to get the positive passage through “Deepest 
Manageable Cause?” element.   
Some critics emphasize the weakness of 5-Why's tool mainly because one "Why's" 
wrong answer could mislead investigator.  To avoid this trap, one can use the Five-
by-Five tool principle (Bill-Willson Net, March 2019, www.bill-willson.net/b73) in 
which five questions are defined to help in defining the right answer to each Why: 
• What is the proof that this cause exists? 
• What is the proof that this cause led to the stated effect? 
• What is the proof that this cause actually contributed to the analysed 
problem? 
• Is anything else needed for the stated effect to occur? 
• Can anything else lead to the stated effect? 
The other trap is that one effect could have more causes. Thus, they should be 
considered too. This would add parallel amplification loops and amplify additional 
hidden deficiency signals of Organisation. 
6.5.3 Actions 
In plain language the results of Condition/Deviation Report assessments are well 
defined causes of registered deviations and adverse conditions. They present 
vulnerabilities of the assessed Organisation and should be eliminated.  
Regardless of deepness of retrieved causes, they should be well defined. This 
means that they should provide important information necessary to define 
effective corrective actions. If they are properly defined, definition of actions 
should be unambiguous.  
E.g. production process in one NPP was stopped for some days because of failure 
of one safety control electronic circuit board. Further investigation found that one 
electrolytic capacitor failed because of aging. Extended/deeper investigation 
revealed that this model of circuit board is used in several other applications and 
that the manufacturer discontinued production, so it was no longer possible to 
replace the electronic control circuit boards, but this was not the case for the 
capacitor. Thus, an action plan was made to replace the same model capacitors in 
all circuit boards. 
Actions defined this way should be reasonable and achievable on time, i.e. 
manageable by the Organisation. Some operating Organisations set requirements 
for corrective actions that have to be respected in a more popular way. E.g. in 
Organisations that use SMART approach (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, 
Relevant, Timely), typically the Corrective Action Program process enables the 
launch of corrective action when confirmation of all these requirements are 
achieved. Since it based on a defined problem’s cause, it is obvious that the cause 
has to be well defined.  
Furthermore, the Organisation should be motivated to perform even deeper 
investigation, even though this can bring Organisation to situation where it is 
unable to perform corrective action because it could be beyond the power of the 
Organisation or because of lack of resources (Roed–Larsen et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, knowing more about the background of the problem could be an 
asset in Foresight in Safety. E.g. after defining actions to replace all affected 
capacitors in the safety electronic boards (because of ageing and inability of 
manufacturer to re-produce the same type of electronic board), extended 
investigation might reveal that the manufacturer is experiencing a survival risk due 
to a superior competitor. This might be important information for the Organisation 
because of difficult troubleshooting of possible other equipment failures with 
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equipment produced by the same manufacturer. Thus, this information is not 
crucial for immediate action plan, but might be critically important to possible 
future decisions and negotiations outside the Organisation.     
6.6 Conclusion 
To truly understand the problems in our operating Organisation, they should be 
visualised to the level of plain clearness. Tools and processes explained in this 
chapter can help to understand those problems deeply enough and enable 
visualisation of their weak and faulted roots. Only in this state of understanding, 
are we able to obtain good qualitative insight of our vulnerabilities. With the 
knowledge and experience of design and operations we will then get all necessary 
elements for smart decisions in fighting discovered weaknesses.  
This chapter tried to explain how registered anomalies in operating Organisation 
should be processed to reveal deeper causes i.e. to visualise warning signals and 
provide a clear basis for definition of a corrective action plan. The four phases of 
visualisation process consist of Detection, Acquisition, Modulation and 
Amplification of warning signals. Naturally, output of this process becomes an 
input for determination and implementation of corrective actions process – 
typically called Corrective Action Program.   
The presented work mechanism of fictional electronic device illustrates main 
elements of an efficient EWS treatment process in an operating Organisation. This 
can be developed in more details by adding additional electronic elements e.g. 
“Noise filter” or “Screener discriminator” etc.  But the intention of this chapter is, 
at the first place, to give operating Organisations interested in continuous safety 
improvement an idea about an alternative approach in fighting the problems. 
In the context of Foresight in Safety, revealing weak and hidden signals of 
decreased safety enables stakeholders to foresee potential safety consequences 
and initiate timely actions. Thus, visualisation of hidden and weak signals has an 
important role in predicting possible incidents and accidents. Nevertheless, deeper 
investigation of causes than needed for efficient action plan definition, can bring 
additional information to decision makers and enable them to use this extra 
knowledge in future decisions and negotiations.  
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7.1 Executive summary 
The ESReDA Cube model was developed by the ESReDA Project Group on Dynamic 
Learning and published in 2015. In this chapter we propose that the Cube model 
may be utilized to identify early warning signs of the system functioning, and 
solutions to improve the safety performance of the system in which the failures 
occur.  
The purpose of this chapter is not to have foresight results, but to show how the 
Cube can be utilized to identify foresight potential. Applying the Cube makes it 
possible to explore links between otherwise isolated solutions, causal aspects and 
contributing factors. Here we are interested in the context, operating conditions 
and system states in which such factors, actors and aspects can serve as early 
warning signs. In doing so, we can use the Cube as a proactive, analytic tool to 
identify early signals of system safety performance during design regarding 
assumptions, simplifications and modelling, including or excluding specific safety 
aspects. Moreover, we can identify suppressed safety signals that get lost in daily 
operations, traded-off against economy, environment, lead time and production 
stress.  
By such a coherent scan of all system dimensions, in practice the mapping will give 
us insight by e.g. helping to identify early warning signs and safety management 
system components that need to be followed in a systematic way in order to gain 
foresight and avoid future accidents and other undesirable events. Yet, it is not 
only the goal, it is the road towards it: The Cube model should not be looked at as 
merely a mapping of all the elements involved. In addition, the mapping of the 
elements generates a process that aims to provoke discussion of aspects (incl. 
insight, and foresight potential) that might otherwise be ignored or get lost in the 
shuffle. The ‘rote faden’ of our chapter is to structure the search for order in the 
complexity chaos, discriminating between safety interventions in either the event 
or the system, while accumulating understanding of the coherence and dynamics 
of what is going on. 
7.2 Introduction 
The ESReDA Cube is a model developed by the ESReDA Project Group on Dynamic 
Learning during 2010-2015 and published in 2015. Originally, the Cube model was 
developed to give structure to the various descriptions of what a ‘system’ could 
look like in accident investigations. Throughout the debates in the project group, 
several additional options for application became feasible regarding foresight and 
early warning signs. Modelling the system behind accidents could better identify 
successes and failures behind occurred accidents, identifying learning agents and 
change agents at various system levels. This resulted in a Cube 2.0 version. 
The ESReDA Cube has been published on the ESReDA website where it is freely 
available (ESReDA 2015). As named, it is a cube, a three-dimensional model which 
can be used as a tool to demonstrate and communicate feasible, credible and 
plausible system changes and adaptations. The Cube is illustrated in Figures 1a and 
1b, and in more detail in Figure 2. The three dimensions represent viewpoints to 
change potential and learning: 1) stakeholder affected: the organizational levels 
where learning occurs, 2) work organization: the constituent parts of operational 
environment where the learning is executed and 3) degree of renewal: an 
assessment of the impact such learning may have on the system’s safety 
performance. The cross-sections of these viewpoints create 3x3x3 “building 
blocks” of learning and change, expressed as elements that can be utilized as a 
systematic way to create new understanding and solutions. The Cube is chosen to 
visualize issues of a complex nature, in analogy with the Rubik Cube. Careful 
manipulation of the ‘building blocks’ should demonstrate the ability to produce 
the primary system dimensions in a logical and formal manner in an apparently 
chaotic environment.  
The Cube 2.0 version does not add another communication metaphor to existing 
ones, such as the Swiss Cheese, Domino Stones and Iceberg. The Cube aims at 
structuring the collected investigation information, interpretation of findings and 
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potential for change in terms of system dimensions, contributing variables, actors 
and actions. The Cube has two functions: first it helps the analyst to identify the 
position of learning agents, and second, it identifies change agents and change 
drivers in a complex modern socio-technical system. By combining the two 
functions, a relation is established between the problem definition (what went 
wrong) and solution diagnosis (what can be done about this). These activities may 
intervene in the event as well as the system. Since it is not likely that – due to a 
variety of non-linear relations between multiple contributing factors- the problem 
definition and solution diagnosis are to be found in the same cell of the Cube, 
interrelations between cells are identified. Consequently, the Cube may picture 
the complexity and dynamics of modern socio-technical systems. The actual 
accident scenario under scrutiny is considered the sequence of events, vectoring 
its path through the Cube by linking cells.  
 
 
Figure 1a. The ESReDA Cube 2.0. A model with three dimensions and 27 individual cells that 
represent different possibilities to improve safety. 
Figure 1b. The Cube may be sliced into planes. If sliced into horizontal planes, each plane 
represents a different organizational or societal level where safety may be 
improved. Slicing vertically (different aspects of work organization) or in-depth 
(levels of learning) is also possible, depending on the objectives of the analysis. 
We can discriminate between the questions: WHAT to change (aspects, factors), 
WHO is changing (actors, agents) and WHERE to change the system 
(components, configurations, concepts) 
The Cube is supported by a Template (see ESReDA 2015) that serves as a user 
guideline for categorizing and ranking of contributing factors, actors and aspects 
into the Cube. While the Template provides an assessment of the results of the 
analysis phase of the investigations, the Cube provides a communication tool for 
further learning and needs for change. 
Since the publication of the Cube it has been tested by both members of the 
ESReDA project group and external researchers. These analyses have led to 
knowledge that the Cube may be used in several ways that are beyond its original 
purpose, and to the further development of the Cube. Therefore, the Cube 2.0 




Figure 2. The “building blocks” of Cube 2.0. 
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The Cube 2.0 version differs from the original ESReDA Cube most notably by 
dealing with the former fourth operational aspect “context” separate of the Cube, 
for two reasons. First, the context adds case specific short-term operational 
conditions (such as deteriorating weather conditions, occupational stressors or 
aggravated system states) which may pull the event outside the intended and 
normal operating envelope. Second, it puts the event in a long-term historical 
development which may deviate from intended performance by design and 
foreseen operations. In short, the description of the event in the first phase is a 
specific representation of the occurrence. This occurrence may deviate from the 
designed and intended performance of the system under normal conditions in its 
intended operating envelope. The difference between ‘as is’ versus ‘as ought to 
be’ may provide transparency to what actually happened and requires further 
investigation into why this difference occurred. 
Safety experts are hereby invited to test the Cube and the ESReDA project group 
is highly interested in feedback from various industrial domains, scientific 
disciplines and actors with different expertise and backgrounds. 
7.3 Application of the Cube in the investigative process 
Generally, the investigative procedures can be divided into three phases, each with 
a specific function. The aim of the first phase is accident reconstruction, the aim of 
the second phase is the analysis and interpretation of system deficiencies leading 
to the accident, while the third phase aims at adaptive intervention in the system 
itself. The investigation itself is an iterative process. In the investigation, and in 
exploring the usefulness of the Cube, we rely on the tools and techniques that are 
readily available from investigation practices across various sectors and domains.  
Most prominent are: 
• Timeline reconstruction of each potential contributing event 
• Preservation of volatile data by digital information storage and analysis 
• Interview techniques, covering actors, witnesses and bystanders 
• Document analysis, such as maintenance and operational logs 
• Historical surveys of past performance, accident reports and safety audits 
• Inventory and repositories of already published recommendations. 
 
A completely new domain to be explored is the use of Big Data analysis techniques 
to identify patterns and trends in data that has been collected for other reasons, 
but that can be useful to create a more complete picture of the system under 
scrutiny.  
Timeline reconstruction is essential since we want to elaborate on the dynamics of 
complex systems. This is what is asked for in classical investigative questions: 
“What happened?” and “When?” However, it is even more useful for the 
investigation of accident when the above-mentioned techniques help reach the 
reconstruction of the accident scenario. In an ideal case, such a scenario describes 
the accident as a (possibly branched) sequence of events occurring under certain 
circumstances.  
The second phase of the investigation is to determine the causal factors behind 
the accident. Here the Cube may be utilized to identify causes systematically and 
thus achieve a more complete overview of the ‘big picture’. 
In the third phase of the investigation process, the function of adaptation and 
change is dominant in phrasing: What can be done to prevent similar occurrences. 
The Cube serves as a repository of already existing solutions and provides a 
learning potential for change, varying from optimization and adaptation to 
innovation. The focus can be on the event, the system or both, depending on the 
scope and goals of the investigation.  
From the system perspective, it is ideal to apply the Cube to the learnings and 
recommendations of each causal factor. Because it clarifies interrelations between 
factors, components, decisions and intentions, dynamic behaviour can be made 
more transparent. Consequently, multiple applications of the Cube are necessary. 
The number of applications is equal to the number of causal factors that make up 
the accident. Results of individual applications of the Cube can be surprisingly 
variable not only because the causal factors are different, but also because the 
application of the Cube reflects that causal factors i.e. deficiencies in the system's 
functioning may occur in the different processes implemented within the system. 
7.4 Foresight potential of the ESReDA Cube 
In order to have foresight potential, it is essential that foresight potential elements 
can be identified. Every event (accident, incident or near miss) is the end-product 
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of a breakdown of the design or operations of a system. Such breakdown can be 
traced back to certification, its safety management system (SMS) or governmental 
oversight. SMS elements could be of the following nature: 
• human-related behavior and procedures 
• organisational-related behavior and procedures 
• system component (equipment) condition 
• environment conditions, etc. 
 
The challenge to obtain foresight is to be able to select key SMS elements that 
would be ideal candidates to be potential foresight elements that could be 
monitored and evaluated on a continuous basis. 
Additionally, it is essential to stress the importance of multi-stakeholder 
involvement in the process to obtain foresight potential elements: operators, line 
managers and senior managers are key actors in the process. At the operational 
level, operators’ knowledge is essential because they are the ones doing the work. 
They will better understand which behaviors and work routines failed and 
succeeded. They know their designated system and they would be able to identify 
where improvement could be made, and which could be candidate foresight 
potential elements. To complement this, the knowledge of the overall 
management perspective is very important because floor workers are limited in 
what they are able to see at the organisational level. They may detect the cause of 
the organisational stress that led to the event but will be limited in identifying the 
foresight potential elements at the organisational level. Thus, managers and 
operators need to be together on this fact-finding journey to be able to design a 
foresight program and a foresight seeking system ad hoc to the SMS of their 
organization. They should also be together in the design of the audits and 
corrective actions (e.g. new procedures) related to the foresight potential 
elements. 
Examples of foresight potential elements that could be regularly monitored and 
audited by both operators and managers are: 
• workflow systematism 
• equipment abuse/misuse 
• deviation in work procedures 
• behavioral trends 
• production pressures 
• etc. 
 
This chapter describes five application types of the ESReDA Cube. The objective 
was to verify whether some foresight notions could be obtained for each use case. 
Each application type is also accompanied by at least one example and discussion 
on the application’s potential to identify early warning signs and foresight 
potential. Figure 3 below portrays, for each application type, when the ESReDA 
Cube analysis has been carried out. 
 
 
Figure 3. Temporal position of the ESReDA Cube analysis. 
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7.5 Application 1: Single case analysis 
Single case analysis. The original purpose of the development of the ESReDA Cube 
was the need to construct a model that would help analyse all the pieces of a large-
scale accident in a systematic way.  
 
Example of single case analysis 
One of the cases utilized in the original Cube analyses was an explosive fire 
that had occurred in Finland in 2003. Inserting the causes and 
recommendations onto the Cube identified e.g. the several culture-related 
changes that had been made in the company’s safety management system 
after the accident, including better reporting of accidents and near misses, 
and sought-after changes in attitudes and safety culture.  
Examples of analyses are available in the original ESReDA Cube publication 
(ESReDA 2015). Also, three large-scale aviation accidents were analysed by 
Martens (2015). 
 
7.6 Application 2: Theme analysis 
Theme analysis is a method to get more from less. Analysing several similar 
“smaller” cases with the Cube will result in more information than can be obtained 
from one case alone. Examples of use could be e.g. incidents occurred with LPG 
(liquified petroleum gas) cylinders, building fires with similar consequences or 
immediate causes, and other incidents which constitute a need to make an 
emergency call to the Fire and Rescue Services, but do not usually necessitate the 
creation of a larger investigation body. The reports of these incidents usually have 
the common factor that one case itself does not contain enough information to 
draw wider conclusions that will prevent similar accidents in the future. 
Nevertheless, combining the information of all known such incidents may result in 
new findings concerning most common problem areas and e.g. what should be 
improved on the organizational level. Basically, the outcome of the analyses is a 
“trend” or knowledge of what the cases have in common. This can be used as 
foresight to what might happen if such knowledge deficiencies can be resolved and 
new solution domains are opened for further elaboration. 
 
Example of theme analysis 
Instead of grouping causes, Karanikas et al. (2018) used an adaptation of the 
ESReDA Cube to group recommendations. They grouped the 
recommendations of 82 aviation accident investigation reports and the results 
of their analysis indicated that most recommendations are located near a 
particular corner of the Cube, but that there are significant differences across 
investigation authorities. Also, the severity of the accident influences the 
location of recommendations in the Cube.  
These results may be used to gain insight of how recommendations are 
constructed and to subsequently identify best practices for the formulation of 
effective regulations. 
 
To identify the knowledge deficiencies and new solution, theme analyses could be 
made inside of an organization, or (probably most important) inside of a network 
(system). Also, the analysis could be made between different systems (aviation, 
railway, maritime). 
7.7 Application 3: Analysis of investigation success 
This type of analysis may be utilized both in-house and by outsiders. Learning from 
investigations has two purposes: first, to improve the skills of the investigators, 
which will mean better investigations in the future. Second, to analyse the 
completeness of the investigation and thus the investigation report. The ESReDA 
Cube will reveal if there are aspects missing from the report. Aspects which either 
were thought to be irrelevant by the investigators (in which case they still should 
have been addressed in the report to avoid elements that remain open and 
questions that remain unanswered to the reader) or they were actually missed by 
the investigators altogether, and should therefore be re-opened for scrutiny. A 
third possibility, which should be addressed in the final investigation report, are 
the boundaries of the investigation that are due to e.g. a predefined scope (e.g.  
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 Figure 4. Mind map of recommendations according to groups requiring to implement 
them, along with ESReDA Cube textual classification (created using Coggle). 
        Page 141 of 252 
“we will not examine further than..”, “we will not ask the managers” or 
“subcontractor’s organizational culture issues were not examined”) or stoprules 
during the investigation process, such as the limited time, funding or human 
resources of the investigative body. 
 
Example of analysis of investigation success 
The explosion at BP Texas in 2005 led to several accident investigations 
executed by different stakeholders. This resulted in the production of several 
investigation reports, most of them now available online (see e.g. list of 
references on the Wikipedia page of the accident). Although the incident’s 
chain of events remains the same, in other aspects the investigation reports 
are significantly different and concentrate on different issues, whichever 
viewpoint deemed most important by the investigative group. Still, one of the 
key results of the investigations was that BP Texas had not monitored the 
process safety status of the site. Nowadays companies have the foresight (as 
a result of e.g. the investigation of this accident) to include several process 
safety indicators in their safety management system to gain insight of increase 
in accident risks via the monitoring of process aberrations. 
The CSB accident investigation report concerning the BP Texas accident was 
analysed by Tulonen et al. in 2018. The analysis was continued further for this 
report. Before mapping the recommendations onto the Cube, an initial 
mapping using a mind map (see Figure 4), was carried out according to actors 
required to address the recommendations. The mindmap helped in the 
analysis of the recommendations and facilitated mapping onto the ESReDA 
Cube. 
The mapping of the meso-scale recommendations led to some interesting 
results and related questions: 
• There were no triple-loop learning recommendations. 
• There were no culture-oriented recommendations. 
 
With the ESReDA Cube each investigation report (like the individual reports 
concerning the BP Texas accident) may be analysed separately, to identify the 
priorities of each investigation group. The Cube will also identify the possible 
differences or contradictions in the results of the investigative groups, and aspects 
(empty cells in the Cube) that each group has possibly missed or omitted. 
On the other hand, as investigations with differing objectives produce reports with 
differing focus, combining the results of all the investigations and inserting them 
into the cells of the ESReDA Cube will gather all the results into a systematic and 
easy-to-understand form that will help assess the incident as a whole. In addition, 
it will identify accident factors that need to be addressed without the risk of 
ignoring others.  
Perhaps, when designing recommendations, safety boards should take care to also 
target recommendations that lead towards triple-loop learning and culture-
building at all levels (meso in the example above, but also micro and macro). That 
should be an objective from the start. Interestingly enough, Karanikas et al. (2018) 
arrived at a similar conclusion: 80% of the recommendations in aviation were 
targeted toward single-loop learning, and 95% towards other than culture-
oriented recommendations (see also summary of their results in Tulonen et al. 
2019). 
Concerning the example above, it would be interesting to do the exercise for 
different levels for this event, but also to do it for several other accidents. Would 
the outcome be similar? It would be interesting to see how many boards in the 
past have strived to make recommendations addressing triple-loop learning and 
culture-building in an explicit manner. 
Additionally, what would be very interesting to check with this BP Texas accident 
is to verify if all recommendations have been implemented and consequently map 
the current follow-up situation onto the Cube. Such an exercise would trigger 
questions such as: 
• What were the obstacles encountered at the meso level that made it 
difficult to implement a given recommendation? 
• Which recommendations led to an improvement in the mapping 
classification onto the Cube? 
• How can these results feed into improving safety-related aspects at the 
meso-level across the given industry? 
• How can we design better recommendations that target a triple-learning 
loop learning level and a culture-building organisation level? 
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The use of the Cube serves as a consistency check and quality control on the 
investigation process management.  
In this application, the aim was to validate whether the Cube can be used as a tool 
for foresight in safety based on knowledge gained from past accidents. When 
studying past accidents one is usually interested in knowing four main issues: 
causes, lessons learned, recommendations and follow-up (implementation, 
effectiveness).  
The BP Texas accident causes, lessons learned, and recommendations have been 
identified as knowledge elements that were mapped onto the Cube cells. This 
process resulted in a systematic way of better understanding the accident from an 
operational perspective in terms of different stakeholder levels, operational 
aspects and degrees of learning potential. The Cube can assist to gain insight on 
foresight as the mapping process facilitates identification of questions that need 
answers, such as what do the empty cells mean. Why do some cells have many 
knowledge elements more than others? Which learning from these knowledge 
elements can be implemented for foresight in my organization? Answering 
questions such as these, with a visual tool such as the Cube, facilitates and 
structures multidisciplinary teams to discuss foresight issues in relation to a 
specific scope in a systematic manner, e.g. cell by cell.  
7.8 Application 4: Investigation support 
The ESReDA Cube cannot be classified as an accident investigation method, but as 
a tool.  
Utilizing the Cube at the end of the investigation, or during different phases of the 
investigation process, can be very useful. After those involved in the accident have 
been interviewed and the collection of information seems to be at an end, the 
Cube will help identify which aspects of the accident have indeed been covered 
and which have not (Cube cells remain empty).  
Thus utilization of the Cube will help formulate further questions that require 
answers in order to obtain a more comprehensive investigation and report. 
 
 
Example of investigation support 
This was tested at the end of an accident investigation concerning a chemical 
explosion that occurred in Finland in March 2018. (Tulonen et al. 2018). The 
identified causes of the accident were compared against the cells of the Cube, 
with the aim of provoking further discussion about potential accident causes. 
  
At the end of the investigation the ESReDA Cube may be used to help construct 
the final chapter of the report, the recommendations on how to prevent similar 
accidents in the future. 
7.9 Application 5: Recommendations check 
Recommendations check helps to detect if there are differences between the 
results of the analysis, the recommendations and implementation. 
   
Example of recommendations check 
This was also tested at the end of an accident investigation concerning a 
chemical explosion that occurred in Finland in March 2018 (Tulonen et al. 
2018). The cells of the Cube were compared to the draft investigation report 
to identify possible missed viewpoints.  
This application was also illustrated in the previous examples in applications 
2 and 4 concerning the analysis of the 82 aviation accidents and the analysis 
of the CSB recommendations concerning the explosion that occurred at BP 
Texas in 2005. 
 
Ideally, cells in the Cube that should be occupied by root causes should be identical 
to points in the Cube that should be occupied according to recommendations 
resulting from the accident analysis and to the points in the Cube that are occupied 
by the measures which were implemented after the accident. 
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7.10 Conclusions 
The Cube and its underlying template is an investigation tool available to analyse 
the lessons learned in order to explore solutions and recommendations. The 
structure of the Template and the Cube provide a checklist for completeness of 
analytical conclusions, facts, and findings. The results yield information about not 
only the direct causes of the accident(s), but also the underlying surroundings. This 
information may be used to formulate an overview and foresight on what should 
be done to prevent other accidents.  
The Cube identifies an overview of shared lessons and solutions for specific types 
of events beyond a case by case basis of analysing of events. To provide an 
encompassing overview, single event investigations should be rich of information 
or combining information into a category of similar cases should be used. The Cube 
serves as a quality check for completeness of findings and conclusions of an 
investigation. Rather than counting the number of recommendations and 
solutions in a cell of the Cube, understanding of their relevance and potential for 
learning and change counts. 
7.11 Discussion 
Differences in investigation results may origin from vision, mission and legal 
mandates of an investigative author, resources, past performance and 
competences. Differences may also stem from the methods applied, procedures 
and limitations in qualifications and competences and proficiency in conducting 
investigations. In general, investigation authorities are highly qualified in the 
forensic first phases, sophisticated in the second phase of analysis of systemic 
deficiencies, but less experienced in effectively dealing with systemic safety 
deficiencies. The Cube 2.0 version might add to their intervention potential in 
enhancing safety at a systemic level. 
Utilizing the ESReDA Cube is integrated into modern accident investigative 
procedures. The Cube is applied within the different phases of investigative 
procedure in direct relation to timeline development, creating scenarios (see 
chapter 5 on scenarios) and system perspective (see chapters 1 and 2). 
Creating a timeline is a collaborative effort of all investigative parties and intends 
to lead to consensus on the sequence of events. Creating a timeline is based on 
the available data at the moment of the on-scene data collection. Since such data 
collection is never complete, missing information on critical steps and building 
blocks may create gaps in understanding the sequence of events and leaves 
opportunities for speculation, interpretation and continuation of the fact-finding 
process. A more encompassing data set can be created by combining similar events 
and re-opening of investigations in case of new evidence. Here the ESReDA Cube 
shows its strengths. 
The company gains foresight from the results of the Cube analyses. The results give 
information about underlying problems and needs for learning and change. 
Through this information the company gains foresight to change its safety 
management system, e.g. to redefine what should be measured – what could be 
indicators of a rising accident risk. 
The ESReDA Cube provokes discussion on learning beyond ‘the obvious’, beyond 
the general idea of preventing similar accidents by identifying and eliminating the 
direct causes of an occurred accident. The Cube invites parties to discuss potential 
for double- and triple-loop learning: to adapt and to innovate. These discussions 
will result in new ideas to increase safety, beyond the prevention of ‘similar’ 
accidents only by providing foresight to prevent any/all accidents by identifying 
underlying causal factors that are the root of the system safety as a whole, and 
needs to learn and change the system in more innovative ways.  
Applying the Cube supports the transition from evidence based understanding of 
the event towards transition based intervention in the safety performance of the 
system. It visualizes the links between insight, -based on the investigative 
reconstruction-, towards oversight over the system operations and safety 
performance -by analytic interpretation-, leading to foresight over the 
consequences of adaptive interventions. 
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8 Why and How to Employ Organizational Factors for 
Foresight in Safety? 
Frank Verschueren, Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social 
Dialogue, Belgium.2324 
Yves Dien, Collectif Heuristique pour l’Analyse Organisationnelle de Sécurité 
(CHAOS), France. 
Nicolas Dechy, Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), France. 
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8.1 Executive summary 
Organisational factors, which are critical levers of the safety, reliability and 
resilience of operations and systems, are not considered enough. When in good 
order, these factors make it more likely that accidents will be prevented and have 
lower potentials to occur. However, when dysfunctional, these factors make 
accidents much more likely and serious because they impact many activities and 
equipment. In some organisations, top management and boards of directors may 
be unaware of the dysfunctionality of the organisations over which they preside. 
This unawareness may result from several causes. For example, not receiving or 
listening to bad news, not being proactive enough to seek out learning and 
improvement opportunities through event investigation, audit reports, 
organisational diagnosis in normal operation, or not anticipating future threats.   
We provide some definitions and some guidelines for elaborating a framework of 
analysis that includes organisational factors and the dynamic status of the system 
state (improving or degrading safety). We illustrate these using some practices 
from inspection and regulatory assessment of safety management.  
Our key messages are: 
- organisational factors affect risk in the totality of the organisation, due to 
a multiplying factor; 
- organisational factors have been and are still ignored or under-used;  
                                                                
23 DISCLAIMER: My experiences and insights are out of my Industrial career and my following career as 
Process Safety Inspector.  However not all of my insights are those of my employer. 
- top management lack knowledge about the effects of organisational 
factors because of flawed investigations (hindsight problems), audits 
(insight problems) and perception of future threats (foresight problems); 
- the lack of practical oversight of organisational factors and their 
interrelationships is an existing operational gap;  
- a guiding framework with adequate questions could be developed to fill 
this gap. 
8.2 Introduction: the organisational factors as an opportunity for 
safety I and II? 
8.2.1 Purpose of the chapter 
The purpose of the chapter is to provide some reasons and some guidelines for 
practitioners for investigating, auditing, diagnosing, inspecting and detecting 
whether organisational factors are leading to a more dysfunctional organisation 
that degrades safety, or enhancing the reliability and resilience of the organisation 
and improving safety.  
More specifically, the goal is to encourage safety actors (managers, operators, 
investigators, auditors, and inspectors) to treat ‘organisational factors’ (OFs) as 
important variables that could, according to the type of OF, either limit or enable 
foresight about safety accidents and their prevention. For many safety analysts, 
those organisational factors have been and are still not enough used by operators 
and regulators to enhance risk prevention, though they offer a strategic 
multiplying factor that is worth investing in. 
Safety actors’ investigations and interpretations should address past and current 
weaknesses and strengths but should also foresee the future: the likely outcomes 
of existing trends, as well as forthcoming threats and opportunities. On this basis, 
improvement actions can be taken to increase safety margins and, perhaps, 
acknowledge the conditions that are essential to achieve current success.  
The assumption is that organisational factors can be very powerful and durable 
conditions that lead to safety degradation, and which have contributed to many 
24 Correspondence can be made to frank.verschueren@werk.belgie.be. 
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major accidents. However, it also assumed that OFs are key levers to reach a more 
reliable and resilient organisation and improve safety.  
In general, accidents do not happen ‘like lightning striking out of a clear sky’. Before 
major accidents happen, it has been observed that there occur early warning signs 
(EWS), such as near misses which were not recognised or alerts by some actors 
which were not treated early enough during the “incubation period” (Turner, 
(1978). This empirical lesson from accidents provides an opportunity for 
preventing other accidents, but it depends on investing sufficiently action-oriented 
effort in investigations, audits, inspections, and situation understanding / 
interpretation, as well as the management and regulatory actions that achieve 
effective change.  
Concerning strategy (i.e. how to improve foresight and prevention by addressing 
organisational factors), two paths can be followed by safety actors: 
• On the one hand, there is a normative route that starts by comparing 
the conditions in an organisation to some ideal model (founded on 
theory, experience or research findings) about organisational safety, 
reliability and accidents and implementation of measures for accident 
prevention, then makes recommendations designed to make things 
better.  
• On the other hand, there is a more dialectical route, for example: obtain 
data and offer interpretations; then discuss different interpretations; act 
on some things, but on other things ask new questions; collect more 
data, encourage stakeholders continue to contest meanings, and so 
forth. 
Of course, a combination of the two paths is also possible. 
This chapter will first define in general the organisational factors and show the 
logic that connects facts to organisational factors of accidents (as root causes but 
especially as underlying (latent) causes). It will also provide readers with some 
examples, directions and guidance to inquire and act on organisational factors, 
such as from the BP Texas City accident, organisational diagnosis of safety 
                                                                
25 1/ our work is in Progress, because not fully tested; 2/ we only provide directions, guidelines on how 
to develop a framework for specific inspection, audit, investigation, because the examples provided do 
not cover all topics 
management in the nuclear industry in France, and regulatory inspections of 
Seveso chemical plants in Belgium.  
As a final element, the future principles for elaborating a framework are explained. 
This ‘OF Framework for questioning Foresight in Safety‘ is a work in progress25: the 
present authors aim to develop a ‘part two’ to this ‘part one’. This kind of 
framework could be used by safety actors (managers, operators, investigators, 
auditors, and inspectors) to develop their own “road map” to guide themselves 
during processes of investigation, diagnosis and inspection, specific to the features 
of the organisation investigated. For instance, it aims at giving further plausible 
directions and targets for organisational investigation once a dysfunctional 
organisational factor is detected and confirmed. 
8.2.2 Organisational factors and failures of foresight: BP Texas City refinery 
accident 
The Texas City BP refinery accident that occurred in 2005 is a reference case. It 
illustrates the key concepts: organisational factors26, early warning signs and 
opportunities for Foresight in Safety (FiS) through organisational analysis of safety. 
It is a typical case where the accident confirms the prognosis “an accident waiting 
to happen” that was made by several actors (managers, workers, and health and 
safety engineers) and by different processes (internal audits, event investigations, 
and an external audit by a consultant) (Dechy et al., 2011). 
On March 23, 2005, an explosion and fire at the BP refinery in Texas City led to 15 
deaths and 180 injuries. The board member and CEO of the US Chemical Safety 
Board (CSB), Carolyn Merritt (2007) said: “The combination of cost cutting, 
production pressures, and a failure to invest caused a progressive deterioration of 
safety at the refinery." But the accident has its roots deeper in the past. The CSB 
report (2007, p. 20) found that "cost-cutting in the 1990s by Amoco and then BP 
left the BP Texas City refinery vulnerable to a catastrophe.” The CSB (2007, p. 18) 
noted also that “The Texas City disaster was caused by organisational and safety 
deficiencies at all levels of the BP Corporation. Warning signs of a possible disaster 
were present for several years, but company officials did not intervene effectively 
26 We chose this accident as paradigm, knowing that many other events could have been chosen (e.g. 
the nuclear power plant accident at Three Mile Island (1979), head on collision of trains at Ladbroke 
Grove (1999), disintegration of the space shuttle Columbia (2003, …).  https://www.csb.gov/u-s-
chemical-safety-board-concludes-organizational-and-safety-deficiencies-at-all-levels-of-the-bp-
corporation-caused-march-2005-texas-city-disaster-that-killed-15-injured-180/ 
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to prevent it.” Merritt (2007) also said that “adhering to and enforcing federal 
regulations already on the books would likely have prevented this accident and its 
tragic consequences.” 
Indeed, the CSB investigation showed that some BP members had identified the 
major risks already in 2002. The new director of BP’s South Houston Integrated 
Site observed in 2002 that the Texas City refinery infrastructure and equipment 
were “in complete decline” (CSB, 2007, p. 151). In consultation with senior 
managers based in London, the director ordered a study that looked at mechanical 
integrity, training, safety, and economic opportunities. The study, which was 
shared with London executives, concluded that mechanical integrity was one of 
the biggest problems (CSB, 2007, p. 151). 
The BP Group Refining Vice-President suggested a follow-up inquiry asking in an e-
mail (August 16th, 2002), “How has [South Houston] gotten into such a poor 
state?” This follow-up report, entitled “Texas City Refinery Retrospective Analysis,” 
was issued later in 2002, and had the objective of determining why Texas City 
refinery performance had deteriorated. The analysis concluded that “the current 
integrity and reliability issues at TCR [Texas City Refinery] are clearly linked to the 
reduction in maintenance spending over the last decade.” Capital spending was 
reduced 84 percent from 1992 to 2000 (CSB, 2007, p.153). 
Several other studies, surveys, audits and also serious incidents alerted and 
signalled the severity of deficiencies, but the response of BP managers was “too 
little and too late” (CSB, 2007, p. 26) with the implementation of corrective action 
plans that were poor. CSB found that “at the end of 2004, the Texas City site had 
closed only 33 percent of its PSM [process safety management] incident 
investigation action items; the ISOM [isomerisation] unit closed 31 percent. 
Furthermore, CSB note that BP management made a presentation in November 
2004 on the reality of safety, saying: "Texas City is not a safe place to work" (CSB, 
2007, p. 172).  
BP managers were not alone in holding these views. A safety culture assessment 
conducted by an external consulting company (Telos Group) alerted the managers 
in January 2005 to the critical and degraded state of the refinery. The Telos report 
identified many of the same problems later found by the CSB in retrospect after 
the March accident. The business unit leader who initiated the Telos survey was 
looking for “brutal facts” concerning “our management systems, our site 
leadership, our site cultures, and our behaviours for safety and integrity 
management” (CSB, 2007, p.168). 
The CSB (2007, p. 169) stated that the Telos safety culture assessment findings 
included: 
• Production pressures impact managers “where it appears as though 
they must compromise safety.”  
• “Production and budget compliance gets recognised and rewarded 
before anything else at Texas City.”  
• “The pressure for production, time pressure, and understaffing are the 
major causes of accidents at Texas City.”  
• “The quantity and quality of training at Texas City is 
inadequate…compromising other protection-critical competence.”  
• “Many [people] reported errors due to a lack of time for job analysis, 
lack of adequate staffing, a lack of supervisor staffing, or a lack of 
resident knowledge of the unit in the supervisory staff.”  
• Many employees also reported “feeling blamed when they had gotten 
hurt or they felt investigations were too quick to stop at operator error 
as the root cause.” There was a “culture of casual compliance.”  
• Serious hazards in the operating units from a number of mechanical 
integrity issues: “There is an exceptional degree of fear of catastrophic 
incidents at Texas City.”  
• Leadership turnover and organisational transition: the creation and 
dismantling of the South Houston site “made management of protection 
very difficult.”  
• The strong safety commitment by the Business Unit Leader “is 
undermined by the lack of resources to address severe hazards that 
persist,” and “for most people, there are many unsafe conditions that 
prove cost cutting and production are more important than protection. 
Poor equipment conditions are made worse in the view of many people 
by a lack of resources for inspection, auditing, training, and staffing for 
anything besides ‘normal operating conditions.’”  
• Texas City was at a “high risk” because of a widespread “check the box” 
mentality. This included going through the motions of checking boxes 
and inattention to the risk after the check-off. “Critical events, 
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(breaches, failures or breakdowns of a critical control measure) are 
generally not attended to.”  
When the business unit leader received the results, he wrote (in an e-mail March 
17, 2005) that “seeing the ‘brutal facts’ so clearly defined was hard to digest, 
including the concern around the conflict between production and safety. The 
evidence was strong and clear, and I accept my responsibility for the results” (CSB, 
2007, p.171). But the same day he wrote a summary to all plant supervisors stating 
that “the site had gotten off to [a] good start in 2005 with safety performance that 
“may be the best ever,” adding that Texas City had had “the best profitability ever 
in its history last year” with over $1 billion in profit—“more than any other refinery 
in the BP system” (CSB, 2007, p.171). 
The downward trend of reduction in the numbers of occupational incidents was 
misinterpreted by some managers as a sign of improvement of industrial safety, 
while the number of losses of containment increased (from 399 to 607 per year 
from 2002 to 2004) and costly accidents occurred (e.g. 30 million $ in 2004). But at 
the same time, the 2005 Texas City HSSE Business Plan (presented March, the 15th) 
warned that the refinery likely would “kill someone in the next 12-18 months.” This 
fear of a fatality was also expressed early 2005 by the HSE manager: “I truly believe 
that we are on the verge of something bigger happening,” referring to a 
catastrophic incident (CSB, 2007, p. 173).  
Thus, the lessons learned from this accident clearly show that signs of deteriorating 
safety had been detected by many actors, despite the differences in their 
approaches and methods (observations from operators and from managers, 
internal and external audits, safety culture survey, incident investigation) and were 
confirmed after the accident by the CSB investigation (Dechy et al., 2011). In 
general, ’advanced‘ industrial systems are resistant to errors and the accident is 
"hard to obtain" (Perrow, 1984). An ’incubation period‘ (Turner, 1978) is observed, 
implying an accumulation of EWSs. The systematic study of accidents (Llory, 1996) 
demonstrates that the deficiencies are sometimes severe, often visible to a certain 
number of actors that are able to make the adequate diagnosis or prognosis if they 
are given adequate resources. 
8.2.3 Why do organisational factors have such potential to enhance or 
endanger safety? 
The BP Texas City case is a trenchant example and costly reminder of the 
significance of organisational factors to accident prevention. Organisational 
factors are of strategic interest for accident prevention because they create the 
conditions in which safety efforts benefit from a multiplication factor on the 
positive side (safety II) and are the basis on which to counter negative effects on a 
larger scale (safety I).  
This multiplication factor deals with the impact of local factors versus macroscopic 
factors on probabilities of errors and failures (as illustrated in the following 
scheme). This multiplication factor is the key strategic reason why it is worth 
employing and investing in organisational factor leveraging for safety 
enhancement. 
 
Figure 1. Organisational factors strategic interest for prevention-the “Multiplication Factor” 
(adapted from Verschueren, 2015) 
 
Figure 1 shows how an investigative process (accident investigation, organisational 
diagnosis, or audit) could develop on different levels of the socio-technical system 
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(e.g. Rasmussen, 1997) and how measures to reduce risk could be implemented at 
all levels although not with the same impact. 
It starts with one of the direct causes of an accident/incident (investigation) or a 
direct potential disturbance and weakness or deviation (audit). A generic example 
of a direct cause is ‘operator makes a mistake’. If lesson learning reduces a complex 
event to a single human error and marries this to a corrective action ‘fire the 
scapegoat of the organisational chain’ or ‘train the individual’, then the 
‘multiplication factor’ at this most local level is the smallest: 1 to 1: one operator 
fired or better trained. This at best stops the repetition of one mistake or some 
mistakes at this level. We are on a ‘human error’ level. 
What if someone else was in a similar work situation: could an error occur or recur? 
If one searches for the possible causes of the operator error, the verification by 
auditor/investigator of the procedure used by the operator could lead one to find 
errors in the written procedure. So, the next level cause would be the ‘faulty 
procedure’. Here the multiplication factor will be more than 1, especially if the task 
is performed by more than one person or when someone else takes the position: 
one erroneous procedure => several operators could make similar mistakes.  
We are now at the ’human factors‘ level related to ’working situations‘. Faulty 
procedures are not the only factors influencing working situations (e.g. human-
machine interface, staffing, fatigue, etc.). Of course, an investigator or auditor 
shouldn’t and usually will not stop here (beware of ‘stop rules’27) but should 
further ask ‘why’; for example, why this procedure contained an undetected 
error(s). The investigator might find that, in the past, there existed a 
person/function who checked every new written procedure before it was put into 
use and that at the time of investigation/audit this function no longer existed. If 
one procedure contains error(s), then it brings into question the whole process of 
designing and verifying procedures. In this situation, the multiplying factor would 
be even greater than those restricted to one working situation. This is because a 
flawed process of designing and checking procedures => possible more procedures 
contain errors => even more errors could be made by operators.  
Once more the auditor or investigator should ask why this function/person was 
removed from the existing control chain if that is the reason that explains the 
                                                                
27 Several ‘stop rules’ have been defined (e.g. Hopkins (2003)); the main idea is that an investigator may 
explicitly or implicitly stop asking why when he believes he has a satisfying explanation of failure that 
flawed organisational process. One of the possibilities he could find is that this 
function was removed during (and due to) a cost reduction campaign.  
Depending on the size of the company/organisation (several services, several 
departments) it could be that during this cost-reduction campaign, several other 
control functions were removed. It should be clear that in that way the ‘semi 
quantitative’ relation will be enhanced again. Thus, due to cost cutting => 
removing several control functions => possible even more procedures or measures 
to manage risks over the whole organisation contain undetected errors => even 
more errors could be made by operators in all departments and all working 
situations.  
The cost reduction in this example might have been decided in a company-wide 
overall strategy definition and policy review aimed at finding a new financial 
balance and, of course, this cost-cutting campaign may have other transversal 
effects to other organisational controls beyond just reducing the “procedure 
designing and checking activity”. We are now on the “highest organisation” level.  
The investigation would continue, of course, to question the rationales and the 
evidence for such decision-making processes. This was done by the US CSB for BP 
Texas City refinery from the business unit level in South Houston to the top of the 
BP Group at BP headquarters, the board of directors in London and even 
questioned the role of regulators, especially in the US (OSHA and EPA). 
The essence of all this, is that with every new level [operator => procedure => 
checking function => cost reduction => strategy], the probability of having errors 
and the negative impact of a flawed process gets multiplied.  
If we state this in a positive manner to enhance robustness and resilience: if the 
organisation responds with the related measure on a higher level, the gain in risk 
reduction will be larger: many more potential mistakes will be prevented (green 
arrow: ‘increasing risk reduction‘. In other words, the higher the level of 
organisational factors the auditor/investigator gets to and that a manager corrects, 
the more they open windows of opportunity to prevent many types of accidents 
(and not only a similar one). 
fits with its worldview categories of thinking and acting (e.g. if it is human error, then train the 
individual, or improve the safety culture) hiding the complex causal relationships.  
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8.2.4 History of accidents and the importance of organisational factors 
ESReDA has campaigned since the 1990s for better analysis of events and 
investigation of accidents (ESReDA, 2003, 2005, 2008; Roed-Larsen et al., 2004; 
Dechy et al, 2012, Dien et al., 2012), for ‘dynamic learning’ to consider the issues 
of the follow-up of lessons from investigations, and for the removal of barriers to 
learning (ESReDA, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). However, many event and accident 
reports were still not “well investigated and analysed” meaning that they did not 
correctly address organisational factors (Dien et al., 2012). This issue is revisited in 
subsection 8.3.3. We will define these organisational factors (also known as 
organisational influence factors) in table 2 of 8.2.5 and distinguish them from 
human and technical factors.  
Researchers who reviewed many ‘well’ investigated and analysed accident reports 
(e.g. Cullen, 2000; CAIB, 2003; CSB, 2007;…) observed recurring root causes, similar 
patterns, “striking similarities”, “echoes”, “parallels” between accidents (Turner, 
1978; Llory, 1996, 1999; Reason, 1997; Rasmussen, 1997; Dien et al., 2004, 2012; 
Hayes and Hopkins, 2015). These recurrences offer the opportunity to capitalise 
them into a ‘Knowledge of accidents’ (Dechy et al., 2010, 2016, 2018). This 
knowledge of accidents is then useful for guiding and for interpreting in 
organisational analysis of accidents (Llory and Dien, 2010a, 2010b; Llory and 
Montmayeul, 2010, 2018) and organisational diagnosis of safety (Rousseau and 
Largier, 2008; Dechy et al., 2011, 2016, 2018).  
One outcome is related to the identification of a pattern of accident causation. An 
accident model has been observed and defined (Dien, 2006; ESReDA, 2009) with 
weak signals of safety degradation (Turner, 1978), latent failures (Reason, 1990, 
1997) that go unrecognised during an incubation period (Turner, 1978). For 
Foresight in Safety (FiS), this accident model and definition have implications for 
risk prevention and specially to provide an opportunity to detect and act on early 
warning signs (EWS) before a severe or major accident happens.  
A socio-technical system generates uncountable gigabytes of data every day; some 
information, and potentially some EWS, will get buried in the noise. Some of the 
                                                                
28 An organisation is more than a crowd. Because it has a particular purpose, an organisation imposes 
constraints on actors’ behaviour. In contrast, each actor in a crowd of undifferentiated individuals has 
more freedom to act on his own accord, albeit within the wider dictates of society at large. 
EWSs are the symptoms of a safety degradation caused by a root cause of an 
accident waiting to happen. 
To establish or enhance FiS, the goal of an investigation, audit, inspection, 
diagnosis that aims at preventing an accident is to capture those EWSs. Strategies 
to collect data, to generate and filter information, to recognise and interpret signs 
related to negative and positive organisational factors) will be proposed. 
8.2.5 Definitions of Organisation, Technical, Human and Organisational 
Factors 
As many writers and disciplines use the terms’ ‘organisation’ and ‘organisational 
factors’, for a practitioner perspective, it is important at this stage to start to clarify 
our definition of these terms in the context of technical, human and organisational 
factors in high-risk industries. The document also suggests a classification scheme 
for organisational factors. For example, it locates management systems as a subset 
of organisational factors, and suggests governance ‘functions’ as another subset. 
Definition of ‘Organisation’ 
An organisation is an entity comprising multiple people that has a particular 
purpose and is more than a crowd of acting actors.28 It can operate in the public 
sector (fulfilling public duties) or private sector (developing commercial activities) 
or in both. For the purpose of this chapter on organisational factors for FiS, we will 
look into the organisations as found in high-risk industries. In this perspective, an 
organisation is viewed as an entity being organised, reorganised and where the 
focus is to support processes, tasks, decisions and actions that enable sustainable 
performance and risk management. 
An organisation may be therefore understood as the planned, coordinated and 
purposeful action to reach a common goal or construct a tangible product or 
service. Part of the organisation is governed by formal and management 
provisions, structures, systems, processes, rules, procedures, auditing, inspections 
to implement, enforce, enable the different activities of workers at all levels of the 
socio-technical system; part of the organisation is controlled by real practices of 
workers in the field, taking into account informal aspects, making sense of signals, 
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individual and collective decision-making processes and the influence of power, 
social and cultural aspects as well. 
Other authors refer to an organisation also as a socio-technical system (e.g. 
Rasmussen, 1997; Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000; Leveson, 2004) as it is a 
combination of social elements (individual and groups of people belonging to the 
organisation), technical elements (infrastructure, installations and individual 
apparatus), interacting and performing different activities to produce or operate 
safely. Additionally, an inter-organisational dimension is to be considered (Wilpert 
and Fahlbruch, 1998), or organisational network (Dien, 2006), implying to consider 
interactions with regulators, subcontractors, competitors, non-governmental 
organisations, citizens. 
By coordinated and planned cooperation of all these elements the organisation 
can solve tasks that lie beyond the abilities of the single elements. This is the 
positive side of the mix of these socio–technical–organisational elements. The 
negative side is that because of the same mix most organisations tend to be 
complicated or even complex by nature. 
Definition of ‘Causal’ and ‘influence’ factors: technical, human and 
organisational   
In accordance with research on accident and system models (e.g. ‘organisational 
accident’ in Reason, 1997; ‘socio-technical system’ in Rasmussen, 1997) and 
accident investigation such as Management Oversight Risk Tree (Johnson, 1973), 
Tripod (e.g. Groeneweg et al., 2010) developed on basis of the Swiss Cheese model 
(Reason, 1990, 1997), Accimap (Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000), STAMP (Leveson, 
2004), organisational analysis (Dien et al., 2004, 2012), we can distinguish three 
types of causal and influence factors influencing safety in an organisation: 
technical causal factors, human and organisational influence factors.  
Technical factors can be considered as causal factors because they refer to a 
mechanistic and deterministic causality, while human and organisational factors 
are better considered as influence factors because they refer to complex 
relationships, with cause-consequence relationships transformed and belonging to 
a different paradigm (Morin, 1977), and that are more probabilistic (e.g. Dien, 
2006; ESReDA, 2009; Vautier et al., 2018).  
In many accident investigation methods (Sklet, 2004; Institute of Energy, 2008), it 
is common to distinguish direct or immediate causes, which are the last "stage" of 
the event, meaning that they are both the visible phenomena and consequences 
of root causes. Direct causes are generally technical failure and / or human error, 
while root causes are related to underlying deficiencies in upper levels of the socio-
technical system and latent effects (Reason, 1990) such as an inadequate 
maintenance policy. 
Table 1. Definitions of technical, human and organisational factors. 






Technical causal factors related to technical elements: 
processes used in the industrial organisation and technical 
components (equipment, apparatus and installations) used in 
these processes. In the immediate chronology of events, 
often, the failing of critical equipment can lead to the start of 
an incident sequence or can lead to the failure of a technical 
barrier, so an incident sequence is not interrupted but 
continues and escalates. In the remote chronology of events, 
the failures of equipment and barriers are influenced by 
underlying human and organisational factors levels (e.g. poor 
maintenance action because of inadequate competencies 




Human influence factors are factors that influence and may 
determine the performance of an individual, such as fatigue 
in some working situations. They are related to all humans 
(operational people, as operators and planners; people in all 
supporting services, such as maintenance, design, research, 
logistics, and procurement; decision makers on all levels from 
front-line operators and front-line technicians, the 
supervisors, the managers, every senior manager up to the 
CEO and the Board of Directors. They can also be identified in 
the work situation and activity of each actors (does he/she 
have the resources and tools (e.g. man-machine interface, 
procedure) to properly achieve the required job?), which lead 
to human errors such as omissions and faulty human 
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decisions which impact an individual action or (possible and 




They are the factors relating to the influence of the 
organisation. We propose to distinguish here three groups of 
organisational factors (Table 2.) 
 






Indeed, an organisation has several essential 
Management Systems to “manage” its activities, 
especially its key functions (production, safety…). 
Examples of Management Systems (MS) are Production, 
Safety, Quality, Project, Maintenance, Logistics, 
Procurement, Human Resources, Facility, and others such 
as risk analysis, learning from experience, management 
of change, emergency management… Each of these 
Management Systems can fail and produce “System 
Failures” which directly impact the equipment and 
barriers deficiencies, unsafe acts. When these 
Management system failures emerge, they can generate 
or contribute to other failures (technical or human 
factors). The criticality of these Management system 
failures depends on their direct or indirect impact on 
safety critical elements in the scenarios of major 
accidents. As production, quality or maintenance 
management systems tend to be more closely related to 
safety, their failures are more often critical. 
                                                                
29 In this work, the term “dysfunctional” is used for all organisational factors that lead to an impaired 
function, a failing to serve an adjustive purpose (here, the safety of an organization with all its 
constituents especially including people). 
“Organisational 
dysfunctionalities”29 
30   
Organisational dysfunctionalities have a direct or indirect 
impact on almost every part of the organisation. They can 
directly cause safety management system failures. There 
is an internal part of the organisation (usually, at the ‘top’ 
of the organisation: Board, Senior Managers, decision 
makers) that has greater responsibility than other actors 
for the adequate internal governance of the total 
organisation. This top part of the organisation has the 
role and power to define internal governance 
functionalities as the strategy of the organisation 
(mission and vision, priorities, and strategic objectives), 
the policy of the organisation (setting of objectives and 
deployment in tasks in order to reach the strategic 
objectives) and the structure of the organisation (roles 
and functions with their authorities and responsibilities, 
power distribution, trade-off processes). But also, on top 
of formal dimensions of the organisation, historical, 
social and cultural factors may facilitate or hamper 
organisational performance. If this strategy, policy or 
structure is poorly defined, implemented or protected, 
then the organisation will be in a state of dysfunction and 
will not reach its purpose (as per definition) with 
inadequate decision-making processes and trade-offs. 
Regulation 
dysfunctionalities 
There is an external part of the operating organisation, 
the regulatory context (laws), and their enforcement by 
control authorities (e.g. inspection). The external 
directed governance of the system includes the operator 
and his relationship with the regulator but also internal 
(health and safety committees, trade-unions) and 
external stakeholders (NGOs, neighbours…).  
30 Presentation by Frank Verschueren “Learning from Organisational Dysfunctionalities” at Energy 
Institute Conference on “Human Factors Application in Major Hazard Industries”, (17 - 18 Oct 2017); 
London. 
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8.3 How to employ organisational factors for Foresight in Safety? 
Some guidance and examples in investigation, auditing and 
inspecting 
8.3.1 Hindsight, insight, foresight 
We distinguish three temporal perspectives where organisational factors can be 
employed to the benefit of accident prevention: hindsight, insight and foresight.  
In our view, the goal is to turn hindsight (past) or insight (present) into foresight 
(future).  
In our definition, foresight has two main activities: interpreting the 
weaknesses/strengths and vulnerabilities/resiliencies and making a prognosis of 
their outcome or sufficiency (safety margins); and, eliminating deficiencies to 
reduce or eliminate risk factors of recurrences of accidents; creating new measures 
to prevent accidents.  
In this chapter, to create some foresight in safety, we will see and study events in 
the past or present to proactively prevent accidents in the future and also give an 
example of foresight of future risks. Other chapters of this ESReDA deliverable 
address the three parts.  
As mentioned in the introduction, concerning the strategy of how to improve 
foresight by addressing organisational factors, there seem to be two paths that 
safety actors can follow (the normative route or the more dialectical route), taking 
in consideration that a combination of the two paths is also feasible.  
8.3.2 Past/Hindsight: Improving Investigation of Accidents and Incidents to 
gain Foresight 
A first source of FiS, foresight in safety, is exploring the system or organisation in 
hindsight, meaning studying the past. It implies studying the accidents and events 
which happened in the past and deducing all the pertinent and likely recurring 
causes related to organisational factors.  
It is important to develop approaches to address the real root causes and to detect 
the relevant organisational dysfunctionalities that contributed to an event. The 
lessons from past accidents and incidents can help to show how organisational 
factors can improve or degrade safety within an organisation or in general for all 
high-risk organisations if the study is enlarged to all industries’ accidents.  
It can be valuable also to study past normal functioning to establish the former 
state of SMS performance, organisational and regulatory performance as well.  
It may seem paradoxical that an approach of FiS advocates first looking at the past, 
but the idea is to find specific and generic factors to prevent similar events to recur 
in the future elsewhere as well. 
Searching for underlying root causes to prevent next accidents 
Investigating root causes related to underlying deficiencies in the depth and 
history of organisations is far from an easy task. It requires a multi-disciplinary 
approach aiming at questioning the different dimensions of the socio-technical 
system that may influence accident causation. The investigation commission into 
the space shuttle disintegration, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board put it 
this way: “Many accident investigations do not go far enough. They identify the 
technical cause of the accident, and then connect it to a variant of “operator error” 
– the line worker who forgot to insert the bolt, the engineer who miscalculated the 
stress, or the manager who made the wrong decision. But this is seldom the entire 
issue. When the determinations of the causal chain are limited to the technical 
flaw and individual failure, typically the actions taken to prevent a similar event in 
the future are also limited: fix the technical problem and replace or retrain the 
individual responsible. Putting these corrections in place leads to another mistake 
– the belief that the problem is solved. The Board did not want to make these 
errors” (CAIB, 2003 - p. 97). 
Examples are numerous and can be easily found on the web, so we do not need to 
develop an example here. Several very good accident investigations (e.g. Cullen, 
2000; CAIB, 2003; CSB, 2007) highlighted that some incidents and events before 
accidents were not properly investigated. In the British rail network, several signals 
were passed at danger (signal was at red) by train drivers, highlighting systemic 
vulnerabilities in a complex system. However, rather than consider the systemic 
effects of privatisation, specifically the fragmentation of the system, the passing of 
signals at danger were considered by railway management as wholly the 
responsibility of drivers (Cullen, 2000). The CAIB (2003) found that prior foam 
losses were not well analysed by NASA, especially why the foam losses occurred 
more frequently on the left side of the bipod. The CSB (2007) found that several 
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incident investigations by BP Texas City refinery failed to address root causes, 
especially an investigation of a 30-million-dollar accident in 2004. 
Multi-layered approach or “Why does an investigation need to be considered on 
multiple levels?” 
Reason (1990, 1997) developed an accident model that included the concept of 
“latent causes”. These latent causes could be, for example, an undetected 
deficiency in an equipment design or the consequence of a poor maintenance 
policy, which opened the questioning towards the engineering and management 
failures (in decision making). Those failures of decision making were situated in the 
front-line team and its management, middle management or senior management. 
So, these alone made already three levels of an ‘organisational accident’ model 
(Reason, 1997). 
The simplest methods for investigating accidents focus on one level (Frei et al., 
2003; Sklet, 2004): the actors in the front line, typically, operators and technicians, 
such as train drivers. They produce direct causes (activities and decisions of these 
“front liners”) with a very limited “penetration insight”. 
Many accidents have shown that by questioning upwards the role of hierarchical 
lines, one can detect how the decision making of higher management levels play a 
large role in degrading the working conditions of several frontline actors. These 
conditions are later involved in combination with other direct causes, triggering 
events, and are therefore influencing the causation of incidents and accidents as 
underlying causes. Only a thorough investigation of the accident will reveal the 
different connections between direct and underlying causes.  
A thorough investigation of the accident should consider the multiple levels of the 
organisation, which interact (e.g. human resource management impacts the skills 
available in working situations) and with the environment (e.g. technological and 
political changes have an impact on: the skills needed to operate new 
technologies; the level of regulation, and; the acceptability of high-risk industries). 
Several researchers recommended this multi layered approach, and among them, 
Reason (1997), Rasmussen (1997) and with Svedung for Accimap (Rasmussen and 
Svedung, 2000). It was followed by others, such as Nancy Leveson’s STAMP (2004). 
Several other examples exist (in Sklet, 2004; Dekker, 2006; Dien et al., 2012; 
Institute of Energy, 2008).  
The layers of governance or supervision levels should be considered in those 
organisational ‘cause–consequence’ schemes that can be visualised in a top-down 
perspective in accordance with the organisational accident view (Swiss cheese 
model of Reason, 1997). A complementary but consistent view integrates the 
bottom-up flows of information. An important issue is to consider the system 
behaviour as a product of interactions, with consideration of systemic effects as a 
whole (e.g. Vautier et al., 2018).  
It remains a challenge to go up to the top (i.e. senior management and the board 
of directors) who make the decisions on strategy, policy, structure, and “steer” the 
whole organisation. As they make very important decisions on resources and 
budgets, they can either limit or enable discretion at lower levels. Examples of 
policies of cost cutting are numerous (e.g. Texas City) and can paralyse the 
management of integrity maintenance and the whole departments related to 
safety.  
For that reason, it is rare that internal people from lower organisational levels 
doing investigations or auditing do ask questions in their investigation all to the 
top of their own organisation to show how strategy, policy or structure were 
dysfunctional or not. There is self-censorship, stop rules, pressures from 
management and taboo subjects (e.g. Dien et al., 2012). 
8.3.3 Present/Insight: Improving Auditing and Diagnosis to improve 
Foresight in Safety 
A second source for gaining FiS is exploring the system or organisation in insight, 
meaning studying the present. It requires that the company governance, 
provisions and practices related to safety are investigated and assessed to detect 
dysfunctionalities and assess the quality of safety management. 
Organisational performance can be assessed in a range of dimensions, production, 
quality, safety, environment, social… For our safety purpose, it is important to 
develop approaches that provide insight into on-going performance, through the 
knowledge of influencing factors on daily performance, that can be related to 
company’s governance and safety management. When we use the term ‘real 
performance, in practice’, our meaning goes beyond effort to formalise safety 
management processes, provisions, procedures and is related to the concepts of 
activity and work, that are more than applying procedures. These approaches 
require as well, collecting formal and informal data, interpreting information, signs 
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and infer EWS, symptoms or indicators of weaknesses or strengths related to best 
practices, reliability and resilience organisational factors. 
Analogies of Auditing with Investigating 
Conducting an organisational diagnosis in hindsight differs from conducting it on 
the basis of real-time data. Some analysts consider that the two configurations are 
radically different. Indeed, analysis of events is often criticised for its hindsight bias 
(e.g. Reason, 1990; Vaughan, 1996). Knowing the end of the story brings an effect 
of wisdom (Reason, 1990) to the investigator (however investigating root causes is 
not easy!) while the actors in the system did not benefit from this knowledge prior 
to the accident. Hindsight bias can be "harmful" if the aim of the investigation is to 
find (only/mainly) one or more people to blame. Especially, EWS would be easy to 
detect in a retrospective approach, while actors seeking insight in real time have 
inherent difficulties to extract EWS from daily noise. On that point, Vaughan (1996) 
considered that some weak signals could not be understood before the accident 
because they were normalised in NASA culture.  
It is partly true, but we disagree with the generalisation to all cases. The Texas City 
accident just recalled in this chapter is a contrary example and shows that many 
EWS were, indeed, recognised before the major accident by operators, managers, 
audits and event investigations.  
In fact, there are similarities in the two configurations of organisation’s diagnosis 
(hindsight and insight) (Dechy et al., 2011). Background knowledge in human and 
organisational factors used by analysts (investigator, auditors, inspectors) are 
mainly common requirements for both. The interviews with people might be 
biased (people who refuse to speak-up or misinform investigators) in the two 
configurations, but not on a dichotomous basis.  
In both cases, we can find events that can reveal symptoms of organisational 
weaknesses prior to the accident or the diagnosis in normal operation (e.g. Texas 
City refinery accident). In both cases, making an expert judgment upon the 
complex causalities of influence factors remains uneasy, though evidence and 
proofs of (un-)reliability might differ.  
                                                                
31 Presentation “Inspection of Investigations of Accidents and Incidents” by Frank Verschueren at MJV 
Seminar on Learning of Incidents (11 - 13 September 2013 Gothenburg, Sweden) 
32 These findings are consistent with the practices declared fifteen years ago (limited use of investigation 
procedures, very limited investigation of root causes, very limited involvement of experts in 
Auditing and Inspecting: Looking for underlying deficiencies in Safety 
Management 
An example from Belgium Competent Authority for Seveso plant regulation31 
The following example relates to a normative approach which is especially efficient 
for compliance-oriented approach, but also because there is consensus on the 
expectations of what are good practices for the management of safety. For 
instance, it requires that safety management systems are implemented (a 
regulatory requirement of the Seveso Directive). Also, safety actors know that 
good event investigations should address root causes. But, is it the case?  
A study by the Belgium Competent Authority found that a sizeable minority of 
companies have in their incident investigations a ‘blind spot’ to organisational 
factors. In a representative sample of Seveso companies, the study found that 36% 
carried out investigations that poorly identified the underlying organisational 
causes of events, and 27% carried out investigations using procedures that were 
very poor at identifying underlying organisational causes and organisational 
factors. 32 
All companies under the Major Hazards regulation in Belgium are obliged to have 
a complete and well-functioning Major Accidents Prevention Plan (MAPP). The 
core element of this MAPP is a safety management system to prevent major 
accidents. One of the components of a safety management system is the 
investigation of accidents and incidents; this is audited by Seveso inspection 
agencies in their role as enforcers of the Seveso regulation in Europe. 
In 2013, the Belgian Seveso inspection agencies studied specific regulatory audits 
to get a more detailed view on the strengths and weaknesses of companies’ 
accident and incident investigation systems. The data for the study were drawn 
from seventy audits that had been carried out by 14 inspectors over four years. 
investigation, learning, human and organisational factors (ESReDA, 2003; Roed-Larsen et al., 2004, 
Dechy et al., 2012) though we can observe some improvements. 
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The seventy audited companies are a representative sample of the total 375 
companies under Seveso regulation in Belgium.33  
Each company was audited in the same way using a specific inspection instrument. 
This instrument contains 53 questions arranged in eleven question blocks. The 
general topic of incident/accident investigation is spread across a number of these 
blocks, such as those focused on the reporting system, investigation & analysis, 
and remedial actions. Each of these blocks is subdivided into smaller subtopics, 
each with a set of questions for the auditor. Each question block has a set of criteria 
based on the expectations of the inspection agencies and have been discussed in 
advance with the relevant industrial bodies. 
In recent years, the Belgian Competent Authority has made efficiency a priority in 
the design of its inspection instruments. Inspection agencies have decreasing 
resources, often less time, and an increasing number of companies to inspect. 
Therefore, every question asked in an audit instrument must count in the sense of 
demonstrable relevance. All audit questions in the inspection instrument are of 
the closed type: the answer is ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and reflects the presence or absence of 
certain objects in the company’s system. For the purposes of this special study, 
these objects or items comprise the elements of a company’s investigation system.  
The questions are focused on objects or items established as essential and 
necessary for an effective and efficient investigation system. Each question 
addresses an enforceable requirement, justified with reference to: 
• Legal compliance; 
• Official Standards;  
• Codes of good practice34; and, 
• Accepted (and necessary) risk analysis measures. 
Furthermore, the questions must be capable of producing answers that can be 
verified by the company’s documents, standard operating procedures, 
investigation reports, or by interviews. The necessity and verifiability of the 
questions are critical qualities for regulatory inspections. Because each item is 
established as necessary, its absence from a company’s system can be considered 
                                                                
33 In Belgium, two-thirds of Seveso companies belong to the following sectors: Oil and Gas; Chemical, 
Petrochemical, and Pharmaceutical manufacturing, and; Distribution and Warehousing of dangerous 
goods. The remaining third are dispersed across several smaller sectors. 
as a deficiency and registered as a shortcoming. This also allows the inspection 
agencies to enforce improvements. 
The seventy audits (each asking 53 questions) produced a total of 537 
shortcomings. To see patterns of weaknesses in the companies’ investigation 
systems, the results from the sample of seventy companies were expressed as 
frequencies. For each audit question, the maximum possible frequency is 70, 
meaning that 100% of the companies had this shortcoming in their system. The 
higher the frequency of observed shortcomings per question, the greater the 
significance of this item as a weakness in the investigation systems of the Belgian 
Seveso companies in general.  
When ranking the frequency of all shortcomings, the observed result showed that 
some of the questions with the highest frequencies were directly related to 
organisational factors: 
• “Were the underlying organisational causes identified?” was the 
question associated with the largest number of shortcomings (highest 
frequency). This shortcoming was registered for 25 companies out of the 
total of 70, or 36% of the audits. 
• Another question high in the ranking (top 5) and germane to this 
chapter was: “Does the general instruction specify an investigation 
technique that is explicitly focused on not only investigating the 
immediate causes but also the underlying organisational causes?” This 
shortcoming was registered for 19 companies, or 27% of the audits. 
The upshot of this finding is that a sizeable proportion of companies seek to explain 
accidents and incidents without examining the organisational conditions that may 
be undermining how they manage the major risks created by their operations. 
An example from Institut de Radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire (IRSN) 
As mentioned previously and in the previous example, one strategy to enhance 
prevention of accidents and their foresight relies on a normative strategy which 
references organisational factors. Another one relies on a more dialectical route 
within organisational diagnosis. For instance, and referring to the previous 
34 Codes of good practices are practices that are considered by one or more industrial sector(s) as 
practices who should be used as they have shown by multiple experiences to have a proven reduction in 
risk. 
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example, when the company does not investigate root causes, the judgment is 
automatic. But for companies who do so, how can we rank the most and less 
performing and how can we judge if their practices and outcomes are good enough 
or bad? How can we make a judgment of the quality of analysis, the depth of 
organisational analysis and the relevance of the organisational factors addressed? 
This kind of approach is necessary as well to improve safety management but 
requires more data collection and collective expert judgment. The following 
example aims at illustrating the approach and some challenges.  
Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN) is the technical support 
organisation to the French nuclear safety authority (ASN). IRSN experts are in 
charge to conduct safety assessment on engineering provisions but also in-depth 
organisational diagnosis on safety management effectiveness of French nuclear 
power plants all operated by Electricité de France.  
For our example here, the main scope of the safety assessment conducted was on 
maintenance activities performed during the 50 outages per year for the 58 
nuclear reactors in France. Between 3,000 to 15,000 maintenance activities are 
performed per outage, involving several hundreds of workers over a period of one 
to six months. Most workers are subcontractors. So, a first challenge is related to 
the scale and complexity of the system: a nuclear reactor fleet of 58 reactors 
operated in 19 plants involving around 30,000 employees (including central 
engineering divisions) and 20,000 subcontractors employed by 400 companies. 
A second challenge is related to the definition of the scale, scope and focus of an 
“open” audit or an organisational diagnosis. This can become especially 
challenging if the approach combines formal and informal data collection, 
interpretation of evidence of vulnerabilities or reliability/resilience, and debates 
about the necessity to implement preventive measures.  
A multidisciplinary team of ten IRSN experts in human and organisational factors, 
safety and radiation protection engineering, conducted the safety assessment. Its 
goal was to assess the risk management efficiency in the ‘daily’ ‘normal’ 
functioning. In other words, it focuses on real practices, not on paper, nor it is rule 
or compliance based. It relied on an in-depth investigation over 2.5 years, 150 
interviews, and 70 days spent observing working situations during three outages 
on three NPPs. Data collected is more or less subjective and therefore an 
objectification process aims at establishing evidence, facts and findings. It also 
relied on an in-depth review of documents running into thousands of pages from 
several hundred of documents (e.g. safety procedures of the nuclear operator, 
reportable events analysis, inspections findings).  
Six months were necessary to prepare the diagnosis, its scope and framework of 
analysis and the strategy for data collection. The preliminary analysis implied 
reviewing procedures to understand the safety management policy, structure, 
provisions implemented by the operator in a complex system. A determining factor 
to escape ‘cognitive capture’ was to benchmark across other strategies and 
provisions implemented by foreign nuclear operators. It required identifying the 
key organisational factors to be investigated. Investigating all organisational 
factors is not possible in one diagnosis for such a complex system, so the idea is to 
justify the selection of the most relevant organisational factors, based on major 
safety issues, such as the ones raised by organisational changes, or the 
vulnerabilities found in event analyses, known former vulnerabilities and new 
provisions dedicated to improve safety management. Five key organisational 
factors were selected (Dechy et al., 2016, 2018): organisational changes due to a 
new program of multiple changes; human resource management (in quantity and 
quality in a context of a wave of retirements); decision-making challenges within a 
complex organisation with multiple interfaces between people and processes of 
which subcontracting was a particular topic; and learning as efforts to improve the 
processes were undertaken. A transversal perspective, related to the historic 
dimension with the picture of a previous organisational diagnosis conducted five 
years before by IRSN (Rousseau, 2008) helped to address if safety management 
was improving or not.  
All the key organisational factors selected were related to a ‘pathogenic 
organisational factor’ (Dien et al., 2004, 2012) though this was not the main 
selection criterion. Indeed, several other background knowledge references were 
used from human and social sciences, and good practices seen abroad. This 
‘knowledge of accidents’ (Dechy et al., 2016, 2018) that contains pathogenic 
organisational factors helped to raise assumptions and support interpretations. 
IRSN experts were able to recognise echoes of accidents: a programme of multiple 
changes to improve performances (production, safety,…) echoed the ‘torrents of 
change’ at NASA before the Columbia accident; ‘inversion of burden of proof’ 
deviations at NASA that contributed to both Challenger and Columbia space 
shuttles accidents; and also a drift pattern of erosion of defence-in-depth, echoing 
the Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 1997). Collective expert judgment was produced 
to consider if the organisational weaknesses were serious and would need to 
        Page 158 of 252 
implement strengthened prevention measures, or if the safety management 
provisions in place were robust enough based on evidence of their efficiency. IRSN 
made fifteen recommendations, whose relevance and efficiency were assessed 
and challenged within a contradictory debate with the nuclear operator and thirty 
experts from the advisory committees35 to the nuclear safety authority, before 
being translated by the safety authority in a new regulation to be enforced. 
8.3.4 Foresight of Future Risks for Proactive Management of Risks as used in 
an organisational diagnosis 
After hindsight and insight, the third temporal perspective where organisational 
factors could (and should) be employed to enhance proactive risk management is 
related to the future. For this chapter on employing organisational factors for FiS 
(Foresight in Safety) the act of gaining FiS is translated as getting the knowledge 
about how accidents in future could happen due to organisational causes or could 
become more likely due to new threats. In this perspective, the organisational 
dysfunctionalities to investigate, recognise and assess are not only the past ones 
nor only the current ones, but some that could occur in the near, mid-term and 
longer-term future. In other words, the goal is to implement an approach like risk 
analysis but related to plausible future threats to organisational safety. As a 
consequence, it requires developing all measures to counter those organisational 
causes and threats and to reinforce or to seize opportunities to implement new 
reliability/resilience factors to prevent these accidents from occurring, reoccurring 
or to decrease their likelihood by adding safety margins.  
An example from Institut de Radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire (IRSN) 
A practical experience we can refer to is related to the organisational diagnosis 
performed by IRSN and described in previous pages. As mentioned earlier, the 
historical perspective of organisational analysis (Dien et al., 2006) was useful to 
investigate if in the current situation, one could notice safety improvements or 
degradations compared to the past diagnosis performed a few years previously 
(Rousseau et al., 2008). The historical perspective integrated also the future of the 
organisation towards potential forthcoming threats.  
Indeed, the rationale was that IRSN experts had to consider if the 
dysfunctionalities found so far and the countermeasures to increase risk 
                                                                
35 Advisory committees (Groupes permanent d’experts), http://www.french-nuclear-
safety.fr/ASN/Technical-support/The-Advisory-Committees 
management robustness were enough to cope with new threats forthcoming in 
the next few years. The main threats that were recognised at that time in 2013 
were the lasting effects of the wave of retirements, ageing of the equipment 
especially because the nuclear operator was aiming for operating the nuclear 
reactors over forty years of operation (which was their design assumptions), which 
implied to increase up to 50% the workload in some maintenance domains and 
refurbish some critical equipment.  
However, in 2012, IRSN experts observed a vicious circle (delays in outages that 
shorten time and resources available for learning post outages and the preparation 
of next outage; in such a case, it would generate new delays in outages). This drift 
was considered as a clear EWS by IRSN experts and they recommended to the 
nuclear operator some measures to counter it. This kind of safety degradation that 
is theorised (Dien, 2006) within accident models (such as the ‘incubation period’ 
(Turner, 1978), “latent failures” (Reason, 1990), and EWS that are not recognised 
or treated (Vaughan, 1996; Llory, 1996)) is not familiar to nuclear operators who 
are culturally educated with the so-called mantra of “continuous improvement” as 
a natural outcome of quality approaches and changes, which in itself is a fallacy 
(Dechy et al., 2011; Rousseau et al., 2016). The company for instance decided to 
reduce the maintenance workload in order to better manage the maintenance 
activities during outages of the next year and reduce therefore the vicious circle. 
The company was also advised to reduce the frequency of changes so as to enable 
their implementation and ownership by an overloaded workforce that was 
coincidentally stressed by a wave of retirements and a heavier workload in 
maintenance work. This should enable better consideration of the impact of 
changes and especially the risks related to interactions of changes which remained 
under-investigated so far. In short, the company was invited to reconsider the 
overall strategy of changes which it finally did by delaying some changes and by 
giving more subsidiarity to local nuclear power plants than to central engineering 
and management departments of the nuclear fleet.  
Last, the company was invited to consider the concept of organisational resilience 
and the need to diagnose and reinforce its resilience to potential new troubles.  
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8.4 Key elements of an OF Framework for guiding and 
questioning Foresight in Safety 
The last suggestions in the previous example fit with our proposal to employ the 
positive sides of organisational factors to lever management of safety for the 
future. 
After explaining the reason why organisational factors are a key lever for 
prevention and specifically for foresight in safety and providing examples in the 
way they were employed in inspection and auditing contexts conducting 
organisational diagnosis, this part addresses the practical challenges of employing 
organisational factors to prevent accidents. It outlines some guidelines for 
enquiring into the organisational factors of FiS. It also uses lessons learned from 
the nuclear and chemical industries that can be applied to other industrial sectors. 
8.4.1 Background and foundations for elaborating a framework 
This subsection aims to develop additional definitions about organisational factors 
in relation to safety, either positive and negative, by illustrating some of them in 
multiple literature sources, and their combined outcome on system states. 
Diagnosing the dynamic state of functioning with opposite forces? 
As explained (figure 1), quality and efficiency in organisational functioning has a 
great impact on safety, whether its outcome is positive or negative. Our diagnostic 
challenge is to anticipate risks and enhance safety.  
If we look at the impact on safety, the functioning of an organisation can be placed 
on a continuum, moving from time to time and oscillating between different 
states. Of course, an organisation has different parts, and these may differ, but we 
consider that the functioning of the whole is dependent on the weakest part. At 
least, in a simple manner, we can identify three specific organisational situations 
that lead to three different safety states: dysfunctional, normal, and resilient. 
The impact on safety of a dysfunctional organisation ranges from negative to very 
negative. Chronically dysfunctional organisations are sometimes called 
‘pathological’ (Reason 1990, 1997; Westrum, 1992; Dien et al., 2012). In these 
organisations, the degradation of safety is severe enough to be detected with 
relative ease by several actors or processes (audit, investigation, as in Texas City 
2005 accident). However, many EWSs and alerts are not treated accordingly. Part 
of the culture within the dysfunctional organisation does not want to know and 
discourages ‘bad news’. These are the organisations who ‘shoot their messengers’, 
punish whistleblowers, blame individuals for failures and discourage new ideas 
(Westrum, 1992). In such organisations, the likelihood of a system accident grows 
as negative organisational factors accumulate. Dynamically, the effect may be seen 
as a ‘system drift’ (e.g. Dekker, 2011) accompanied by normalisation of deviance 
(Vaughan, 1996). In the longer term, the likelihood of accidents may become very 
high as the system becomes critically vulnerable, and its ability for adaptive change 
becomes embrittled (Woods, 2009). In such an environment, an event can trigger 
cascading effects because several lines of defences are already weak or lack safety 
margins. Foresight is low and even reactive measures are lacking. For the present 
authors, the Texas City accident is a case that demonstrates the effects on safety 
in a severely dysfunctional, pathological organisation.  
A normally functioning organisation has adequate safety in normal conditions. 
This would be the minimum expectation of a responsible, law-abiding 
management. Its approach to safety is characterised by adequate preventive and 
protective measures; a reactive and proactive attitude towards near misses (e.g. 
what if?); regular auditing, and; looking for root causes when investigating and 
inspecting. It is already doing more than treating safety in a bureaucratic manner 
(Dekker, 2014) which would be limited to listening to messengers if they arrive, 
and responding with local repairs only (Westrum, 1992). It does not mean there 
would be no incidents or local accidents, but their impact would be limited, as 
some safety margins and barriers would block their escalation into a major 
accident. The likelihood of a system accident remains low, and although some 
limited drift may occur, it can be recovered in time if action is focussed. Unlike the 
dysfunctional organisation with its eyes closed, foresight in the normally 
functioning organisation is practiced with conventional tools. Overall, we could say 
that the normally functioning organisation is a robust system: it can withstand 
deviations and anomalies to degree, especially if these stay within the design basis.  
A resilient organisation, in contrast, can withstand and even repel unforeseen 
events and disruptions and still stay safe. It is highly reliable (e.g. Roberts, 1990) 
and resilient in the sense set out by Hollnagel et al. (2006). The resilient 
organisation is highly proactive (sometimes called generative, Westrum 1992) 
about tackling residual risks. This proactive behaviour is characterised by 
challenging and reinforcing their defence-in-depth, conducting stress-tests on 
beyond design basis events (e.g. in the nuclear industry after Fukushima), learning 
from their own events and opportunistically from others, and challenging basic 
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assumptions and questioning the status quo. Bad news is welcome in the resilient 
organisation, in fact it searches for divergent opinions (messengers are trained and 
rewarded, Westrum, 1992). Its approach to foresight goes beyond the use of 
conventional tools. It involves outsiders, sponsors ‘red teams’, investigates root 
causes—not just of near misses but even of EWSs. The resilient organisation 
conducts organisational reforms and invests in additional safety margins without 
regulatory requests. 
Table 3. Three organisational situations leading to three different safety states. 
Organisational 
situations 
Dysfunctional Normal (even robust) Resilient 
State Unsafe to very 
unsafe 
Safe within design 
basis in normal 
conditions 
Safe, even when under 
stress beyond design 
basis 







First target is 
maintaining safety. 
There is a positive 
balance between 
positive and negative 
forces with the safety 
margins that remain 
Safety is maintained by 
adding safety margins 




within or outside 
the organisation.  











system functions are 
performed with 







and status quo (stress 
tests their defence in-
depth). 
Uses unconventional 
methods to see and 
think differently (e.g. 
‘red teams’). 
EWSs are treated at the 
"right" level and may 
lead to organisational 
reforms. 
Adds safety margins 
without regulatory 
requests. 
8.4.2 Which are the relevant organisational factors to investigate to enhance 
safety and foresight in safety? 
Investigating, for prevention purposes, the potential or actual effects of 
organisational factors on the system requires a general mapping of the relevant 
organisational factors that could be addressed. 
Review of Lists of Organisational Factors 
Since Turner (1978) and Reason (1990, 1997) broke the ground, a lot has been said 
and written about organisational accidents, reliability, resilience and safety. The 
literature contains several lists of organisational factors that are claimed to be 
relevant. Each of these lists has its own logic and arises from its author’s theoretical 
tradition (safety, psychology, sociology, management sciences or economics). In 
this paper, we call them organisational factors (OFs) as defined in part 8.2.5. 
However, other authors have used terms such as pathogenic and resilient 
organisational factors, dysfunctional factors, latent causes, and so forth. 
We reviewed about 30 of those lists, but there are more. This work is still in 
progress, but readers are invited to regularly update their lists with insights from 
accidents and new researches. The lists we reviewed came from different sources, 
researchers and safety analyst but also safety organisations including: the US 
Center for Chemical Process Safety, who published a book on the subject; the 
Energy Institute; inspection agencies, such as the Health and Safety Executive in 
United Kingdom; and many individual authors writing about safety, or about 
organisational management.  
The review found that the lists exist in isolation and do not, except in a very few 
cases, refer to each other or have common links. We see this as an important 
missing characteristic; it is one of the reasons why we wish to develop a guiding 
framework.  
Moreover, many lists included either positive OFs, negative OFs, or both, without 
distinction. This can sometimes mislead readers. We took from this that OFs should 
be labelled or stated in a way that makes it absolutely clear whether it purports to 
have a positive or a negative impact on the safety of an organisation. In future 
work, we want to fulfil this requirement by providing an assessment question for 
each OF in the framework.  
In the next two subsections, we provide illustrative lists of purely negative OFs, and 
purely positive OFs. 
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An Illustrative list of negative organisational factors 
Here are three examples of entries on a list of organisational factors that are purely 
negative in their effects on safety. Those below are presented as illustrations; 
many other negative OFs could be included. 
• Production pressures. These result in behaviours and injunctions aimed 
at overriding or voluntarily ignoring certain dimensions of safety in order 
to favour short-term technical or economic performance. Production 
pressures arise when the production culture—a set of knowledge, know-
how, etc. contributing to technical or economic results—is no longer 
counterbalanced by the safety culture. Often in a competitive 
environment, the strategy and priorities set-up by top management 
initiate or reinforce those production pressures. A first difficulty of 
detection comes from the confusion between the culture of production 
and the pressures of production, that is to say that the pressures of 
production can be assimilated within a dimension of the culture of 
production. 
• Weakness of operational feedback. The feedback (lesson learning) 
process comprises: the detection of malfunctions, the collection of these 
data, the analysis and synthesis of the causes of these malfunctions, the 
definition of corrective measures, the implementation of these measures, 
the evaluation of the effectiveness of the measurements, and the 
memorisation of the treatment. The implementation of corrective 
measures aims to prevent the occurrence of new incidents and accidents. 
This process is iterative and dynamic, and in this sense the feedback is 
‘alive’. The lesson becomes ‘unlearned’ when the organisation has 
difficulty in recalling the experience. This difficulty appears when the 
feedback process is either weak or not at all supported in the 
organisation, or when the associated resources are insufficient, or when 
a step is (systematically) absent or deficient. 
• Weakness of control bodies. Control bodies are the entities responsible 
for verifying compliance with duties for safety. These duties, owed by the 
operator of the socio-technical system at risk, arise from various 
obligations: legal, regulatory, contractual, procedural, social, moral, and 
so forth. The control bodies reflect these different classes of obligation. 
They include those attached to the installation (local safety departments, 
for example), those at a “corporate” level of the company in charge of the 
installation, and those outside the company (safety authorities for 
example). The possible weaknesses of control bodies refer to the 
weaknesses of their interventions and actions, meaning that they do not 
play the role of counterweight and counter-powers as they are supposed 
to. 
Several other negative organisational factors have been identified by investigators 
and researchers. Among the most important recalled here, we could add the lack 
of re-examination of design assumptions, flaws in human resource management 
and the organisational complexity including subcontracting (e.g. Dien et al., 2013). 
More examples are e.g. the POFs, called “pathogenic organisational factors”, as 
described in Pierlot et al. (2006).  
An Illustrative of a list of positive organisational factors 
In general, positive OFs are those that either maintain or improve the level of 
reliability of the system or its robustness and resilience, and therefore have a 
positive impact on its safety performance. Note, however, that compiling a full list 
of positive OFs may be complicated. For example, the benefits to safety that are 
associated with positive OFs might in some cases be indirect or may depend on 
circumstances that change. Furthermore, some organisational provisions can 
improve both production performance and safety but can oppose as well. There 
are also conceptual differences between reliability and safety (see Nancy Leveson, 
1995 and 2004; Llory and Dien, 2006).  
The items below are presented as illustrations; many other positive OFs could be 
included. These particular items arise from studies of highly reliable organisations 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001).   
• Efficient treatment of malfunctioning. A major negative event is never a 
standalone situation. It does not occur by chance. It is (almost) always 
preceded by ‘little’ events which are all early warning signs—symptoms 
of the deterioration of the safety level. So, if every event is detected, 
analysed in terms of its generic aspects (i.e. considering what could have 
been worse) and, if the corrective measures designed cover also generic 
aspects, then the organisation increases the likelihood of avoiding a more 
serious event. Too often, ‘little’ events are treated as ‘here and now’, 
meaning the only corrective measures defined are those that will only 
avoid reoccurrence of this specific event. To treat an event as unique and 
wholly exceptional is to deny its significance. It is fair to say that an 
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organisation with ‘a lot‘ of small events treated well is safer than an 
organisation with no events. As well as stimulating the search for 
improvements, feedback keeps an organisation watchful for danger. One 
could say that when this OF is present, people in the organisation are 
mindful of failure rather than blinded by success. 
• Real operations oriented. Every activity and organisation, and especially 
those with large safety risks, are governed by rules, procedures and 
regulations. In general, these are attempts to define and describe 
boundaries of operations. Unfortunately, makers of rules cannot foresee 
all the possibilities of real life, which contains unexpected events and 
unforeseen situations that operators must cope with on the front line. 
Furthermore, these situations or events can arise in any of several 
domains of activity: operations, maintenance, or training. Because of this 
complexity, a feature of maintaining an appropriate level of safety is a 
great reliance on those closest to the process. ‘Great reliance’ does not 
mean ‘blindly’ relying on everything done by front line workers. It means 
that regulators, designers and managers must pay attention to everything 
done beyond procedures and to check how right (or wrong) it was. 
• Deference to expertise. Some situations, mainly hazardous situations 
(e.g. crises, incidents, and accidents) demand that decisions are made 
quickly. In those cases, especially if complex, the real-time processes of 
decision making cannot be based on the organisational hierarchy. Rather, 
decisions are made by the people locally in charge of operations, based 
on their knowledge and skills. An organisation needs to have prepared for 
this change in how decisions are made. Amongst other things, hierarchical 
leaders must be ready to allow these knowledgeable, skilled people to 
speak freely. Moreover, by virtue of their knowledge and skills, these 
people may also be able to improve decision-making in everyday, non-
emergency, circumstances. Deference to expertise is the tendency to 
delegate decision making to those who have the most expertise, 
irrespective of their position or hierarchical status.  
• Open minded to debate. Steep hierarchies in organisations often lead to 
bureaucratic management (Dekker, 2014). This situation favours the 
emergence of a single, not to say over simple, official ‘view of the world’. 
Yet, organisations are generally heterogeneous entities, and not 
monolithic wholes (Dien, 2014). The usual situation, especially on issues 
of process safety, is for the coexistence of several opinions and views of 
a situation. Since safety is not only a matter of rule compliance, but is also 
a matter of debate, every opinion must be expressed, irrespective of the 
hierarchical position it comes from. Diverse and dissenting voices must be 
taken into account, although not necessarily agreed with. They must be 
listened-to without a defensive attitude. The ability to give room to 
debates (about safety) and welcome ‘bad news’ is a positive 
organisational factor for safety. This is notably true in crisis situations, 
where as well as pre-planned emergency actions, some time will be spent 
sharing information and interpretations—sometimes through 
sensemaking confrontations—to inform decisions about what needs to 
be done.  
• Reluctance to simplify. Industrial facilities are usually manifest as 
complex systems. In order to be able to handle the whole process, 
organisations are tempted to simplify interactions between some 
subsystems and to exclude some others from serious study. An example 
of this is modelling, which even when detailed still represents a 
simplification of an even more complex reality. By putting aside what they 
consider to be outliers, organisations take risks. Treating outliers in this 
way creates blind spots over the corresponding zones of the process, so 
creating the scope for unanticipated and unwanted situations to occur. 
So, simplification creates a wrong picture of the real situation. The ‘devil’ 
as the saying has it, ‘is in the details’. To put it another way, ‘situational 
awareness‘ demands a questioning attitude, one which avoids easy, 
simplistic explanations and shortcuts in assumptions. Rather than those 
that simplify at every turn, it is organisations willing to grapple with the 
complexity of their processes that stay able to avoid major surprises.  
These positive factors, it is contended, act in combination. The more of these and 
other positive factors are present within an organisation, the better safety is 
positively ensured with safety margins.  
Other positive organisational factors are those which allow facilities to remain 
resilient. As proposed by the resilience engineering school of thought (Hollnagel et 
al., 2006), the four resilience features are: the ability to respond, the ability to 
monitor, the ability to learn, and the ability to anticipate. Hollnagel (2009) 
proposed a matrix which provides a measurement of the resilience level of an 
organisation according to the score it obtains for each ability. 
        Page 163 of 252 
8.5 Bridging the operational gap: from current ‘part one’ to 
future ‘part two’  
8.5.1 Synthesis of ‘part one’: A road map towards an OF’s framework for 
guiding and questioning Foresight in Safety  
By looking at the literature on major accidents and several accident theories and 
at our own investigating experiences (in nuclear and chemical industries) we have 
shown (section 8.2) that it has been known for more than twenty years that OFs 
affect risk prevention heavily. However, they remain underused by industry and 
regulators. 
In addition to the general definitions of technical and human influence factors that 
are widely accepted in the safety community, we have proposed three levels of 
organisational factors: management system failures, organisational 
dysfunctionalities, and regulation dysfunctionalities.  
Exploring our past experiences together with our ideas about hindsight, insight and 
foresight permitted us (section 8.3) to link different activities (such as 
investigations, audits, and organisational diagnoses) to different temporal phases 
(past/hindsight: investigating accidents and incidents; present/insight: auditing 
and diagnosis; future/foresight: proactive management). The practical examples in 
this section gave us some ideas about how to improve foresight by combining 
these different ‘sights’. 
After research of the literature, we were able to define the three organisational 
situations leading to three safety states (dysfunctional, normal, and resilient 
defined in table 3 in section 8.4). 
To get a view on which organisational factors are relevant, we reviewed several 
lists of OFs. Although in the safety literature, there exist several lists of OFs36, they 
are scattered and many of them have a limited scope. Moreover, a global and 
coherent view is lacking and support for a thorough coherent organisational 
diagnosis remains limited. 
The result is that organisational factors remain vague, opaque and, relative to their 
importance, barely visible as latent causes of accidents or levers for risk 
                                                                
36 We studied 26 lists from authors of different competences and skills (safety, engineering, sociology, 
psychology and management) 
prevention. Therefore, there is a need for a framework that enables practitioners 
and researchers to more readily use these OF constructs in the search for 
weaknesses/threats and strengths/opportunities in organisations. The use of the 
framework would be not only backward looking (hindsight) and present (insight) 
but also for the future (foresight).  
8.5.2 Future work for ‘part two’ 
This section describes the work that we plan to do in the future.37 We identify two 
tools to be developed.  
As result of the above (section 8.5.1), the first step in our plan is to develop a 
framework that practitioners can use as a tool to help them find significant 
organisational safety weaknesses and strengths.  
The value of the framework to the practitioner will be to guide a systematic search 
for relevant OFs. We see it as assisting, not replacing, practitioners’ existing 
fieldwork processes. For example, if a practitioner finds that an OF in the 
framework to be relevant in a particular audit or investigation, they would gather 
more data using their existing skills and practices to evaluate the relevance and 
potency of that OF on the organisation’s safety.  
The framework will permit people acting as investigator (of accidents), auditor, 
organisational analyst to look from the starting OF to the surrounding, 
(neighbouring or adjacent) organisational factors so those factors can be 
investigated and assessed in turn for their impact on safety. Consequently, the 
“spreading” of the negative or positive impact inside the organisational framework 
can be made more obvious. In this way, new foresight is created. 
Although one must be careful not to overcomplicate the framework—usability is 
crucial— the possible connections and plausible links between organisational 
factors could be mapped and will be part of the interpretative framework. For 
example, too many organisational changes in a short notice might be linked to 
production pressures or a misperception of the effects of changes, for instance on 
roles and responsibilities.  
On the other side when practitioners find plenty of evidence for a particular OF, 
they will be very tempted to close too soon the analysis. This is contrary to the 
37 Any volunteering is welcome! Contact frank.verschueren@werk.belgie.be or nicolas.dechy@irsn.fr 
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principle of thorough inspection and investigation. Our aim is that the future 
framework will support the questioning and prevent the premature stop of an 
analysis. 
The second step in ‘part two’ will be a set of “assessment questions”. Ideally, each 
component of the framework will have questions to help the practitioner assess 
the quality of impact (positive or negative) and its level (weak or strong impact). 
However, although safety issues evolve in general ways, (e.g. ageing, digital 
transformation, etc.) they manifest uniquely in every specific organisation. Mindful 
of this interplay between general and specific, when applying them, practitioners 
will always need to adapt the framework and the set of questions. 
Our approach implies to look for the effects, observable outcomes of the 
combination of OFs in some specific normal functioning situations of the system, 
activities or events inside the organisation. 
In contrast with the classic basic audit which delivers an instantaneous picture of 
the present situation and performance, we see an approach that is more extended 
over time, and dynamic in what it focuses on and the temporal perspective taken.  
If time is a limiting factor, this kind of organisational diagnosis (audit, inspection, 
investigation) can be performed on specific topics rather than the whole 
management of safety. To avoid staying at the surface of the organisation and the 
‘speeches of the front stage’, we recommend a tighter focus: selecting a few sub-
topics to be questioned, such as those revealed by previous audits or 
investigations, or areas that the organisation is changing. 
By assessing organisational factors, which we see as characteristics of the 
organisation that are critical for safety, we can identify weaknesses. Some 
weaknesses will require urgent remedy, but others allow a more gradual approach 
to improvement. Similarly, by referring to positive factors, we can detect areas for 
consolidation. 
To summarise, we propose these as relevant objects for study and intervention: 
• Historical vulnerabilities               
 =>      to be found especially in the past 
 
• EWS, symptoms of dysfunctionality, drift and changes                               
=> to be searched for in the past and in the present situation; 
 
• New threats to consider and opportunities for improvement   
=> to be looked for in future potential situations. 
As we aim to support practitioners to find these objects and to assist them in 
verifying and proving that they identified the correct former vulnerabilities, the 
right present or past EWS and the relevant future threats (we cannot imagine 
now), we propose development of: 
1. A framework to help practitioners detect and characterise if the set of 
organisational factors (the factors that are essential characteristics of the 
safe functioning of the organisation) are dysfunctional, normal or resilient 
and are producing observable effects (symptoms and EWS); 
2. A set of questions that practitioners can ask as part of their exploration of 
organisational factors in a given investigation, audit or assessment; 
3. An assessment method to foresee the future effects—whether positive, 
negative or neutral — of organisational factors on safety in a given 
organisational setting. This will be a kind of SWOT analysis (Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats); 
4. A protocol for collective and debated judgment of the overall safety state: 
stable, improving or degrading.  
 
All this will be further developed and finalised in our future part two, where in 
addition we would like to see development of the following capacities: 
• Guiding Hindsight, Insight but specially Foresight in Safety by the 
(“guided”) search of other plausible EWS starting from a detected and 
confirmed EWS; 
• Enhancing Insight and Oversight on the safety performance of an 
organisation; 
• Questioning Foresight in Safety by assessing the impact of present and 
future decisions and behaviours of all levels, but in particular those of the 
Board and senior management. 
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9 Safety foresight in asset management 
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Executive summary 
In recent years, asset management has been applied consistently as a structured 
discipline to several areas of economic activity, including infrastructure, industry, 
banking and insurance. Banking and insurance are mainly related to the financial 
sector. Infrastructure refers to energy networks (electricity, gas, district heating), 
water and sewage, roads, rail network and telecommunications, and the relevant 
industrial sectors include, amongst others, power generation (renewables, fossil 
and nuclear), chemical and petrochemical, and pulp and paper. However, to 
present this subject in a reasonable level of detail, only industrial assets will be 
considered here, with a special attention to the power generation industry. 
There are many reasons why asset management has recently become an essential 
part of management activities and management science. Several examples can be 
cited, such as the ageing of industrial asset systems and its increasing integration; 
more stringent quality, safety and environmental requirements for the industry, 
imposed by regulators; greater awareness of risks among workers, managers and 
stakeholders; globalisation and fierce market competition; and pressure on asset 
managers for higher profitability and return on assets. Frequently, several of these 
features generate a combined effect, making it difficult to identify the specific 
contribution of each one to asset management. 
In the literature, several definitions of asset management can be found. However, 
the definition included in the ISO standard for asset management released a few 
years ago (ISO 55001:2014), will be used here as a reference, although its meaning 
is quite broad. The standard defines asset management as a coordinated activity 
of an organisation to realise value from assets. In turn, ‘asset’ is defined as an item, 
thing or entity that has potential or actual value to an organisation. However, in 
the specific context of this paper, the term asset management has its main 
application to the industry, that is, asset management focussed on physical assets. 
The main objective of this paper is to identify areas of asset management that can 
be used in safety foresight, to enable the detection process for systems/equipment 
deterioration signals or anomalies before a serious accident can occur. To 
accomplish this objective, it is necessary to limit the period of the lifecycle of an 
industrial asset to its intended use, that is, to the operational/production stage. 
However, this does not preclude taking necessary safety measures during design, 
or later in the construction, commissioning or even in the decommissioning stages. 
The relevant activity during the operational/production stage is Operation and 
Maintenance (O&M), which is accomplished both by personnel and 
systems/equipment through a set of processes following established operating 
procedures. This is the reference period that will be considered in detail in this 
chapter, it being simultaneously the longest and the most relevant in the life cycle 
of an industrial asset. 
In industry, although internal agents, including managers and technical staff, put 
asset management into practice every day, the role of external agents cannot be 
neglected. They influence the way industrial assets are managed, too. External 
agents include: regulators, certification bodies, insurance companies, 
technologists (high-tech manufacturers), O&M specialist companies or industry 
institutes, users’ groups and sector associations. They help companies by 
identifying non-conformities, weaknesses, gaps and process deviations in the way 
asset systems are being managed. When agents find these indications, they act: 
issuing instructions and alerts, or making recommendations aimed at correction. 
And occasionally, recommendations issued by one external agent can even induce 
a synergistic effect on related issues in the domain of other agents. As the 
contribution of these external agents to foresight in safety is not usually 
mentioned in the literature, it will be the main topic addressed in this chapter. To 
better illustrate the subject, practical examples taking from the conventional 
power generation industry are given. In this context, nuclear power generation is 
ruled out of this analysis, as oversight of regulators is quite intense, even dominant 
in respect to other external agents, and major accidents occur very infrequently. 
As a result, it is quite difficult to find areas for improvement in nuclear power 
generation that would have broad application to other industry sectors. 
        Page 169 of 252 
9.1 Introduction 
“I am prepared for the worst, but hope for the best.” 
Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881) 
 
The term ‘asset management’ has become quite popular in recent years and is 
currently used to address management issues in several areas of economic activity, 
including infrastructure, industry, banking and insurance. Although asset 
management activities have been performed since society started to use capital 
assets, recent changes in our way of living and business environment have required 
the adoption of a more structured management approach. The efforts made to 
obtain this more structured approach culminated with the publication in 2014 of 
the first edition of the ISO standard on asset management Standard 55001. The 
standard defines a set of requirements that once established, implemented and 
maintained, will ensure the fair asset management performance of an 
organisation, responding to the requirements and expectations of interested 
parties and ensuring value creation and maintenance. 
Assets can be physical, financial, human or ‘intangible’. However, to reduce the 
broad spectrum of assets to be addressed in this chapter, only physical and human 
assets from the industry sector will be considered. Physical assets include systems 
and equipment, the environment and the associated production processes. Special 
attention will be devoted to the conventional power generation industry, from 
which examples will be provided to further illustrate the statements and, 
hopefully, enabling replication to other industries, whenever applicable. Nuclear 
power generation is ruled out of this analysis, for several reasons, including the 
specificity of this industry and the intense oversight of regulators, mainly 
concerned with nuclear safety. As a result, it is quite difficult to find areas for 
improvement in nuclear power generation that would have broad application to 
other industry sectors.  
The main objectives of this chapter are to (i) identify tools, practices and agents 
(internal and external) that can contribute to safety foresight in asset management 
within the power generation sector, and (ii) to describe how this can be achieved. 
9.2 Systems and Equipment 
In the power generation industry, as in other industries, physical assets can be 
divided into several categories and levels. Complementary to this, a coding system 
is usually adopted for asset management purposes, including operation and 
maintenance. At the top level, power plants are divided into units, of similar or 
different design, technology, installed capacity, etc. When a power plant is to be 
constructed within a specific investment project, typically between two and four 
units, similar units are considered. The division into units provides adequate 
operational flexibility to satisfy power grid needs and minimise the risk that all 
units might fail simultaneously. However, in recent years, as an effect of the 
European liberalised electricity market and the opportunity to use extra installed 
capacity, some reservoir hydro power plants have been subject to repowering 
projects. In these cases, the tendency is to construct units with a higher installed 
capacity, thereby taking advantage of the benefits of a higher electricity price in 
peak hours and, simultaneously, of the technological advances made in relation to 
the original units, which sometimes were built decades before. 
The second level of physical assets are the systems and equipment; the third, the 
components; and fourth, the parts. 
Having in place an efficient coding system is a key-element for operation and 
maintenance activities. It enables the asset owner to better manage systems and 
equipment failures, stocks of critical spare parts, and communication with 
manufacturers. 
Reference to all these asset levels will be made, where appropriate.  
9.2.1 Operation 
9.2.1.1 Performance Requirements 
Systems and equipment performance requirements are established through a set 
of standards, manufacturer operational instructions and emergency procedures 
that should be followed by the industrial asset personnel, including managers, 
supervisors and operators. 
Any advanced industrial process is managed by a command and control system, 
usually known by the acronym SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition). 
This system includes safety instrumentation and process control systems that are 
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run automatically, under operator supervision. In recent years, major advances 
have been made in those systems. Due to this, command and control system 
obsolescence cannot be ignored, as this system is the ‘heart’ of the plant. Based 
on experience, a command and control system becomes obsolete approximately 
in 20 years. This is critical, especially for hydro power plants, as these power plants 
may reach 100 years, without major improvements in the remaining systems, 
besides regular maintenance overhauls. 
Operators should be submitted to a specific training programme in accordance 
with their own functional requirements, comprising theoretical courses and on-
the-job training. A simulator aided operator training through a dynamic operator 
training system can improve and speed up this process significantly, enabling the 
trainee to repeat actions that were not performed correctly until an acceptable 
performance level is reached. Depending on the functions allocated to each 
operator, in some cases, training can last one year, before being able to run a unit 
autonomously. Refresher training sessions should also be delivery periodically, to 
check if appropriate actions are taken, when an immediate response is required. 
Although human error cannot be eliminated, training is one key aspect to lower 
the operational risk, especially during emergency situations, when human factors 
are at stake and a swift and appropriate response from plant operators is intended 
and expected. 
9.2.1.2 Safety Requirements 
9.2.1.2.1 Procedures 
Safety alerts are included in the operating instructions set out by systems and 
equipment manufacturers (technologists). The Emergency Safety Plan (ESP) should 
also be readily available to all personnel, preferably both on paper and 
electronically, in the internal information technology network.  
The ESP provides details about the actions required in the event of emergency 
situations. Usually, foreseeable loss scenarios are included and selected as the 
basis for periodic safety drills. The main purpose of drills is to test the preparedness 
of the industrial asset personnel to react to a specific emergency and limit the 
damage. Drill results highlight areas for improvement and allow corrective actions 
to be scheduled and included in the safety drill report [see also chapter 5]. 
Other relevant safety procedures that might be available are referred in 9.3.2.3.2.  
9.2.1.2.2 Proactive Controls 
Proactive controls include alarms, emergency or unplanned shutdowns (trips), 
proactive safety performance indicators, and event analysis. Under certain 
circumstances, they can be interpreted as early warning signs (EWS) of system 
malfunction (instantaneous) or as system safety deterioration (over time), when a 
benchmark or reference parameter indicating a normal operation situation can be 
established [see also chapters 6, 7 and 10]. 
In operational safety, an alarm activation means that an anomaly has been 
detected in the system or equipment and an urgent action is required to eliminate 
the cause. Alarms are installed in systems and equipment to allow actions to be 
taken well in advance of a more serious event. These include actions on a process 
variable, machinery malfunction, fire outbreak, etc. 
In terms of process control, an alarm is an indication to the operator that is 
initiated by a process variable or measurement that has passed a predefined limit 
considered to be an undesirable or an unsafe value. Poorly functioning alarm 
systems, or lack of training operating a system or equipment under emergency 
situations, worsen the seriousness of upsets, incidents and major industrial 
accidents. 
Alarm activation can be attributed to two main sources: operator error or 
equipment malfunction. False alarms may also occur, either due to a non-
calibrated or faulty sensors. To overcome this situation, where critical parameters 
on critical systems and equipment are concerned, the ‘2oo3’ (2 out of 3) voting 
system principle should be applied. Under these circumstances, this principle will 
issue a shutdown command if at least two modules (that is, modules of critical 
parameter sensors) issue a shutdown command. This voting system will fail to 
perform its intended function on demand if two failures occur together. In 
addition, both failures will have had to be undetected by the system’s internal 
diagnosis; or one failure must be ‘dangerous undetected’ and the other failure has 
to be ‘dangerous detected’. When two dangerous and detected failures occur, it is 
assumed that the system responds in a safe way, and a system trip will occur. This 
can be considered the means of last resort for the system to prevent a potential 
serious failure. 
In fact, trips are the last resort available to halt the system operation, to avoid 
further deterioration and potential widespread damage to equipment or harm to 
personnel and the environment. This action can be triggered by human 
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intervention (the operator) or automatically by the system, when predefined 
operational parameter values are reached. The costs of trips, which happen more 
frequently than accidents, can be quite significant. Besides process interruption, 
that can only be resumed after the possible cause of the unplanned shutdown is 
well identified and corrected. Also, although a more serious failure has been 
prevented, an unplanned shutdown reduces slightly the useful life of equipment. 
When an abnormal event is stopped before causing any damage and the 
operational parameter returns to its normal zone, this is considered as a process 
near-miss. 
To take full advantage of the information provided by such indications of system 
disturbances or malfunctioning, alarm and trip analyses (also called event analysis) 
are highly recommended. 
Many industrial companies record these alarm occurrences in distributed control 
systems (DCS) and emergency shutdown (ESD) databases. Operators, supervisors 
and managers seek guidance from these databases, by recording key indicators 
and paying special attention when alarm flooding occurs (Oktem, et al., 2013). 
Asset managers are becoming increasingly aware that these databases are rich in 
information related to near-misses. In recent years, researchers have been 
developing key performance indicators or metrics, associated with potential trips 
and accidents, leading indicators and failure probabilities of each of the safety 
systems. When conducted at frequent and regular intervals, analyses that are 
associated with these performance indicators are usually referred to as dynamic 
risk analyses or simply near-miss analyses.  
9.2.1.2.3 Reactive Controls 
Reactive controls are actuated when an unwanted event materialised and an 
immediate response is needed to limit the damage to a system, equipment, 
property or even harm to people and environment. Contrary to the proactive 
controls, where no or limited damage is expected, reactive controls are the last 
resort. An asset manager implements reactive controls to prevent an incident 
escalating to the degree where widespread damage and great financial loss would 
result. Typical examples on the conventional power generation industry are 
automatic or manual fire protection systems, dam spillways, fire brigade action, 
and also drills (derived from accident scenarios) conducted to assess the 
emergency preparedness of power plant personnel and reactive safety 
performance indicators. The main objective here is to react, in the shortest time 
possible, to suppress the source of danger with maximum effect. Even if limited 
damage has occurred due to the swift action of first responders, the objective is to 
learn lessons and so prevent similar accidents. Although safety foresight was not 
effective to prevent this specific accident, as it was not able to assess the risk and 
treat it adequately, if appropriate corrective measures will be adopted, similar 
accidents will be prevented. However, if corrective actions were to be 
implemented in the system, the conditions heralding its occurrence will be 
detected in an earlier stage, enabling precautionary actions to be taken. 
9.2.1.2.4 Safety Performance Indicators 
In the literature, there is no unified approach concerning terminology and 
definition of Safety Performance Indicators (SPI). 
An SPI can be defined as a basic parameter, described qualitatively or 
quantitatively, that is perceived as having potential meaning or a relationship to 
plant safety (Davies, et al., 2006), (Hale, 2009), (Van Binnebeck, 2002). 
A robust performance indicator should comprise the following features: 
• Relevant: to provide useful information in due time for decision taking; 
• Reliable: it provides the same value when used by different people; 
• Measurable: able to be measured in an objective and clear manner; 
• Feasible: cost-effective to collect; 
• Comparable: it should allow comparisons over time; 
• Resistant: resistive to manipulation, misuse and misunderstanding; 
• Clear: easy to define, report, and evaluate; 
• Specific: in relation to what is to be measured; 
• Sensitive: reacts to what is being measured; 
• Significant: in terms of sample size (number of events); 
• Auditable: likely to be auditable. 
 
Some precautions should be taken to prevent manipulation and misuse of 
performance indicators, especially when using performance indicators in bonus 
pay systems. 
The metrics chosen to establish a quantitative or qualitative SPI system that can 
be compared to a reference (benchmark) is the main difficulty to be overcome. If 
an in-house SPI system is used, reference values or qualifications (benchmark) 
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should be defined by the asset manager, taking into account the objectives set by 
the management board. However, in the case of an external SPI system, the 
benchmark should be defined by an independent organisation (e.g. a user group 
or industry sector association) to enable comparisons between peers. 
In addition to the selection criteria, several types of indicators have been 
proposed. 
According to the OECD, indicators can be divided into two types: 
• ‘activities indicators’; and 
• ‘outcome indicators’. 
Activities indicators are designed to identify whether organisations are taking 
actions believed to lower operational risks. In contrast, outcome indicators are 
designed to measure whether such actions are, in fact, leading to a lower likelihood 
of an accident or reducing the potential impact on human health or the 
environment, should an accident happen (OECD, 2005). 
On the other hand, indicators can be divided into two groups, according to their 
use (Dahlgren, et al., 2001): 
• leading (or proactive); and 
• lagging (or reactive) indicators. 
Leading indicators are useful as a precursor of safety degradation, allowing early 
management reaction. Lagging indicators are commonly used to drive plant 
performance, for monitoring, and for benchmarking against similar plants. 
Finally, two dimensions of safety indicators can be considered (Hopkins, 2009): 
• personal safety indicators versus process safety indicators; and 
• lead versus lag indicators.  
According to Hopkins, although the distinction between personal and process 
safety indicators is relatively clear, the distinction between lead and lag indicators, 
while frequently referred to, is rather more problematic. However, if one is 
interested in knowing how well safety is being managed, the distinction between 
lead and lag indicators becomes largely irrelevant, as both will provide relevant 
information to assess and monitor safety performance. 
In summary, besides the great number of definitions that can be found in the 
literature, what should be kept in mind is the fact that if properly selected, SPIs are 
useful for: 
• evaluating/measuring and comparing safety performance over time for a 
given asset or group of assets, over a cross-section of assets at a given 
time, etc.; and 
• informing decisions about the safety performance improvement of an 
industrial asset. 
Finally, the selection process of any SPI should consider the effort spent on data 
collection, treatment and reporting against the usefulness of the information 
provided, especially in terms of risk-mitigating actions or safety improvement 
measures that it can generate. 
In summary, although performance indicator systems have been established by 
sector associations to make results comparable between peers, no standardised 
SPI system has been established so far. Performance indicator systems may 
provide information regarding the process and equipment safety, but the main 
objective of such systems is monitoring operational performance and not 
operational safety. 
9.2.2 Maintenance 
Maintenance can be managed by different methods according to the type of 
system or equipment requiring intervention. The simplest method is corrective or 
run-to-failure maintenance, based on the principle break/repair or replace, which 
nowadays is seldom applicable to systems or equipment, as usually basic 
preventive tasks are performed in all of them, such as lubrication, calibration or 
visual inspection. 
Another method is preventive maintenance, where tasks are based on regular time 
intervals or running hours. This takes into account the specific mean-time-to-
failure (MTTF) statistic for each type of equipment, usually available from the 
manufacturer or in the specialist technical literature. The main disadvantage of this 
method is that MTTF is an average value that is not kept constant for all similar 
equipment, which means that either unnecessary maintenance interventions or 
catastrophic failures can happen. In the first case, labour and material are wasted. 
However, the second case implies that the run-to-failure method was applied, 
which is even more costly. 
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Predictive maintenance is based on a regular monitoring of several operational 
parameters of the equipment, and process systems will provide the data required 
to maximise the interval between repairs and minimise the number and cost of 
unplanned unavailability due to failures. Predictive maintenance is a condition-
driven preventive maintenance method. Instead of being based on industrial or 
equipment average-life statistics (i.e. MTTF) to schedule maintenance activities, it 
uses direct monitoring of equipment condition, process efficiency and other 
parameters to estimate the MTTF or loss of efficiency for each system or 
equipment.  
9.2.2.1 Type of Components 
Not all equipment and systems have the same importance for the asset manager 
or the production process. A few of them are so relevant, that a serious failure can 
produce significant financial losses, resulting from widespread damage and 
process interruption over a large time period, from several months to one year. 
The identification and selection of critical components is generally carried out by 
dividing the industrial asset components into critical and influence (non-critical). 
A critical component can be defined as having the following features: 
• its failure can cause an extended forced outage, or 
• its failure can endanger the safety of the asset, the environment or 
personnel, and 
• has long lead times and high costs for repair or replacement. 
And an influence component is characterised by: 
• failure results in significant degradation of asset performance but does 
not cause forced outage, or 
• failure does not endanger safety of asset personnel or cause widespread 
secondary damage, and 
• failure susceptibility is known due to ‘asset specific’ experience. 
Examples of critical components in the conventional power generation industry, 
namely fossil-fired power plants, include live steam piping, turbine and electrical 
generator rotors and step-up power transformers. 
Special attention should be directed towards critical components because the 
maximum probable losses due to their failures are by far more serious than those 
from ‘influence’ component failures. Critical components are the ones where the 
application of an asset management methodology can reap the most benefits, by 
avoiding losses due to major accidents. 
Bearing in mind this observation, critical components should have clearly defined 
requirements that are substantiated by records. It is much more advantageous and 
useful to maintain the strict requirements on a smaller number of items than it is 
to assign the same criteria to every piece of equipment in the facility (Newslow, 
2001). This distinctive feature allows event analyses that can reveal anomalies in 
systems and the opportunity to enact the necessary preventive measures in good 
time.  
9.2.2.2 Predictive Maintenance 
Predictive maintenance is designed to help determine the condition of in-service 
systems and equipment, and to estimate when maintenance should be performed. 
This approach enables cost savings over routine or time-based preventive 
maintenance, because activities are performed only when justified. So, it is 
regarded as condition-based maintenance, as is carried out in accordance with 
estimations of the degradation state of a component. 
The main advantages of predictive maintenance are to allow convenient 
scheduling of corrective maintenance, and to prevent unexpected system and 
equipment failures. In this way, safety foresight is applied in predictive 
maintenance to define the optimal maintenance period. 
In the conventional power generation industry, a critical system, specifically the 
turbine-generator set, dictates the interval between two power plant maintenance 
overhauls, as per the manufacturer’s instructions. These overhauls are based on 
running hours and number of starts and allow all the remaining predictive 
maintenance actions to be adjusted to the turbine-generator overhaul. 
9.3 Process Control 
According to ISO 9001:2015 Quality Management Systems standard, a process is a 
set of activities that are interrelated or that interact with one another. Processes 
use resources to transform inputs into outputs and are interconnected, because 
the output from one process often becomes the input for another process. An 
effective process control enables a product to be delivered, or service provided to 
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clients according to the procedures in force at the organisation and hence 
achieving the required quality standards. 
9.3.1 Certification (Quality, OHS, Environmental Management) 
In addition to the internal process control in force at the organisation, the quality 
management system certification provides a universal assessment level. This 
enables a competent and independent entity—the certification body—to 
periodically assess the adherence of an organisation’s processes to the quality 
management system principles set out in the ISO 9001 standard. The same is 
applicable to the occupational health and safety (OHS) management system 
standard (ISO 45001) as well as to the environmental management system 
standard (ISO 18001). The certification acts as a guarantee that the organisation is 
following the requirements established in the relevant standards, and that control 
mechanisms are set in place to enable the early detection of process degradation. 
The main advantages of certification claimed by certification bodies include, 
amongst others, better management control and improved internal 
communication. Both advantages may have a positive impact on safety foresight. 
In addition, industrial companies have physical assets and staff associated with the 
manufacturing or production process. Usually, in these cases, audits to award or 
renew the certification include on-site visits to the plants, where areas for 
improvement can be recommended, including aspects related to process safety. 
When this happens, safety foresight has been applied. 
9.3.2 External Entities 
External entities play an important role in establishing rules and controlling 
organisation activities by reference to directives, regulations, standards, 
specifications, etc.  
Regulators, certification bodies, insurance companies, technologists (high-tech 
manufacturers), O&M specialist companies, users’ groups, and sector associations 
are a few examples of entities that can help an organisation to be aware of process 
safety deterioration. In the main, they do this by identifying weak points and 
recommending preventive and corrective actions to put the process back into 
conformity with the principles of the relevant reference document or technical 
specifications. 
9.3.2.1 Regulators 
Regulators, also known as regulatory agencies, regulatory authorities or regulatory 
bodies, are public authorities or government agencies responsible for exercising 
autonomous authority over some areas of economic activity. This includes 
rulemaking, enforcing rules and regulations, and imposing supervision or oversight 
for the benefit of the public at large. Some independent regulatory agencies 
perform investigations or audits, and others may levy fines on the relevant parties 
and order certain measures to be implemented [see also Chapter 13]. 
In power generation but also in other industries, there are generally two areas 
where regulators act to exert their authority: occupational health and safety (OHS) 
and protection of the environment. The first is a multidisciplinary field concerned 
with the safety, health, and welfare of people at work. The goals of occupational 
safety and health programs include providing a safe and healthy work 
environment. The second deals mainly with environmental pollution control, 
including air quality, water quality, waste management and contaminant clean up. 
Other related areas supervised by regulators include the use of large amounts of 
dangerous chemicals in industry (under the Seveso Directive), dam structural 
safety, and emergency safety valves for pressurised equipment used in several 
process industries that make use of steam in their production processes. In the 
case of that last example, accredited laboratories calibrate and certify emergency 
safety valves periodically, according to the regulations set out by the competent 
authority. If these requirements are not met, the asset owner will have its 
operating licence cancelled. 
So, when major accidents happen, these can pose a significant threat to people 
and the environment, cause huge economic losses and disrupt sustainable growth; 
hence the value of external regulation. 
9.3.2.2 Certification Bodies 
The main roles of certification bodies are to award and issue certificates of 
compliance with the relevant management system. An auditor is usually involved 
in the company’s certification process (first certification or renewal), by conducting 
the audit on behalf of the certification body and then by reporting their findings 
back to it. A consultant can also participate in the process, providing specialist 
advice to ensure that the management systems will meet the certification 
requirements. 
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In the case of OHS, the main advantages of certification to the organisation are to: 
• increase employees’ awareness and motivation towards safety; 
• ensure that official and legal OHS requirements are met; 
• prevent accidents; 
• reduce downtime and production stoppages; 
• reduce the cost of insurance policies; 
• improve the organisation’s image as a safe and reliable business in the 
eyes of its clients, suppliers, authorities and investors. 
The relevant fact here is that both internal and external audits enable the 
detection and correction of non-conformities that otherwise would contribute to 
the occurrence of serious accidents. 
9.3.2.3 Insurance Companies 
In developed market economies, insurance plays an important role in controlling 
the risks carried by industrial assets. In simple terms, a company agrees a contract 
with an insurer to transfer a certain portion of its risk for a determined sum of 
money, called a premium. The contract is called an insurance policy. 
Usually, the insurance of large industrial assets is structured so that relatively 
minor losses are borne solely by the asset holder (Barnard, 2006). This implies that 
only losses above a certain amount, called the deductible, are incurred by the 
insurance company. On the other hand, the usual practice in the insurance market 
is also to limit the amount of losses covered by the insurance policy. Both limits, 
the deductible and the loss coverage of an insurance policy, have a financial impact 
on the premium paid by the asset holder. 
In general, the risk retention and risk transfer strategy depends on the level of risk 
that a given company is willing to accept and on the premium offered by the 
insurance market. When the insurance market is hard or risk averse—especially 
following large losses after natural disasters that have generated widespread 
damage—premiums rise and companies tend to retain a higher level of risk, to 
keep a similar insurance premium value. When the market is hard, two options are 
available: to increase the insurance deductible or to lower the insurance limit. 
Increasing the deductible usually reduces the premium more effectively than 
would lowering the insurance limit. This is because by agreeing a larger deductible, 
which is the first layer of the insurance policy, the organisation accepts to bear a 
higher portion of the loss from each accident, up to the deductible limit. Only when 
the loss exceeds the deductible limit, the insurance policy will cover the remaining 
portion of the loss. 
Usually, high frequency risks result in low severity losses, so these are the risks that 
will be retained in the company, because usually they fall under the deductible 
limit. On the contrary, low frequency risks result in high severity accidents, so these 
are the risks that are typically transferred to the insurance market, as their 
materialisation could affect heavily the economic activity of the company or even 
jeopardise its existence as such. 
For large industrial companies, there is also the possibility of self-insurance 
through an internal reinsurance company called a ‘captive’, which enables them to 
retain more risk at an intermediate level of frequency and severity. The mechanism 
of risk retention and risk transfer is represented schematically in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Risk Retention and Risk Transfer Mechanism (source: Outreville, 1998, p177) 
In terms of asset management, the most relevant insurance policy is called 
Property Damage. This type of policy may comprise two parts: Material 
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Damage/Machinery Breakdown (MD/MB), covering losses related to physical 
assets, and Loss of Profits (LP), Business Interruption (BI) or Time Element (TE), 
which cover losses derived from the interruption of the company’s supply chain. 
In this context, supply chain means power generation, transmission and 
distribution, gas supply, pulp and paper production or any other manufacturing 
process. Only the MD/MB insurance contract can be awarded separately.  
However, only sudden, unexpected and random property damage claims are 
eligible for payment by the insurance companies. This means that equipment 
failures resulting from wear and tear are ruled out from the insurance contract. 
9.3.2.3.1 Audits 
In the case of a disaster, the large economic value of industrial assets can impart 
great financial losses both to asset holders and the insurance companies. Having 
in mind this possible outcome, insurance companies carry out regular site visits, 
whose frequency is directly proportional to the total asset insured value (value at 
risk). Site visits are conducted to check if operational safety is being kept at an 
acceptable level, according to applicable codes and standards, internal 
procedures, controls and best practices. Following each site visit, a report can be 
delivered to the asset holder, mentioning areas for improvement, called 
recommendations.  
9.3.2.3.2 Recommendations  
Recommendations are intended to improve the risk and safety of an industrial 
asset as seen from the perspective of the insurance company. These are based on 
the global knowledge and experience of the insurance company (statistical data of 
similar incidents), international standards and insurance company technical 
datasheets or O&M instructions from critical equipment manufacturers 
(technologists). 
It is well known that insurance companies rely on statistics of previous losses for 
premium calculation purposes. So, it is not hard to believe that some of the 
recommendations proposed result from causes related to similar events that have 
occurred elsewhere, that could not be anticipated and have resulted in a claim. In 
effect, the goal of an insurance company is to set up a robust asset management 
system of ‘zero accidents’. Although the asset holder pursues the same objective, 
recommendations involving considerable financial investment should undergo a 
technical-economic analysis prior to taking the final decision regarding its 
completion. As financial resources to invest in completion the recommendations 
are totally incurred by the asset holder, a detailed technical-economic analysis 
allows to prioritise the ones where major benefits can be achieved at the lowest 
possible cost. 
Typically, the recommendations issued by insurance companies after field visits 
can be divided into three categories: 
• Procedures; 
• Inspection and Testing; and 
• Systems and Equipment. 
This division of insurance recommendations into categories is important mainly for 
asset management purposes. For example, if most pending recommendations fall 
into the ‘procedures’ category, it reveals that the company (the asset holder) has 
in place an operational safety system with a lot of scope for improvement. In such 
a case, the insurance company may even request a safety improvement plan, to 
assure that the company will reach a certain operational safety standard in the 
shortest time possible. On the other hand, if most of pending recommendations 
are in the ‘systems and equipment’ category, it shows a mature operational safety 
system in place. Under these conditions, and having in mind that operational 
safety is a continuous improvement process, insurance companies may prioritise 
those recommendations where, if followed, most benefits can be expected. 
Although both the insurance company and the asset holder pursue the same 
objective, which is to reduce operational risk to a satisfactory level, the investment 
necessary to complete recommendations falls completely onto the asset holder 
side. Under these circumstances, both will benefit from reducing the probability 
or consequence (or both simultaneously) of a serious failure, but the asset holder 
incurs all the costs. In the hypothetical scenario where all the recommendations of 
this category are implemented, the financial coverage provided by the insurance 
would decrease so drastically that it would become residual, possibly only useful 
for ‘Act of God’ events.  
Recommendations relating to procedures ask for new ones to be written or 
existing ones to be improved, in either case to reach the standards established by 
the insurance company. However, in a broad sense, procedures have two 
dimensions. The first is the written procedure itself (‘paperwork’), where all the 
instructions and warnings are laid down. The second is the strict fulfilment of the 
procedure. 
        Page 177 of 252 
When a procedure deals with inspection and testing instructions, the relevant part 
is the instructions and then the recommendation falls under the category of 
‘Inspection and Testing’. When the procedure, as paperwork, needs to be 
improved or updated, the recommendation is from the ‘Procedures’ category. 
Procedures of the insurance companies address mainly operational safety and fire 
prevention. Examples include the no smoking policy, ‘automatic fire protection 
systems impairment communication’ to the insurance company (for assessing the 
need of reinsurance), hot work for maintenance works involving flame or heat 
generation (e.g. oxy-cutting and welding) and contingency plans for critical 
equipment, typically, generator step-up transformer spare units, for reducing the 
loss of profits related to the period of unavailability caused by the failure, which 
can last 12 months or more. 
Usually, procedures are not costly in themselves and are easy to set up. However, 
they may be challenging in some situations because they can present practical 
difficulties. For example, to check that fire protection systems remain fully 
operational, emergency procedures require that the systems are regularly 
discharged. However, as the practical application of procedures are considered 
under the category of ‘Inspection and Testing’ recommendations, this will be 
referred to later. 
Usually, procedures are of reduced cost and easy to setup, but may be challenging 
in some situations, because they can present practical difficulties or be quite 
expensive to carry out. 
Inspection and testing’ covers all periodic maintenance actions that are required 
to keep all safety systems fully operational, and permanently ready for actuation. 
Generally, recommendations made under this category can be fulfilled at 
moderate cost. However, in some cases, testing can increase operational risks or 
become quite expensive to carry out. For example, the overspeed test of a turbine-
generator set under actual conditions calls for a 10% increase in rotation above 
nominal speed. This test creates the risk of serious widespread damage. An 
example of a costly test is checking the tightness of a turbine enclosure. This 
requires a full-scale discharge test of its fire protection system: emptying a rack of 
CO2 gas containers is a quite expensive undertaking. In such cases it is important 
to reach an agreement with the insurance company to perform the test under 
electronic simulated conditions or to use an alternative gas for tightness checking 
of the turbine enclosure respectively. 
Finally, systems and equipment installation, replacement, refurbishment or 
extension entail considerable investment that requires a technical-economic 
analysis to inform the final decision. Examples include automatic or manual fire 
protection systems and process safety control devices (e.g. a synchro check relay 
in the command line of the circuit breaker for synchro in manual mode).  
Recommendations issued by insurance companies are one of the most effective 
tools to continuously improve industrial risk and operational safety. Safety alerts 
are also used to warn insured asset holders, when property damage has occurred 
elsewhere in similar equipment. This will enable asset managers to question the 
technologist regarding the failure risk in its own equipment. In this way, safety 
foresight is used by insurance companies to prevent accidents in similar equipment 
elsewhere. 
The global knowledge and experience of insurance companies cannot be 
disregarded as a powerful tool in the prevention of serious industrial accidents. 
When these accidents happen, insurance companies are called-on to pay the 
claims, which represent the major part of the property damages incurred. In 
addition, experts (loss adjusters) are called to perform a thorough accident analysis 
aiming at determining the root cause and contributing factors of the accident. 
Once these are determined, insurance companies check if identical conditions are 
present in similar systems and equipment elsewhere, and if there is a match, 
recommend preventive actions. In this way, insurance companies use foresight in 
safety to prevent similar accidents from happening in other locations. 
From the side of the asset holder, even if recommendations are not mandatory, 
and if it is not possible to establish a direct mathematical relation between the 
insurance premium paid and pending recommendations, it is important for asset 
managers to make their own judgment about investment priorities in terms of 
asset risk and safety improvement. 
9.3.2.4 Technologists 
Technologists, in this context, are specialist firms that have the required 
knowledge and experience to develop a critical asset, characterised by a highly 
complex technology manufacturing process, only available to a restricted number 
of companies. In the power generation industry, gas turbine manufacturers, also 
called original equipment manufacturers (OEM) for combined-cycle gas turbine 
(CCGT) power plants is a good example. As only a few exist worldwide, a limited 
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number of options are available to power generation companies. In addition, the 
increase in demand for CCGT power plants by power generation companies has 
raised the competition amongst the gas turbine manufacturers, pushing them to 
innovate, aiming at reaching higher efficiency rates. Several versions of the same 
equipment model were released, as manufacturers were introducing 
improvements constantly, some due to equipment malfunctions or failures in the 
previous versions. These actions increased the risk of failure, as innovative 
solutions were released without enough time to mature. 
The maintenance of CCGT power plants, particularly gas turbines, is a complex 
discipline, especially with respect to the integrity of hot gas path components, 
which is the part of the gas turbine where temperatures can reach as much as 
1,200°C. To help asset managers in O&M matters, long term maintenance 
agreements (LTMA) are offered by turbine manufacturers as a guarantee of 
specialist technical support, for a period of 15 years or more. Besides maintenance 
technical support, these agreements may comprise daily event analysis, implying 
the delivery of all plant operational data to the manufacturer. If process 
degradation signs are detected, the manufacturer will contact the asset manager 
for more information about how the equipment is being used or maintained. 
Finally, when agreed by both parties, LTMA contracts may also include penalties, 
which can be applied if a pre-set standard quality of service level is not met by the 
manufacturer. 
Once again, the global knowledge and experience of these technologists play a 
very important role. They are aware of all equipment malfunctions and failures 
happening globally. When serious failures can jeopardise other similar units 
elsewhere, a technical information letter is issued and sent to all asset owners of 
the same equipment version. These technical letters include recommendations 
about how to operate or when specific parts should be replaced. The rationale is 
to prevent failures in other similar equipment elsewhere. In this sense, foresight 
in safety is being put into practice by the cooperative action of the technologist. 
9.3.2.5 O&M Specialist Companies 
These specialist companies and institutes are usually contracted to carry out 
specialised industrial tasks using advanced technological means and highly 
qualified human resources, such as those with expertise on power plant command 
and control systems and on critical process equipment. In the power generation 
industry, critical equipment comprises turbines, electric generators and step-up 
power transformers. These are responsible for the major failures in the power 
generation industry and the highest value claims paid by the insurance companies. 
O&M specialist companies have an in-depth knowledge and global experience in 
the field, which can be very useful when providing O&M specialist services to asset 
holders. Global experience brings awareness of the major risks and failures 
involved. An external view by qualified entities is of utmost importance to improve 
industry processes, procedures and practices. 
9.3.2.6 Users’ Groups and Sector Associations 
Users’ groups can be thought of as clubs focused on the use of a specific 
technology. The groups are usually associated with a company that is a developer 
or technologist. Although these are external interest groups, the participation of 
each asset holder allows peers to share relevant information about processes and 
equipment.  
A good example in the power generation industry are the CGGT users’ groups that 
are affiliated with each gas turbine manufacturer. On the CCGT manufacturing 
technology, the gas turbine is the most critical equipment. Challenged by the 
electricity market, the power generation industry demanded higher process 
efficiency rates, fostering a strong competition among gas turbine manufacturers. 
The rapid evolution of gas turbine technology turned it into a non-mature 
technology. Failure rates started to increase and company profit losses worsened. 
Sometimes, failure root-cause analysis carried out by the manufacturers took too 
long or could not provide satisfactory technical answers to the questions asked by 
asset managers. Users’ groups were the solution found by asset managers to 
exchange technical information regarding problems encountered in this type of 
technology. Information about corrective actions that were effective for a specific 
failure could be shared and applied to similar equipment operated by another user, 
well in advance or when appropriate. The main objective would be reducing this 
specific failure probability and improving overall operational safety for all the other 
users. 
Through regular group meetings, formal presentations and attendee-driven 
discussion sessions focusing on the design, erection, operation, and maintenance 
of the integrated plant; asset managers are aware of problems and solutions that 
could be useful to their specific case. In this way, in taking the appropriate 
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measures, safety foresight is put into practice, as similar potential equipment 
failures are anticipated and prevented from occurring. This is even more relevant 
where an LTMA agreement between the asset manager and the technologist is not 
awarded. 
Sector associations act at a higher level than users’ groups and deal with a wider 
range of issues. In the electricity industry, two examples are VGB and Eurelectric. 
VGB is the technical association of energy plant operators. Members are 
companies that operate worldwide facilities for the generation of power, heat and 
cooling as well as for energy storage and sector coupling. As an independent 
technical competence centre and network, VGB supports its members in their 
operational business as well as in the implementation of innovations and strategic 
challenges. One of the main goals is to strengthen and safeguard a high standard 
in operational and plant safety as well as health and safety at the workplace. In 
addition to technical issues, VGB is also actively involved in the political and social 
debate on technical issues, on behalf of operators. Eurelectric is the sector 
association representing the common interests of the electricity industry at a 
European level, plus its affiliates and associates on several other continents. It 
encompasses all major issues affecting the sector, from generation and markets to 
distribution networks and customer issues. 
As VGB deals with a more specific set of technical issues than Eurelectric, mainly 
related to the energy plant operators, it is easier to identify potential issues where 
safety foresight may be applied. VGB provides its members with an international 
network, a platform for the exchange and transfer of technical know-how, as well 
as access to qualified expert knowledge via, for example, operational and 
availability databases for benchmarks. These technical means can be used for a 
wide range of technical purposes. For safety foresight purposes, the most relevant 
is the benchmarking tool provided by VGB through power plant performance 
indicators. However, the indicators available are mainly related to plant 
performance in terms of availability of power supply to the electrical grid and not 
to operational safety performance. In this sense, the information obtained through 
users’ groups is more relevant to the daily life of power plant asset managers. This 
information acquaints asset managers with technical problems that may seriously 
affect process and equipment safety, allowing them take adequate actions for its 
prevention.  
9.4 Conclusions 
Nowadays, industrial assets are managed according to internal procedures, 
controls, standards and best practices. However, these are also informed by the 
influence or oversight of external entities, which operate through legal and 
contractual obligations, or by the asset holder’s own initiative. Legal obligations 
are mandatory, so they cannot be considered an option if the company aims at 
staying in the market. Contractual obligations can derive from negotiated 
agreements that require pre-conditions to be set out. If obligations result from the 
asset holder’s own initiative, they are based on the trade-off between benefits 
derived from the commitments assumed and the incurred costs. In this case, 
although almost every benefit can be monetised, some of them are difficult to 
quantify, like the company’s image or reputation. 
Internal safety requirements like procedures and controls are a very important tool 
to prevent accidents. 
Industrial companies have a set of tools available to monitor process and 
equipment safety, including proactive and reactive controls, event analysis and 
performance indicators. 
Certification of quality, OHS and environmental management systems are a 
guarantee that the organisation follows the requirements established in the 
relevant standards and that control mechanisms are in place to enable the early 
detection of process degradation. The main advantages of certification claimed by 
certification bodies include, amongst others, better management control and 
improved internal communication. Both advantages may have a positive impact 
on safety foresight. 
External entities play an important role in establishing rules and controlling 
organisation activities by reference to directives, regulations, standards, 
specifications, etc.  
Regulators, certification bodies, insurance companies, technologists (high-tech 
manufacturers), O&M specialist companies, users’ groups and sector associations 
are examples of external entities that through foresight in safety can contribute to 
improve the operational risk and safety of industrial assets at different levels. This 
is particularly true of insurance companies, who are usually the first external 
entities to be aware, are in close contact with the accidents through loss adjusters, 
and who have access to confidential, detailed information regarding the causes of 
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the losses. Inside information of the causes of loss is relevant to similar systems 
and equipment under operation elsewhere. Under these circumstances, 
recommendations issued by the insurance company towards improving risk and 
safety on similar units can be considered as a safety foresight measure. 
Finally, asset managers are responsible for the process and equipment safety of 
the company. They should be aware of all the internal and external tools and 
entities available to prevent major accidents. By being aware of and using these 
tools adequately, asset managers can play a relevant role in reducing the 
probability of major accidents.  
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10 Big data analytics and early warning signs 
Eric Marsden, Fondation pour une culture de sécurité industrielle (FonCSI), France, 
Nicolas Dechy, Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire (IRSN), France, 
Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano, European Commission Joint Research Centre, Ispra, Italy. 
10.1 Executive summary 
The analysis of “big data” has generated a large amount of interest in industry over 
the past decade. Promoters can point to a number of benefits and success stories 
in the retail and entertainment areas, as well as in optimization of industrial 
processes, and more recently in overcoming security (Amanullah et al., 2015), 
safety (Huang et al., 2019) and reliability (Ham & Park, 2020) challenges. 
To what extent can increased collection and analysis of data help to detect early 
warning signs of system failure, and predict the occurrence of the infrequent 
events that are relevant to the management of industrial safety and major accident 
hazards? What should we monitor? What are the challenges and risks of 
inadequate use of big data? 
10.2 Key messages 
Big data analytics has a significant potential to improve the detection of early 
warning signs of system failure, when compared with the use of standard statistical 
tools or of unassisted human monitoring of system data. It also provides 
opportunities in health usage monitoring of equipment (e-Health). 
Industry 4.0 has fostered the burgeoning of digital twins, offering enterprises the 
capability of real-time situation awareness thanks to digital technologies 
(ubiquitous sensors generating big data, artificial intelligence, machine learning, 
predictive software analytics, etc.). These dynamic digital simulation models of 
physical assets allow continuous data, information and knowledge (DIK) 
acquisition related to system performance and failure. Thus, enterprises are able 
to rapidly run diagnostics, intervene to correct problems before they become 
critical and detect new improvement opportunities. 
Effective use of predictive analytics faces a number of obstacles, some induced by 
the black-box-effect of algorithms and tools. Their use requires specialised skills of 
the analysts who build the data collection and analysis tools, but also from the 
users, who will require training though they will not become data analysts. 
Algorithms can improve human judgment, but will never replace it completely. 
Humans, within organisational processes, will remain important at every step of a 
big data analytics process: framing individual and organisational attention to the 
data that important to analyse, putting in place and checking the data collection 
process, interpreting the importance of outliers found in data, and validating the 
causal nature of correlations identified. 
Automatic decision-making based on algorithms should be very carefully 
controlled to check for potential biases in available data and its treatment. 
The big data paradigm emphasizes the importance of data quantity, but analysts 
should start by checking the quality of data and its relevance to the analysis 
undertaken. This issue is particularly significant when addressing the human and 
organizational dimensions of system operation and searching for the underlying 
causes of events. Moreover, the big data paradigm focuses on official reported 
data, disregarding tacit and informal data, which is sometimes critical to 
understanding the complexity of social and organisational issues that affect safety. 
Data and information are constructed by worldviews, tools such as sensors and 
human perception; different meanings can be associated to the same data or word 
by different people and groups of professionals. 
Big data analytics raises questions regarding privacy, information security, ethics, 
which should be handled by a well-designed data governance process. 
10.3 Context 
Statistical analysis of reliability data has a long and illustrious history, including Dr 
Snow’s analysis of the 1854 cholera epidemic in London, which identified the 
public water fountain at the epicentre of the outbreak. Research over the past 50 
years has also shown that even simple mathematical models, such as linear 
regression models, provide better predictions and forecasts than human experts 
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in a range of situations39, by avoiding a range of cognitive biases that affect human 
information processing. 
Over the past decade, a new strand of work on “big data analytics”, which applies 
statistical techniques and more recent machine learning techniques to larger sets 
of data, has gained much attention. The emergence of this concept has been 
enabled by a number of coinciding factors: 
• Affordable computer systems that are able to store and process very large 
volumes of data. 
• Increased use of “smart sensor” systems that can provide real-time data on 
various performance measures of equipment (temperatures, pressures, 
vibration levels, etc.). This “internet of things” trend has been enabled by 
technological advances in integration levels for microelectronics, by reduced 
power consumption and improved battery technology and by the 
development of low-power wireless communication technologies. Other 
sources of data include social media platforms, e-commerce and smartphones 
with geolocalisation features. 
• Increased industrial use of sophisticated machine learning techniques40 such 
as neural networks that allow classification, anomaly detection, and 
optimization. 
• Development of natural language processing (NLP) tools that allow automated 
treatment of large volumes of unstructured text. These tools are often based 
on statistical learning rather than on language models developed by humans. 
Companies often possess large corpuses of unstructured text, including 
historical information which has not been manually classified when companies 
moved from paper-based to computer-based storage of reports and data logs. 
Until recently, unstructured text could not be used in analytical tools without 
significant manual effort to classify the data. New techniques can extract 
structured information from these data sources and allow their combination 
                                                                
39The field known as “clinical vs. statistical prediction” was developed by psychologist Paul Meehl, who 
reported on 20 studies that compared the predictions of well-informed human experts with those of 
simple predictive algorithms. The studies ranged from predicting how well a schizophrenic patient would 
respond to electroshock therapy to how likely a student was to succeed at college. Meehl’s study found 
that in each of the 20 cases, human experts were outperformed by simple algorithms based on observed 
data such as past test scores and records of past treatment. Subsequent research has decisively 
with numerical data from other sources. NLP also enables automatic 
classification or clustering of documents according to their level of similarity. 
 
Table 1: Comparison between structured and unstructured (with natural language 
processing) data analysis (Dechy and Blatter, 2018) 
 Prior assumptions to verify No prior assumptions to verify 
Structured data 
analysis 
Validation of the 
correlations identified by 
experts 
Cross-referencing databases to identify 
targets to be analysed 
 
Cluster analysis to discriminate 
 
Analysis of textual data 






Failure analysis to identify the features 
of the systems considered: type, 
manufacturer, composition,… 
 
The term “big data” is generally used to refer to new generations of data collection 
and analysis systems, which were initially characterized by “three Vs”: 
• a large volume of data41, that typically cannot be stored on a single personal 
computer; 
• high velocity: data sources that generate large streams of events that cannot 
feasibly be stored, but must be filtered and analysed in real time; 
• significant variety: different data formats, often unstructured or multimedia, 
which are difficult to store in traditional relational databases. 
Four other V’s have later been added to this motto (Khan et al., 2014): 
• veracity: large volume and flows of data are automatically collected, but they 
may be erroneous or their accuracy becomes harder to check; 
confirmed Meehl’s findings: more than 200 studies have compared expert and algorithmic prediction, 
with statistical algorithms nearly always outperforming unaided human judgment. 
40Machine learning is based on algorithms that can “learn” (infer relationships) from data without 
relying on rules-based programming. 
41As an illustration, a typical offshore oil rig can generate two TB of data per day, and an A350 aircraft 
includes more than 6000 sensors (temperature, pressure, operating speed, stress, humidity, vibration, 
fuel flow rate, etc.) that generate more than 2.5TB of data per day. 
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• variability: the rate of change of the structure of the data, which depends on 
the stability of the context in which data is extracted (for example, the same 
word used by the same person in different contexts and tones of voice may 
signify different meanings); 
• value: the net added value for users, which is the difference between the gross 
benefit and the cost of collection and analysis; 
• visualisation: the quality and relevance of data visualisation is a key to reveal 
the significance of data analysis and control biases of representation. 
10.4 Motives and benefits of big data analytics 
Some analysts, start-ups and industrial promotors, full of optimism concerning the 
potential of these technologies and techniques to improve industrial production, 
refer to a fourth industrial revolution, or “Industry 4.0”, in which continuous 
streams of real-time data from sensors within the production line and upstream 
supply chain can be analysed using artificial intelligence techniques to allow 
increased product customization, performance optimisation, more flexible and 
adaptive production and anticipatory detection of critical events. 
Leveraging these sources of data to improve decision-making (an activity called 
predictive analytics) requires a combination of skills in new computer technologies, 
statistical analysis, machine learning and data visualisation (an intersection called 
data science). Their application for reliability and safety purposes is more recent 
(10 years ago for software from start-ups). 
Traditional collection and analysis of safety data (operational experience feedback, 
event reporting, generation of safety performance indicators) have long been used 
for safety management, to identify anomalies and to check that interventions 
result in a system improvement. Reliability engineers have long used trend analysis 
on critical system measures such as operating temperatures or pressures to 
identify deviations from design levels and from normal operating conditions. When 
thresholds are passed, alarms inform plant operators; when extreme levels are 
                                                                
42 Big data analysis sometimes generates insights that contradict experts’ prior knowledge. For example, 
a large mining company undertook a clustering analysis to identify which of 620 data points and metrics 
concerning employees was correlated with workplace injuries and fatalities. Some of the findings, such 
as the fact that most incidents occurred less than half a day into a shift, or that highly tenured employees 
had significantly higher accident rates, challenged managers’ views of the drivers of accidents. 
passed an emergency shutdown is triggered. Big data analytics, when applied to 
safety issues, is a complement to these traditional methods that analyses more 
complex correlations or interactions between multiple variables to help identify 
more subtle anomalies, that can have performance or safety implications. These 
more sophisticated analysis techniques are also better able to account for slow 
changes in plant performance as it ages than the static thresholds used in 
traditional trend analysis. They may be able to produce relevant insights when the 
plant is operating outside standard conditions (for example during startups and 
shutdowns), which is rarer for traditional statistical analysis methods. 
Traditional statistical analysis of data requires the analyst to formulate a 
hypothesis, then collect relevant data and undertake an analysis to check whether 
the data supports the hypothesis. The specific promise of new “unsupervised 
learning” models is that a computer might identify ‘patterns’, ’features’ or ‘a model 
in the data’ that predict specific outcomes (such as mechanical breakdowns or 
technical failures) in an “automatic” manner, without benefiting (or indeed 
suffering42) from the preconceived assumptions of the safety analyst.  
As discussed in section 10.6, this promise does not eliminate the need for an 
experienced analyst to examine the features identified by the algorithms, verify 
the assumptions and assess whether they are of relevance to operational 
performance or safety in general and in a specific context of use43. 
10.5 Safety and security applications of predictive analytics 
The most prominent applications of predictive analytics techniques have been in 
e-commerce and entertainment, with recommendation engines (“if you liked that, 
you might like this”) and targeted advertising (“if you searched for this, you might 
buy this”) being the most commonly developed features. The techniques also have 
applications in the safety domain, related to the detection and analysis of early 
warning signals. In particular, the algorithms, processing facilities and approaches 
can be applied during: 
43 The “knowledge hierarchy” analysed in the knowledge management literature distinguishes between 
data, information, knowledge and wisdom (Rowley, 2007), and provides a framework to describe the 
processes involved in moving from a low-level element in this hierarchy, such as data, to a higher-level 
element, such as information. 
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• The detection phase of an experience feedback/reliability analysis process: 
they can help to detect anomalies, unusual trends, typical configurations and 
emerging patterns of behaviour that may affect only a subset of equipment or 
a population of system users. This can be used to detect the early warning 
signs mentioned in chapter 6 (Strucic, 2020) dedicated to the visibility of early 
warning signs.  
• The analysis phase: they can help analysts to dig deeper and test their 
hypotheses. The “slice and dice” data processing facilities that are associated 
with the development of a big data infrastructure can be used by analysts to 
extract all events that match specific search criteria, to filter issues and to 
check for trends or anomalies in these events, in a much more convenient 
manner than when data was fragmented across multiple departments and 
storage systems.  
• The prediction phase: they can help safety experts anticipate the performance 
of system changes before they are implemented, through more sophisticated 
and precise system models.  
 
Data sources that can be used for these safety applications of predictive analytics 
techniques include: 
• Data generated by equipment and sensors, with very high volumes and high 
frequency of use in modern technological systems where many components 
have been instrumented to generate monitorable outputs.  
• Operational data from management systems, such as the number of 
inspections undertaken, number of flights flown, number of customers. 
• Text written by humans, such as the descriptions included in incident reports 
and inspection reports, the content of emails. 
 
In the security domain, predictive analytics is being used in the following ways: 
• Maintenance of military vehicles: predictive maintenance allows the 
military to reduce malfunction and failure of vehicles in operation, thanks 
to real-time data collection and analysis from sensors and telematics44. 
• Prediction of soldier effectiveness: in a virtual near-reality environment, 
soldiers can be monitored to predict how they will react with the help of 
                                                                
44 https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/predictive-analytics-in-the-military-current-applications/ 
biosensors that collect real-time data that can be analysed by predictive 
analytics and machine learning algorithms6. 
• Tracking readiness of equipment: in order to better manage military 
training and defence operations, real-time access to intelligence related 
to the degradation state and location of equipment is essential in order 
to make better informed decisions, e.g. if a tank needs to be moved from 
one military base to another45.  
 
Big data analytics techniques allow a move from a static analysis of the factors of 
system performance to a dynamic and continuous approach, allowing more 
customisation to the specific characteristics of the system. 
In the next paragraphs, we describe a number of applications of predictive 
analytics to safety management.  
10.5.1 Detecting new safety and security threats  
Collecting and treating massive quantities of data may allow the early detection of 
anomalous situations which may represent new component failure modes or 
threats to system safety. Big data analysis techniques allow high-dimensional data 
to be analysed using data mining techniques, searching continuously for new 
correlations or new outliers between multiple streams of data, such as those 
provided by various sensors (temperature, pressure, flow rate, displacement, 
rotational speed, stress, vibration, concentrations, geographic or spatiotemporal 
location, etc.). This work can help analysts to identify and define new early warning 
signs, surprises and potentially problematic assumptions. After investigation to 
assess their relevance, these new features can be added to the system monitoring 
framework.  
These new technological promises are particularly relevant concerning technical 
data, but are also to some extent applicable to data concerning human and 
organisational factors of safety, such as data extracted from reports written in 
natural language. Correlations and outliers identified also require a cautious 
investigation approach. 
45 https://defensesystems.com/articles/2018/06/19/comment-dod-analytics.aspx 
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An example application of this approach in information system security is given by 
intrusion-detection systems, which monitor network data and machine usage 
patterns for signs of new security (malicious use) threats. 
 
Big data for detecting hidden correlations and Early Warning Signs – lessons 
from an IMdR project 
The literature review undertaken for this project46 suggests that weak signals 
are not intrinsically “weak” (Guillaume, 2011; Jouniaux et al, 2014). Rather, 
the notion of weak signal is an extrinsic property of an observation; it requires 
links between the observation and other information sources to be 
established, like a pattern in a puzzle. The interpretation process needed to 
establish a weak signal involves 3 steps: (1) detection: identification of a link 
between one observation and a scenario that impacts risk, (2) relevance: 
qualification of the link between the scenario of impact to risk and the risk 
modelling, (3) amplification: confrontation of the weak signal with safety 
objectives and means to deal with it. Some strong signals can be weakened as 
they lead to no changes or actions. A number of accident scenarios (the 
Concorde crash in 2000, Three Mile Island in 1979, Air Moorea crash in 2006, 
Paddington rail crash in 1999) were revisited with these principles. A big data 
case study was tested on a database of several tens of thousands of incidents 
with sixty fields of data to describe incidents. Pre-treatment of data using 
principal component analysis enabled to reduce to five the number of 
relevant parameters to search for correlations. The algorithm based on 
random forests (a classification algorithm based on decision trees) was able 
to confirm dominant parameters but also identified a number of correlations 
that surprised experts. The experts were unable to understand the underlying 
causality relationship or why some specific system state emerged, but the big 
data treatment provided a new line of investigation or assumption to be 
verified.  
                                                                
46 Project P12-1 (2013) - Institut pour la Maîtrise des Risques, a French NGO, www.imdr.eu 
10.5.2 Monitoring effectiveness of safety barriers 
Big data allows organisations to measure and monitor the effectiveness of 
individual barriers, using data on operations (for example sensor data for physical 
barriers, and semi-structured text data such as incident reports for organisational 
barriers). This type of integrity analysis is not fundamentally different in nature 
from earlier work by reliability engineers and safety managers, though the use of 
larger quantities of data and more sophisticated statistical analysis techniques can 
improve the effectiveness of the monitoring. 
 
Monitoring unsafe behaviours in Chinese underground mines 
In order to effectively predict and decrease the number of “unsafe 
behaviours47” in Chinese underground coal mines, safety specialists analysed 
unsafe behaviour data of 2220 coal miners between 2013-2015 (Qiao et al., 
2018).  
Thanks to data mining techniques (association-rule and decision tree), the 
analysis of unsafe behaviours in underground coal mines helped to identify 
which unsafe behaviours needed to be better addressed to decrease 
frequency of accidents occurring. The study concluded that the factors that 
influence the frequency of unsafe behaviours were training (less training, 
more frequent unsafe behaviour), attendance (less attendance, more 
frequent unsafe behaviour), experience (less experience, more frequent 
unsafe behaviour) and age (very young and more elderly, more frequent 
unsafe behaviour). 
 
10.5.3 Safety investigation 
The data collected by equipment, if it is stored, can help safety investigators to 
understand the sequence of events that preceded the accident and to determine 
whether similar conditions have occurred in the past.  
 
47. This notion of “unsafe behaviour” is related to behavioural approaches of safety which have been 
criticized by workplace analysis of working conditions and real activities challenges within 
organisational constraints 
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British Airways flight 38 
A Boeing 777 crash-landed at Heathrow airport in 2008 due to a loss of thrust 
from both Rolls-Royce engines upon landing. The flight had taken a polar 
route, which led to the formation of ice crystals in the fuel. Upon landing, the 
temperature increase led to a slush of crystals flooding the fuel-oil heat 
exchanger and restricting the flow of fuel. The initial phases of the 
investigation found it difficult to identify the cause of the loss of engine thrust. 
“Data mining” techniques48 were used to attempt to identify whether the 
flight had any specific features that differed from 175000 other Boeing 777 
flights and which might explain the problem. The flight was found to be unique 
in combining low fuel flow during cruising and high fuel flow with low 
temperatures during approach49. A fix to the fuel-oil heat exchanger was 
implemented on all aircraft using these engines.  
10.5.4 Condition-based maintenance 
Traditional maintenance plans are either corrective (equipment is replaced once it 
fails) or time-based (maintenance is planned according to predefined component 
lifetimes based on statistical treatment of successes and failures of several 
component). The data collected from machinery and smart sensors embedded in 
a plant allows the implementation of another category of maintenance plan, 
condition-based maintenance, where replacements are planned depending on the 
degree of wear or corrosion of the specific pieces of equipment. Use of the 
approach improves the predictive ability of maintenance workers and allows them 
to optimize the availability of the component and the logistics of spare parts 
management.  
A few examples illustrate applications of this approach: 
• Aircraft engine manufacturers now collect large amounts of data from 
multiple sensors embedded in their engines50, which is transmitted to ground-
based engineering centres. The data allows them to detect problems requiring 
maintenance even before the aircraft lands (a process called “engine health 
management”). The complexity and importance of this data analysis leads to 
                                                                
48Data mining describes the exploratory process of finding patterns and knowledge within data. 
Predictive analytics then attempts to leverage that knowledge to make predictions about the future 
(attempting to forecast, anticipate, or infer). 
new business models where engine manufacturers retain ownership of 
engines and bill airlines per hour of engine operation, rather than selling 
engines outright. 
• Power plant operators can be warned in advance of changes in the operating 
conditions of a unit that are not sufficient to trigger standard monitoring 
alarms (because they don’t exceed predefined thresholds), but do indeed, 
through the presence of a correlation between unusually high and unusually 
low readings for example, point to serious problems that could have a safety 
impact. 
• Railway operating companies receive real-time data from their rolling stock 
indicating the state of braking systems, batteries, compressors, doors, cooling 
equipment and toilets. The French national railway operator estimates that 
these tele-diagnostics technologies have allowed them to reduce maintenance 
costs by 20% and to improve availability. 
• Predictive failure analysis in computer systems allows failure of system 
components to be anticipated by recording and analysing internal diagnostic 
indicators that are continuously produced by components such as storage 
drives, processors and fans. The Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting 
Technology (SMART) mechanism available in most hard drives is an example 
of this process that is available even in consumer equipment. 
 
 EU Horizon 2020 SafeClouds.eu project 
SafeClouds.eu is a project funded under the EU H2020 programme addressing 
“SOCIETAL CHALLENGES - Smart, Green And Integrated Transport”. 
Participants were aviation stakeholders, airlines, IT infrastructure experts, 
universities, safety agencies and air navigation service providers. The project 
investigated the use of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques, such as deep 
learning and artificial neural networks, to analyse the precursors of safety 
events. According to the project coordinator, Paula Lopez-Catala, 
“Understanding the precursors and potential risks that may lead to a safety 
incident is critical to complementing the traditional methods of monitoring 
safety, reviewing accidents and incidents and extracting lessons learned”. The 
techniques and algorithms were customised and tested to be effective in 
49See UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch aircraft accident report 1/2020, available online.  
50An aircraft engine in the Pratt & Whitney 1000G family (used in the A320Neo) includes more than 5000 
sensors, generating data at a rate of 10GB/s.  
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every safety scenario identified, including unstable approaches to terrain 
warning, mid-air losses of separation, and runway safety. 
10.5.5 Structural health monitoring 
The integrity of mechanical structures can be monitored by collecting and 
analysing large numbers of measurements over time (temperature, pressure, 
vibration, strain, electrical conductivity, mass flow rates). Sophisticated condition 
monitoring and anomaly detection systems, monitoring real-time flows of data 
from smart sensors, can enable the safe life extension of aging industrial facilities. 
By analysing multiple sources of data, these systems can reduce the false alarm 
rate, which is a significant barrier to the implementation of simpler anomaly 
detection systems. 
 
Lessons from an IMdR project on Health Usage Monitoring Systems 
This project51 identified four functions in implementing HUMS – Health Usage 
Monitoring Systems: (1) acquire and treat data from equipment, (2) diagnose 
the state of equipment by analysing flaws and failures observed, (3) establish 
a prognosis of the equipment state (4) aid decision-making based on current 
and foreseen evolution of state. Behind the technical vision of HUMS, the data 
format and software languages and interfaces, attention to organisational and 
human factors that influence the design of HUMS as well as their use, in 
operation, maintenance and logistics is a key. To calculate remaining useful 
life, some approaches rely on physical modelling of equipment (model-
driven), some are data-driven, and some experience driven (based on expert 
judgment with inference to cognitive ontologies), while others combine the 
three. The prognosis should be established with regard to: its time horizon, 
the application domain, the level of decision, the perimeter, the freshness of 
data, the dynamics of the phenomenon, the level of detail and input data 
available. The project led to a practical guide that helps identify the questions 
to address with lessons from transportation (aviation and rail), the military 
and energy production sectors. 
                                                                
51 Project reference P15-2 (2017) undertaken by the Institut pour la Maîtrise des Risques, a French NGO, 
10.5.6 Fraud detection 
Banks have long been using big data analytics to analyse large, unstructured data 
sets of transaction information and communication records to identify anomalous 
behaviour (internal fraud, credit card fraud, money laundering, etc.). Similar 
anomaly-detection techniques are used in the early stages of pharmaceutical 
research and drug development, with data mining techniques attempting to 
identify correlations between consumption of certain substances and health 
effects. 
10.6 Challenges and risks to the effective use of big data analytics 
In the following, we discuss a number of specific new challenges and recurring 
issues that safety analysts face in attempting to use predictive analytics to improve 
the detection and analysis of early warning signals. We also discuss ned risks 
generated by the use of big data techniques. 
10.6.1 Level of confidence in predictions 
Despite the high levels of interest and increasingly widespread implementation 
seen today, big data analytics are not a magical solution to all risk management 
problems. For example, a large quantity of information, both historical and real-
time, is available on earthquakes, yet their prediction is extremely difficult (Silver 
2012); the results of the 2016 and 2020 elections in the USA suggest that foresight 
concerning complex social systems is very difficult to achieve.  
 
Failure in foresight on the Snorre Alpha oil rig 
Over the past two decades, many companies in high-hazard environments 
have started to use safety climate surveys. These quantitative data analysis 
methods can be seen as an attempt to apply statistical methods to measure 
and analyse certain organisational factors of safety. As an illustration, staff 
operating the Snorre Alpha offshore oil extraction platform in the North Sea 
were subjected to a standard safety climate questionnaire in 2003, and 
analysis of the data indicated no points of concern. Only a few months later, 
the rig suffered a blow-out, an incident with potentially very severe 
www.imdr.eu  
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consequences. The resulting investigation identified a number of serious 
concerns with the way tradeoffs between production and safety were 
managed on the platform and whether the organisational culture encouraged 
staff to raise concerns (Antonsen 2009). This example suggests that the value 
of safety climate survey data in predicting safety performance is very low 
(worse, it may even encourage managers to develop a false confidence in their 
site’s safety culture), though they may on occasion help understand certain 
organisational weaknesses52.  
10.6.2 Data silos and the challenge of data interoperability 
For technical, historical, political and practical reasons, data is often generated and 
stored in “silos”, or activity-specific information-processing systems which do not 
inter-operate. Companies operate a range of systems and equipment, each one 
specialized for a specific technical function and domain of expertise and for a 
different purpose (reliability, safety, purchasing); each produces data in a specific 
format and underlying data model. Establishing bridges between these data 
sources, i.e. making them interoperable, to enable cross-referencing and analysis 
of correlations, or moving to a unified “data lake” architecture (see Figure 1), is 
often a significant technical challenge to the effective implementation of big data 
programmes. It may also constitute a political challenge, because the ownership 
of data is a source of organisational power.  
This challenge is compounded for companies that rely on numerous suppliers and 
contractors to design and assemble products, since relevant data is owned by large 
numbers of companies within the supply chain and network of partner 
organisations.  
 
                                                                
52 For instance, the Baker panel report, is an independent audit of the five BP refineries in the USA; it has 
published after the accident at the BP Texas City refinery the 23rd March 2005; it has used questionnaires 
 
Figure 1. Example of data lake architecture. 
 
Examples of interoperability challenges that companies could face when investing 
in a big data programme include (Scheerlinck et al., 2018):  
• poor data quality;  
• data protection considerations (confidentiality, privacy regulations);  
• data sources with different data licences; 
• requirement differences between data producer and user; 
• difficulties in data integration, in particular when the number of data sources 
is high; 
• rapid data integration difficulties linked to increased demand for near real-
time analytics to generate insights in a timely manner;  
• difficulties related to interfacing mechanisms between systems, e.g. 
incompatible communication protocols and data formats. 
Further challenges include social dimensions such as vocabularies, different 
meanings and contextual backgrounds that co-exist with different sub-cultures 
(internally and externally). 
to help understand, ex post, a number of organisational weaknesses affecting safety management on 
the five BP refineries in the United States. http://sunnyday.mit.edu/Baker-panel-report.pdf 
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EASA’s Data4safety initiative for the European aviation sector 
The Data4Safety partnership initiated by the European regulator, the 
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) in 2017 aims to collect and 
analyse data from many organisations involved in aviation safety in the EU, 
including airlines, airlines, air traffic management service providers, national 
aviation authorities, aircraft and engine manufacturers, weather agencies. 
The project will allow centralized analysis of data that is currently fragmented 
across a large number of organisations. 
10.6.3 Lack of expertise 
Effective use of data to improve organisational performance and safety requires a 
combination of skills in statistical analysis, machine learning, programming, the use 
of new storage technologies and data retrieval and query technologies. Analysts 
must also understand the system and its safety barriers to appreciate potential 
safety impacts; they must also possess communication and storytelling skills to 
present results in a form which is understandable by decision-makers. Although 
the situation is progressively improving, there still is a significant lack of specialists 
with such skills (Espinosa et al., 2019). Such skills are sought after by companies in 
many industries that are building up multi-domain and integrated data science 
teams. 
Given this range of competencies, which are rarely held by a single individual, the 
collective process to design and operate a big data system requires cooperation 
between domains of expertise and territories of responsibilities. 
To address this skill shortage, some companies are also resorting to training their 
own staff and changing their traditional modus operandi. Implementing big data 
and automated natural language processing techniques are not just a 
technological change with new tools for users. It will lead to change of practices 
and organisations across the different interacting disciplines (Rousseau et al, 
                                                                
53 IMdR project n°17-4 (2019) concerned “big data and reliability”. 
54 Consider for example a problem that affected a machine learning system developed to identify skin 
cancer in photographs of skin lesions. The system was trained on photographs of skin that were labelled 
by dermatologists, some malignant (affected by cancer) and some benign. Unfortunately, 
2018). Some companies are reluctant to adopt a big data solution due to the 
significant investment required.  
To build confidence in the predictions and algorithms, it will be necessary that 
domain experts and data scientists53, work together on the data samples to 
develop the performance indicators, and make several tests. 
10.6.4 Black boxes 
Some of the new classes of algorithms used to analyse big data, such as neural 
networks, originate in the field of artificial intelligence. These algorithms 
implement a form of “machine learning”, being trained on large quantities of input 
data to optimize some specific output quantity, such as the ability to recognize 
faces in images, to group observations into clusters, to identify anomalies in a 
stream of data. The resulting models are “black boxes”, since —unlike classical 
statistical models — the analyst is not able to inspect the model to understand why 
one event is being classified in a specific way or why one point in a time series has 
been highlighted as anomalous. For example, if a neural network misclassifies an 
image, it is very difficult to determine which specific features in the image led to 
the neural network’s error54.  
The opaque nature of these models has several drawbacks, when compared with 
simpler statistical models such as regression models: 
• When a potential early warning signal is detected (for example by a neural 
network trained for anomaly detection), typical tools do not provide an 
explanation for why the situations is judged to be anomalous, providing little 
assistance to analysts who must attempt a diagnosis. 
• They do not help analysts to build and test mental models of system operation, 
nor to make “rule of thumb” checks on model plausibility.  
• Regulators have no way of checking the model’s internal validity or underlying 
assumptions. 
• The legal system cannot inspect the logic underlying the model’s predictions, 
in case of an accident.  
dermatologists often include a ruler in a photograph of a skin, to provide a reference of scale, and rulers 
were often present in the photos labelled “malignant” and absent in the photos labelled “benign”. The 
machine learning system therefore learned to detect rulers [Esteva et al 2017]. See also 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601860/if-a-driverless-car-goes-bad-we-may-never-know-why/ 
for a description of why this may lead to problems understanding the behaviour of autopilots in vehicles. 
        Page 190 of 252 
• Model predictions (related to the effects of implementing a new safety barrier, 
for example) may obtain less buy-in from decision-makers, because they do 
not help identify a plausible cause-effect mechanism and develop intuition 
concerning system operations.  
Research into “explainable AI” (Hagras 2018) attempts to resolve these challenges 
related to transparency, lack of bias and fairness in the application of artificial 
intelligence techniques to decision-making in the public and private sphere. 
10.6.5 Man-machine interface 
In large organisations, the end users of big data analytics are generally not those 
who implemented the machine learning algorithms or the technological 
infrastructure that collects, stores and processes data. The data treatment process 
appears to them as a “black box”. The man-machine interface should be carefully 
designed to help users in their activities and decision-making, to avoid a “master-
slave” relationship between the technical infrastructure, the algorithms and the 
users. The system should be designed with affordances that help users understand 
the data treatment process and the underlying assumptions. Additionally, 
automatic steps enabled by algorithms and software should be carefully designed 
or limited to enable the user to decide between steps (Blatter and Dechy, 2018). 
The user should always have a questioning mindset and not blindly accept the 
outputs of the machine learning process. System designers should also be aware 
of the ironies of automation (Bainbridge, 1983). Users are not involved in the 
design and only act when problems arise, or when tasks cannot be automated, and 
must be handled in unexpected situations without understanding the algorithms.  
10.6.6 Incomplete data – formal versus informal, tacit, and quality 
Data is (quite obviously!) central to big data analytics, but some key questions 
concerning quality and relevance of data are sometimes overlooked by analysts in 
their haste to apply cutting-edge technologies and analysis techniques. Indeed, big 
data generates dreams of an ideal world in which visits to the shop floor and 
exposure to the sharp end of operations are no longer necessary, since all relevant 
information will be pulled into their dashboards. Some important characteristics 
of sociotechnical system operation such as perceptions, ideas, intentions, beliefs, 
                                                                
55 This is an instance of the “What You Look For Is What You Find” or WYLFIWYF problem described by 
Erik Hollnagel concerning incident investigation. 
and non-verbal interactions will remain hard to cover using automated data 
collection mechanisms. 
A fundamental issue to raise is the over-focus on data reported. What about data 
that is not reported? When some data is collected, what about its relationship to 
the context in which it was obtained? A lot of context is lost when formalising data 
and this context must be reintroduced or ‘compensated for’ (Koornneef and Hale, 
2004) by the user in their activities and decision-making processes. There are 
fundamental elements that are not collected: tacit data, informal information, 
overlooked items. Not collecting them hampers human and organisational factors 
analysis (especially for root cause analysis). These factors can also dramatically 
impact quantitative safety analysis. The frequency of occurrence of some 
conditions and events can be underestimated.  
Even the data reported and collected raises questions as well. The data which is 
collected on system operation is determined and constructed by the worldviews 
of the people who decide which elements are important to monitor; a narrow 
worldview may limit the analyses that can be undertaken55. This social 
constructivist perspective of reality should be acknowledged. It implies that even 
similar data or words, may have different meanings for different people and 
professional groups. Therefore, critical doubt will remain needed as a complement 
and check on data codification and automatic decisions based on algorithms.  
Data elements are collected, filtered, validated, enriched, analysed and 
interpreted by multiple people at different phases of the data collection, 
processing, and decision-making process. The separation between all these people 
(different professions and objectives) can lead to deviations in the interpretation 
of the meaning of the data, which can be a source of risk. This phenomenon is 
particularly relevant concerning data obtained from automated textual analysis, 
because it is known that different professions or different sites of a same 
organisation may give different meanings to the same word. In addition, what to 
report as feedback and as data to collect is affected by political issues within 
organisations, managerial decisions, and the level of front-line confidence in the 
reporting system. It could lead individuals and work groups to withhold or under-
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report certain events to protect their professional reputation or avoid unwanted 
intrusions. 
Safety analysis is often based on event reports. These reports contain not only 
textual data, but information and even knowledge from field experts and analysts. 
Contextual and historical factors, which might be critical to interpreting the textual 
content of a report, are difficult or impossible to handle using big data and NLP 
techniques (Rousseau et al, 2018). 
Finally, the big data paradigm over-emphasizes the importance of data quantity, 
and can lead to a “shift from too few to too much data56” (Lannoy, 2018). It is 
known that event recording, especially for near-misses, is not as complete as for 
serious events, and is sometimes very poor with records registered that are only a 
few lines for an event in a database. Data quality and the level of coverage of 
events of interest inevitably impact the level of insight that can be generated 
concerning safety issues. Efforts for big analytics should be accompanied by 
renewed investment in the data collection process, not only about its quality, but 
also about its relevance in particular concerning the human and organisational 
dimensions of sociotechnical system operation (Dechy and Blatter, 2018; Rousseau 
et al, 2018). 
10.6.7 Data analysis 
The streams of data collected by big data infrastructures allow more dynamic 
analyses than in the past. Data analysis can become more specific and customised 
with digital twins. 
The promises of these new techniques that can find patterns and models in the 
data may have side effects. Indeed, this added value should not lead to lack of prior 
analysis, knowledge modelling, formalising heuristics and expert judgment. Real-
time thinking for designers and users will require them to have some knowledge 
readily available; they should not wait for models to emerge from data. 
Implementing digitalisation and big data analytics can only work if there is a strong 
analytical program, with ontological efforts, to clarify rules and models for coding 
data, language and sense-making issues especially when preparing the machine 
learning (Rousseau et al, 2018; Dechy and Blatter, 2018).  
                                                                
56 https://www.imdr.eu/offres/file_inline_src/818/818_pj_260419_164033.pdf 
In other words, big data analytics should not lead to ‘small thinking’ (Alloing and 
Monet, 2016). Rousseau et al. (2018) recalls that the digitalisation and big data 
issues are not fundamentally new with regard to the questions already raised in 
the 1980s and 1990s during the first AI and expert system wave.  
10.6.8 Machine learning biases 
The training data used to build machine learning models may lead to embedded 
biases which are illegal but difficult to identify. For example, if members of a 
particular ethnic group tend to have lower than average incomes, they may also 
have higher rates of incarceration.  
Consider an insurance company which builds a machine learning model to 
estimate credit default risk by feeding input data from existing clients into a large 
neural network. This neural network may associate specific first names, which are 
highly correlated with the low-income ethnic group, with higher credit risks, 
embedding a bias within its decision-support tool that may produce legal 
problems57.   
10.6.9 Data governance and ethics 
We live in a world in which each individual generates 1.7 megabytes of data each 
second (Petrov, 2020). This rapid data generation brings both opportunities and 
risks (AIHLEG, 2019). On the one hand, the big data analytics market is estimated 
to reach $103 billion by 2023 (Petrov, 2020).  
On the other hand, there are many evolving risks in our digital landscape such as 
privacy and security risks (UNDG, 2017; Micheli et al., 2018). The predictive ability 
of machine learning models may lead to intrusions into people’s privacy. 
Against this background, data governance is of utmost importance to ensure data 
is effectively managed and used in an ethical manner. A number of principles for 
ethical use of big data analytics have been proposed to limit some of these threats 
(Schwartz, 2010; AIHLEG, 2019). 
 
 
57 See for example http://www.marketwatch.com/story/big-data-can-lead-to-big-legal-problems-for-
companies-2016-06-01 and [O’Neil 2016]. 
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Unexpected foresight in retail operations 
An annoyed customer walked into a ‘Target’ store in Minneapolis to complain 
about the store sending coupons relating to pregnancy products to his high 
school daughter. A few weeks later, the same customer apologized to the 
store manager: a discussion with his daughter revealed that she was in fact 
pregnant [Duhigg 2012]. It is worth noting that an individual’s “data footprint” 
today in 2020 is more than 100 times larger than at the time in 2012.  
 
10.6.10 Invalid conclusions 
Appropriate use of machine learning techniques requires high levels of skills in 
causal reasoning, and subtle mistakes are easily made. Analysis of any large volume 
of data will very often identify a number of correlations between different 
variables. Some of these correlations will turn out to be spurious “flukes”, and 
others will be due to the presence of hidden underlying variables, meaning that 
there is no causal mechanism which could motivate a safety intervention.  
 
Underlying variables 
Medical research shows58 that American men aged between 45 and 82 who 
skip breakfast have a 27% higher risk of coronary heart disease than other age 
categories over the 16-year followup period. This does not necessarily imply 
that eating breakfast reduces heart disease risk; the research also found that 
people who skip meals may have less healthy lifestyles than average. 
 
In general, it is necessary to implement some form of experiment to check that 
changing the “predictor” variable does indeed lead to a change in the observed 
outcome variables. For obvious ethical reasons, this may be difficult to do for 
safety-related outcomes. The development of a critical view on the validity of 
inferences made is an important part of training in data analytics. 
 
                                                                
58 Prospective Study of Breakfast Eating and Incident Coronary Heart Disease in a Cohort of Male US 
Invalid conclusion in healthcare 
The Cost-Effective HealthCare project analysed emergency room data to try 
to improve treatment for patients with pneumonia symptoms. They aimed to 
build a system that could predict people who had a low probability of death, 
so they could be simply sent home with antibiotics. This would allow care to 
be focused on the most serious cases, who were likely to suffer complications. 
The neural network developed by the team had a very high accuracy but, 
strangely, it always decided to send asthma sufferers home. This conclusion 
was unexpected, since asthmatics are actually at high risk of complications 
from pneumonia. It turned out that asthmatics who arrive at the hospital with 
pneumonia symptoms are always admitted to Intensive Care. Because of this, 
the training data used to develop the neural network did not include any cases 
of asthmatics dying, and the model concluded that asthmatics were low risk, 
when the opposite was actually true. The model was very accurate, but if 
deployed in production it would certainly have killed people. 
10.7 Conclusions 
Big data analytics has significant potential to improve the detection of early 
warning signs of system failure, when compared with the use of standard statistical 
tools or of unassisted human monitoring of system data. However, while 
algorithms can improve human judgment, they will never replace it completely. 
Humans will remain important at every step in designing the process but also in its 
operation, in (automated or manual) data collection and in expert validation of 
correlations found. As correlations are not causation, investigation of assumptions 
made by big data analytics will remain a key activity.  
Big data analytics can find patterns in data and derive models from data. This new 
opportunity does not reduce the importance of traditional analysis techniques, 
including modelling work to establish a cognitive representation of reality, analyse 
possible causal links, and extract expert decision-making heuristics. We should 
take heed from the lessons of the excessive optimism seen during the expert 
system era of the 1980s and 1990s: implementing big data techniques is not just a 
technological change that will magically produce results, but must be accompanied 
Health Professionals, Circulation, 2013, DOI: 10.1161/CIRCULATIONAHA.113.001474. 
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by critical analysis and expert assessment of the safety relevance of algorithmic 
predictions.   
Effective use of predictive analytics faces a number of obstacles, and requires very 
specialized skills of the analysts who build the data collection and analysis tools. It 
also requires a critical viewpoint on the part of users, who will need to assess the 
relevance of predictions produced by the systems and counter the “black-box” 
effects of algorithms and integrate contextual factors that may not have been 
taken into account. The man-machine interface is of critical importance to allow 
step-by-step control of the data analysis process, back and forth, in a master-slave 
relationship. Automatic decision-making based on algorithms should be very 
carefully controlled due to many biases in quality of data (including under-
reporting) and its treatment, the difficulty of handling data on human and 
organisational factors of system performance, which are often tacit and informal. 
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Executive summary 
Even if industrial accidents are felt as a surprise, their investigation studies show 
that they do not occur by chance. They result from the degradation of safety. Issue 
to detect symptoms of degradation in order to act before the event. In addition to 
conventional foresight practices (i.e. “tools” for prevention) studies of accidents 
also show that, in many cases, some persons launched alerts about safety level 
decreasing. Take advantage of information provided by these persons could help 
for avoiding occurrence of accidents. Unfortunately, these whistle-blowers are not 
listened, not to say, worst, they are harassed or put aside by their management or 
even by their colleagues. Often, management either is unable or denies alerts, 
knowing that they make sense only after the event. Nevertheless, alerts and 
whistle-blowers have characteristics that allow them to be identified and 
differentiated from "moods" and "bad spirits". Remaining question, which is 




“The freedom to speak the truth is one of the pillars of democracy" 
Polybius (c. 200 – c. 118 BC), The Histories, XII 
 
“O monstrous world! Take note, take note, o world 
to be direct and honest is not safe!” 
Shakespeare (1564 – 1616), Othello, III, iii 
 
Current, relevant and interesting debates about industrial safety call into question 
the relevance of some concepts whose definitions and approaches have seemed, 
so far, to be widely shared. One such concept is that of safety. Does safety mean 
avoiding things that could go wrong or ensuring that things go right? Are causes of 
events to be found in failures, errors and malfunctions – the operational dark side 
– or should we consider that both expected and unwanted outcomes occur in the 
same way (Hollnagel, undated; Hollnagel, 2014)? In some countries, the concept 
of safety has been developed as a kind of “umbrella concept”, covering both 
unwanted events within the safety field and intended events (security). Safety is 
also, in this new tradition, integrated in the modern SHE Safety, Health, 
Environment approaches and is strongly linked to risk and events which may occur 
both in the working environment and in the external environment and to both 
health risks of employees and to third parts. 
In many of these discussions, the focus of safety approaches is still mainly on the 
avoidance of adverse events. In spite of undeniable progress in recent decades, 
many experts share the view that safety has reached an asymptote (Frantzen, 
2004). Facing this problem, practitioners are trying to find new ways in order to 
improve safety management. 
Does the problem arise in the same terms in the field of societal safety? First of all, 
we note that industrial safety is a part of the societal security domain that is global. 
In addition to technical failures, it includes protection of society and response to 
incidents, emergencies and disasters caused by intentional or unintentional 
Organisations are generally not a monolithic whole, a homogeneous entity. 
Sometimes, within the midst of the organisation, some dissident voices alert the 
powers-that-be about potential safety problems. Could these persons, whom we 
call “whistle-blowers”, help to improve levels of safety? Could they help to meet 
the challenge of foresight for safety? 
        Page 196 of 252 
11.2 The Issue 
Current Industrial safety approaches and practices mainly rely on two pillars: risk 
analysis and learning from experience. 
Risk analysis can be broadly described as the process of risk identification and 
measurement. In that case, risk mitigation is a tool to avoid unwanted events or to 
minimize the impacts of their occurrence. Quantitative risk analysis seeks answers 
to questions such as the following: 
• What are the events, with negative safety impacts, that could occur? 
• What is their likelihood? 
• What would be consequences of their occurrence?59 
Risk analysis allows us to define the “notionally normal starting points” of the 
industrial process, meaning (i) “initial culturally accepted beliefs about the world 
and its hazards” and (ii) “associated precautionary norms set out in laws, codes of 
practice, mores and folkways”60 (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997, p. 72). Because 
theoretical knowledge evolves with time, analysing risks is a continuous process. 
In spite of substantial efforts in terms of methodology and successes in terms of 
results due to risk analysis, some events happen during production. These events 
are analysed in order to figure out causes of their occurrence and to determine 
and implement improvement(s). Industries, especially high-risk industries, have 
set up operating feedback systems for learning from experience. It is the second 
pillar of industrial safety approaches. Unfortunately, it seems that industries have 
reached a limit in terms of results. They hardly progress, they are ‘‘dancing a tango 
on asymptote’’ (Frantzen, 2004), meaning that, from year to year, numbers of 
safety records are more or less the same (either slightly higher or slightly lower). 
Does it mean that “learning from experience” is in a state of persistent deadlock? 
Occurrence of an event can be described from two different points of view. On the 
one hand, the operating feedback system is reactive (the conventional approach), 
that is, an event is seen as a surprise, as an “exceptional set of unfortunate 
circumstances” (Finn, 2002). Nowadays, safety management is more foresight-
oriented, considering a situation as “an accident waiting to happen”, i.e., when we 
                                                                
59 Qualitative risk analysis, as for it, uses words or colours to identify and evaluate risks or presents a 
written description of the risk 
60 Emphasis added. 
are living during the “incubation period”61 of an event. Indeed, “[a]ny event is 
generated by direct or immediate causes (such as a technical failure or “human 
error””). Nevertheless, its occurrence and/or its development is considered to be 
induced, facilitated or accelerated by underlying organizational conditions 
(complex factors) and some warning signals exist prior to the event” (Dien, 2006, 
p. 148). So, the goal becomes to assess degradation of the safety level in detecting 
the warning signals, near-misses, and weak signals… In that sense, our operating 
feedback systems need to become proactive. 
The concept of weak signals exists in several areas such as history, geology, 
medicine, acoustics… It was more recently coined by Vaughan (1996) in the domain 
of industrial safety after the space shuttle Challenger disaster: “A weak signal is 
one conveyed by information that is informal and/or ambiguous, so that its 
significance […] is not clear” (Vaughan, 1996, p. 355). Essentially, a weak signal is a 
symptom of a degradation of the production system. 
Turner and Pidgeon (1997) describe these kinds of signals, “visible” during the 
incubation period, as a “set of events”. They observed that these events go 
unnoticed. Indeed, unfortunately, even if detection and treatment of weak signals 
seems a promising way to go, it appears quite difficult to precisely define what a 
weak signal is. Its features are (Vaughan 1996): 
• Qualitative (in contrast with quantitative); 
• Subjective; 
• Inconclusive; 
• Giving partial information; 
• Ambiguous, meaning several interpretations are potentially possible. 
Furthermore, weak signals could be repetitive. In that case, repeatability itself is 
the criterion for identification. In this perspective, both qualitative and 
quantitative features are useful to validate its relevance in the context of the 
analysis (identification and selection) of weak signals. For example, a retrospective 
analysis of an accident can detect a weak signal based on its relevance (quality) 
and frequency (quantity) for a particular accident. Although it will not help prevent 
that accident, it can be useful to avoid similar accidents. 
61 “Accumulation of an unnoticed set of events which are at odds with the accepted beliefs about 
hazards and the norms for their avoidance” (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997, p. 72). 
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Detection of a weak signal relies on an engineer’s feelings, intuition, perceptions 
rather than rational and scientific demonstration. In that sense, a weak signal is 
not in line with “the norms of quantitative, scientific positivism”62 (Vaughan, 1996, 
p. 355). Indeed, it may even be in conflict with such norms and consequently, 
challenge the validity of such norms. 
Furthermore, often, in terms of safety, a signal makes sense only after an event 
has occurred. In other words, the meaning of signs related to safety is not obvious, 
and organisations put in place systems for collecting and gathering signs that they 
do not really know what to do with except compiling statistics on accumulated 
data. Furthermore, companies have to cope with two concerns: 
• Taking into account and treating a “wrong” signal (i.e., a signal that did 
not impact safety), which would lead to waste resources and time. 
However, such signals could be symptoms of other type of weaknesses or 
problems in companies, as weaknesses connected to the company 
culture, to shortcomings in leadership or management, to misconduct 
concerning social responsibility etc. 
• Not detecting a relevant signal, which would be symptomatic of poor 
safety management and could lead to a major event.  
So, here is a key question: Is it worth investing in the collection and treatment of 
weak signals, especially if we do not even recognise the weak signal? And here is 
another question: How should we define the relevant and accurate features of a 
weak signal?  
The analysis of major events often shows that, in many cases, they were preceded 
by alerts, warnings launched by persons close to (or knowing) how a system 
technically functions.  
Organisations are generally not a monolithic whole, a homogeneous entity. 
Sometimes, within the midst of the organisation, some dissident voices alert the 
powers-that-be about potential safety problems. Could these persons, whom we 
                                                                
62 Let’s remember that when engineers of the space shuttle O ring manufacturer raised an alert 
concerning the performance of seals in cold temperatures, NASA decision-makers challenged them to 
prove it by quantifying their concerns!! (Vaughan, 1996). 
63 Chapter written in 2018. 
call “whistle-blowers”, help to improve levels of safety? Could they help to meet 
the challenge of foresight for safety? 
11.3 Definition of “Whistle-Blowers” 
So far63, there is no common legal definition of a whistle-blower, and a lot of 
different perceptions. 
Nevertheless, before proceeding further, let’s define the term “whistle-blower” (or 
whistleblowing). The implied definition mainly refers to the societal domain. 
For Wikipedia, a “whistleblower (also written as whistle-blower or whistle blower) 
is a person who exposes any kind of information or activity that is deemed illegal, 
unethical, or not correct within an organization that is either private or public”64. 
For the British Government "You’re a whistleblower if you’re a worker and you 
report certain types of wrongdoing. This will usually be something you’ve seen at 
work - though not always. 
The wrongdoing you disclose must be in the public interest. This means it must 
affect others, for example the general public"65. 
According to Near and Miceli (1985), whistleblowing is "the disclosure by 
organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate 
practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may 
be able to affect action". 
Chateauraynaud and Torny66 (1999) make a distinction between “prophets” whose 
message is future dedicated and “whistle-blowers” (denouncers) who condemn 
past and ongoing events. Nevertheless, in both cases, the aim is to avoid 
occurrence of unwanted events and/or negative outcomes. 
ADIE (2008) added a notion explaining that a “whistle-blower is anyone who 
discloses or helps to disclose fraud, irregularities and similar problems”. So, a 
whistle-blower is not only the one who acts, but also the one who supports. 
64 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whistleblower, retrieved March 31, 2018. 
65 https://www.gov.uk/whistleblowing, retrieved March 31, 2018. 
66 They were the first French scholars who tackled this issue. The French concept is “lanceur d’alerte” 
which means in a word-for-word translation “alert launcher”. 
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The Council of Europe (2014) considers that a whistle-blower is “any person who 
reports or discloses information on a threat or harm to the public interest in the 
context of their work-based relationship, whether it be in the public or private 
sector”. 
For the European Commission (2018), "whistle blowers are people speaking up 
when they encounter, in the context of their work, wrongdoing that can harm the 
public interest, for instance by damaging the environment, public health and 
consumer safety and EU public finances." 
For Edward Snowden67 (2019), a whistle-blower is "a person who through hard 
experience has concluded that their life inside an institution has become 
incompatible with the principles developed in - and the loyalty owed to – the 
greater society outside it , to which that institution should be accountable". From 
his point of view such a person “knows that they can’t remain inside the institution, 
and knows that the institution can’t or won’t be dismantled”.   
So, in conclusion, the definition of a whistle-blower seems to have developed in 
the last decades: 
• From only related to internal company conditions/employees to issues 
related to institutions and organizations of public interest 
• From narrow subjects (e.g. types of wrongdoing) to a wider group of 
threats or harms 
• From a single actor to group action (supporters). 
However, it is important to emphasize an important distinction: whistleblowing 
should not be confused with the statutory obligation of information established in 
a number of countries: many companies within different industrial branches, 
health and care institutions, transport operators, etc. and some occupational 
groups (e.g. doctors, nurses) have a special reporting obligation, including 
conditions that have safety relevance. In an attempt to distinguish between 
different reactions to negative working environment conditions among workers, a 
researcher distinguished between insulted employees, whistle-blowers, 
complaints and messages from employees favouring openness ("bell ringers").  
                                                                
67E. Snowden  is a whistle-blower (see § 11.4.4.3). 
11.4 Examples of Whistle-Blowers 
Whistleblowing is not a recent concept. If we immerse ourselves in mythology, we 
already may find, in tales of ancient Greece, persons who warned their 
compatriots. Perhaps the most famous was Cassandra, Princess of Troy, daughter 
of King Priam and Queen Hecuba, who spoke true prophecies. Unfortunately, a 
curse struck by Apollo had the consequence that her true prophetic statements 
would never be believed. Laocoon, a Trojan priest, warned the citizens of the 
deceptive nature of the horse, but was killed with both of his sons by sea serpents, 
sent by Poseidon. 
11.4.1 Whistle-Blowers in Industry 
11.4.1.1 A Committed Nuclear Engineer 
Let’s return to our times, where we wish to draw your attention to a decision made 
in January 1996 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 68, to put the 
three units at the Millstone nuclear power plant (NPP) in Connecticut on the Watch 
List. This action allows the NRC to order the shutdown of a unit and to authorize 
its restart only under certain conditions. 
This decision was motivated by serious unsafe practices in the operation of the 
plant (during the refuelling process). It was not the consequence of an incident nor 
did it result from an investigation or an audit carried out by the Safety Authority. 
It was the result of determined, voluntary and pugnacious action by a NPP senior 
engineer, named George Galatis. As early as 1992, he became concerned about 
the management of spent fuel that did not comply with regulatory safety 
requirements. He warned his hierarchy, but they did not take his alert into account. 
In the next two years, nothing changed, except that Galatis was isolated and 
bullied within the plant. In 1994, he took the initiative to directly alert the NRC, 
knowing that the NRC had been aware of the plant practices for the previous 10 
years and had not taken any corrective action. Faced with the persistent apathy of 
the NRC, Galatis decided, in August 1995, and in connection with an NGO, to 
petition the NRC to suspend the Millstone I licence for 60 days and deny the 
company's request for an amendment of the regulatory requirements concerning 
68 American Nuclear Safety Authority. 
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fuel unloading. (Miller, 1995; Pooley, 1996). The pressure on Galatis redoubled, 
but the case became public, and the NRC was forced to react. 
The “stubborn crusade” of this engineer earned him a long article and the cover of 
the American magazine TIME. 
11.4.1.2 A Product Engineer Involved in Safety 
On 3 March 1974, Turkish Airlines Flight 981 crashed over the Ermenonville Forest, 
north of Paris, few minutes after its taking off from Orly airport. The 346 people 
on board of the DC-10 airplane died. 
The direct cause of the accident was an explosive decompression, due to a broken 
cargo door at the rear of the plane. It led to a collapse of the passenger 
compartment floor that cut all wires necessary to control the aircraft. The plane 
became uncontrollable and crashed to the ground. 
A similar event had happened two years before. On 12 June 1972, the rear cargo 
door of American Airlines Flight 96 DC-10 blew off while flying over Windsor, 
Canada. Because they were fewer passengers (67 persons), decompression led to 
(only!) a partial collapse of the compartment floor with (only!) a partial restriction 
of the controls. In spite of the situation, the pilot was able to land safely. 
Fifteen days after this event, Dan Applegate, Director of product engineering for 
Convair, a McDonnell Douglas subcontractor involved in the DC-10 design, wrote 
a document known as the “Applegate Memorandum”. Applegate gave it to his 
immediate supervisor. In the memo, he mentioned some concerns. The long 
memo stated, among other things: 
“The potential for long term Convair liability has been causing me increasing 
concern for several reasons: 
• The fundamental safety of the cargo door latching system has been 
progressively degraded since the program began in 1968. 
• The airplane demonstrated an inherent susceptibility to catastrophic 
failure when exposed to explosive decompression of the cargo 
compartment in 1970 ground tests. 
[…] 
                                                                
69 Emphasis added by authors Eddy et al. 
“Since Murphy's Law being what it is, cargo doors will come open sometime during 
the twenty-plus years of use ahead for the DC-10” 
[…] 
“I would expect this to usually result in the loss of the aircraft” 
[…] 
“it seems to me inevitable that, in the twenty years ahead of us, DC-10 cargo 
doors will come open and I would expect this to usually result in the loss of the 
airplane” 69(Eddy et al., 1976, pp. 183-185) 
Applegate's supervisor considered that it was needed to “look the "other side of 
the coin"” (Eddy et al., 1976, p. 186). 
Convair vice-president in charge of the DC-10 project convened a meeting to 
decide the company's policy regarding this issue. Convair management thought 
that changes requested from the memo would be costly and it was not sure which 
company would pay the bill (Convair or McDonnell Douglas). During this meeting, 
it was acknowledged that Applegate was closer than his supervisor to the 
engineering of the DC-10. Nevertheless, the reasoning of the supervisor was 
preferred and the "interesting legal and moral problem" was resolved “by deciding 
that Convair must not risk an approach to Douglas”. […] most of the statements 
made by Applegate were considered to be well-known to Douglas and there were 
nothing new that was not known to Douglas (Eddy et al., 1976, p. 187). So, Douglas 
was never officially informed about Applegate’s concerns. 
11.4.1.3 A Field Journalist 
On the night of 2 - 3 December 1984, a toxic cloud of methyl isocyanate (MIC) 
spread over the city of Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, 600 kilometres south of Delhi. 
The cloud made its way especially into and around the shanty towns located near 
the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant. The disaster eventually 
created about 600,000 victims, including more than 12,000 deaths. 
The cause of the disaster is still under debate. Nevertheless, we could assume that 
slack management leading, among other things, to deferred maintenance which 
created a situation where routine pipe maintenance caused a backflow of water 
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into a MIC tank, triggering the accident 70. Before the accident, the plant was idling 
with reduced staff (Shrivastava, 1992; Lapierre & Moro, 2001). 
Several serious events preceded the catastrophe. On 23 December 1981, a 
phosgene (toxic gas) leak occurred during a maintenance shutdown and caused 
the death of Mohammed Ashraf, foreman of the plant. Union Carbide concluded 
that the causes of the accident were two human errors. However, the trade unions 
claimed that the accident resulted from a deterioration of the plant’s safety levels 
since the rules of procedure prohibited the storage of phosgene when the 
treatment unit was out of service. On 10 February 1982, a new gas leak occurred 
on a phosgene pump: 25 people were intoxicated71. Factory workers launched a 
strike. 
Rajkumar Keswani, owner of and reporter for the local newspaper, the “Rapat 
Weekly”, was an acquaintance of Mr. Ashraf. He wanted to know if his death was 
an accident or the consequence of internal failures at the pesticide plant. With the 
collaboration of plant workers, he was able to visit it illegally. After consulting 
scientific books, he came to the conclusion that “tragedy was only a matter of 
time” (Lapierre and Moro, 2001, p. 264). He also obtained results of an audit 
carried out in May 1982 by three engineers from the technical centre of the parent 
company in the United States. Its conclusions concerning safety of the plant were 
alarming. The audit report revealed hundreds of deviations from both operational 
and safety rules. He also underlined the high staff turnover, the lack of training and 
insufficient operating procedures. 
With this information at the end of his investigation, Keswani tried to alert the 
public by writing a series of articles with prophetic titles: 
• “Please, spare our city”, on 17 September 1982. In this article, he warned: 
“If one day misfortune happens, do not say you did not know.” 
• “Bhopal: “we are all sitting on the crater of a volcano”, on 30 September 
1982. 
• “If you refuse to understand, you will be reduced to ashes”, on 7 October 
1982. 
                                                                
70 Union Carbide Corporation, owner of the plant at the time of the accident, claimed it was due to 
sabotage. 
71 Six other serious incidents, which led to a dozen victims (dead and wounded), occurred before the 
disaster. Some of these events were in connection with the MIC. 
Keswani became a modern-day Cassandra. His articles gave rise to indifference and 
at worst to denial. Thus, the Madhya Pradesh State Minister of Labour said: “There 
is no reason to worry about the presence of Carbide because the phosgene it makes 
is not a toxic gas” (Lapierre and Moro, 2001, p. 266-269). 
Bored by the attitude of his fellow citizens, the journalist left Bhopal shortly after, 
but before the tragedy of December 1984. 
11.4.1.4 A Conscientious Operations and Safety Director 
On 5 October 1999, two trains on the same track collided head-on at the Ladbroke 
Grove Junction a few kilometres west of Paddington Station, London. The accident 
cost 31 lives and injured more than 400 people. 
A Public Inquiry was launched after the accident. The Investigation Commission 
chaired by Lord Cullen conducted a detailed and thorough analysis of the event. 
The immediate and direct cause of the accident was a signal (SN 109) passed when 
it was red. It brought to light that beyond the direct cause, the accident was rooted 
in the shortcomings of organisation and poor management of safety in this railway 
sector (Cullen, 2000). 
The investigation showed in particular that the SN 109 signal had been passed 
eight times when it was red in the six years preceding the accident72. During this 
same period, 46 cases of signal passed at red were recorded in the railway zone of 
the accident. 
The Commission of Inquiry noted the existence of a whistle-blower in the person 
of Mrs. Forster. She was the Operations and Safety Director of the rail company 
operating at Paddington. In February 1998, a train of her company passed the SN 
109 signal when it was red. She was informed that a train from another company 
had also passed the same red signal in early August. 
This information worried her. So, she wrote at the end of August 1998 to the 
chairman of a working group in charge of proposals for improvements in signal 
safety. She shared her concerns about the SN 109 signal and she asked what action 
could be taken “to mitigate against this high-risk signal?” In view of the dilatory 
72 It means that with this single signal, there is an annual risk of collision of 7.2%, that is to say, the risk 
of a collision every 14 years. It seems that, sometimes, even “scientific” data are not enough for an 
organisation to make the (right) decisions! 
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response of the chairman73 and his move to another position, she wrote to his 
successor to reiterate her concerns about “a serious problem with drivers 
misreading signals” in the Ladbroke Grove zone. The new chairman promised her 
“a full risk assessment” through a future study that a consulting firm would have 
to carry out. No contract was ever signed on the subject and the “new” chairman 
of the working group left office. Mrs. Foster wrote again to the third chairman four 
months before the accident. Her letter remained unanswered, the addressee 
confessing after the accident that “he was not aware of the remit which had been 
given” to the working group (Cullen, 2000, p. 117-118). 
11.4.1.5 A Seismologist Warning about Tsunami 
On 11 March 2011, a powerful earthquake struck Japan, triggering a tsunami and 
a nuclear accident. It was an earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 on the Richter 
scale. The tsunami, with waves more than 10 meters, impacted a wide area of the 
Japanese north-eastern coast. It caused huge damage to buildings and 
infrastructure. The earthquake and tsunami caused great loss of life and 
widespread devastation in Japan. As of May 11, 2011, the death toll of the 
earthquake and tsunami is 14,981 dead and about 9,850 disappeared according to 
the Japanese police. Three months after the disaster, there were 23,500 dead and 
missing, with no hope of finding missing survivors. 
The tsunami specially impacted 3 NPPs: From north cost to south, it was Onagawa 
NPP (3 reactors), Fukushima Daini NPP (4 reactors) and Fukushima Daiichi NPP (6 
reactors). The anti-tsunami seawall of Fukushima Daiichi NPP (called Fukushima in 
the rest of the section) was 10 meters high, with about 6 meters above the sea 
level. The 15 meters high waves of the tsunami submerged the seawall. Waves 
flooded and totally destroyed the emergency diesel generators and every other 
power generation systems of the plant. The loss of electricity led to an insufficient 
cooling of the reactors and nuclear meltdowns in Units 1, 2, and 3 (from 12 March 
to 15 March). Loss of cooling also caused the pool for storing spent fuel from 
Reactor 4 to overheat (15 March). It is difficult to assess consequences of the 
nuclear disaster. Indeed, ionizing radiations and life of radioactive elements are a 
very slow decaying process that may take decades and centuries. 
                                                                
73 “I have commissioned a special study to determine what causes can be identified which contribute… 
I expect a report in the near future and this will ensure that effective solutions are identified for early 
implementation…” However, no such report was ever produced. 
In 2009, the NISA74 held meetings with panel of experts to discuss the safety needs 
of the Japanese NPPs. During the meetings, issue of tsunamis was never on the 
agenda. In 2007, an earthquake with a magnitude of 6.6 impacted the west cost of 
Japan. It caused radioactive leaks at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, owned and operated 
by TEPCO75, as Fukushima, and water from a pool of nuclear wastes entered the 
Sea of Japan. When case of Fukushima NPP was addressed, the panel focused on 
earthquake. Dr Yukinobu Okamura, a respected seismologist, was invited to a 
meeting in order to present his findings. It was concerned because NISA did not 
see tsunamis as likely enough to be considered in the Fukushima area. Data used 
for preventing effect of earthquake were taken from the largest earthquake 
recorded in 1938 with a magnitude of 7.9. It caused a small tsunami and TEPCO 
had built a seawall able to stop this kind of tsunami. Okamura explained to the 
panel that this earthquake was not the biggest. An earthquake that occurred in 
year 869 was more important and Okamura did not understand why it was not 
mentioned. The TEPCO representative said that it did not cause much damage. 
Okamura disagreed and said that damage had been severe. Discussion were focus 
on earthquakes, not on tsunamis. Furthermore, for TEPCO the earthquake 
occurred in 869 was simply “historical” without certified data. Eventually, the 
safety report for Fukushima was approved. It did not consider the 869 earthquakes 
in model used for updating Fukushima safety guidelines (Clarke and Eddy, 2017). 
We note that Okamura was not the only person raising concerns. For instance, a 
geologist, Masanobu Shishikura told the government before the Fukushima 
disaster, that north-eastern Japan was overdue for a huge wave (McKie, 2011). 
11.4.2 Whistle blowing in the military 
In the maritime and aviation sector, based on a long military tradition, operational 
feedback on safety matters to top management was established as a distributed 
and delegated responsibility of the captain and his officers. Such feedback covers 
both the individual level of Good Seamanship and Good Airmanship and the 
institutional level of legal disciplinary actions by a Maritime Court in case of 
misconduct. Social sciences have elaborated this good operatorship concept into 
High Reliable Organisations, while the Maritime Court concept evolved into 
74 Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, the Japanese Safety Authorities. 
75 Tokyo Electric Power COmpany. 
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independent safety investigation agencies. Such operational feedback can be both 
prospective and retrospective. 
11.4.2.1 The Joe Kennedy air crash: a prospective case 
On August 12th 1944, a thunderous explosion destroyed a B-24 Liberator over the 
coast of England on its way to its targets in France, the underground Fortress of 
Mimoyecques launching sites of the German V3 missiles. The B-24 was part of 
Operation Aphrodite, equipped as a drone; a massive flying bomb with 
rudimentary control equipment for guiding the drone to its target. The pilots were 
supposed to bail out after bringing the aircraft up to 2000 feet where it was 
supported further along to its target by another aircraft. Several minutes short of 
the planned bailout, an electrical fault in the wiring harness of the warning device 
of the Liberator caused the 21.170 pounds of Torpex to detonate. The massive 
explosion dispersed the aircraft and the two airmen on board; Joseph Kennedy –
the older brother of John F. Kennedy- and Wilford Willy. The shockwave almost 
brought down the trailing Mosquito flying 300 feet above and about 300 yards to 
the rear of the robot. The photographer on this aircraft was injured and the aircraft 
was damaged slightly by the explosion. The aircraft belonged to a unit under the 
command of the son of President Roosevelt who claimed to be aboard this trailing 
aircraft. 
An electronics officer, Earl Olsen, who believed the wiring harness had a design 
defect, had warned Kennedy of this possibility the day before the mission. The 
electronics officer implored the 29-year-old pilot and veteran of 25 combat 
missions not to go on this one. He discovered a fault in the remote-control arming 
device aboard his aircraft. He warned Kennedy's Chief Officer to no avail. Olsen 
pleaded to call off the flight, but was ignored. Since hearing about John's exploits 
in the South Pacific, Joseph badly wanted to top his brother heroics. While John’s 
patrol boat sunk by a Japanese destroyer, he led the 10 survivors to an island 
where they were eventually rescued. John received the Navy Cross for his actions 
and was celebrated as a genuine war hero. It started his political career and run 
for Presidency. Operation Aphrodite was a complete disaster. Of more than a 
dozen missions, only one plane caused damage to the target, and only because it 
                                                                
76 One reason could be because event reports are anonymous (people are not named), disembodied. In 
numerous reports, not to say the largest majority, it seems that there is no human being with flesh and 
blood present at the time of the event! (see Llory, 1996). 
crashed somewhat close. In September 1944, Canadian troops raided the V-3 base 
and found it abandoned since July (Wikipedia 1).  
11.4.2.2 The Aerolinee Itavia air crash: a retrospective case 
On June 1980, an inexplicable explosion destroyed an Italian DC-9 aircraft of 
Aerolinee Itavia, flight 870. It crashed into the Tyrrhenian Sea near Ustica. All 77 
passengers and 4 crew members perished. The crash remained a source of 
conspiracy for many years with reports that contradicted each other. Only on 
December 20th 2017, a former US military, Brian Sandler, felt confident after 37 
years to speak up in public about the crash (Telegraaf 2017). Sandler recalled a 
return to the US aircraft carrier Saratoga of two Phantom jets without their air-to-
air missiles, because they had shot down two Libyan MIG jets that had approached 
them aggressively. The DC-9 had been hit accidentally during the interception, but 
the American attack had been denied until his revelation, 37 years later. 
11.4.3 Note on the Role of Whistle-Blowers in Industry 
The role and importance of whistle-blowers in the domain of safety is not yet fully 
acknowledged76. For instance, Rajkumar Keswani (see § 11.4.1.3) is not cited in the 
accident analysis seen as a reference by scholars (Shrivastava, 1992). His action is 
“only” described in a general audience book (Lapierre and Moro, 2001). You could 
not find the name of Dan Applegate (see § 11.4.1.2) in the official accident report 
(Secrétariat d’État aux Transports, 1976): to know the existence of his warning, you 
must read a book written by journalists (Eddy et al., 1976). The same story has 
happened to the alert launched by Carlyle Michelson (see § 11.5): it is expressed 
in a technical report drafted for the NRC (Rogovin and Frampton, 1980) and not in 
the “official” report of the President’s Commission on the accident (Kemeny et al., 
1979). 
We have also to note that it is difficult to find documentation in scientific literature 
about cases for which a warning was successfully listened and treated. 
Taking whistleblowing into account does not belong to a statistical or probabilistic 
paradigm. Event occurrence and whistle-blowers belong to the domain of “outliers 
of the curve” treatment. It takes effort to dig as deep as possible during an event 
        Page 203 of 252 
analysis to highlight the existence of whistle-blower(s). We assume that the game 
is worth the candle because events would be analysed in a more systematic way 
and it would allow us to define more precisely features or alerts of whistle-
blowers. 
National, monetary, corporate or military vested interests may obstruct a timely 
transparency in precursors and causes of accidents, preventing further analysis, 
research and development. An exception exists in the aviation industry, where 
Good Airmanship and High Reliable Organisations were created to institutionalize 
timely operational feedback without fear of retaliation or exclusion of the 
messenger (McCall 2017). 
11.4.4 Whistle-Blowers in Civil Society 
11.4.4.1 The “First” Whistle-Blower 
To be whistle-blower should it be in our DNA?  Can we educate ourselves in this 
direction? Should it be a civil obligation?  Is it something good or bad to be a 
whistle-blower? What or who should determine us to become a whistle-blower? 
Is it a matter of courage? What risks can we assume?  
After a decade since the end of the Second World War and practically the 
beginning of the "Cold War", more precisely on November 1, 1955, an armed 
conflict started in South East of Asia, in Indochina Peninsula. This is known as the 
"Vietnam War" or the "Second Indochina War". People from Vietnam, called it the 
" War of Resistance Against America". It is still known as the "American War" and 
in fact, it was a fight against the two parts of Vietnam, North and South. The army 
of North Vietnam (The Democratic Republic of Vietnam) was supported by the 
Soviet Union, China and other communist allies, and the army from South Vietnam 
(The Vietnam Republic) was supported by the United States, South Correa, 
Australia and other anti-Communist allies (Wikipedia 3, undated). 
The period in which this war occurred, until April 30, 197577, was an extremely 
difficult one for the four successive Presidents. The whole period was 
characterized by big protests organised by anti-war associations and most of the 
Americans considered that the war was "unjustified", indefensible (Ely, 1990). 
                                                                
77 Fall of Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam. This event marks the end of the Vietnam War. 
At the end of the 60s, the US Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, set up a 
Commission for drafting a realistic analysis about Vietnam situation ("a study"). 
Goal was to have an "encyclopaedic history of the Vietnam War". According to his 
point of view, this report, officially entitled "History of U.S. Decision-making in 
Vietnam, 1945-1968". He believed, he later said, that a written record of the key 
decisions that led to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam would be of great value to 
scholars. (Linder, 2011). 
The Commission, was composed of specialists from the Pentagon, the State 
Department, academics and some "think tanks", such as RAND Corporation78 
(Wikipedia 4, undated). They had access to many documents and records, from the 
White House, the Secretary of Defence personal notes and from the CIA.  
The study was finished by the beginning of 1969. The result of this work, 7000 
pages contained in 47 volumes, showed that the USA was involved in that war by 
the Truman administration, which decided to offer military support to France in its 
colonial war against the Viet Minh. Also, the analysis revealed that the next three 
administrations (Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson), have intensified the war and 
made decisions which were hidden to the American people or which had, at that 
time, negative observations from the "US Intelligence Community" such as "the 
bombing of North Vietnam in 1965" (Encyclopaedia Britannica, undated). 
Although, the study could have been a historical study, considering the disclosures 
made, the it was classified "Top Secret" by the Pentagon and only fifteen copies 
were published. The authorities "were worried" about the possible negative 
consequences if the public came to know about the whole output. (Linder, 2011). 
Daniel Ellsberg was one member of the Commission. He was a strategic analyst at 
the RAND Corporation. In 1954, he enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps and served in 
the army for three years. From his point of view, the study showed that the United 
States faced a difficult choice between "the bad and the worst" ". He was not 
optimistic regarding a victory of his country in Vietnam. (Linder, 2011).  
In August 1969, Daniel Ellsberg met Randy Kehler, an opponent of the war, on a 
meeting of the "War Resisters International" (an international anti-war 
organisation) organized by the Haverford College. Kehler’s speech, in which he 
showed his availability to go to prison (finally, he was charged with a federal 
78 RAND Corporation is an American non-profit global policy think tank created in 1948 by the Douglas 
Aircraft Company. 
        Page 204 of 252 
crime") to fight against the war, impressed him and was an important event for his 
future decision (Wikipedia 4 & 5, undated).  
In this context, considering that this war had done enough victims for all parts 
involved, and probably it would never stop, after Kehler’s conference, he decided 
to do something, assumed any risk, including his act being considered as a crime 
and to be punished for that. 
At the end of September 1969, he decided to copy that report and to give it to the 
press. In 13 of June 1971, the New York Times published parts of this study. 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, undated) 
The Washington Post and another 18 publications, did the same. They called them 
the "Pentagon Papers". 
On June 28, 1971, Ellsberg publicly surrendered to the United States Attorney's 
Office in Boston. He admitting to have given the documents to the press. 
He faced charges under the Espionage Act of 1917 and other charges including 
theft and conspiracy, carrying a total maximum sentence of 115 years. The trial 
began in Los Angeles on January 1973. Ellsberg tried to claim that the documents 
were illegally classified to keep them not from an enemy but from the American 
public. However, that argument was ruled "irrelevant". Ellsberg was silenced 
before he could begin.  
In spite of being effectively denied a defence, Ellsberg began to see events turn in 
his favour when the break-in of Fielding's office was revealed to the Judge Byrne.  
On May 9, further evidence of illegal wiretapping against Ellsberg by the FBI was 
revealed in court. Furthermore, the prosecution had failed to share this evidence 
with the defence 
Due to the gross governmental misconduct and illegal evidence gathering, Judge 
the Judge dismissed all charges against Ellsberg on May 11, 1973 after the 
government claimed it had lost records of wiretapping against Ellsberg.  
                                                                
79 In 1969, Vietnam veteran Ron Ridenhour wrote a letter to Congress and the Pentagon describing the 
horrific events at My Lai – the infamous massacre of the Vietnam War – bringing the scandal to the 
attention of the American public and the world. 
80 Olaf Palme was a former Prime Minister of Sweden, assassinated in 1986 while he was in office. The 
crime remains unsolved. 
Ellsberg’s action led to a decrease in confidence from the American people in the 
government, reducing also the influence capacity of the American authorities in 
that region. Finally, the war finished in April 1975, after the fall of Saigon 
(Wikipedia 4, undated). 
Daniel Ellsberg is recipient of the inaugural Ridenhour79 Courage Prize as well as 
the Gandhi Peace Award, the Right Livelihood Award, the Dresden Peace Prize, and 
the Olof Palme80 Prize. 
Daniel Ellsberg became an anti-war activist (against US-led war in Iraq, against US 
military action against Iran, …). He is also a support for American whistle-blowers 
(he says that the existence of WikiLeaks81 helps to build a better government, he 
is taking part in demonstrations against Manning's incarceration82, …) (Wikipedia 
4, undated). 
He is also concerned be nuclear weapons. For him: "As long as the world maintains 
large nuclear arsenals, it is not a matter of if, but when, a nuclear war will occur". 
(Canfield, 2017)  
11.4.4.2 A Physician with a Global Vision 
Irène Frachon is a French pulmonologist, posted at the Brest hospital since 1996. 
She developed a support activity for people suffering from arterial pulmonary 
hypertension. During early 1990s, as young doctor she trained in a unit of a 
hospital in (the suburb of) Paris. This unit was specialised in pulmonary arterial 
hypertension and was recently receiving and treating a number of young women 
with a lethal very high pulmonary hypertension. This disease was related to the 
consumption of the drug Isomeride® (which is an “appetite suppressant”) for 20% 
and later for 30% of them. Isomeride®, manufactured by Servier laboratories, was 
commercially marketed in the 1980s and was withdrawn from the market in the 
late 1990s due to serious side effects, including heart valve disease and pulmonary 
arterial hypertension. 
81 International non-profit organisation, founded by Julian Assange, that publishes classified media 
provided by anonymous sources. 
82 Chelsea h Manning was an intelligence analyst assigned in 2009 to an Army unit in Iraq who disclosed 
to WikiLeaks about 750,000 classified, or unclassified but sensitive, military and diplomatic documents. 
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In June 2006, Dr Frachon reads in a medical journal an article criticising the 
retention of a drug marketed since 1976 under the name of Mediator®83. 
Manufactured also by the Servier Laboratories, it should be prescribed for cases of 
non-insulin-dependent diabetes. Nevertheless, it is widely distributed in France84, 
because it is prescribed and used as an "appetite suppressant" with 
recommendation as a simple adjunct to a diabetic diet. Mediator® is a drug of the 
same family as Isomeride®85. They are amphetamine derivatives.  
In February 2007, she received a patient with an unusual pulmonary arterial 
hypertension. Looking at her prescription, she realised that the patient has been 
on Mediator® for several years. She then contacted her former Parisian colleagues 
who tell her that they do not know what to do because they have only a few 
observations. Together, they decided to report the facts at Afssaps (the French 
Health and Safety Authority for Health Products): it is a pharmacovigilance 
declaration. They also decided to make a scientific communication about the cases 
they will gather. But it would be complicated because there are not many cases, 
and it will be a little tricky and to attribute causes. Furthermore, they start to get 
a little scared because Servier laboratories are known for their legalism, bullying, 
and lobbying. So, she looked for accurate and detailed information about 
Mediator® in order not to get into trouble with laboratories (in case of wrong 
information or error). Laboratories explained that there was no relationship 
between Mediator® and Isomeride®, for both the chemical structure and the 
metabolic pathway. Actually, the molecules are not the same, but, according to 
Dr Frachon, to say that there is no chemical resemblance between the two is “to 
be in bad faith”. Norfenfluramine is the active ingredient (“appetite suppressant”) 
of one and the other of these products. 
Throughout the years 2007-2008 Dr Frachon led an informal team that she set up. 
It was made of some cardiologists with whom she worked in the frame of arterial 
pulmonary hypertension studies. They alerted her to cases of valvopathy for 
patients who took Mediator®. Dr. Frachon doubted about pure coincidence. This 
opinion was shared by her colleagues in the hospital’s IT department. In parallel 
that she goes to see in order to get the list of patients suffering from valvopathies 
                                                                
83 The Mediator® was initially prescribed as part of a treatment for diabetes before being recommended 
for weight loss (although it was not an "official" appetite suppressant). 
84 From 1976 to 2010, the Mediator® was a top selling drug:  bought by at least 2 million consumers and 
with 7 million boxes sold per year. Main (most serious) pathology linked to the Mediator® are 
valvopathies for some people (and only those people). 
and thus exploit epidemiological statistics. Relationships appear between 
valvopathies and Mediator® intake.  
In October 2008 and February 2009, she made two scientific papers about this 
issue at conferences. These communications did not receive a considerable echo. 
Then a report of 15 cases is sent to Afssaps. The report is accompanied by an email 
saying, "We are very worried, very concerned about these valvopathies". The team 
was received for the first time by Afssaps on June 3, 2009. During the meeting, the 
team presented everything they have gathered with photos of the valvopathies. It 
also compares with the 1998 American dossier about Isomeride®, that shows the 
same pathologies. It also presents a dossier of a Spanish case in 2003: a patient 
who, under Mediator® had a very retracted valve. The Spaniards sounded an alarm 
by saying that they saw valvopathies under Mediator® as under Isomeride®86. So, 
the results of the study are shown to Afssaps committees. The committee 
members said: "This is very good, but we will have to do additional studies 
beforehand to confirm this causal link, we do not withdraw a Marketing 
Authorisation like this". Therefore, the team sets up a case-control epidemiological 
study. It consists in taking into account all the valvopathies leading to 
insufficiencies and requiring hospitalization at the Brest hospital from 2003. Then 
the unexplained valvopathies were isolated, assuming that it is among them that 
there is the best chance of finding this causal factor. Then the patients were 
questioned extremely rigorously to know if they had been exposed to the 
Mediator®, their surgeon was also interviewed, and their medical file was 
compared with patients who had valvopathies for commonly known causes. The 
team realises that it was 70% exposure to Mediator® (unexplained valvopathies) 
compared to 6% (valvulopathies for known causes). These results are shown, 
during an in-camera meeting in September 4, 2009 to Afssaps management, which 
rushed ... to criticise thoroughly the study because of – supposedly - bias in the 
study. The study is presented to Afssaps dedicated committee on September 29, 
and the study worries the experts of Afssaps. It is noted that results of another 
study are added to the first results. This second study was collected thanks to the 
85 While drugs from the amphetamine family have been withdrawn from the market two years after the 
Isomeride® ban, the Mediator® is not concerned since it is not officially an appetite suppressant. 
86 Servier laboratories immediately withdrew its drug from Spain (probably so that the noise does not 
come to France !!). But they did not remove it from France. 
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“arterial pulmonary hypertension network” that Dr Frachon activated during the 
month (Frachon, 2010; Bensadon et al., 2011; Hermange, 2011). 
On September 29, 2009, based on these two studies, Afssaps voted that it is not 
possible to leave patients exposed to this risk. The effective withdrawal is decided 
to be effective on November 30, 2009. 
Dr Frachon realises that there will be no information for public about the reasons 
of the drug withdrawal. As victims who will never be fully informed, it will make 
difficult for them to file a lawsuit in front of the Servier laboratories in order to 
obtain recognition of their responsibility and then compensation. She decided to 
write a book with the goal to have a document that was not too big, accessible and 
extremely well documented. The book was published in June 2010 with the title 
“Mediator 150 mg” and subtitle “How many deaths?”. The censorship of the 
subtitle is ordered right after its released by a court at the request of the Servier 
laboratories. In January 2011, a judgement by a Court of Appeal annulled the 
censorship of the title of the book. 
Regarding medical consequences of the scandal of Mediator®, at first, Afssaps 
advanced the figure of 500 deaths minimum. A latest forensic expertise on the 
subject estimates that between 1,500 and 2,100 people died of the adverse effect 
of this drug. 
In 2011, Irène Frachon received a “Citizens Whistle-Blower” trophy award from an 
NGO whose role is to rehabilitate representative democracy, to promote ethics in 
politics, to fight against corruption and tax evasion. 
Finally, the Servier Laboratories and the “National Agency for Drug Security”87 are 
being sent to the correctional court for the Mediator case, on September 2017. 
They are charged respectively for "aggravated deception, fraud, injury and 
manslaughter and trading in influence" and "Injury and manslaughter".  
                                                                
87 New name for the Afssaps (which was reorganised after the Mediator® scandal). 
88 Laura Poitras is a director, documentary producer, journalist and American photographer. Her 2014 
movie about Snowden history (Citizenfour was awarded the Oscar for Best Documentary in 2015). 
11.4.4.3 A Citizen Sensitive to the Protection of Privacy 
Edward Snowden is an American computer scientist who revealed the details of 
several US mass surveillance programs. 
In 2006, Edward Snowden was hired by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as a 
computer engineer to maintain the computer system’s network security, having a 
top-secret security clearance. In 2009, he resigned from the CIA and is, then, hired 
as a contractor by Dell. He is assigned to National Security Agency (NSA) facilities 
(in Japan and in Hawaii). While he was working in Hawaii, he copies on a USB stick 
ultra-confidential information. In January 2013, he contacts Laura Poitras88 and 
Glenn Greenwald89 anonymously. 
Edward Snowden fled to Hong Kong in May 2013. In June he flew to Moscow where 
he was granted temporary asylum in July90. In January 2017, his asylum was 
renewed for three more years 
In June 2013, the British newspaper "The Guardian" started publishing some the 
revelations. Then, many newspapers from all over the world published leaks 
originally provided by Snowden. 
The volume of documents transmitted is a controversial issue. According to 
different sources it is between 15,000 and 20,000; another estimate goes up to 1,7 
million. 
Snowden's leaks revealed, among other things, that: 
• there were many NSA programs for mass surveillance of telephone calls 
and online exchanges; 
• many foreign leaders are wiretapped; 
• many data on "ordinary" American citizens were collected; 
• although focused on surveillance for an anti-terrorist purpose, the NSA 
was also involved in economic and industrial espionage. 
The US government indicted Snowden on three charges: theft of government 
property, unauthorised communication of national defence information and wilful 
89Glenn Greenwald is a political journalist, lawyer, blogger and American writer. 
90 In the meantime, he had applied for asylum in twenty-one countries. 
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communication of classified intelligence to an unauthorised person: the last two 
charges fall under the 1917 Espionage Act (Burrough et al., 2014; Lefébure, 2014). 
11.4.4.4 The Panama Papers: Action of An Anonymous Whistle-Blower 
Panama Papers report, in August 2015, the leak of more than 11.5 million 
confidential documents from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, detailing 
information on more than 214,000 offshore companies and the names of the 
shareholders of these companies. Among them are politicians, billionaires, top 
athletes or celebrities and even mobsters and smugglers. 
The documents were provided by an anonymous and unpaid whistle-blower 
(known only under the pseudonym of “John Doe”). “John Doe” chose to send 
information to Bastian Obermayer, a reporter from "Süddeutsche Zeitung", a 
German newspaper. The Süddeutsche Zeitung decided to analyse the data in 
cooperation with the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ)91. 
When "John Doe" contacted the Süddeutsche Zeitung, he put a couple of 
conditions for providing the information because he considered that, doing that, 
he put his life in danger: 
• to chat only over encrypted files; 
• no meeting, ever. 
"John Doe" said that reasons why he leaked information was to make "these crimes 
public". 
Volume of data leaked was approximately 2,6 Terabits – more than the combined 
total of the Wikileaks Cablegate92, Offshore Leaks93, Lux Leaks94, and Swiss Leaks95. 
The data primarily comprises e-mails, pdf files, photo files, and excerpts of an 
internal Mossack Fonseca database. It covers a period spanning from the 1970s to 
                                                                
91 ICIJ is an international network launched in1997 by the Center for Public Integrity (non-profit 
investigative journalism organization). ICIJ was spun off in February 2017 into a fully independent 
organisation which includes more than 200 investigative journalists and 100 media organizations in 
over 70 countries (Wikipedia) 
92 In 2010, leak of 251287 diplomatic telegrams which were exchanged between nearly 300 embassies 
since 1966 (1.7 gigabytes of data). 
93 Name of an ICIJ report disclosing details of 130,000 offshore accounts in April 2013. It was seen as the 
biggest hit against international tax fraud of all times. 
94 Financial scandal revealing the content of several hundred very advantageous tax agreements 
concluded with the Luxembourg tax authorities by audit firms on behalf of many international clients 
such as multinational corporations Apple, Amazon, Heinz, Pepsi, Ikea and Deutsche Bank. The scandal 
is revealed in November 2014 following investigations by the ICIJ. The judicial aspect of the scandal 
the spring of 2016. 
On 3 April, 2016, 109 newspapers, TV and online channels, published 
simultaneously, in 76 countries, first conclusions to inform about schemes used by 
Mossack Fonseca clients for hiding for money in some tax havens, for tax evasion 
and for money laundering. (Obermayer and Obermaier, 2016; 2017). 
Because all these people and actions seems to have connections with the law office 
Mossack Fonseca from Panama, this investigation was called “Panama Papers” in 
reference to the "Pentagon Papers”, and is probably, as Edward Snowden said, 
"the biggest leak in the history of data journalism" (on Twitter, April 3, 2016). 
11.4.4.5 Social Media and Whistle-Blowing 
The emergence of social networks (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, …) has 
changed the game in allowing to dissemination of information in real time on a 
large scale, thus bringing an audience to many citizens who claim themselves as 
whistle-blowers. In that case, social networks can be important relays for an alert 
receives a significant audience. For instance, in 2017, when an interim truck driver 
posted a video on YouTube showing that an iron and steel company spilling acid in 
a slag near the plant96, he did not suspect for a moment that the images would 
become viral, be seen by millions of people, and thus trigger an environmental 
scandal97. 
So far, the alert launching and the warning role of the general public was rather 
played by a single person expert in a specific domain or by consumer or 
environmental organizations, as well as unions and journalists. But the current 
atmosphere of mistrust between people and "official institutions" has not spared 
concerns people prosecuted by the Luxembourg courts for leaking documents and which resulted in 
2016 in the conviction of the two whistle-blowers. 
95 Disclosure in 2015 of a giant tax evasion scheme operated with the knowledge and encouragement 
of the British multinational bank HSBC via its Swiss subsidiary. Disclosure has been triggered by leaked 
information from a computer analyst Hervé Falciani on accounts held by over 100,000 clients and 20,000 
offshore companies with HSBC in Geneva. 
96 Liquid spilt was nots not iron mud, as indicated by the delivery notes, but "used acid". The cargo should 
instead be driven to a suitable recycling centre, an hour and a half far from the plant. A longer and much 
more expensive procedure. 
97 The truck driver was fired for "breach of commercial discretion". Since then, he has not been able to 
find another job. 
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intermediate bodies. This phenomenon, associated with the development of social 
networks that allows all citizens to speak without intermediary, marks a break and 
explains the proliferation of ordinary committed citizens who behave as whistle-
blowers, eager to engage themselves. 
Social networks have taken up a lot of space today. It is an important relay so that 
an alert could receive a large audience. Being a whistle-blower leads to a kind of 
authenticity label for many causes, meaning that case/information provided is 
relevant and important. 
In the past, the tools used by citizens to express themselves implied the use of 
traditional media, for example by being interviewed by journalists. Today, social 
networks can transmit information in real time, as evidenced by the many movies 
posted live by users on Twitter. The "traditional" media then intervene in a second 
phase, taking up some information to increase its visibility. 
Citizens becoming whistle-blower take risks, which can put their lives in danger. 
Thus, Daphné Caruana Galizia, a Maltese journalist, columnist for several media 
and editor of a popular blog, denounced the corruption that ruled in Malta among 
politicians of all political parties, up to members of the Government. She was 
murdered in October 2017, in the explosion of her car, under which a bomb was 
put. 
On the other hand, is denouncing an abuse or a danger on the web enough to make 
you a whistle-blower? Social networks have brought a lot of confusion up to 
misinformation. So, the Cambridge Analytica scandal showed that Facebook has 
decisively influenced the results of the US presidential election in 2016 and on the 
result of the referendum on Brexit in Great Britain in 2016 (Lewis and Hilder, 2018; 
Szadkowski, 2019). 
11.4.4.6 Crisis Situation and Whistle-blowing 
We have just seen that being a whistle-blower is not an easy position whether in a 
business or in civil society. One might think that this is partly due to the fact that 
                                                                
98 Data from April 2020, paragraph writing period. At the end of the crisis, the figures will be much more 
significant. 
99 She is seen as the first whistle-blower regarding covid-19. 
100 Authorities are accused, on social media, of delaying the announcement of his death. Some criticize 
the Chinese government for covering the scale of the outbreak and demand more freedom of expression. 
On March 19, an official Chinese investigation disavowed the Wuhan police for having reprimanded Li 
he/she warns of a hypothetical event for which the possibility of occurrence is 
difficult for others to comprehend. Do crisis situations restore the role of whistle-
blower in giving it back the place it deserves? In other words, in a crisis situation, 
the dreaded event (the threat) has occurred. Therefore, the question is no longer 
whether the alert is relevant but to appreciate if the perception of the danger 
linked to the consequences is shared. 
In December 2019, an outbreak due to the coronavirus covid-19 started in the 
Wuhan region of China. It quickly turned into a global pandemic leading to more 
than 2 million people infected and the death of more than 160,000 people 
worldwide98. This crisis gave the opportunity to see on the one hand a few whistle-
blowers appear and in the other hand the behaviour of decision makers (Bodet 
and Chaverou, 2020; Johnson, 2020; Gafni and Garofoli, 2020): 
• On December 30, 2019, Li Wenliang shared with former medical students, 
on a social network, the report sent by Doctor Ai Fen99. Two days later, in 
the middle of the night, he was arrested with seven other doctors for 
"spreading rumours" and "seriously disrupting social order". Questioned 
for several hours, he was forced to sign a letter of reprimand for spreading 
rumours on the internet. He must promise not to commit "acts contrary 
to the law". Only then is he allowed to return to work. On January 10, Li 
Wenliang cares for a patient with glaucoma, without knowing that she is 
infected with the coronavirus. He tested positive on February 1. 
Hospitalized two days later, he was transferred to an intensive care unit 
and placed on respiratory assistance. On February 6, Chinese national 
television CCTV and the daily newspaper Global Times announced his 
death, before removing this information from social networks following 
the denial of the Wuhan central hospital. A few hours later, the 
establishment confirmed his death100; 
• On March 25, 2020, Sergei Satsouk, editor of the online daily Ejednevnik 
in Belarus, was arrested and charged with "corruption", a crime 
punishable by ten years in prison. Three days earlier, Ejednevnik, well 
Wenliang and his seven colleagues. In late January, the Supreme Court had already rehabilitated Doctor 
Li and other whistle-blowers in an article published in the press. Li Wenliang is now a national hero for 
part of the Chinese population for alerting colleagues when the virus first appeared, while the 
authorities sought to stifle his revelations. He was 34 years old. He and his wife were expecting their 
second child 
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knowns for its inquiries about the country's health care system, published 
an editorial questioning official statistic on the Covid-19 outbreak. The 
article also criticizes President Lukashenko's order to "deal with" the 
media covering the epidemic; 
• Ruth Michaelson, a journalist with the British daily The Guardian, has 
worked in Egypt since 2014. On Sunday, March 15,2020, she reported in 
the newspaper on research by infectious disease specialists from the 
University of Toronto, as well as public health and information reports 
that indicate that Egypt is much more affected by the coronavirus than 
the government says. The day after publication, the journalist is 
summoned for three and a half hours by the Egyptian State Information 
Service. On March 17, Ruth Michaelson lost her accreditation. She was 
expelled from the country three days later. In Egypt, the government has 
stepped up censorship, officially to fight "fake news»101; 
• Ana Lalić, journalist for the Nova.rs news site in Serbia, publishes an 
article about the hospital in Novi Sad, in northern Serbia. Its title: 
“Voïvodine clinical centre at the breaking point, no protection for nurses”. 
Ana Lalić describes there "a chronic shortage of basic equipment" and 
"chaotic" working conditions. On condition of anonymity, a doctor said 
that "the nurses rebelled and refused to enter the patients' rooms 
because there was no protective equipment". The article states that 
employees of the emergency centre and the intensive care unit, including 
those in the operating rooms, are only entitled to one protective mask 
per day. The hospital denied this information and filed a complaint against 
Ana Lalić for defamation, shouting her "indignation at the inaccurate, 
unverified and malicious reports" of Nova.rs. The day after her article, Ana 
Lalić is arrested by six police officers who search her apartment from top 
to bottom, seize her computer and mobile phone and make her undergo 
two hearings; 
• In Great Britain, draconian measures were decided/applied in order to 
prevent some healthcare professionals discussing their work during 
covid-19 outbreak. Healthcare professionals are being silenced and 
                                                                
101   Other cases of police violence against journalists in Africa are reported: for instance, Tholi Totali 
Glody, journalist in the Democratic Republic of Congo is responsible for covering the confinement in the 
province of High-Katanga. The journalist was arrested by two police officers, who chased him and struck 
him voluntarily. He suffered a broken leg and injuries to the face and arm. In Mali and the Congo, a 
threatened with disciplinary action for speaking out about their work 
during the coronavirus outbreak. Healthcare professionals are being 
silenced and threatened with disciplinary action for speaking out about 
their work during the coronavirus outbreak. Workers who have spoken to 
the journalists say they fear being disciplined. Several professionals said 
they worried about losing their jobs. Examples include an email signed by 
the chief executive of one NHS (National Health Service) trust forbidding 
all staff from talking to the media. In some cases, staff suspect emails and 
social media accounts are being monitored. Many NHS staff are 
increasingly concerned that their ability to share stories about their work 
is being restricted by a clampdown on speaking out publicly. It follows 
reports of doctors and nurses being gagged by hospitals and other NHS 
bodies from speaking out about widespread shortages of personal 
protective equipment. It has included threatening emails, the possibility 
of disciplinary action, and some people even being sent home from work. 
f suspect emails and social media accounts are being monitored; 
• Brett Crozier, the commander of the American nuclear aircraft carrier 
Theodore Roosevelt, can be seen as the whistle-blower's symbol in the 
US Navy. It all started on March 30. After a stopover in Guam, Brett 
Crozier alerted his hierarchy about the meteoric progression of the 
disease on board the ship: a hundred men were affected out of nearly 
5,000 crew members. “This will require a political solution but it is the 
right thing to do”, Crozier wrote. “We are not at war. Sailors do not need 
to die. If we do not act now, we are failing to properly take care of our 
most trusted asset — our Sailors.” Crozier also said that only a small 
contingent of infected sailors have been off-boarded. Most of the crew 
remain aboard the ship, where following official guidelines for 14-day 
quarantines and social distancing is impossible. Due to a warship’s 
inherent limitations of space, we are not doing this,” Crozier wrote. “The 
spread of the disease is ongoing and accelerating.” Eventually, he 
requested “compliant quarantine rooms” on shore in Guam for his entire 
crew “as soon as possible”. Few days later, acting secretary of the US 
journalist and a television crew were briefly arrested following reports of the outbreak. For having 
revealed two cases of coronavirus in Abidjan prison in an investigation whose conclusions were denied 
by the prison administration, two Ivorian journalists were sentenced to a fine of 5 million CFA francs 
(7,622 euros) each for “Spreading fake news” … 
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Navy, Thomas Modly, announced that captain Brett Crozier was relieved 
of his command of the USS Theodore Roosevelt, stationed in the Pacific, 
for showing “extremely poor judgment” by widely disseminating a memo 
about the coronavirus infection spreading quickly on the vessel with 4,800 
crew members. Thomas Modly accused Crozier of “misrepresenting the 
facts” and took him to task for disobeying the chain of command102. Even 
the President ot the USA, Donald Trump, called the letter a "mistake" that 
had worried families and showed "weakness”. 
All these examples show that even in crisis situations whistle-blowers are rarely 
listened to or even worse, harassed undergoing censorship attempts to silence 
them. 
We can notice that a crisis situation "favours" the emergence of whistle-blowers - 
here a worldwide crisis with whistle-blowers in many countries, whatever the 
political system. We also note the speed at which they disseminate information 
using massively social networks and the media (presence of journalists playing the 
role of whistle-blower. 
The authorities' reaction is also very rapid and very strong in order to silence the 
whistle-blowers who are seen as troublemakers. In addition, they have little room 
for their defence with a lot of cover-ups, administrative decisions or "botched" 
trials. Whistle-blowers shake the certainties of authorities in power who fear that 
their authority and decisions will be criticized or called into question Is it really 
surprising? Not so much when we keep in mind that whistle-blowers point to 
system failures (or weaknesses) that only a few people agree to see, and that crisis 
situations are the moments when these weaknesses become "obvious" (visible).  
11.5 Features of Whistle-Blowers and of Whistleblowing in 
Industry 
This chapter has only addressed a few iconic cases. We could have talked more in 
detail about Carlyle Michelson, a nuclear engineer who worked part-time for the 
NRC and who took, in 1977, the initiative to study behaviour of the process in case 
of a small break in a specific location of the reactor primary circuit (top of the 
                                                                
102   Eventually, Thomas Modly has resigned, fallout from the ongoing controversy surrounding the 
Navy’s handling of a coronavirus outbreak on the naval ship USS Theodore Roosevelt. 
pressurizer). Results were far beyond design (designers) assumptions, yet few 
people read about them. A reviewer in NRC prepared a memo based on 
Michelson's concerns and based on a previous incident that occurred at Davis 
Besse NPP (Ohio). Michelson’s study and the memo did not circulate widely 
because the issue was not identified as a generic safety problem for operating 
plants. Eventually the memo was filed away (Rogovin, 1980). About one year later, 
a major accident occurred at the Three Mile Island NPP (Pennsylvania). The 
scenario was similar to that imagined by Michelson. 
We could also have told about the story of Roger Boisjoly, one of the most well-
known whistle-blowers in the “history” of industrial safety. He was a mechanical 
engineer at Morton Thiokol, the manufacturer of the solid rocket boosters for the 
Space Shuttle program. In July 1985, he wrote a first memo about their 
weaknesses, arguing that if, unfixed, it could lead to a catastrophe. He wrote 
several other memos on that matter, but no action was taken. On the eve of the 
launch of the 25th Space Shuttle flight, on 28 January 1986, he tried with some 
colleagues to convince the NASA management to postpone the flight because of 
the cold temperature. They felt that this would jeopardize the safety of the 
mission, and potentially lose the shuttle. No one listened to them. The Space 
Shuttle exploded 73 seconds after lift-off, killing the seven astronauts on board 
(Vaughan, 1996). 
Even if the search for whistle-blowers is not yet a major concern of event analysis, 
we could still provide an outline of whistle-blowers and of whistleblowing features: 
• "Whistle-blower lacks a legitimate base of power for making the change" 
(Near Miceli, 1985, p. 2); 
• Whistleblowing deals with degradation of safety and could prevent 
occurrence of some events; 
• Duration of an alert is variable: It can last days, months or years; 
• A whistle-blower is either inside or outside the organisation (company / 
plant), but he / she is always close to the technical aspects of operations; 
• The position of a whistle-blower in the organisation could be from the 
bottom (e.g., a field operator) to the top (e.g., a manager) and expertise. 
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The whistle-blower has the power of influence, but is not a decision-
maker regarding the alert launched; 
• For informing about the alert, the whistle-blower uses internal channels 
(within organisation), or (often then) the Safety Authorities, or the media, 
or NGOs; 
• Alerts are technically oriented and safety oriented and they can be 
repeated, sometimes in different ways; 
• Most of the time, alerts are issued by people close to the technical field 
or having information from field personnel; 
• Warnings can be issued before events or can disclose information 
afterwards that was suppressed before the event. 
We have to stress that alerts are not a scientific “expert opinion”, since a whistle-
blower is personally involved and ethically committed. Typically, an alert is not a 
simple denunciation since the alert is developing. This is not a prediction because 
an alert relates to the symptoms of deterioration of safety. 
This first set of features might help to make a difference between alerts and 
background noise, i.e., to figure out relevant safety alerts among the numerous 
alerts that are launched. 
11.6 Position of the Company Towards Whistle-Blowers in 
Industry 
It seems that very often, companies are not ready to listen to alerts. There are 
several underlying cultural reasons explaining this “behaviour”. They are 
summarized by the US CSB103 (U.S. CSB, 2007, p.160): 
• “The incentives used in [the] workplace may encourage hiding mistakes.” 
• “[…] work under pressures that lead us to miss or ignore early indicators 
of potential problems.” 
• “Bad news is not encouraged.” 
As we saw, very often, organisations do not listen to whistle-blowers104. Two 
apparent reasons that lead to this result are on the one hand the inability to 
                                                                
103 CSB: Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. 
identify the relevance of alert, and on the other hand, the will not to detect or to 
identify the alert.  
Several tactics to cope with whistle blowing exist: 
When an organisation is unable to identify or accept the alert, it will have an 
attitude of denial in claiming that whistle-blowers are dissatisfied or displeased. 
The organisation will deny the risk (e.g., Keswani, Okamura) or engage in delaying 
tactics (e.g., Forster). 
When an organisation does not want to acknowledge the significance of an alert, 
it becomes obstructive in isolating or bullying the whistle-blower (e.g. Galatis). 
In every case, the implicit message is that the organisation denies the expertise 
and competence of the whistle-blowers. 
We also note that, in some cases, whistle-blowers are isolated by their colleagues 
who consider them as “traitors” (e.g. Galatis, Boisjoly). Often, they have to leave 
the company they were working for. For example, George Galatis worked for the 
pharmaceutical industry and in the maritime sector after being pushed out of his 
job. Similarly, Roger Boisjoly resigned from the NASA and became a speaker on 
workplace ethics. 
In recent years, a number of strands of research in the social sciences have 
emphasized the importance of diversity of viewpoints to effective decision-
making, and have identified a number of features of organizational culture that 
encourage the expression of concerns and their effective management. The more 
normative recommendations that have emerged from this research are being 
integrated into management practice in various ways: 
• The importance of requisite variety of expertise to learning within 
organizations, the risks generated by attempts to eliminate divergent 
opinions and the implications in terms of power struggles within 
companies have been described by researchers in organizational studies 
(Antonsen 2009).  
• Researchers analysing what they called high reliability organizations 
identified the importance of features within the organizational culture 
104 Unfortunately, as we already said, we do not have enough data concerning alerts listened and 
treated. 
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including chronic unease, the opposite of complacency with respect to 
risks (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001), preoccupation with failure and sensitivity 
to nuances that can lead to failure. Managers are encouraged to actively 
seek out information about potential vulnerabilities in the system and to 
encourage front-line workers and experts to raise any concerns they may 
have related to safety.  
• The nuclear power sector refers to an important attribute of the 
organizational culture, the questioning attitude (INSAG 4), which 
encourages people to continuously challenge existing conditions and 
activities in order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or 
inappropriate action.  
• A study in the finance sector105 pointed to the dangers associated with a 
risk glass ceiling, a situation where information on risks does not reach 
top-level managers who have the power to allocate resources necessary 
for risk prevention. The “glass ceiling” can be caused by a tendency in the 
organizational culture not to share bad news, by a position of safety units 
within the organizational chart which is too distant from decision-makers, 
and by top-level managers who do not make the effort to seek out 
contrary opinions and signs of organizational vulnerability. A report106 by 
the UK Financial Reporting Council (concerning the audit profession) 
suggests that board members have a responsibility to leave the board 
room to speak with front-line staff and establish their own impression 
concerning risks facing the organization, as well as to ensure that internal 
reporting channels are working correctly.  
• The notion of psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999) is important in 
encouraging people within an organization to speak up and raise their 
concerns. Psychological safety is a shared belief, within a group, that one 
will not be punished or humiliated for speaking up with ideas, questions, 
concerns or mistakes. Training courses such as the CRM programmes 
implemented in many high-hazard industries have been developed both 
                                                                
105 Report “Roads to ruin. A study of major risk events: their origins, impact and implications”, 2011, 
Cass Business School on behalf of Airmic.  
106 FRC report on “Corporate Culture and the Role of Boards”, available from 
https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/the-culture-project.  
to improve team managers’ ability to encourage debate and the voicing 
of concerns within the work collective, and to foster workers’ ability to 
speak up about their concerns.  
• Firms are encouraged to establish whistleblowing policies and set up 
communication channels to allow reporting of concerns in a trusted 
environment107.  
For further reading on this topic, we refer to the chapter on resilience to explore 
theories and concepts of identifying and managing safety and risk. 
11.7 Features of Whistle-Blowers and of Whistleblowing in the 
Civil Society 
As for the whistles-blower in industry who are close to the technical dimension of 
operations that they deal with, whistle-blowers in civil society are close to the 
sources of information they disclose. They usually have direct access to the data.  
Actions of whistle-blower (disclosure of "hidden" information) is often a matter of 
ethics. Indeed, the whistle-blower wants to share "material" with public opinion 
for making if know the non-ethical, not to say immoral, behaviour of the institution 
he/she is working for/dealing with/in contact with. In revealing the case they are 
concerned about, whistle-blowers know that they take personal legal risks (see § 
11.8). 
The channel used for dissemination of information is mainly specific media 
involved in investigative journalism. Another “tool” available to them begins to be 
widely used by whistle-blowers: it is WikiLeaks108. 
We also note that if monitoring or control authorities exist in the domain 
concerned (e.g. health system), the whistle-blower will first contact them. If the 
alert does not lead to “effects”, then the whistle-blower will address the mass 
107 An example of such guidance is the report “Effective speak-up arrangements for whistle-blowers: a 
multi-case study on the role of responsiveness, trust and culture” by the Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants (ACCA), available online.  
108 WikiLeaks is a non-profit organisation, initiated in 2006, that publishes secret information provided 
by anonymous sources. 
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media. It may happen that contact with the mass media is provided through non-
governmental organisations. 
11.8 Position of "Society" Towards Whistle-Blowers in Civil Society 
The position of "Civil Society" has a twofold aspect. 
On the one hand, public opinion is grateful to the whistle-blowers for keeping it 
informed of the malfeasance of certain institutions, as these wrongdoings may 
have a more or less direct impact on health, on freedoms, etc.  
On the other hand, the institutions in question have an attitude of denial, and bring 
lawsuits against the whistle-blowers. For instance: 
• Servier Laboratories sued Dr. Frachon for publishing a book on the 
Isomeride® case (Frachon, 2010); 
• Daniel Ellsberg and Edward Snowden were prosecuted by the American 
Administration; 
• Antoine Deltour, Raphaël Halet and Edouard Perrin109 have been sued by 
the Luxembourg justice for the Luxleaks affair110; 
• … 
These prosecutions (legal proceedings) can create a halo, an atmosphere of threat, 
not to say of fear, and lead to a chilling effect which inhibits or discourages the 
legitimate exercise of information to the public about malicious acts or 
malfeasance. 
11.9 Treatment of An Alert 
An alert is not a prediction of when the event will occur. It is even not sure that an 
event connected to this alert will happen. Nevertheless, it is an information about 
a (potential) degradation of safety level. As such, it deserves to be treated at an 
institutional level. It means that it has to be listened to and investigated by a 
                                                                
109 Antoine Deltour and Raphaël Halet are the former employees of the consulting firm 
PricewaterhouseCoopers who have uncovered the large-scale tax optimization practiced by 
multinationals via Luxembourg. They had communicated the documents to journalist Edouard Perrin, a 
person with the authority/capability to make decision (whether in industry or in 
the civil domain). 
The treatment of an alert has to begin as soon as possible after it is received 
through channels made available to whistle-blowers or used by them. 
The duration of the treatment (i.e. release of the results, whatever they are) have 
to be issued as quickly as possible. Indeed, it is not possible to determine how far 
from the event the situation is. So, the quicker the potential corrective measures 
are implemented, the better. This neither means nor implies that the investigation 
must be neglected and / or carried out in a shoddy manner. 
Furthermore, the whistle-blower must be kept informed (or better, associated) all 
along progress of the investigation. 
11.10 Protection of Whistle-blowers 
Protection of whistle-blowers is a recent concern. In the 1990s, the issue was still 
seen almost invariably in a hostile light. The term was most frequently used to 
describe public officials who had paid a heavy penalty for leaking information, 
usually to the media. Whistle-blowers were presented, if not as villains, as loners 
(Public concern at work, undated). 
On the other hand, recent cases (“Dieselgate”, “Luxleaks”, “Panama Papers”) have 
shown that whistle-blowers can play an important role in uncovering illegal 
activities that are detrimental to the general interest and well-being of citizens and 
society. So, their protection became an issue since a decade or so in several 
countries. A few examples are given hereafter. 
The goal of protection is that the whistle-blower is not blamed or worst (e.g. 
pestered, laid off), because he/she released information about malfunctioning or 
fraud. 
Some companies have put in place mechanisms that allow employees to issue 
alerts which could be seen as "shields" for whistle-blowers. For example, in: 
member of the organisation behind the revelations (an international consortium of investigative 
journalists). 
110 For this case, see footnote 92. 
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• Offering "channels" to the alert launcher (e.g. confidential to the line 
manager, the human resources Department or the legal Department of 
the company, anonymous, directly to the management of the company 
through a dedicated Department); 
• Setting up a Committee for Ethics and Social and Environmental 
Accountability to which any employee can report and submit cases in a 
confidential manner, if an employee considers there are breaches of the 
rules enacted by the company code of conduct; 
• Setting up hotlines to warn of possible behaviour contrary to the values 
of the company. 
It should be noted that very often in some companies, alerts should be limited to 
the violation of financial and accounting rules. 
We note that, as an output of the 2011 G20 Summit in Cannes (France), the G20 
leaders provided support to the compendium of best practices and guiding 
principles for whistle-blower protection legislation, prepared by the OECD, as a 
reference for enacting and reviewing, as necessary, whistle-blower protection 
rules by the end of 2012111 (G20, 2011). 
Hereafter, few examples of laws/regulations in domain of whistle-blower 
protection for some countries are given. 
11.10.1 At the European (Union) level 
The European Commission proposed (in 2018) a new law to strengthen protection 
of whistle-blowers across the European Union (EU). It will ensure a high level of 
protection for whistle-blowers who report violations of EU law by setting new 
Union-wide standards. This new law will see the establishment of safe channels for 
reporting both within an organisation and the public authorities. It will also protect 
whistle-blowers against dismissal, demotion and other forms of retaliation and will 
compel national authorities to inform citizens and train public authorities to 
accompany whistle-blowers. 
The project proposes to set up internal structures to denounce illegal acts. These 
structures will have to be installed in companies with more than 50 employees, or 
with a turnover of more than 10 million euros, as well as in all public 
                                                                
111 The compendium was endorsed by the G20 Anticorruption Working Group. 
administrations, from the highest level (the State) to the municipality of more than 
10,000 inhabitants. 
The draft of the European executive will be submitted to the two European 
legislators, the Council (the member States) and the Parliament. 
Until then, there was only a recommendation which states “that member States 
have in place a normative, institutional and judicial framework to protect 
individuals who, in the context of their work-based relationship, report or disclose 
information on threats or harm to the public interest”. To reach this goal, “the 
recommendation sets out a series of principles to guide member States when 
reviewing their national laws or when introducing legislation and regulations or 
making amendments as may be necessary and appropriate in the context of their 
legal systems” (Council of Europe, 2014). 
The EU law has been ratified April 19, 2019. 
Every Member State of the European Union will have to transpose the Directive 
into their national legislation. 
11.10.2 United Kingdom 
The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 is an Act of the British Parliament which is 
a "shield" for whistle-blowers against detrimental treatment by their employer. It 
is an amendment to the Employment Rights Act 1996.  It applies to cases where: 
• a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to 
be committed; 
• a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal 
obligation to which he is subject; 
• a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, 
• the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be 
endangered; 
• the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or 
• information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the 
preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately 
concealed. 
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Nevertheless, despite undeniable progress, some workers do not (yet) qualify for 
the whistle-blower protection (e.g. Jobseeker, volunteers, interns, non-Executive 
Directors, foster carers members of the armed forces and security services, self-
employed workers, …). 
It has also to be noted that a disclosure of information is not a qualifying disclosure 
if the person making the disclosure commits an offence by making it. 
Against the background in the 1990s of both serious accidents (sinking of Herald 
of Free Enterprise, the Clapham rail crash) and an expressed negative attitude to 
whistle-blowers (Villains/loners) organizations to support and advise whistle-
blowers and business firms/industry companies were established. Example of such 
an organization is e.g. "Public Concern at Work" in 1993 
(www.whistleblowing.org.uk). In 2018, a group of parliamentarians formed an All-
Party Parliamentary Group/Whistleblowing (APPG/Whistleblowing), which has 
proposed a series of reforms to update and modernize the British legislation 
(including expanding the whistleblowing concept to include all citizens and 
establish an Independent Office for Whistleblower). 
11.10.3 France 
The law of 9 December 2016, known as the Sapin 2 law, relating to transparency 
and the fight against corruption, created a protection for the whistle-blower by 
requiring companies with more than 50 employees to set up procedures for 
collecting data and reports issued by employees or by outside and casual 
collaborators. 
The granting of the legal status of whistle-blower is subject to the following 
conditions: 
• Have personal knowledge of the facts; 
• To act in good faith; 
• Do not profit or draw compensation from the alert issued; 
• Do not try to harm. 
If his / her status of whistle-blower is acknowledged, the person concerned will 
benefit from special protection. The law provides that no person may be excluded 
from a recruitment procedure or access to an internship or a period of professional 
training, no employee may be sanctioned, dismissed or subject to a discriminatory 
measure, direct or indirect after an alert.  Nevertheless, some trade unions and 
some NGOs consider that Sapin 2 has some limits: 
• The whistle-blower must denounce the facts by internal channels of the 
company; 
• Legal persons (a company, an association, a trade union, etc.) cannot have 
the quality of whistle-blower; 
• The whistle-blower cannot be defended by a staff representative or a 
union in its alert procedure. 
As a consequence, in France, 42% of executives, out of the 36% who witnessed 
"illegal or unethical practices", did not report these abuses. If they did not warn 
about these shortcomings, it is because they do not have confidence in the 
declaration procedure. Furthermore, 51% of executives consider that it is risky to 
denounce unethical practices in their business. (AFP 2019). 
The European Directive should address shortcomings of the current French 
regulation. 
11.10.4 The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, investigating accidents as a timely feedback of safety mishaps 
in reality has a long history of about 100 years. Started in 1909 in the maritime, 
other modes of transportation followed in inland shipping, (1931), aviation (1937) 
and railways (1956). In 1999 the call for an independent and permanent 
investigation agency lead to the establishment of the intermodal Transportation 
Safety Board. Due to a series of major disasters -in particular disco fires, firework 
explosions-, the scope of independent investigations was extended to other 
industrial and social sectors by establishing the Dutch Safety Board in 2005.  There 
was felt no need to further institutionalize whistle blowing after establishing 
independent safety investigation organisations. However, mishaps and 
deficiencies triggered several cases of whistle blowing, in particular in the military 
and public governance sectors which were not covered by the safety board 
mandate. At the initiative of the chairman of the Dutch Safety Board, a separate 
arrangement for individual whistle blowing was established in 2016 with the 
Whistle Blowing Clearing House Act, providing a clearing house for re porting of 
mishaps and abuse. This system for individual whistle-blowers however, has not 
yet functioned properly due to a mismatch between staff and functions and close 
working relations with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Wikipedia 2). Consequently, 
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in the Netherlands, facilitating whistle blowing has been successful only on an 
institutional level by the establishment of independent safety investigation 
agencies, albeit restricted to a retrospective approach. 
11.10.5 Norway 
Norway has a long history of whistleblowing – from individuals within a number of 
areas; such as industry, health and social sectors, the education sector, the armed 
forces, civic activities and government management. But it was only in 2007 that 
rules on whistleblowing were established in the Working Environment Act. The 
regulations included the right to whistle-blow, the way in which whistleblowing 
should occur, and prohibition of retaliation (which includes the right to remedy). 
In the present legislation, there is a duty for employees to notify in some 
circumstances: all workers are obliged to notify if a colleague is discriminated 
against or harmed or in conditions that could endanger life and health. Elected 
representatives at the workplace should assist workers who alerts. A 
representative may also notify on behalf of the notifier so that the notifier may be 
anonymous to the employer.  A safety representative (a legally mandatory function 
in companies) has self-notification obligations in certain cases, such as concerning 
injury and illness and the risk of life and health. The regulations were partly 
changed in 2017. Now, businesses with more than five employees are also 
required to develop internal notification procedures. In addition, there are 
separate rules in the Equality and Discrimination Act: there is a prohibition of 
retaliation against anyone who has complained about discrimination, sexual 
harassment or any other form of harassment, such as ethnicity, disability or sexual 
orientation. There are also separate rules for employees in shipping.  
The present legislation is undergoing change. A public exposition (NOU 2018:6) has 
been out for public consultation, and the Government promoted in April 2019 
proposals to the Stortinget (The Parliament) concerning changes in the law, 
including that the scope of the field would be expanded to include certain groups 
that are not workers, clarifications of key concepts, sharpening the employer's 
duties after receiving notice and introduction of objective liability for financial loss 
after retaliation. 
An association, the Zola Association (based on Emile Zola's defence of Dreyfus and 
famous article – J'accuse-) has since 1998 annually given the Zola prize to "people 
who openly and unafraid have uncovered or counterworked conditions that 
threaten human dignity, democracy and rule of law in Norway ", including many 
whistle-blowers. 
11.10.6 Romania 
Through law of 14 December 2004, No. 571, have been regulated some measures 
for the protection of persons who have complained or noticed violations of the law 
within the public authorities, public institutions and other units, committed by 
persons with management or execution functions in the authorities, public 
institutions and other budgetary units. (Parlamentul României, 2004). 
The warning had to be made in respect of any act that involves a violation of the 
law, professional ethics or principles of good administration, efficiency, 
effectiveness, economics and transparency.  
We have to note that the law covers only the worker from the public sector and 
not those from private sector. The general principles refer more to corruption facts 
or offenses against the financial interests of the European Communities or public 
institutes.   
The protection of whistle-blower refers to: 
• The presumption of good faith, until proven otherwise; 
• In case of a disciplinary inquiry for a whistle-blower, the inquiry 
commissions should invite the press and a representative of the union; 
• Identity protection if the denounced is a direct or an indirect manager or 
he have control or evaluation tasks for the whistle-blower. 
11.10.7 Portugal 
Currently, Portugal only provides partial protection to whistle-blowers from 
specific sectors of economic activity (e.g., financial services) or certain categories 
of employees (e.g., civil servants). 
The law no. 19/2008 of 21st April, that set out measures to combat corruption is 
the only one that explicitly specifies provisions concerning the protection of 
whistle-blowers. However, this law only refers to offences in general terms, failing 
in specifying which ones are included. On the other hand, as this law addresses 
measures to combat corruption, it can be inferred that the offences should be 
related to corruption and alike. So, if the term corruption is used here in its broad 
sense, besides the legal and criminal sense, it may also include abuse of power, 
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damaging management, financial participation in a business, money laundering, 
embezzlement, unfair advantage or influence peddling. In this context, it can be 
assumed that the option by the term ‘offences’ in the law is a deliberate decision 
of the legislator to encompass a wide range of crimes related with the corruption 
world. In addition, the legislator option by a generic term (‘offences’) may also 
include any type of irregularities that the employee may be aware of by having 
access to the information through the exercise of his employment, profession or 
duties. By way of example, this includes criminal offences such as tax-related ones, 
prevarication or even sexual abuse committed by an employee’s colleague or a 
hierarchical superior, as well as administrative offences, such as labour or 
environmental infractions. 
In all situations mentioned, the denunciation can cause damages to the whistle-
blower, including disciplinary action up to dismissal, as well as when the infraction 
is an offence of passive corruption, in which the denunciation would deserve the 
same type of protection. Although it is the most appropriate understanding to 
reach a wide and effective protection of the whistle-blowers, this is not the 
solution provided for by the law no. 19/2008 of 21st April. (J.A.A. de Matos Ramos, 
2018). 
11.10.8 United States of America 
As far we know at this moment, the history of whistle-blower protection in USA 
started on July 30, 1778, when the Continental Congress, enacted by “unanimous 
consent”, America’s first whistle-blower protection law (Snowden, 2019). The law 
declared that “is a duty of all person in the service of the United States, as well as 
all other inhabitants thereof, to give the earliest information to Congress or any 
other proper authority of any misconduct, frauds, or misdemeanors committed by 
any officers or persons in the service of these states, which may come to their 
knowledge”.        
The United States has an ambiguous policy towards whistle-blowers. Famous 
whistle-blowers have been prosecuted and jailed like Chelsea Manning112, and yet 
there is a US law since 1989, the Dr. Chris Kirkpatrick Whistle-blower Protection 
Act113 (GPO, 1989). This law protects federal government employees from 
                                                                
112 Chelsea Manning (born Bradley Manning) is a former United States Army soldier. She was convicted 
by court-martial in 2013 of violations of the Espionage Act and other offenses, after disclosing to 
WikiLeaks nearly 750,000 classified, or unclassified but sensitive, military and diplomatic documents. 
She was imprisoned between 2010 and 2017. 
retaliatory action for voluntarily disclosing information about dishonest or illegal 
activities occurring in a government organization. This text reinforces the 
protection of US public service agents if they denounce activity of their 
administration, in violation with laws or regulations. The law was completed in 
2007 and allows federal agents to submit evidence of violation of the law, heavy 
waste of public money, abuse of authority, danger to health or public safety. There 
are restrictions to this law. The law does not apply neither to employees of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), neither to employees of the Federal Police, 
nor to employees of the National Security Agency (NSA). It was again amended in 
2017 with the aim of providing greater whistle-blower protections for Federal 
employees, increased awareness of Federal whistle-blower protections, and 
increased accountability and required discipline for Federal supervisors who 
retaliate against whistle-blowers. 
On the other hand, if a person works in a company that is fraudulent to the 
American tax authority, he (she) is strongly encouraged to launch the alert, to 
denounce his(her) employer. The US tax office promises informants up to 30% of 
the amounts recovered through their information. 
In private companies, the protection is often less effective than for federal agents. 
When whistle-blowers lodge complaints against their employer reprisals, the legal 
proceedings are often slow and inefficient. 
11.10.9 Remarks on Protection of Whistle -Blowers 
Legislations protecting whistle -blowers are recent. Their goals is mainly to ensure 
transparency and to fight against corruption and embezzlement of (public) funds. 
Many conditions must be met to be considered a whistle-blower and, therefore, 
"protected". 
Moreover, with regard to the European Directive, it is not clear to what extent it 
conflicts with the Directive (EU) 2016/943 (June 2016) which deals with the 
protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) 
against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure. Indeed, information 
113 Chris Kirkpatrick was a Department of Veterans Affairs psychologist and whistle-blower who 
committed suicide by gun on July 2009, he was fired from the Tomah Veterans Affairs Medical Centre in 
Tomah (Wisconsin). Previously, he complained about overmedicating patients at the facility. 
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revealed by a whistle-blower can be claimed as "sensitive" information by the 
incriminated institution. 
Despite legal protection of whistle-blowers, it is possible to inflict damage to the 
reputation of individuals and organisations that serve the goal of feedback and 
foresight. 
Recent research suggests that the proportion of whistle-blowers exposed to 
reprisals and retaliation is increasing — despite more or less explicit law 
protection. And although whistleblowing can happen via multiple channels, which 
has a positive effect on the scope of whistleblowing, the vast majority of whistle-
blowers reports internally and to the immediate leader. Only about 2% of the 
whistle-blower notices to the supervisory authority as the first step. 
Furthermore, the protection of whistle-blowers can be thwarted as long as their 
positive contribution in security (of citizens and of industrial processes). For 
example, some academics (e.g. Amalberti, 2013) question the role of whistle-
blowers, and in particular the one played in detecting weak signals, arguing that 
alerts are probably more useful to the social positions of those who raise them 
than to the risk analysis itself. 
Heroes or villains? 
The role of whistle-blowers as adversary opponents to a consensus perception of 
what went right is frequently submitted to framing, blaming and shaming of the 
individual whistle-blower. Killing the messenger remains a persistent tradition 
after the Greek example of Laocoon. 
In our times, this blaming, shaming and framing may even create an inverse 
picturing of the actual role and function of safety investigation agencies (Wilson 
and Straker 2018). In the movie ‘Sully” on the ditching of UA 1549 in the Hudson 
river, the director Clint Eastwood transformed the role of the NTSB into the role of 
villain. Despite of the proof of the contrary, given by both the NTSB report on case 
UA 1549 and Sullenberger in his book "Highest Duty: My search for what really 
matters". In the movie, the NTSB was portrayed as discrediting the role of captain 
‘Sully’ Sullenberger: Sullenberger, meanwhile was portrayed as the All-American 
Hero in saving the lives of the crew and passengers of flight UA 1549. The NTSB 
was chosen to serve the role of villain. Both the professional pilot community and 
the general public raised doubts about the integrity and credibility of this US 
governmental organisation. As a consequence of such portraying as villain, the 
reputation of the NTSB as an independent and blame free safety assessor was 
jeopardized. (Wilson and Straker 2018). 
In the realm of safety, namely occupational safety, two administrative measures 
would help in protecting the whistle-blowers and possibly to alleviate some of the 
prejudice burden associated to them. The first one would be based on a 
communication channel/reporting system that would enable any employee to 
report (anonymously or not) a safety observation, intended to correct, improve or 
eliminate a potentially dangerous or harmful situation related to the health and 
safety at work. In this context, safety observation means a communication tool 
available to all employees and subcontractors to report hazards or to propose 
safety recommendations in the workplace. The system would then analyse the 
safety observations submitted and propose the adequate actions, whenever 
appropriate. Publicizing internally all the safety observations received and the 
measures adopted for each one, would demonstrate that any opinion is important 
and motivate others to participate. The second measure, especially targeted for 
large-sized enterprises, would include the appointment of a safety ombudsman, in 
line with the ethics ombudsman figure already available in some of them. The 
safety ombudsman would be committed to fully respecting, amongst others, the 
health and safety principles at work and convey through the appropriate channels, 
complaints reported by employees and subcontractors. Alternatively, this role 
could also be played by the ethics ombudsman, with the advantage that besides 
the issues related to health and safety at work, all the other issues would also be 
reported to just one person. 
11.11 Conclusion 
In industry, it turns out that listening to whistle-blowers is a way to detect major 
degradation of safety level and, so, potentially to prevent major events. Also, 
middle and minor safety related unwanted events or intended events (social 
security) may be prevented or consequences reduced. 
In that sense, listening to whistle-blowers must be an integral part of safety and / 
or citizens protection processes. Nevertheless, to listen to whistle-blowers does 
not mean to agree with them. However, listening to them should lead to open 
debates about industrial safety and its current and actual practices. Debates about 
safety could naturally, not to say mechanically, lead to an increase in safety 
because the organisation’s mindset would change. 
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Taking account of whistleblowing requires the adoption of a new paradigm: to see 
beyond quantitative approaches and to leave room for “alternative voices” and 
field expertise, which is one feature of highly reliable organisations (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2001)114. 
The solution goes through a bottom-up approach (i.e., decision-makers listening 
to the technical experts and front-line workers) to complement the top-down 
approach (i.e., decision-makers asking questions), recommended, for instance, by 
Conklin (2012). 
Whistle-blowers cannot be an official position, a box in the organization chart. To 
be a whistle-blower is a specific moment in a professional career. 
The entire safety burden cannot be carried by whistle-blowers. Listening to 
whistle-blowers seems a necessary but not sufficient condition for maintaining and 
increasing safety. Whistle-blowing must just be one (more) tool in the toolbox for 
prevention. Every sign or event, near-miss… must continue to be treated in order 
to increase safety. For instance, in the six months preceding the DC-10 airplane 
accident115, 1,000 incidents related to the cargo door were reported (it means 
about 10 incidents by DC-10 aircraft in service in the USA). It seems to “sign” a poor 
safety culture and safety flawed approaches in the aviation domain at that time 
So, it is not a big surprise that warning of Dan Applegate was lost in an “ocean of 
indifference”, not to say an “ocean of denial” to safety. The curse of Cassandra 
lives on. 
In the social domain, listening to whistle-blowers helps to fight against potential 
fraud and to be informed about malicious actions or misintentions of citizens or 
governments. They disclose information in the general interest, allow the 
prevention or the revelation of the flaws and dysfunctions of our States, our 
economies, our political and financial systems. In particular, their action has led to 
considerable progress in the fight against corruption. Their action has made it 
possible to disclose certain lies, be they lies of States or private companies, as well 
as certain breaches of privacy.  So, their role is very important for maintaining and 
improving democracy. 
In both cases, industry and civil society, protection of whistle-blowers is of utmost 
importance. 
                                                                
114 For differences between “reliability” and “safety”, see Llory and Dien, 2006. 
Analysing information provided by whistle-blowers should be part of Safety 
Management System, as a part of foresight for safety. 
Foresight is about reducing uncertainty and predicting future performance. New 
approaches, theories, technologies and notions are still open and their desirability, 
feasibility and applicability is still undetermined. Their functioning may be revealed 
during operations as "emergent" properties with unanticipated consequences. 
Whistle-blowers can be seen as a specific form of operational feedback and early 
warnings of future mishaps in the functioning of systems and sectors. 
Whistle-blowers - both individual and institutional - may serve three primary goals: 
• Provide subject matter expertise  
• Represent voices in a democratic participation process 
• Support a multiple (ethical) value driven adaptation process which should 
be practiced in the context of the system in which they are applied. 
Their functioning can be integrated in socio-technical systems at various levels of 
control. This integration could make the outsiders role of whistle-blowers obsolete 
and could reinstall their role as subject matter experts from within the system. 
Such a transition poses challenges on creating a shared repository of expertise, 
experiences and knowledge management, combining feedback and feed forward 
loops to design and operations of complex systems. As such, it may benefit 
foresight in safety by helping to identify early warnings of system degradation 
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12 Role of Technology in Foresight for Safety -
Technological potentials and challenges to enhance 
foresight in safety 
Zdenko Šimić, European Commission, Joint Research Centre (EC JRC), the 
Netherlands. 
Executive Summary 
This chapter identifies the major existing and emerging technologies relevant for 
foresight in safety, based on a systematic literature review. The chapter presents 
technologies, domains and applications in use to improve safety directly and by 
enabling the use of foresight. The review identifies potentials, limitations and 
difficulties associated with the application and the use of advanced technologies 
for enhancing safety and enabling foresight in safety. 
New technologies are mainly based on the availability of advanced sensors and 
growing computing power, communication bandwidth and storage capacity. These 
basic technologies are improving software and hardware solutions and allowing 
the use of more advanced technologies like computer aided hybrid development, 
real time modelling, advanced simulations and artificial intelligence.  
Technological advances are useful for all stages of the life cycle of safety related 
systems, i.e. design, verification, validation, production, testing, commissioning, 
operation, maintenance, emergency response and decommissioning. Improved 
designs assure system safety with an optimised use of resources.  
The use of realistic simulators for the training of operators increases both 
performance and safety.  
Monitoring and predictive diagnostics also improve availability and reduce the risk.  
The use of technology for enhancing safety and foresight is scalable and widely 
applicable to many domains (e.g. transportation, power generation, construction, 
process industry, etc.). Different applications allow for the optimisation without 
compromise in safety. Advanced risk modelling with big data analytics and 
knowledge management allows for the integration of foresight in safety with 
conventional approaches. Simulations and virtualisations are improving the 
design, operation, safety and planning, while creating more realistic accident 
management.  Improved realism, extended scope (with scenarios and time 
coverage) and easy use are together enabling foresight in safety.  
The role of technology in enabling foresight in safety is to complement 
conventional approaches with the wider consideration (including less likely events 
and scenarios for long-term time horizons) as well as with means for a wider 
participation.  
Some of the problems associated with the use of advanced technologies are 
related to the increased technical complexity and required connectivity. The 
problem with complexity is that software and digital instrumentation and control 
is more challenging to verify and validate. The necessary connectivity, wireless and 
over internet, increases both privacy and cyber security related risks.  
The potential benefits from the use of new and emerging advanced technologies 
are continuously increasing. This is especially important for safety related 
applications where optimisation should not compromise safety. Foresight in safety 
is easier to apply with advanced technological tools like modelling and simulations 
over the whole life cycle of the system. It is important to assure that these benefits 
are greater than the threats coming from the use of many new technologies.  
12.1 Introduction 
Modern life is more and more changing because of the ongoing and increasing 
digitalisation of the world. The change to society is mainly digital (new software 
and more powerful hardware) but it is also complemented with the development 
of novel and inexpensive sensors, networks and communication systems. When 
combined, these technologies enable connectivity and base for many new 
applications, i.e. wide band global communication systems, affordable remote 
data storage, global positioning system (GPS), cloud computing power and internet 
of things (IoT). The resulting development is generally improving everyday life, the 
economy and society as whole but is also causing serious unintended 
consequences and issues.  
The role of technology in safety and foresight is of special importance because 
technological advances can potentially influence safety related systems through all 
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stages of their life cycle. The design and operation of safety related systems can 
benefit significantly from technology, with a potential for continuous safety 
assurance through the application of advanced hardware and software solutions 
with optimised use of resources. A more integrated life cycle of safety related 
systems allows for example the use of advanced risk assessment modelling and the 
easier inclusion of complementary foresight thinking.  
A specific example of a framework for an integrated nuclear digital environment, 
in [1] illustrates the potentials. The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (DRR) 2015-2030, on the other hand, emphasises the general use of 
science and technology, Error! Reference source not found.. 
This chapter portrays a systematic review, which aims to identify major existing 
and emerging technologies with tangible potential safety benefits applicable to 
different life cycle phases (i.e. design, verification, validation, production, testing, 
commissioning, operation, maintenance, emergency response and 
decommissioning) of various systems.  
The goal is also to identify domains of application and to provide typical examples 
of potential safety benefits emphasising the relevance for foresight in safety.  
New technologies, while solving many problems, also introduce new challenges 
related to the use and safety (e.g. with unintended consequences). This duality 
raises many questions about the optimal development, regulation and 
implementation of new technologies.  
The relevance of new technologies for the foresight in safety will be measured by 
how the conventional approach to safety can be extended and enhanced in 
relation to the inclusion of less likely and long-term scenarios proposed by a 
multidisciplinary team.  
Foresight in safety can potentially greatly benefit from different new technologies 
(e.g. advanced simulations, visualisations and virtualisations). It is important to 
note that the development, use and valorisation of new technologies could also 
benefit from the foresight thinking and approaches.  
The chapter is organised in the following way: the first section describes the 
approach and the scope of this systematic review; the following section presents 
findings and discussion; final section contains the concluding remarks.  
 
Life cycle where technologies for foresight in safety are used 
The role of technology is key for foresight in safety during all phases and 
related systems’ activities – concept development, design, production, 
commissioning, operation, and decommissioning; validation, verification, 
testing, monitoring, education and training. 
12.2 Approach 
The role of technology in safety and foresight is inherently connected to both the 
use of technology in general and to the safety related systems specifically. This 
results in many different safety applications and related approaches to the 
development and use of regulations. Learning about the safety related use of 
technology and understanding the value of numerous applications in many 
different domains is a significant challenge.  
A literature review was selected as an approach to define the systematic multi-
domain role of technology in safety and foresight. Considering the author's 
background and the specific importance of safety the review is more focused on 
nuclear power. Many other fields are also included in an effort to make the review 
more comprehensive and to illustrate the generic value of many technologies that 
are useful for safety and foresight. Similar examples from different domains are 
used in order to illustrate common approaches and solutions. Reviewing different 
domains is also valuable in identifying different issues and potential limitations. 
Google Scholar (scholar.google.com/intl/en/scholar/about.html) online search 
tool was used to access a list of related literature. The tool gives simple and flexible 
open access to most comprehensive cross-domain literature databases. 
References from many disciplines and sources are included, i.e. journal articles, 
theses and books from academic publishers and other online repositories like 
societies, universities and libraries. Google Scholar ranks articles based on the 
content, the publisher, the authors and the citation. The location of documents (in 
publishers and other repositories) and different versions are also available. Based 
on some estimates Google Scholar is the most comprehensive academic search 
engine with 389 million records [3]. 
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Performing a literature search with Google Scholar is as easy as doing a regular 
web search with additional special functionalities. The search for chosen key words 
can be applied for selecting a time range. Search results contain a total number of 
references ordered based on the relevance. Every reference contains a number 
and the access to the searchable list of cited by articles. Additionally, search results 
provide a list of related articles.  This is all web browser based and conveniently 
hyperlinked. With a Google account, it is possible to save interesting references. 
The search for this chapter was made mostly for recent years, with only a few 
exceptions for some domains, in order to capture the broader development. The 
initial search was made with the key-words "technology" and "safety". Based on 
the titles and an abstract review the most relevant references were selected from 
the list as pointers for a further, more refined search and review. Over 100 papers 
were initially selected for further review. The selected references were then 
grouped in domains including "miscellaneous". A special group was related to 
"issues" from all domains.  
The findings from this review are presented in the next section covering six 
dimensions as follows: domains where these general technologies are used; 
general groups of available technologies; list of specific applications; identified 
parts of life-cycle with related activities where technologies are used; technologies 
especially related and useful for the foresight in safety; identified issues related to 
preventing use of technologies or issues with potential to introduce new safety 
problems.  
The selection and review are representative for the role of technology in safety 
and foresight. However, this is far from the most representative or comprehensive 
review considering rapid developments, as well as the number of domains and 
applications.  
Domains where technologies for foresight in safety are used 
Technology is used for safety and foresight everywhere: transport, power 
generation, medicine, construction, mining, military, industry, food, 
meteorology, security, communication, internet, research & 
development, smart cities, disasters risk reduction and society in general. 
                                                                
116 These numbers were derived using Dimensions online tool (www.dimensions.ai/). This resource is 
similarly big to Google Scholar with a functionality for generating yearly statistics of publications.  
12.3 Findings and discussion  
The present findings about the role of technology in safety and foresight are based 
on the more detailed review of 60 references. The presentation is divided into 
three subsections. The first subsection presents the fundamental technologies 
with example applications in different domains. The second subsection presents 
the major issues related to safety and foresight from the use of technologies. The 
final subsection covers the role of technology in foresight for safety.  
The total yearly number of English articles resulting from the search of the term 
“technology safety”116 has increased  to the point that it doubled during the last 
ten years to over 300 thousands in 2019. This illustrates the increasing importance 
of technology for safety. The yearly number of publications including the term 
“safety foresight” is steady over time at about five thousands (and it is similar when 
the term “technology” is added).  Perhaps this is an indication of a constant, if not 
strong, interest for the foresight in safety.   
12.3.1 Findings about the role of technology in safety and foresight 
The role of technology in safety and foresight is reviewed through examples from 
literature in nuclear power and several other domains. The findings are presented 
as short explanations of the technology used, the specific application, the part of 
the life-cycle in which it is used and how it contributes to the foresight in safety. 
Applications are usually combining several technologies and the grouping of 
technologies selected in this review emphasises the role of computing power and 
software.   
 
Technologies useful for foresight in safety 
Computing power, software, cloud computing, sensors, laser scanning, 
radars, machine learning, artificial intelligence, smartphones, social 
networks, internet, internet of things, global positioning system, 
geographic information system, virtual reality, augmented reality, 3D 
printing, big data analytics, knowledge management and blockchain. 
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12.3.1.1 Computing power and advanced software 
Computing power is an enabling factor for many other technologies and 
applications, e.g. safer and affordable design needs the fastest possible computing 
in order to explore numerous alternatives and test them against multiple hazards. 
A nuclear power plant (NPP) design, for instance, requires both the highest level 
of safety and economic competiveness. High performing computing with advanced 
modelling and simulation is necessary to include multi-physics "core simulation" 
(e.g. radiation transport, thermal-hydraulics, corrosion chemistry, etc.), which 
requires algorithms for robust numerical solutions and uncertainty quantification 
[4]. The access to enormous computing is significantly improved with so-called 
cloud computing. Significant and affordable computing power enables the 
application of many other technologies including advanced software technologies.  
Advanced software consists of algorithms and the necessary hardware. The 
hardware is usually a combination of high computing power, sensors and some 
other peripherals. Several advanced software technologies are presented here, 
both specific (i.e. simulators, building information modelling and virtual and 
augmented realities) and general (i.e. visualisation and knowledge management).  
Plant simulators are proven tools allowing for a better training of operators of 
complex systems like airplanes, NPPs and process plants, [5]. Methods for 
designing a human system interface evolve together with the development of 
technologies and include more than just an improved user interface, [6]. 
Simulators improve in two different directions in order to make them fully realistic 
and affordable. So-called full-scale simulators can not only present the full 
operational characteristics of the plant but also the accident conditions and the 
development of related scenarios, [7]. Simplified simulators can run on a single 
personal computer and still represent most of the plant operation, including 
emergency conditions. This improves both the education and training of plant 
engineers and operators, [8]. Plant simulators enable foresight in safety with a 
wider involvement and engagement of staff and stakeholders for the evaluation of 
different plant conditions and for testing various what-if conditions.   
Virtual and augmented realities (VR and AR) are the most advanced software 
developments with the potential to improve education, training and operation. 
Both VR and AR could be applied independently or combined with other 
technologies like simulations. For instance  [9] and [10] suggest a virtual 
environment and simulation as means to improve the safety during both the work 
and the decommissioning of an NPP. In [11] the use of augmented reality is 
evaluated for safety signs in the working environment. The use of AR for 
generating safety awareness and enhancing emergency response for construction, 
earthquakes and driving is reviewed in [12]. VR and AR have a potential similar to 
plant simulators (and especially in combination with simulators) for enabling 
foresight in safety with a wider participation and the consideration of less probable 
plant conditions. 
Visualisation and multimedia are demonstrated to be beneficial, for example in the 
construction industry (e.g improved safety management and training, hazards 
identification, monitoring and warnings, [13]), and hospitals (e.g. preventing 
surgery mistakes, [14]). The Building information modelling (BIM) framework is 
used in construction design, implementation and operation for different domains 
(e.g. for nuclear [1] and general waste [15]) and many applications like 
construction risk management [16] and fire protection [17]). BIM is also used for 
the planning and building of the first high-level radioactive waste final disposal 
facility by Posiva in Finland, [18]. The risk management potentials for BIM are 
further enhanced with ontology and web semantic technologies, [19]. Visualisation 
and multimedia enable foresight in safety by allowing a wider participation and 
safety deliberation. BIM is therefore important for foresight in safety because it 
enables a long time consideration.  
Knowledge management (KM) is increasingly important for complex systems 
during the whole life cycle. KM has the potential to improve the safety economy 
with a better design and efficient operation and decommissioning, with a better 
use of accumulated knowledge and experience, [20]. Successful KM relies on many 
building blocks like information systems, databases, collaborative networking, 
expert systems, ontologies, web semantics and organizational culture. KM enables 
foresight in safety by allowing a wider involvement and consideration of greater 
operating experience (i.e. from other plants and industries, including less 
significant events).  
Computing and software related technologies do not always depend on high 
computing power or sophisticated solutions. Novel approaches and advanced 
algorithms solutions could result in safety improvement like in the central control 
of trains to avoid rear-end collisions in [21]. However, the computing power and 
the software needed to design and test these solutions are still necessary.  
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Applications of technologies useful for foresight in safety 
Technologies applications for foresight in safety: optimised design without 
safety compromise; enhanced validation and verification; 
virtual/augmented experience for better design, operation and 
emergency planning; improved and effective education, training, 
operation and maintenance. 
 
12.3.1.2 Sensors, internet, communication, “big data” and artificial intelligence 
Sensors are (essential) components required for an efficient and safe operation 
(they are critical e.g. for avoiding dangerous situations and for reducing unwanted 
consequences). The requirements for sensors (like precision, speed, robustness, 
connectivity, energy consumption and cost) depend on the domain and 
application. One example in security checking for explosives, where both speed 
and sensitivity are required, is the use of thermo-desorption mass spectrometry, 
[22]. Further examples are the use of hyperspectral imaging technique for 
automated non-destructive analysis and assessment applied to a wide range of 
food products (for disease detection and quality control), reviewed in [23]. The 
values measured by sensors also depend on the software capabilities to interpret 
signals and diagnose conditions, and to predict developments. In [24] the use of a 
distributed equation and artificial immunity system is proposed for the online 
monitoring and prediction in condensate and feed water system of the NPP. 
Sensors enable foresight in safety by expanding the possibilities of collecting small 
signals. 
Internet, as a network of computers, sensors and people, has a growing potential 
for technologies and applications in many domains. Information about online 
search queries is useful for various applications, e.g. early detection of food related 
epidemics, [25]; perception and prediction of viral and other outbreaks, [26] and 
[27]. Together with sensor equipped devices like smartphones, this presents an 
additional potential for the use of technology to improve safety, e.g. monitoring 
health behaviour, [28]; managing construction, [29]; and for collision warning 
while driving, [30]. The traceability of (and thus the possibility to prove) the origin 
of safety parts could be solved with new software technology, like blockchain, by 
assuring the validity of records, [31]. Other technologies like cloud computing rely 
on the internet for accessibility and affordability. Internet and communication 
enhance foresight in safety by enabling wide and instant participation. 
Geographical information system (GIS) is useful for area integrated risk 
management like regional risk assessment in [32]. The optical, radar and other 
satellite data obtained with GIS are useful as a support for emergency response 
services for natural, technology and social related hazards, [33]. The disaster 
planning, warnings and response incorporate the use of social networking like 
tweets, [34]. The combined use of an increasing number of satellites could improve 
both the resolution and the responsiveness (i.e. to hours). Global positioning 
system (GPS) has many applications from industry to personal use and it is critical 
for real time use.  However commercially available resolution still limits some new 
applications, like autonomous driving, [35].  
Data from video and mobile sensors are useful for improving safety in many 
applications, like intersection monitoring for safety analysis, [36]. Wearable 
personal devices with biosensors (e.g. for hart beat, movement, sleep behaviour) 
are able to track physiology data that make health diagnostics and decisions about 
therapies easier, [37].  The accumulation of data from an increased number of 
sources presents an opportunity for a better understanding of complex systems 
and for providing new insights to safety science, [38].  
The analysis and interpretation of huge volumes of data ("big data") requires and 
enables the use of new techniques like machine learning (ML) and artificial 
intelligence (AI). Impressive recent AI results, surpassing humans in GO game and 
medical diagnostics, show huge promises. However, the limits and timescale for 
the development of the further potential of AI are not easy to predict. About 50% 
of the experts believe that high-level machine intelligence will be developed in the 
next 30 years and that superintelligence might be developed in the subsequent 30 
years, [39]. New AI applications like automatizing human work are increasingly 
available, e.g. restaurants food safety check and simple news writing, [40]. ML and 
AI enable foresight in safety by analysing all available data and by identifying 
important patterns that are hardly noticeable for humans. A wider participation in 
safety assessment is possible with user friendly tools based on ML and AI.  
Modern vehicles are increasingly equipped with safety technologies assisting 
drivers (e.g. automatic emergency braking, blind spot monitoring, road line 
support system, objects recognition). Fully autonomous vehicles could be 
commercially available in several years. Automated vehicles are result from the 
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implementation of leading edge technology solutions, including advanced sensors, 
computing power and edge AI, [41]. 
The number of technologies having the potential to enable foresight in safety is 
significant. Two more technologies are mentioned here to illustrate this growing 
and varied potential. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV, drones) are useful for 
numerous applications in remote monitoring (e.g. 3D radioactive contamination 
mapping, [42]). Eye movement recording and analysis allow experts like 
pathologists to learn and improve their diagnostics, [43]. Advanced 3D printing is 
used in many domains for the preparation of difficult tasks, for producing custom 
complex parts, and for education and training, e.g. in medicine [44].  
12.3.2 Issues with the use of technology for safety and foresight 
Some potentials and promises of new technologies for improving safety and 
enabling foresight need testing before wide adoption. This is necessary even for 
simple applications like material condition monitoring ([45]) and especially for 
complex solutions like digital control rooms (DCR), [46]. An example of DCRs show 
that the potential might be different for various domains depending on many 
elements like the implementation and the operators' age. For instance [46] 
documents potential side effects reducing the operators’ reliability in DCRs for 
NPPs.  
The verification and validation (V&V) for digital technologies is an open problem. 
While by nature digital technologies allow for realistic virtual testing, the existence 
of an immense number of possible states makes a full testing practically 
impossible. This is the case for example with the autonomous car [47] and with the 
nuclear digital instrumentation and control, [48]. Experience proves that hardware 
and software induced failures are inevitable in complex digital systems and this 
should always be factored into the design redundancy and the system’s recovery 
function, [49]. Completely new problems arise from the limited capability to 
provide for adequate reasoning and arguments for the results created by AI. A 
number of recommendations for the research and development prioritisation in 
the development of NPPs relates to the adaptation of digital technologies 
addressing V&V and other issues, [50]. 
The Internet and related social networks are both useful and cause many bad 
unintended consequences (e.g. effective dissemination of false information). The 
reliability of information is important for a better functioning society and especially 
during an emergency situation when it can have detrimental effects, as it was 
tragically illustrated during and after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, [51]. 
The possibility that online data are imperfect, incomplete and changing should be 
always considered, [52]. Human and AI based solutions are in development to help 
with this problem. However, the problem of information reliability is increasing 
and additionally complicated with other issues like free speech, who is provider, 
etc. 
While smartphones allow for easy communication and access to information, they 
are also a distraction for important activities like driving, and could be the cause of 
accidents, [53]. This is regulated in some countries and easy to identify through the 
availability of recording of activity by the smartphone before any accident.  
The cost limits the introduction of some technologies with proven benefits. Usually 
a wide use would make them affordable. The cost and potentials depend on many 
factors specific to each application, country or situation. E.g. the difference in 
perception of the so-called “value of prevented fatality” justifies the installation of 
commute bus crash avoidance systems in the U.S. but not in Colombia, [54].  
Cybersecurity is one of the major issues for many internet and wireless based 
technologies because a perfect protection is impossible without losing 
functionality, e.g. for autonomous vehicles [55]. Hacking is an increasing problem 
on the Internet and it might reduce the trust in some new technologies like various 
applications of IoT and AI, e.g. for autonomous vehicles and medical assistance 
devices, [56].  
 
Issues with the use of technologies for safety 
Use of technology for safety and foresight in safety has number of issues: 
cost, complexity; verification & validation; faster change cycles; cyber 
security; disinformation; distraction; proved benefits; privacy; AI 
explained. 
 
Solutions for the issues mentioned are not trivial and will require continuous 
development. For some of these issues the solution is technology itself, either 
already built in (e.g. communication for UAV collisions, [57]) or complemented 
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with other solutions (e.g. documenting scientific software for nuclear safety 
applications, [58]). Another part of the solution is learning by doing (e.g. for health 
information technology, [59]) after accepting a new technology with simple criteria 
in order to prove that it is at least as good as the technology already in use. Some 
issues with a new technology will require the development of new methods which 
will help to prevent unwanted consequences, e.g. for detecting promoted social 
media campaigns, [60].  
12.3.3 Discussion about the role of technology in safety and foresight 
The examples of the current and potential benefits from the use of technologies 
presented in this review demonstrate their usefulness for the whole life cycle of 
various safety related systems. The potential for the role of technology in 
improving safety seems is vast. Technology is beneficial for more efficient and safer 
operation. Advanced technologies enable foresight in safety in all three 
dimensions: plausibility, scope and inclusiveness. Enhanced analytical capabilities 
enable the consideration of less probable events and scenarios. Affordable 
advanced simulations allow for the consideration of long-term developments. The 
Internet, big data analytics and visualisation make it feasible for more actors to 
participate and to include the views and assumptions of non-experts’ in the 
considerations.    
 
Use of technologies for foresight in safety, examples: 
Foresight in safety use of technology examples: improving the 
participation, the scope and the realism of safety analysis and related 
simulations; continuous improvements based on data, simulations and a 
wider participation; prompt and appropriate accident management based 
on the improved assessment and a wide participation; designing faster 
and better emergency response, based on the realistic assessment and a 
wide participation to minimise consequences and prevent societal 
disruptions; use of simulations and a wider participation to improve 
accident prevention and emergency preparedness. 
 
Technology enables and improves foresight in safety with an extended scope of 
assessment, a long-term consideration and a wider participation. Some examples 
of how technology improves foresight in safety are the improved analysis and 
simulations to identify and anticipate safety issues; implementing adaptive 
maintenance to prevent failures; enabling continuous safety improvements with 
operating data assessment; assuring accident prevention with timely preparation 
and appropriate response; helping prompt and appropriate accident management 
with real time assessment; supporting faster and better emergency response with 
appropriate organisation and communication, [61]; improving learning from 
accident investigation; preventing societal disruptions with proper 
communication. 
12.4 Conclusions 
A systematic literature review provided many examples of technology used for 
improving safety and enabling foresight in safety. The numerous examples 
presented in this chapter demonstrate how various technologies, both individually 
and combined, could improve the safety and enable foresight in safety.  
Many benefits are already in realised while some benefits are still in development.  
The role of technology in enabling foresight in safety is to complement the 
conventional approaches with the consideration of a more extensive scope 
(including less likely events and considering scenarios for long-term horizons) as 
well as with means for a wider participation.  
There are also issues caused by complexity and too fast introduction of new 
technology without sufficient regulation. Some of these issues (related to design 
and testing) can be solved by using advanced technologies, while others (related 
to safety assessment) require further intrinsic development. These issues will 
require the solution of specialists, but they also depend on the regulation, on the 
users’ participation and on the change of perception.  
The adaptation of new technologies might improve by accepting relative criteria in 
respect to existing technology, i.e. by keeping the same safety requirements for 
new technologies as it is applied for current technology, and by adopting a 
“learning while doing” approach with a demonstrated minimum initial safety level.  
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13.1 Executive summary 
Safety authorities and regulators have a unique role in governance, which provides 
them with specific opportunities to generate and disseminate foresight. From the 
viewpoint of safety, this means foresight concerning risks from accidents and other 
deviations from safety. This chapter describes some daily activities of safety 
authorities and discusses the current and potential future possibilities of 
authorities to provide foresight during these activities. We concentrate here on 
those authorities that work in the field of safety, especially industrial safety, 
including safety investigation agencies. Parts of the discussion also apply to public 
organizations who aid authorities in some sectors. 
Authorities working in the field of safety in different countries have different 
mandates, structures and cultures. This means that their perspective may be 
somewhat different. In case of an accident, some authorities have the 
responsibility to find out whether there were any violations of laws or regulations 
and whether there is reason to fine or prosecute, while others have no mandate 
to investigate issues of responsibility, but rather to find the root causes of the 
accident and ways to prevent similar occurrences in the future. Despite these 
differences in mode of operation, all safety authorities have the common 
endeavour of working towards a safer future. 
Foresight is gained through the authorities’ numerous contacts with other actors 
in the field of safety. Multi-level cooperation produces insight in various safety 
areas, which may then be communicated to the sectors, areas or fields that are 
under the authority’s supervision. The discussions between actors that follow this 
communication produce foresight that e.g. companies can use to maintain and 
enhance the safety of its personnel, process and products. 
13.2 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the role of regulatory bodies working in the field of safety, 
and the authorities’ potential in developing and using foresight – for instance by 
identifying emerging threats to safety and early warning signs of an accident – and 
sharing this foresight with interested parties such as industry, other authorities 
and the general public.  
An authority or a regulatory body or can be a public entity or a government agency 
at a sub-national, national or supranational level that has a mandate established 
by a specific legal act or acts. Such a body typically aims to protect stakeholders in 
a given sector by supervising that they follow given norms and procedures. 
Examples are: 
• Sub-national level: Transport Scotland aims to deliver a safe and 
sustainable transport system for the people of Scotland guided by the 
Waverley Railway Act; 
• National level: Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (Tukes) supervises 
the safety and reliability of products, services and industrial activities in 
Finland, enforcing e.g. the Act on the Safe Handling and Storage of 
Dangerous Chemicals; 
• Supra-national level: European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) provides 
scientific advice to protect consumers, animals and the environment from 
food-related risks under Regulation 178/2002. 
With the aim of accident prevention and safety promotion, one of the tasks of 
safety authorities is to detect and communicate early warning signs. Traditionally 
authorities have carried out analyses of past accidents in order to learn from them. 
Lessons learned are shared with companies and the public to give insight of risks 
that are present in their activities and to verify that these risks are managed in an 
acceptable manner. Using accident-related hindsight, authorities and other 
regulatory bodies can gain insight and enhance various areas, such as legislation, 
guidelines and inspection practices. 
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Safety authorities have wide-ranging cooperation in different ways with numerous 
other actors that work in the field of safety: standardization organizations, 
academia, research institutions, and unions, for instance. Some of these 
stakeholders are listed in table 1.  
Table 1: Cooperation network of regulators 
Stakeholders Regulators interact with many stakeholders 
Governmental 
organizations 
Local, regional authorities; Military; Supranational 
authorities (EU institutions); Standardization 
organizations; Academia and research institutions 
Social and political 
organizations 




Companies; Unions; Parties active in advancement of 
technology 
 
In some countries, such as the United Kingdom, Singapore and The Netherlands, a 
shift towards strategic foresight has been observed, attempting to cut across the 
traditional segmentation of problems and their allocation to specific organizations 
or departments (Habegger, 2010). These countries have realized that focusing on 
a single issue at a time makes dealing with emerging threats very difficult. Due to 
the interconnectedness between social, political, economic, environmental and 
technological sectors, a multi-disciplinary approach in looking at risks through 
foresight creates increasing margins for improving preparedness and resilience 
towards identifying weak signals and risk scenarios. Thus, the work done by 
authorities can become more anticipatory rather than reactive in approach. It can 
be seen that a posteriori methods are insufficient in capturing weak signals to alert 
companies on time to better prepare themselves for possible adverse effects.  
Given their position and role in the governance of risks, authorities are well 
positioned to identify general industry-wide or societal trends that are likely to 
lead to safety degradations in the future. They are notified of incidents and can 
undertake trend analysis. They can observe the evolutions of external constraints 
                                                                
117For instance, the regulatory framework timeline of EASA on this issue extends into 2023.  
(economic conditions, trends in the societal acceptance of specific hazards…) and 
anticipate their impact. Some examples of this in recent years: 
• The rapid increase in the popularity and technical capabilities of civilian 
drones poses increasing challenges to air traffic control. Regulators in the 
EU, USA, and other countries are working to change regulations 
concerning the use of civilian drones to reduce the risk of collisions with 
general aviation traffic (Cracknell, 2017), and to improve both detection 
capabilities and enforcement of zoning regulations, including developing 
drone destroying capabilities117.  
• The increased availability of high-power laser pointers poses significant 
hazards for general aviation pilots (airplanes, helicopters), with many 
cases of pilots being blinded by pointers during airport approach. 
Regulators may be able to identify a trend in these new forms of threats 
and work with airlines to find risk mitigation strategies.  
• The chemical industry has seen a trend to reduce the quantities of 
hazardous materials stored on site, following inherent safety principles. 
This leads to an increase in the transport of hazardous materials, with 
consequences for safety of road/rail transport that can be anticipated by 
authorities. Such effects of new trends can and should be identified early 
on to avoid unintended consequences.  
• Electric scooters have become more and more popular, also with adults 
in their daily movements. This may mitigate air pollution in big cities, but 
the scooter speeds of 25-30 km/h cause new problem areas that should 
be taken into account in e.g. appointed areas to use scooters, traffic rules 
and accident insurance. 
13.3 Types of foresight-enabling activities 
13.3.1 Foresight possibilities during daily work. 
In order to be effective in carrying out foresight within a safety authority, it is 
essential to have foresight-enabling activities in place during daily work. This would 
build and strengthen a foresight looking culture that would help stakeholders 
become anticipatory in managing safety. Foresight should promote thinking about 
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and visualising future alternative scenarios, whilst engaging stakeholders to 
actively work together to debate the future and contribute to shaping it118.  
When carrying out daily work there are various activities that could enable 
foresight culture in safety authorities: 
• Setting up and sustaining a systematic knowledge base. As there are many 
forms of knowledge storage (emails, forum discussions, social media 
exchanges, local and shared drives, cloud, working groups, experts, etc.), 
having one reference point can be beneficial. Depending on the topics 
that need to be monitored, stakeholders should co-design processes to 
systematically capture, index, store, curate, analyse, visualise, apply and 
disseminate knowledge (old and new; tacit and explicit). Building a 
knowledge management culture is a necessary component to enable a 
foresight culture. 
• Building a systematic data analytics capability. By having analytical 
processes in place to systematically understand the past, i.e. what 
happened (descriptive analytics); to gain the insight on why it happened 
(diagnostic analytics) and what will happen (predictive analytics) [see also 
Chapter 10], safety authorities would routinely be able to detect trends, 
patterns and emerging change. This insight generation process would 
foster informed decision making and increase foresight capacity of an 
organisation. 
• Encouraging organisational learning. When a safety authority motivates a 
systematic implementation of knowledge management processes within 
its organisation, knowledge is embedded into its organisational 
processes. This way the organisation builds its continuous learning 
capacity (in terms of practices and behaviours) whilst achieving its 
corporate objectives. In other words, organisational learning is a 
sustainable way to improve knowledge utilisation. Building a lessons 
learning culture is a necessary component to enable a foresight culture. 
• Reducing learning barriers. Safety authorities should bring stakeholders 
together to regularly identify learning barriers and find ways to overcome 
them. This will help foster organisational learning. Addressing this will 
enable a foresight culture. 
                                                                
118 http://www.foresight-platform.eu/community/forlearn/what-is-foresight/ 
• Putting more emphasis on organisational factors in the development of 
early warning signs. [see also Chapter 8.] Safety authorities often read 
lessons learned reports. It can be observed that such documents tend to 
focus on more technical causes and lessons learned. These result in the 
development of more technical-oriented indicators that help identify 
early warning signs instead of organisational-oriented ones. However, 
when reading such reports, it can be observed that there are underlying 
organisational factors that have not been explicitly communicated. Focus 
on the latter will help increase capacity to capture more tacit knowledge. 
• Promoting inclusive multi-stakeholder and multi-disciplinary teams. 
When a strategic foresight related issue needs to be addressed, safety 
authorities should, as a habit, include in this process many stakeholders 
from various disciplines. Doing this regularly would ensure a more 
effective design of a foresight strategy and action plan, thanks to dialectic 
debate and inclusion of different perspectives. 
13.3.2 Inspections and site visits 
Authorities can adopt different strategies when interacting with regulated 
organisations such as operating companies, ranging from a “policeman” attitude 
which is focussed on identifying gaps between practices on a site and the 
regulatory requirements, to an “advisor” role which involves discussion with 
operating companies on how to interpret the regulatory requirements and 
strategies to attain compliance and improve safety even further. In the academic 
literature, this differentiation in attitude depending on what inspectors perceive 
of the motivation of the operating company is called responsive regulation (Ayres 
& Braithwaite 1982). When operating in an advisory role, which leads to richer 
interactions between inspectors and companies, inspectors are more likely to 
generate foresight than by operating in a “policeman” role.  
Inspectors can help the operating companies identify where procedures, tools and 
systems could be improved. The challenge for regulators is to aid the company to 
improve its foresight capacity. As an example, the inspector can look at the 
elements of the company’s training program as training employees in hazard 
identification and reporting will lead to better insight of the safety status, 
discussions of risks and needs to improve, and through these, foresight. 
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Safety authorities can identify the fact that the technology on a site is lagging far 
behind the state of the art and suggest or mandate changes. Regulations that are 
expressed as obligations to implement best available technologies when possible 
help make this approach systematic. However, new obligations are bounded by a 
legal framework and the objective of avoiding adding unnecessary burden.  
Safety authorities can audit/inspect the systems in place in operating companies 
for handling events and detecting warning signals and the organizational and 
cultural features that are known to be necessary for a learning culture and a 
mindful organization. For example, they may be able to detect underreporting of 
significant events by talking with front-line workers about the incidents they 
experience and the accidents that they remember, and to compare these with the 
formal record contained in the company’s experience feedback database. 
Authorities help generate foresight when they distribute to e.g. small and medium-
sized enterprises good safety practices, information of identified risks and other 
safety aspects they have identified during inspections to pioneering companies. 
In some cases, where for different systems (aviation, railway, maritime), same 
regulation stipulates the condition for medical and psychological examination for 
employees with responsibility in safety traffic (e.g. Romania), the safety and 
investigation authorities should cooperate and exchange information if an 
accident occurred having as cause or as contributing factor, an issue relating with 
the provision of that regulation. 
13.3.3 Feedback to legislation 
The activities safety authorities and regulators perform have a strong link to 
legislation. Regulators and other safety authorities may have a mandate to write, 
monitor, support or update the legislation and associated regulations. Outdated 
regulations are sometimes a contributing factor in large accidents, where new 
technologies on the market are not covered by existing regulations and are used 
without sufficient thought concerning the safety design and related impacts. An 
example is provided by the fire at Grenfell Tower (London) which caused multiple 
fatalities in 2017. Companies involved in the refurbishment of the building used 
combustible building materials which were not specifically covered by existing 
building codes. (Grenfell Tower Inquiry, n.d.) 
“Policy development often lags well behind technological advances” (Lee, 2019). 
By working with legislators in a proactive manner, safety authorities can help 
minimize the temporal lag between the appearance of new risks and the 
development of appropriate regulations.  
Likewise, regulatory bodies need foresight to minimize the lag between societal 
changes and legislation required to protect society and the environment. For 
instance, increasing life expectancy is likely to lead to increases in the retirement 
age in most countries, and to the presence of older workers in the workplace. This 
change may require modifications to labour laws and related ergonomics 
standards, for example to account for physical differences, and to government 
support for lifelong learning programmes.  
As soon as a new scientific invention reaches the regulatory bodies, they should be 
working towards getting that into legislation. There should be certain specific 
groups that focus on anticipating new innovations, designing processes that inject 
new knowledge into legislation in a timely manner (horizon scanning). 
13.3.4 Market surveillance 
Market surveillance done by regulators is targeted at e.g. products that are on the 
market and available to consumers, product documentation, markings and labels 
on products, and procedures for demonstrating compliance. Surveillance can be 
either risk-based or based on random selection. Regulators aim to find and check 
products with the greatest safety risks as they are only able to check a small 
proportion of all the products that are on the market. 
The authorities have insight through EU cooperation concerning safety-related 
events, and they can use it to help companies improve foresight. In early 2019, the 
Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency carried out a survey on the safety of so-called 
escape rooms — a popular game for kids and adults —based on a dramatic 
accident that had occurred in Poland. As a result, Finnish escape room operators 
significantly improved customers’ ability to leave the room in case of a real 
emergency (Tukes 2019). 
The authorities may also use the insight they have to inform consumers to make 
safer choices — and to gain the needed foresight to do this: In a project called “At 
your own risk” (Tukes 2018/1) numerous Finnish authorities and other 
organizations worked together to inform consumers of the responsibility and risks 
they take when purchasing products from outside the EU regulatory framework. 
In this project in 2018, e.g. the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency tested 
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products it had ordered online from countries outside the EU. Only 1 out of 32 
products fulfilled European requirements (Tukes 2018/2).  
13.3.5 Accident database management 
National and local authorities often maintain accident and incident databases. 
Through these databases the authorities can monitor the level of safety on a larger 
scale and identify trends or e.g. new issues that raise concern. As different safety 
and investigation authorities have different mandates, their accident (incident, 
near miss) databases, knowledge and knowhow complement each other. Through 
accident-related information exchange the authorities can obtain a better view of 
the situation as a whole. Additionally, with the rise of open data, big data and 
related methods, existing information can be combined to produce new 
information that the authorities and others can use to help companies gain 
foresight to identify emerging problem areas and prepare for new risks.  
International databases contain information about risks identified in other 
countries, and/or different activities (systems) making it possible for the 
authorities and others to learn from major incidents that have already been 
realized elsewhere. 
When they run an incident database, the regulator is well placed to identify rare 
events. For example, the icing threat on certain types of pitot tubes that was a 
causal factor in the AF447 Rio-Paris crash had been detected by EASA prior to the 
crash. EASA had not yet decided to mandate a change to the equipment, but some 
airlines had decided to replace the pitot tubes by another model which was 
thought to be less susceptible to high-altitude icing. In the case of the affected 
aircraft, Air France was in the process of replacing the pitot tubes, but the change 
had not yet been implemented on that specific aircraft (BEA 2012). 
Some European databases that are utilized widely include: 
• The European Commission has established a Clearinghouse for collecting 
and analysing operating experience from nuclear power plants in order to 
provide feedback for EU regulators to improve nuclear safety 
(https://clearinghouse-oef.jrc.ec.europa.eu/). 
• The European Commission maintains the Major Accident Reporting 
System (eMARS), houses lessons learned reports of chemical accidents 
and near misses from EU, EEA, OECD, and UNECE countries. eMARS event 
reporting by EU Seveso Competent Authorities is mandatory. 
(https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu) 
• The French Ministry of Environment/General Directorate for Risk 
Prevention developed the Analysis, Research and Information on 
Accidents (ARIA) database, which contains   
(https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/the-barpi/the-aria-
database/?lang=en 
• The German database Zentrale Melde- und Auswertestelle für Störfälle 
und Störungen in verfahrenstechnischen Anlagen (ZEMA) contains annual 
reports of all events which must be reported to the authorities pursuant 
to the 12th Federal Emissions Control Ordinance.  
(https://www.infosis.uba.de/index.php/en/index.html) 
• Even smaller countries with less resources are able to develop a simple 
database. This is illustrated by the Belgian Database “Lessons of 




13.3.6 Horizon scanning and adversarial approaches 
Given their position and role in the governance of risks, safety authorities are well 
positioned to identify general industry-wide or societal trends that are likely to 
lead to safety degradations in the future. They may be able to detect signs of 
practical drift or normalization of deviance (Vaughan 1996) through their 
interactions with companies, thanks to their “outsider” view and their mandate to 
provide a critical analysis. Indeed, authorities typically work with a range of 
company roles within high-hazard industry sectors, as well as with representatives 
of civil society (local government officials, members of local communities). 
Authorities are notified of safety-related incidents, participate in audits and 
investigations, and can undertake trend analysis. They can observe the evolutions 
of external constraints (economic conditions, trends in the societal acceptance of 
specific hazards…) and anticipate their impact.  
The following points illustrate horizon scanning and adversarial activities that can 
be undertaken by authorities and other organizations: 
• Brainstorming sessions amongst inspectors after an accident or near miss 
to come up with a list of questions to ask that may enable to identify 
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establishments with similar root causes and problems. These discussions 
can be enriched by operational experience feedback data, and can help 
to identify potential pathways to an accident (scenario-based approach) 
that have not yet been identified. These could be the basis for the 
development of lagging indicators. 
• Brainstorming sessions amongst inspectors to come up with a list of 
leading indicators. 
• Implement “red team” type exercises with volunteer firms. These 
adversarial exercises, developed in the military planning sector, consist of 
establishing two teams, a “red” team which searches for “holes” in the 
organization’s defences and event sequences that can lead to an accident, 
and a “blue” team which is responsible for defence (Bloomfield & Whaley 
1963). These exercises actively challenge an operating firm's beliefs and 
the assumptions underlying its risk analyses, and can help reduce 
complacency. A well-known example of this practice is the stress tests 
used by financial regulators to ensure that banks and insurance 
companies have sufficient capital reserves to deal with extreme events119. 
A similar approach is taken to review the safety of nuclear power plants 
in Europe with stress tests defined and organized at the EU level after the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident. This included self-reporting on defined 
questions from national regulatory bodies and independent public expert 
review and conclusions. 
With this information, authorities are in a position to: 
• Provide additional guidance to operating companies, warning them of 
emerging risks and potential preventive actions. An example of this 
activity is provided by the UK Health and Safety Executive’s annual 
Foresight reports (UK HSE 2018). 
• Update their inspection checklists to integrate new threat types. 
• Suggest changes to regulations that can be made by the legislator. 
13.3.7 Insights from research, other organizations and the industry 
Efforts to improve risk governance exist in all domains (e.g. transportation, process 
and the food industry) where modern government tries to reduce cost and assure 
                                                                
119These stress tests are run by the European Banking Authority in collaboration with the European 
Systemic Risk Board, the European Central Bank and the European Commission.  
safety and benefits. Risk governance approaches and experience from different 
domains contains universally useful values for improving regulatory efficiencies 
and foresight (IRGC, 2017). This cross-domain exchanges could be useful for 
different elements of regulatory framework, i.e. to improve policy, legislation, 
enforcement, inspections, experience feedback practice and foresight. Broadly, 
there are three sources of risk regulation experience from different domains 
potentially useful to improve risk governance and achieve social and 
environmental goals, i.e.: 1) research; 2) international organizations; and 3) similar 
hazardous industries (IAEA 2020). 
Research about risk governance (policy development, implementation and 
regulatory process) exists in all domains and its results could be universally 
valuable. The value of research could go from developing approaches to evaluate 
regulatory efficiency to identification of best practices to improve specific 
regulatory features and include evaluation of the regulatory framework designs. 
Regulatory efficiency could be measured by assessing costs and benefits of 
regulation which could be useful for deciding about introducing specific regulatory 
requirements or selecting alternative approaches, e.g. Robinson at. al. 2008. It is 
important but also challenging to measure efficiency and effectiveness of 
regulation with interconnected impact of co-existing regulatory features, e.g.: 
communication, consultation, consistency, flexibility, independence, 
accountability and transparency (Berg, 2001). Identifying and explaining best 
practice can help improve regulatory efficiency. 
Comparison of regulatory framework designs can contribute to improved 
regulatory decision making. Different regulatory designs aim to enforce 
compliance and to improve efficiency from collaboration with regulated 
organisations. Systematic empirical research into the applicability and 
effectiveness of different regulatory types for different problems and under 
different conditions is lacking (NASEM, 2018). 
International organizations like OECD and the European Commission (EC) are 
facilitating risk governance experience exchanges from different domains. The EC 
has organized workshops with regulatory experts from different domains, e.g. 
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shipping, aviation and nuclear industry (EC 2008). This kind of activity presents 
opportunity for exchange of applicable best cross cutting regulatory practices. 
OECD facilitates exchanges between many different regulatory domains in order 
to improve policy and governance. The OECD Council on Regulatory Policy and 
Governance published recommendations and tools for effective and efficient 
regulatory policy, governance and management (OECD 2012). Another OECD 
report provides guidance on improving regulatory enforcement and inspections 
with examples of good practices and principles, i.e.: evidence-based enforcement, 
selectivity, risk focus and proportionality, responsiveness, long-term vision, 
transparency, information integration, fairness, compliance promotion, and 
professionalism (OECD 2014). The OECD has also developed indicators of 
regulatory policy and governance covering three principles (stakeholder 
engagement, regulatory impact assessment and ex-post evaluation) and providing 
a baseline measurement to track status and progress120.  
More specific experience and more directly applicable insights are coming from 
domains (industries) which share some similarities. The governance of safety in all 
hazardous industry could produce experience and insights applicable in other 
domains. This could include all different aspects from regulatory organization and 
activities to specific technical and human. Findings from investigations of major 
accidents in other hazardous industries should be included within the scope of 
experience feedback. The role of the regulator was assessed e.g. for offshore 
safety following the Macondo disaster (Weaver, 2014). Novel activities from 
regulators in other hazardous industries could be considered for adoption and as 
a source for improvements. For example, process industry regulators from 
different EU countries organized mutual joint inspections in order to exchange 
insights and best practice (Wood, 2014).  
Risk governance experience insights from different industries, especially high 
hazard ones, are potentially universally applicable and should be regularly 
reviewed. Existing activities and available information from different industries 
could help risk governance in many segments (from policy development, through 
implementation, and regulatory process) including foresight. There are however 
many challenges to fully utilizing all these potential opportunities related to the 
applicability of findings, uncertainties of results, and the need for additional 
                                                                
120Indicators are available online for 2015 and 2018 at www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/indicators-
regulatory-policy-and-governance.htm. 
resources. International organizations like the OECD and EC are providing 
arrangements to identify, scrutinize and disseminate such cross domains risk 
governance experience. 
13.4 Conditions for success 
13.4.1 Authorities working with companies 
Compared with the classical operating mode of many safety regulators, which is 
primarily focused on verifying compliance with prescriptive requirements and 
investigating incidents and accidents, the adoption of foresight-informed 
approaches often involves changes to the way in which the authorities operate and 
interact with regulated organisations, legislators and the public. This foresight-
informed regulatory approach also requires the development of new 
competencies for the authorities’ staff. 
To increase foresight, authorities will need to adopt a cooperative relationship 
with operating companies, advising and working in collaboration towards safety, 
rather than a relationship focussed on enforcement alone. This requires the 
development of trust, openness and positive collaboration, all features which 
cannot be imposed but rather which develop with sustained effort over time. Both 
actors need to foster a constructive and open safety environment where early 
warning signs can be identified and dealt with in a transparent and efficient 
manner. Here the safety culture of the regulatory organization also plays a role 
(NEA 2016).  
Effective foresight development also requires specific skills and competencies for 
the inspectors and other regulatory personnel, such as the ability to anticipate 
risks, knowledge of methods such as scenario development and horizon scanning, 
and communication skills. Maintaining and developing these competencies 
requires specific attention at the organizational level. These competencies are 
easier to develop in authorities which maintain specialist expertise in the areas 
they are overseeing, rather than delegating part of their supervisory authority to 
industry personnel (delegation of this type by the US aviation regulator has been 
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heavily criticized after the Boeing 737 Max disasters in 2018 and 2019). Also the 
interface between the company and the regulatory body should be developed. 
Regulators must follow up on their recommendations to ensure that they are 
implemented within an appropriate timeframe. Otherwise, companies may omit 
to implement recommendations, as for example at BP Texas City, where OSHA had 
identified a number of safety management deficiencies during various inspections 
but did not enforce their recommendations (CSB 2007, page 20). 
It is important to note that the role of regulators in generating and disseminating 
foresight is not necessarily positive: if a regulatory body is excessively conservative, 
and does not work towards modernizing legislation, the regulatory framework and 
inspection practices, if the regulatory body promotes an outdated view that 
equates safety with compliance (minimum demands fulfilled), it may constitute an 
obstacle to foresight activities within companies, by preventing the 
implementation of novel technologies and organizational strategies. 
13.4.2 Companies working with authorities  
Between the authority and the company it supervises there should be regular 
discussion and follow-ups of lessons learned, with a focus on near misses. The 
questions addressed in these discussions should also be discussed inside the 
company. 
• What could have been done to prevent this near miss: at individual, 
organizational, corporate level? 
• What can we monitor (which indicators) on a regular basis to ensure that 
we could anticipate and prevent such an incident from occurring? 
• Who are the key actors to ensure that such a process is designed, with an 
integrated follow-up mechanism? 
Once indicators have been identified, encouraging all actors (company, inspectors, 
and other stakeholders) to continuous learning: 
• ensure awareness on this issue (continuous culture building and follow-
up of its effectiveness); 
• know what to effectively do when such EWS are detected for continuous 
knowledge building to ensure long-lasting imprinting. 
Regular discussions and follow-ups of possible scenarios (e.g., known unknowns 
and unknown unknowns) is a useful exercise to make people aware that these 
types of events can occur and discussions such as these increase collective 
knowledge and awareness about the establishment. Thus, a positive environment 
for an “early warning sign detection” culture. 
13.5 Conclusions 
Authorities have a unique role in the governance of safety, which provides them 
with opportunities to generate and disseminate foresight. Authorities are able to 
identify trends and new threats to safety due to their ability to have: integrated 
view of the status of regulated activities; collect and review events that occur in a 
large number of companies; and to observe interactions with a multitude of other 
actors (such as research organisations, unions, citizens and other relevant 
authorities). Safety authorities have channels that help disseminate foresight and 
lead to changes in safety management both within companies and at the 
regulatory level. 
Safety authorities can produce and disseminate foresight through their 
interactions with actors at different system levels and in different industry sectors, 
as a part of many different activities such as inspections, events’ trend analysis, 
work on regulations, market surveillance, and more currently, horizon scanning 
and adversarial exercises. 
From hindsight to insight to foresight: learning from the past, combined with 
multidimensional analyses assists in looking into the future and identifying the 
possible roads to follow. The possible obstacles on those roads will lead to new 
viewing angles to identify both existing and emerging risks. Here the role of the 
safety authority is that of a facilitator and enabler: when the viewpoint of foresight 
is included in the regulator’s daily activities, the discussions between the 
authorities and the organisations it interacts with will generate new possibilities to 
maintain and improve safety. 
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Conclusion 
ESReDA Project Group on ‘Foresight in Safety’121  
This conclusion sets out the key messages of the ESReDA Project Group on 
Foresight in Safety. Please note that each of the other thirteen chapters has its 
own conclusions.  
Overview 
The ESReDA Project Group on Foresight in Safety (“the Project Group”) is a diverse 
team of researchers and practitioners. Safety is a multidisciplinary field, and works 
by exchanging different visions and approaches. The context of foresight in safety 
is ably summarised in Figure 2.1 of Rasmussen and Svedung (2000)122. Although 
multidisciplinary, some of the knowledge in the field of safety arises from the 
efforts of researchers working in their own discipline. That means that pretty well 
everyone else working in the field is either integrating this knowledge, or applying 
it, or both. Against this background, the Project Group has asked how the concept 
of foresight applies in safety and what challenges exist.  
The word ‘foresight’ is not new in safety, but neither is it settled. In fact, the 
connotations of the word are evolving and contended. Since Roman times, the 
concept of foresight has been used in law to decide matters of blame and causation 
after harm has occurred. Those legal cases focus on whether the event was itself 
foreseeable and whether enough effort went into foreseeing it and avoiding it. 
Although commonplace, foresight resists exact definition or description as a 
function or capacity. Nevertheless, knowledge can still be shared about the 
conditions that govern safety foresight and the processes that achieve it.  
Collating the Project Group’s key messages brought to mind a quotation from 
Santayana123. The first sentence is very familiar: “Those who cannot remember the 
past are condemned to repeat it”. The quotation continues, “In a moving world 
                                                                
121 The conclusion has been prepared by John Kingston, Ana-Lisa Vetere Arellano and Yves Dien on behalf 
of the project group. 
122 Rasmussen J. Svedung, I (2000); Proactive Risk Management in a Dynamic Society, Swedish Rescue 
Services Agency. (https://www.msb.se/RibData/Filer/pdf/16252.pdf#page=10 – Retrieved on July16, 
2020) 
readaptation is the price of longevity…” and that our institutions must give “birth 
to a generation plastic to the contemporary world and able to retain its lessons” 
(Santayana, 1905).  
Foresight: Dynamic, Not Static 
Foresight is a projection based on our knowledge and beliefs at a given moment. 
But, new data or further reflection may well change the possibilities we foresee. It 
is usual to have less knowledge when committing to a particular design or policy, 
than later when the results of our decisions unfold. By shoring-up our provisional 
arrangements in the light of new information, we can mitigate the paradox of 
‘learning later’ but having to ‘commit now’. The principle for foresight is to remain 
skeptical and critical, permanently ready to update our models and challenge 
assumptions. But this principle and the related mindset is costly and it is not 
without its practical challenges. 
Change is a basic concept in safety and unites all its branches (process safety, 
occupational safety, etc.). The concept can be found in textbooks and programme 
reports from the 1960s to the present day. At its simplest, safety sees any change 
as ‘the mother of twins: progress and trouble’ (Johnson, 1980124). Foresight is used 
to keep an eye on, and head-off when necessary, the troublesome twin. However, 
by the 1970s, the rapid rate of technological change was recognised as a new 
phenomenon in its own right, and our old tools of foresight seemed inadequate. 
By the 1980s, it was recognised that when change is discontinuous, previous 
technological precedents may be irrelevant to foresight or even misleading. All 
these views remain current, and have implications for the practice of foresight in 
safety. 
Foreseeing accidents and trouble from incremental change is more retrospective; 
whereas radical, discontinuous change relies more on creative, prospective 
foresight. Examples of the latter include ‘gene driving’ technology that forces 
genetically engineered changes in individual organisms to be expressed with high 
123 Santayana, G. (1905) The Life of Reason. [online: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15000/15000-
h/15000-h.htm]  
124 Johnson, W.G. (1980) MORT Safety Assurance Systems, Edited by Marcel Dekker, Inc. 
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likelihood in subsequent generations. Another is the difference of chemical 
properties between regular and nano particle sizes. For instance, nano gold is a 
poison, whereas regular gold is biologically almost inactive. Foresight of radical or 
disruptive change is challenging, even more so when changes interact. In many 
areas, notably technology, it is increasingly unsafe to assume that the near future 
will be an extension of the past. There is a pressing need to enable foresight in such 
systems. 
In areas characterised by rapid or discontinuous change, foresight can be blinded 
when technology and organisation are seen in isolation. Within safety, the term 
‘socio-technical’ has almost become a cliché: often used, but superficial and patchy 
in its application. In practice, however, technology and organisation appear often 
to be managed, researched and educated, as two separate domains. This 
separation creates a void in foresight, which needs to be open to the safety 
consequences revealed by both perspectives and their interaction. The challenge 
of rapid and discontinuous change requires the ‘sociotechnical view’ to be 
refreshed, as Rasmussen and Svedung called for twenty years ago. An example of 
an approach that does this is the ESReDA Cube model125. 
In summary, foresight in safety:   
● is a continuous process, because knowledge and systems continually 
change; 
● has difficulties seeing possibilities created by radical, discontinuous 
change; 
● integrates the social and the technical knowledge of systems at every 
level; 
● is applied skepticism. 
                                                                
125 The ESReDA Cube is a conceptual model focused on the “learning from accident” process. It 
represents learning as a three dimensional space taking account of “what needs to be learned”, “who 
should learn” and “how it is learned”. The Cube was developed by ESReDA Project Group “Dynamic 
Learning as the Follow-up from Accident Investigation”. This document can be found at 
Foresight: A Multi-Actor Activity 
We take it as axiomatic that foresight about safety improves when several 
perspectives are shared and debated by different actors. However, there are 
multiple challenges. Mostly, these stem from the messy reality of foresight activity 
in the practical world. Foresight is as much an issue of agency, structure, power 
and influence, as it is a function of expert knowledge, experience and method. This 
is true both of organisations and society in general. For all these challenges there 
are solutions, but only if we recognise that there is a need for them. 
Within foresight in safety, as in risk management generally, the ‘stakeholder’ 
concept is increasingly recognised as relevant. A stakeholder is, according to 
Freeman (2010), ‘…any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the 
achievement of a corporation’s purpose’ 126. Stakeholders can be within the risk-
owning organisation or outside of it, but Freeman’s definition implies that 
stakeholders are within the overall system.  
Where the corporate capacity for foresight is at stake, appearances of consensus 
are deceptive. Within organisations it is usual for individuals and groups to have a 
range of different opinions about future possibilities. An organisation is not a 
“monolithic whole”. Within an organisation different visions coexist concerning 
the way the "system" is working, its level of safety, and unsafe functioning or 
unsafe acts. By the same token, except in the simplest cases, foresight cannot be 
monolithic.  However, organisations invariably adopt single positions on matters, 
albeit hedged with contingencies. This practice is pragmatic and expedient; it 
allows the organisation to make progress, to get on with providing its services. 
Foresight, in contrast, is more like a competition between individual visions of the 
future than a common denominator of these visions. Furthermore, the best 
informed vision is not necessarily always the winner, because influence and power 
also count in the competition of ideas. 
Therefore, the apparent consensus in an organisation's risk assessments and policy 
documents needs to be treated with caution. Specific risk analyses and policies will 
https://esreda.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ESReDA-dynamic-learning-case-studies-180315-
1.pdf  
126 Which is defined here as “…any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the 
achievement of a corporation’s purpose”. Freeman, R.E. (2010). Strategic Management: A Stakeholder 
Approach. Cambridge University Press.] 
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be based on facts known with different levels of confidence. Some of the facts will 
be indisputable, but not all of the facts. Yet, decisions and policies have to speak 
with one voice. However, what they say is the product of compromise and 
uncertainty rather than a ringing consensus about the meaning of immutable facts. 
Therefore, decisions and policies are invariably simplifications, and may become 
oversimplifications unless reviewed. The danger in such 'faux consensus' is that it 
lures senior decision-makers toward complacency, because it suggests that a 
matter is settled. In contrast, for the sake of foresight, the matter is best treated 
as a momentary stock-take in the continuous, diligent search for future 
possibilities. Foresight is now, based on the best knowledge today; not as we saw 
the matter yesterday. As well as evolving knowledge, stakeholders and situations 
change. This means that a single position can only be tenable in the short term. 
Organisations need to support foresight as a continuous exchange of perspectives, 
even dissenting views, within their communities. 
An assumption of the multi-actor view is that different actors can communicate 
and debate. If actors are to agree about foresight and early warning signs, there 
must be some measure of shared knowledge about how things work. In industrial 
safety, this usually means that actors share a level of technical knowledge of their 
organisation’s operations. For example, in asset management, a field related to 
safety, the relevant standard127 notes that shared technical knowledge helps top 
management make sound, well-supported decisions.  
Open debates favour safety, but very few actors will coincide on all points.  As 
mentioned, consensus about foresight and decisions is an ideal, but the path to it 
is paved as much by disagreement as agreement. In contrast, some organisations 
tend to treat disagreement as poor conduct. In general, to avoid being seen as 
trouble-makers, individuals will abandon defence of their viewpoint. Therefore, we 
should not be surprised when people speak out only after the accident they 
foresaw. It is not reasonable to expect heroism and self-sacrifice to be the safety 
backstop for cultures that discourage individuals from giving voice to foresight.  
                                                                
127 ISO 55000:2014, section 2.5.2. 
128 Hardin, R. (2002) Street-Level Epistemology and Democratic Participation. Estudio/Working Paper 
2002/178. http://www.march.es/ceacs/ingles/publicaciones/working/archivos/2002_178.pdf 
129 A recent illustration from the field of patient safety can be found in the report of the UK 
Independent Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Review. HMSO (2020) First Do No Harm: The 
Historically, we should discriminate between two groups of individuals who open 
up debates: as those individuals who warn against mishaps based on their 
professional judgement. First, mostly engineers who understand the design 
assumptions and limitations. Their judgement is often based on evidence but not 
always... Secondly, people who criticise the appearance of phenomena they do not 
fully comprehend or are only partially informed, but base their judgement on social 
media and ‘influencers’.The COVID 19 situation has demonstrated a public debate 
on social distancing, herd immunity and personal protective equipment. 
Position and qualifications are, however, not an infallible guide to who has valid 
foresight (the response to the Covid-19 crisis illustrates this, too). The reliability of 
knowledge has never been easy to assess, and it is increasingly challenging. As a 
source of of facts social media deserves caution, but so do claims of any kind, 
including those made in peer-reviewed journal articles. Furthermore, the 
characteristics of the knowledge underlying foresight varies with the context. 
Sometimes, the situation allows testable answers to black-and-white questions. 
But, at other times, our knowledge is far less categorical and the problems open-
ended. Describing the latter, Hardin (2002128) writes "In an economic theory, it 
makes sense to say that you know one thing and I know a contrary thing in some 
context. I might eventually come to realize that my knowledge is mistaken and 
therefore correct it, especially after hearing your defense of your contrary 
knowledge. But there is no role for a super-knower who can judge the truth of our 
positions. We are our own judges. If we wish to seek better knowledge, it is we who 
must decide from what agency or source to seek it". In safety, the situation often 
arises that risks created by one group are borne by a different group; pollution 
risks, for example. Often, the group exposed to the risk base their foresight on 
anecdotal observations and general knowledge. Through self-education and 
professional assistance, such groups arrive at a point where the content of their 
claims can no longer be dismissed129. 
Another issue is when views about what constitutes reliable knowledge are 
incommensurable. Although it can be said that ‘Everyone is entitled to his own 
opinion, but not his own facts’130, dispute about facts—and even what constitutes 
report of the Independent Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Review. [online at: 
https://www.immdsreview.org.uk/downloads/IMMDSReview_Web.pdf ] 
130 Attributed to Daniel Moynihan: https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Daniel_Patrick_Moynihan  
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a fact—is a recurring feature in contested foresight. As stated earlier, influence 
and power also count in the competition of ideas—but who wields the power is 
not always obvious, neither are differences of epistemology.  
We recognise that suppressing dissent and disagreement may sometimes blind the 
organisation’s foresight of credible future accidents. Therefore, as well as shared 
technical understanding, we need also to encourage, and not suppress, the 
expression of different views. We need to be able to disagree well131. As Espejo132 
points out, ‘a consensual domain is none other than the play of a particular set of 
interacting models’ (1989; 445-446). However, as suggested, in many 
organisations, the suppression of dissent (including self-censorship) is, 
unfortunately, normal. 
Order in society is sustained by various forces. However, one of the effects can be 
the discounting of views, even data, that do not fit with the current orthodoxy. 
Well-investigated accidents show that this riddles foresight with blind spots. A 
question for the practice of foresight is how to better tolerate and enfranchise 
dissident voices within our organisations and social structures. At present, the 
public record contains an ever-expanding file of whistleblowing cases showing that 
many organisations are immature in this respect. And outside of industrial safety, 
in the wider realm of social goods and social ills, the question is just as relevant. 
Although beyond the scope of this work, new models are appearing to support 
constructive debate and the decision-making authority of institutions. We note, 
for example, the operation of citizens assemblies in Ireland133 and elsewhere.   
Foresight requires flexible approaches to anticipate the ‘unthinkable’. 
Assumptions are constraints on the range of possibilities from which foresight 
proceeds. Constraints make foresight possible (in the unconstrained system, 
everything is possible!) but these assumptions will also rule-out some possibilities 
that may, in fact, be valid and worth thinking about. An investigator remarked of 
his own practice: “I must think the unthinkable even if I dismiss it on the basis of 
evidence’. At least think about it.”134 In all professions that contribute to safety, 
                                                                
131 Stephens, B. (2017). The dying art of disagreement. Keynote speech, 24 September 2017. The Lowy 
Institute. online: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/dying-art-disagreement. Accessed, 4 
June 2020. 
132 Espejo, R. (1989). A cybernetic method to study organisations. In: The viable system model: 
interpretations and applications of Stafford-Beer’s VSM. Edited by Espejo. R., and Harnden. R., John 
Wiley & Sons, Chichester.  
this self-honesty appears to be fundamental to extending foresight. We must try 
hard not to fool ourselves.  But there are various disincentives, such as our 
credibility in the eyes of one's peers, a desire to be seen as a team player, and a 
wish to avoid the discomfort of dissonance. 
The Project Group noted that the visualisation of hidden or weak signals has an 
important role in predicting possible incidents and accidents. The etymology of the 
word invites us to think about foresight as visions of the future. However, as the 
foregoing discussion makes clear, it is helpful to consider foresight more as a 
process in which stakeholders strive to communicate, debate and make change 
happen. It brings to mind the advice: “As visual metaphors never perfectly fit the 
target domain, they also trigger sense making and discussions about the risks and 
the shortcomings of the chosen metaphor. In this way they help to clarify risk 
understandings in groups by sparking lively debates” (Eppler and Aeschimann, 
2009; p82).135  
The term ‘multi-actor’ suggests humans, but technology has reached the point 
where we need to recognise that some actors are non-human. Big Data analytics 
is a relatively new paradigm; dating back to about 2010. Big Data analytics can 
improve predictive ability and generate safety-related foresight in a number of 
ways, helping to detect emerging safety threats. Big Data may be a means to 
identify early warning signs that would be missed by human observers. The 
technology shows promise, but at the same time generates new risks, for example 
the opacity of algorithms for non-expert users. It is perhaps too early to reach 
conclusions about the contribution of Big Data analytics to safety foresight. That 
said, the development of autonomous vehicles is processing prodigious quantities 
of data to shape the algorithms necessary. This may well become the definitive 
case study of foresight in safety through Big Data. People working in safety need 
to keep an eye on developments in Big Data and machine learning.  
Big Data holds the promise of extending safety foresight, but also of compromising 
it. The offer of powerful, objective prediction is a strong inducement to use the 
133 https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/previous-assemblies/citizens-assembly-2016-2018-/  
134 John Fitzgerald, quoted at https://www.basw.co.uk/resources/psw-magazine/psw-online/think-
unthinkable Accessed 2nd June 2020. 
135 Eppler, M.J; Aeschimann, M. (2009). A systematic framework for risk visualization in risk 
management and communication. Risk Management, Vol. 11, Iss. 2, (Apr 2009): 67-89 
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tools of Big Data. However, there is evidence136 that without careful governance 
these tools can further entrench social inequality and bias. Furthermore, for all 
their power, these systems will not be omniscient. This, coupled to their opacity, 
creates a challenge to safety assurance. Therefore, embracing Big Data, like many 
new technologies before it, places high stakes on both sides of the balance.  
Expertise is essential for foresight. Experts see warning signs in data, and foresee 
possibilities that are invisible to non-expert. However, how to qualify as an expert 
is an issue. Knowledge can be of different types, with some types being more often 
recognised as having the hallmark of expertise. For example, qualifications 
awarded by professional bodies and universities provide tangible evidence of 
expertise. In contrast, the extensive empirical knowledge of experienced 
individuals is less easily measured and may consequently be undervalued, or even 
discounted, as expertise. Furthermore, irrespective of their background, experts 
are unlikely to perform well in foresight tasks if they lack independence137. History 
is littered with examples of this kind of bias—scientific opinions about the link 
between tobacco smoking and cancer; and about the link between tetraethyl lead 
petrol additives and lead poisoning, to name just two. Foresight is a projection of 
expert knowledge, but expert knowledge is not an objective quantity. 
As noted earlier, memory is a critical aspect of foresight. A significant example of 
this is the recall by decision-makers of the futures foreseen by experts in earlier 
life-cycle phases. Of particular significance is foresight by designers, which informs 
their assumptions and design choices. These are too easily not communicated to 
actors later in the life cycle. The B737 MAX case illustrates this point: pilots missing 
crucial knowledge about the behaviour of technical systems138 that was well-
understood by designers. Another point here is that the technical system in 
question was a radical departure from the expectations of pilots; an instance of 
disruptive rather than derivative design. 
Experts are also needed to provide interpretive balance to safety metrics. There is 
a trend in many areas of safety towards monitoring through metrics. Measurement 
is to be applauded, but no matter how well-designed, the construction of metrics 
                                                                
136 An overview is provided by O’Neil, C. (2016) Weapons of Math Destruction. Pub. Crown. 
137 “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not 
understanding it.” Upton Sinclair (1994) “I, Candidate for Governor: And How I Got Licked”. University 
of California Press. 
138 The Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). 
requires various assumptions and simplifications. Useful though these data may 
be, they cannot be the whole truth; and treating them as such will blind foresight 
to other, valid interpretations. We should be alert to spurious objectivity in safety 
as in any field, and experts can provide countervailing voices. This is especially 
important if a measure is used as a target139 or key performance indicator.  
This being said, non-experts are especially useful for providing ‘out-of-the-box’ 
ideas, and are able to ask questions which are less influenced by expertise and 
bureaucratic fragmentation and professional norms.  
Within its multi-actor view of foresight in safety, the Project Group noted the 
importance of regulators. Who is a regulator and what is regulation, are both 
relevant questions? Regulators include statutory agencies: the enforcers of safety 
and environmental protection laws. However, regulation can also be seen more 
widely: as the operation of networked groups of stakeholders who support, or 
sanction, risk-owning entities in pursuit of safer products and activities 
(Braithwaite, 2017140). Foresight and regulation connect in many different ways: 
as a competence, as communication, and as an object for regulatory interventions. 
Regulators can generate and disseminate foresight through their interactions with 
actors at different system levels. The privileged access of enforcement agencies 
allows them to inform their foresight, to communicate it widely in industry and to 
renew legislation when new knowledge is obtained (e.g. the precautionary 
principle). The Project Group noted that the value that regulatory agencies can 
bring to safety foresight depends on a number of factors. In particular: close 
cooperation between operating companies and regulatory inspectors, (ii) regular 
discussion and follow-ups of lessons learned, with a focus on near misses, (iii) 
regular discussions and follow-ups of possible scenarios (iv) specific skills and 
competencies for the inspectors and other regulatory personnel, and (v) follow-up 
of recommendations by regulators. In addition to these five points, a basic 
assumption is that regulators can properly engage with risk owner’s models. This 
is not always possible. For example, a fundamental challenge to effective 
regulation, including self-regulation, is caused by the "black box" nature of many 
139 Goodhart’s law. 
140 Braithwaite, J. (2017) “Types of Responsiveness”. In: Drahos, P. (Ed.). Regulatory Theory: 
Foundations and applications. Acton ACT, Australia: ANU Press. Retrieved June 12, 2020, from 
www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1q1crtm  
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machine learning models. This inscrutability makes it difficult for risk owners to 
build and test mental models of system operation, for regulators to check the 
underlying assumptions and inner workings of the system, and for the legal system 
to inspect the logic underlying the model's predictions in case of an accident.  
In summary, foresight in safety: 
● is most acute when several perspectives are shared in a community; 
● is vulnerable to power imbalances between stakeholders; 
● depends on ready willingness to review past decisions and commitments; 
● is more efficient when stakeholders share operational knowledge; 
● requires stakeholders to be able to disagree well; 
● is more effective when dissenting voices are listened to—not necessarily 
agreed with—but taken into account and discussed; 
● may be helped by Big Data and machine learning, but could be hindered 
by it; 
● will vary between experts, even when all their views are valid; 
● can be blinded by metrics, especially when the metrics are used as targets; 
● is an example of the value that regulators can add to safety in cooperation 
with industry.  
Foresight: Memory and the Future 
Foresight of future unwanted possibilities involves making associations between 
monitoring data, mechanisms of failure, and preventative and mitigating actions. 
This knowledge is partly discovered by experience, but also created by imagining, 
modelling and theorising. For example, causal models can be created using 
incident scenarios. This allows the systems modelled to be modified, detection set-
up, and interventions planned.  
Well-investigated accidents tell us that loss of memory is a recurring root cause of 
disasters, and a vulnerability in many organisations. What needs to be 
remembered are monitoring data, safety performance indicators, mechanisms of 
failure, preventative and mitigating actions, and the causal models in which all 
these elements cohere.  
Organisational memory is likely to be vested in many different substrates, both 
human and non-human. Substrates include: the memories of the individuals who 
populate the organisation; the technology into which designers’ have encoded 
their foresight, and documentation of various sorts, in particular on processes. 
There is almost always scope to improve the reliability and capacity of these 
substrates for the sake of safe operations. 
When trying to avoid forgetting, it is tempting to equate memory with storage. We 
know a lot about storage and might prefer to put our effort into the things we 
understand best. However, all the storage in the world cannot deliver faultless 
memory or perfect foresight. Human memory is these days seen as a process 
rather than a store of facts. Similarly, foresight for safety assumes that 
organisational memory is a continuous process that integrates all the different 
substrates within the organisation. Therefore, as well as storage in databases, 
documents, people, and artefacts, we must attend to the whole process for the 
sake of foresight. 
Early Warning Signs have been a recurring concept in the Project Group’s 
deliberations. Foresight entails identifying the events and conditions that signal 
the increasing likelihood of an unwanted event. Before a thunderstorm, the 
gathering of black clouds and distant thunder are early warning signs. Seen this 
way, foresight links current knowledge to future possibilities. In the field of safety, 
early warning signs are crucial links in this chain.  
Knowledge of early warning signs and associated actions are what needs to be 
remembered in the organisation. Memory needs to store this knowledge reliably. 
Moreover, to be remembered, knowledge must also be encoded in the first 
instance, and retrieved at point of need. Encoding, storage and retrieval of this 
information can be made the subject of assurance. Knowing how to use this 
knowledge in different contexts and situations is a competence that is not trivial. 
Loss of memory is a critical failing in foresight. It means that early warning signs 
will go unheeded; we wait under the darkening sky and are surprised when 
lightning strikes. Theoretical models, such as the encoding-storage-retrieval model 
just mentioned, can inform ways to prevent this kind of forgetfulness. Moreover, 
to preserve its memory, industrial practice must recognise the effects of 
organisational ‘macro’ phenomena such as plant ageing and outsourcing. In 
addition, accidents themselves have value as stories. Stories are a means to revive 
memories of early warning signals and to remind about the seriousness of what 
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they presage. Rules alone seldom communicate the experiences that gave rise to 
them.  
In summary, foresight in safety 
● is a process closely related to memory; 
● depends on memory in general, and of early warning signs in particular; 
● is precarious, because organisational memory does not look after itself. 
Foresight and Risk Assessment 
In industries with complex operations, foresight has become almost synonymous 
with analytical risk assessment. However, foresight is also deeply implicated in the 
monitoring and review process that exist in parallel to risk assessment. The 
analytical approach to risk, developed in aerospace in the 1960s, was quickly 
adopted in the US military industrial complex, and spread globally and sectorally 
to most industries by the 1990s. Within that tradition, risk assessment is usually 
seen as comprising several sub-processes, including risk identification, risk analysis 
and risk evaluation.  
Foresight is closely associated with the risk identification step of risk assessment, 
although how closely depends on how one defines these terms. To some extent, 
risk identification is actuarial; it is informed by past failures and successes. 
However, risk identification—the foreseeing of possible futures—is also creative 
and relies heavily on the knowledge of the people involved, their imagination and 
the models they create. For that reason, risk identification is sometimes singled-
out as the least reliable part of the risk assessment process. Least reliable does not, 
however, equate to bad; it simply means that, all other things being equal, no two 
analyses of the same system will produce exactly the same risk model. This implies 
that there is room for discussion, and for humility, in even the most robust and 
meticulous risk analysis.  
To better capture risks, risk analysis approaches are needed that are more open to 
different worldviews and opinions. However, the qualitative roots of a risk analysis 
                                                                
141 Vesely, W.E., Goldberg, F.F., Roberts, N.H., and Haasl, D.F. (1981) Fault Tree Handbook. NUREG-
0492, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. [Online: 
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1007/ML100780465.pdf, accessed 12 June 2020] 
can sometimes be obscured by the complexity of quantitative evaluations made. 
For example, Vesely et al. point out in their classic handbook141 that a Fault Tree 
Analysis is “a qualitative model that can be evaluated quantitatively”. 
Quantification is often necessary, but it may create an impediment to the 
qualitative discussion and review that we have argued is essential to foresight in 
safety. We note the ISO standard on risk management142 emphasises that 
communication and consultation are intimately connected to the risk assessment 
process. How to make this communication work between technical people and lay 
people is one of the questions that workers in the field of safety continue to 
grapple with. Another is how to make opaque risk models discussible, a point made 
earlier in respect of Big Data and visualisation.  
In summary, foresight in safety: 
● is greatly informed through risk assessment, but not synonymous with it; 
● involves combining qualitative and quantitative knowledge—a challenge 
for communication and debate in the multi-actor arena; 
● has to be approached with humility, as despite all efforts there is always 
room for discussion and improvement. 
Foresight in Safety: A Wider Perspective  
Most of this chapter has been in the context of an organisation or within a sector. 
However, foresight with a wider perspective is necessary to avoid the shocks and 
embrace the opportunities that originate from beyond those boundaries.  The 
hallmarks of an international approach are, according to the Project Group, a 
global warning system (of early warning signs), a rapid and trustworthy 
information system, global decision-making procedures, necessary reserve 
capacity, and international cooperation to avoid global inequality in disaster 
management. The last COVID19 crisis can provide examples of successes and 
failures in that respect. 
We mentioned earlier how the rate of socio-technological change was recognised 
in the 1970s. Within safety, this challenge to foresight has driven innovation in 
142 British Standards Institute, 2018. BS ISO 31000:2018. Risk management — Guidelines. Geneva, 
Switzerland: International Organization for Standardization (ISO). 
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modelling and risk analysis. However, the changing safety landscape extends 
beyond these. To keep pace with rapidly evolving technological advancement, 
globalisation and demographics, diversity of worldviews and stakes, safety 
foresight requires a greater embrace of governance principles.  
Risk governance at all levels (in the sense of Rasmussen and Svedungs’ model) is 
significantly challenging. Foresight in safety is a subset of foresight in general. 
According to an online EU foresight guide,143 foresight is defined as “a systematic, 
participatory, future-intelligence-gathering and medium-to-long-term vision-
building process aimed at enabling present-day decisions and mobilizing joint 
actions. It can be envisaged as a triangle combining “Thinking the Future”, 
“Debating the Future” and “Shaping the Future”. Foresight is neither prophecy nor 
prediction. It does not aim to predict the future – to unveil it as if it were 
predetermined – but to help us build it. It invites us to consider the future”.   
The Project Group sees a need to incorporate foresight thinking into the classical 
risk management approach. The aim of the change is to bring about a more 
integrated way of thinking, debating and shaping the future. Part of this change 
would be for stakeholders to consciously incorporate megatrends when designing 
processes and making decisions. Megatrends are “large, social, economic, political, 
environmental or technological changes that are slow to form. Once in place, 
megatrends influence a wide range of activities, processes and perceptions, both 
in government and in society, possibly for decades”144.They are the underlying 
forces that drive trends that are observable now and will most likely have 
significant influence on the future145.  
The megatrends viewpoint allows foresight of the dynamic, unfolding nature of 
large, complex systems. At this scale, an iterative approach appears to be critical 
to foresight in safety. However, the field of safety has yet to rise to the 
methodological and sociotechnical challenges inherent in an iterative approach. 
This is starkly illustrated in major accidents, but also in everyday examples of the 
inflexible bureaucratic approach that characterises much of safety practice. The 
present authors endorse the value to foresight of managing details—such as by 
143 http://www.foresight-platform.eu/community/forlearn/ 
144 http://ssl.csg.org/Trends/Megatrends%20Definitions%20and%20Categories.pdf  
145 https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/foresight_en 
146 For example, see ‘normalisation of deviance’ as described by Vaughan, D. (1996). The Challenger 
Launch Decision. Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA, The University of Chicago Press. 
sophisticated record-keeping and cost-control—but note that these practices do 
not really acknowledge that complexity creates its own patterns. Therefore, the 
Project Group recognises a need to develop know-how and supporting tools to 
address the dynamically complex and evolving safety landscape with foresight 
thinking at all governance levels. In rising to this challenge, it goes without saying, 
perhaps, that advantage should be taken of new technologies to complement 
conventional approaches. 
The history of major accidents leads us to believe that vigilance for anomalies is 
critical to foresight. Once an anomaly is recognised as an early warning sign, and 
the connection made to future possibilities, there is usually time to act. Latent 
flaws can be uncovered and fixed. (And, on a good day, we’ll also ask “if this was 
wrong, what else should we be looking for”?). This kind of vigilance has many 
enemies, among them, production pressure, a changing workforce, plant ageing 
and inadequate monitoring146. However, we also note Turner’s point147 that risk 
management is based on beliefs, not certain knowledge. Overestimating the 
reliability of knowledge can cause us to overestimate the reliability and safety of 
the systems we create. In foresight, a modicum of doubt and humility should 
always be welcome and, when decisions are taken under pressure, a modicum of 
forgiveness in hindsight. This mindset is far from easy to sustain and its added 
value can only be appreciated from time to time and in the long run. 
Change management, education and learning offer opportunities to improve 
foresight in safety. This is in contrast to safety regimes based on compliance, 
control, deregulation and privatisation. The challenges are: to integrate change 
management in a broad, multidisciplinary management model; to stimulate the 
development of competence, flexibility, insight and responsibility instead of 
conventional education; and a culture of dynamic learning, instead of static, rule-
based training among all actors with safety responsibility, including safety 
professionals.  
147 Turner, B. (1978) Man-Made Disasters. Wykeham Publications. 
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In summary. Foresight in safety needs: 
● approaches designed to cope with radical and discontinuous change;
● to find ways that recognise complexity in systems;
● a global approach to collating and sharing data and knowledge;
● to embrace governance principles;
● to include wider megatrends in its imagination of future possibilities;
● to be unceasingly vigilant.
In closing, there is still a lot to learn within the foresight in safety landscape. This 
text is the continuation of a journey that started a few decades ago because of 
concerns about quality of accident databases, of accident investigations, of 
learning from accidents and foresight in safety. It is the Group’s mission to get 
acquainted with this complex and evolving landscape. Against this backdrop, 
members of this Project Group will take stock of what it has learned and start a 
new ESReDA Project Group on Risks, Knowledge and Management. This will 
continue to look at activities and disciplines related to risk assessment, 
identification of early warning signs and emerging risks, foresight, investigation of 
events and lessons learning, management of barriers and lines of defence, 
reliability, and change of policies and culture; however, it will focus on 
knowledge management aspects of these. And the learning odyssey continues... 
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